Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics!

[Victor]

I've inteleaved my comments in the foliage of your commentary.
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Ralph Dumain" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2005 3:51
Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics!

Interleaved comments on further fragments of your post:

At 03:08 AM 5/28/2005 +0200, Oudeyis wrote:
..........
I see your not going to let me deal with the dogmatics of classical
materialism briefly.

The kernel of my argument is that in general, discourse segregated from
practice can only be theological, i.e. concerning articles of faith rather
than descriptions of demonstrable practice. I say in general, since
scientists usually discuss their findings with only minimal reference to 
the
practicalities that are the origins and ultimate objects of their work. 
This
is mostly a manifestation of the extreme division of labour that isolates
professional researchers from all but the immediate subjects of their 
work.
In any case, I've yet to see a monograph or article of a natural scientist
that presents his work as having universal significance. There are
exceptions to this rule such as Hawkins in physics and Dawkins in 
population
genetics, and the result is invariably utter nonsense. I'm referring here 
to
Hawkins conviction that unified field theory will provide an ultimate 
theory
of the physical world and to Dawkin's projection of the mechanics of
population genetics to the science of culture (memics and all that).

Science as the theory of practice is implicitly restricted in relevance to
the conditions of the moment (even when the problems it is designed to 
treat
are projected into the near or far future). The discoveries of this kind 
of
science are inevitably relevant only to the particular circumstances of
their production, and to the specific subjects of their focus and have no
claim as eternal truths.  Einstein, Newton and Galileo will never acquire
the sainthood of the revealers of final truths.  On the contrary, their
ideas will only remain significant so long as they are relevant to the
practices and technologies that we men need to perpetuate ourselves,
"ourselves" here meaning the entire complex of organic and inorganic
components of our individual and collective life activities.  Thus, 
science
as the theory of practice is an inherently revolutionary activity.

This is interesting as a vantage point, i.e. beginning from the scope of 
praxis and explaining why scientists can be blockheads when they venture 
beyond the specific praxis that enabled them to achieve what they did. 
But I find this approach more credible when it is re-routed back to 
objectivity.

Come again?

Discussion on the nature of being, on the substance of nature, and so on 
is
from the point of view of historical materialism no less restricted to the
conditions of its production than is practical science.  However, the
inherent object of such discussions is the determination of the absolute 
and
final nature of things at all places and in all times.  The ostensible
object of the advocates of such metaphysical finalities is the expression 
of
ultimate truths regarding the universe and its parts, the absolute
contradiction to the objects of practice and the science of practice.

Anyway, it is one thing to develop theories concerning particularities of
that grand everything we call nature, it's quite another to present
particular results as universals about the universe.  The former can be
demonstrated, proved if you will, the latter extends beyond all
possibilities of human experience, hence it can only be a product either 
of
divine revelation or of normative practice, i.e. ethos. I prefer ethos to
divine revelation.

I'm afraid I don't quite grasp this.  You are suggesting, I think, that 
general ontological pronouncements not tied to some current concerns of 
praxis become fruitless or even retrograde metaphysics.  I don't quite 
agree with this, but I do agree that these traditional philosophical 
concerns become more dynamic and fruitful when connected to specific 
problems of the present.

The utility of general ontological pronouncements is not in question. 
Undoubtedly they are useful otherwise they would never be made.  I'm arguing 
that ontological pronouncements are retrograde metaphysics and bad science.
..........
> I think you're right.  The question then is--how to put this?--the line 
> of
> demarcation between nature in itself and . . . nature for us . . . and
> science.  I've been cautious about making claims about the 'dialectics 
> of
> nature' in se, i.e. apart from our methods of analysis (which I guess 
> you
> might call 'contemplative'.  This is the old problem, as traditional
> terminology puts it, of the relation between (or very existence of)
> subjective (dialectical logic as subject of debate) and objective
> dialectics (which, with respect to nature, is the focus of positive and
> negative engagements with dialectical thought).  It's not clear to me
> whether you would go along with my various analyses of this problematic
> over the past dozen years, or even accept such a conceptual
> distinction.  But I think that the mess we've inherited shows up its
> historical importance.  While I agree we need an overarching conception
> that somehow interrelates "nature, society, and thought", the direct
> identification of all of these components with the same dialectical 
> laws
> is, I think, a logically blurred mistake.  I believe this implicit 
> problem
> comes up time and time again in the history of debates, whether among
> British intellectuals in the '30s, the pseudonymous debate between 
> Novack
> and Van Heijenoort circa 1943, the debate between Norman and Sayers, 
> etc.
>
I'm in full agreement with you on the existence of such a problem in 
Marxist
thinking.  It is my feeling that the debate on the problem, particularly
among Western Marxists has been considerably confuscated by a failure to
distinguish between the diverse objects of subjective thought and the
divergent ways these objects are tested in practice.  It took a Habermas 
to
realize what Vygotsky had already made clear in his research and 
theoretical
works in the late 1920's, that there is a distinctive difference between 
the
dialectics of sociability of culturally historically situated ethical 
theory
and the dialectics of instrumental practical thought, i.e. science. 
Despite
Hegel's firm belief in an absolute ideal there is not nor can there be any
true universality of reasoning among men regarding ethics.  Even so
Habermas, unlike Vygotsky, misses the whole point of this distinction by 
his
failure to come to grips with the dialectical relation between scientific
and ethical thought.  While historical and cultural conditions do restrict
the object of scientific activity, the fact that scientific thought is
engendered and realized in material practice implies that it focusses on
certain key universals of human activity, namely men's interaction with
nature as a force of nature, that serve as a ground for evaluating
scientific activity that is common to all men.  The difference is 
important
because while ethical consciousness is limited by local social practice
(norms and such) and is justified as the incontroversial expressions of
common sense, scientific subjectivity is solely the function of practical
instrumental experience and is justified first and foremost by its
physically and sensually detected impact on the world. For example, the
indigenous agriculturalists of Papua traded for iron axes long before they
adopted European dress and concepts of physical modesty, colonial
administration and European systems of governance, and Christianity.

I think that the Soviet dialecticians, and particularly Ilyenkov, came
closest to a sufficient formulation of the distinction between scientific
and the more profoundly restricted forms of subjective consciousness and
presented a paradigmatic model for the effective scientific analysis of 
the
latter .  Unfortunately, the mainstay of Western interpretations of
Ilyenkov's works is the absolutely wierd product of a Brit academic who
represents them as a sort of sociologically oriented form of 
Neo-positivism
(itself a contradiction!).  I wrote a first draft on his work that was
totally unsatisfactory (too lacking in focus), and am now finishing up the
outline of a revision which hopefully will be the basis of a more accurate
presentation than was my first effort.

I don't quite get this.  But my first question is: who is this Brit 
neo-positivist academic?

Dave Bakhurst of Queens College Ontario and author of Consciousness and 
Revolution in Soviet Philosophy: From the Bolsheviks to Evald Ilyenkov. 1991


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