Hi,
On Fri, Jan 4, 2019 at 11:32 PM James Morse <james.mo...@arm.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Amit,
>
> On 18/12/2018 07:56, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote:
> > According to userspace settings, pointer authentication cpufeature
> > is enabled/disabled from guests.
>
> This reads like the guest is changing something in the host. Isn't this hiding
> the id-register values from the guest?
>
>
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
> > index 6af6c7d..ce6144a 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
> > @@ -1066,6 +1066,15 @@ static u64 read_id_reg(struct sys_reg_desc const *r,
> > bool raz)
> > kvm_debug("SVE unsupported for guests,
> > suppressing\n");
> >
> > val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT);
> > + } else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1) {
> > + const u64 ptrauth_mask = (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT) |
> > + (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT) |
> > + (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_SHIFT) |
> > + (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_SHIFT);
> > + if (!kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_allowed(vcpu)) {
> > + kvm_debug("ptrauth unsupported for guests,
> > suppressing\n");
> > + val &= ~ptrauth_mask;
> > + }
>
> I think this hunk should have been in the previous patch as otherwise its a
> bisection oddity.
>
> Could you merge this hunk with the previous patch, and move the mechanical
> bits
> that pass vcpu around to a prior preparatory patch.
Yes will do.
>
> (I'm still unsure if we need to hide this as a user-controlled policy)
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> James
//Amit
