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Chris rejects Michael Probsting’s description of Idlib (actually ‘Greater Idlib, which includes northern Hama, southern and western Aleppo, and part of northern Latakia) as "the last remaining liberated area", because “the Turkish army has bases in Idlib, and much of the province is controlled by groups which are Turkish proxies.” Yet in his latest response, Chris rejects Michael’s description of northeastern Syria as “occupied by the US,” because, according to Chris, “If the presence of some foreign troops in an area amounts to "occupation", then Idlib is occupied by Turkey (something that RKOB has denied).” But Chris refers to “the Turkish occupation of Idlib.” So I am confused. Either both Greater Idlib and Greater Rojava (ie, including Raqqa etc) are occupied, or both are liberated, with “some foreign troops.” To clarify, I think we all agree that Afrin is under Turkish occupation. As for the northern Aleppo border region between Azaz and Jarablus via al-Bab, there is a kind of Turkish occupation, but one which appears to be overwhelmingly, if often grudgingly, supported by the local Arab and Turkmen population of that region. But in Idlib we are only talking about a few Turkish observation posts, which are there to prevent the rebels going on the offensive against Assad, and in theory to prevent Assad from going on the offensive against the rebels (which of course does not work). In no sense is Idlib itself under “Turkish occupation.” Perhaps it is an exaggeration to also describe Rojava as under US occupation; as in Idlib and even northern Aleppo, the forces on the ground (the SDF) run their show. But there are a lot more than “some foreign troops.” According to this map (https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DcR-QszW4AAe6hP.jpg), there are 11 US military bases in SDF-controlled Greater Rojava (and one French base), while of course there are zero US bases in any of the areas controlled (or that were ever controlled) by the Syrian rebels, who many liked to slander as “US proxies” (while usually giving a pass to the YPG/SDF!!). There are known to be some 2000 US troops in Rojava. Seems to me that makes Greater Rojava every bit as “occupied” as the Azaz-Jarablus stretch is by Turkey; neither are fully occupied in the Afrin sense; and both a lot more so than Greater Idlib, which is indeed the only remaining fully free territory. And when discussing “occupation”, we always need to keep in mind that the part of Syria most fully under foreign imperialist and regional reactionary occupation is the part controlled by the Assad regime, which is so entirely dependent for its survival on Russian imperialism and Iran that it is essentially a satrapy. Separate to the question of “occupation” or otherwise, it is correct to describe Greater Idlib as liberated territory. Revolution and liberation are not concepts that can be measured simply by a description of the political orientation of the armed groups present. If the entire conflict were just between the Assad regime and various “armed groups”, such groups would have been crushed years ago, given their pathetic level of armament in the face of a massively armed dictatorship with the full backing of a superpower and a major regional power. The armed groups, whether we are talking about the FSA, Islamists, even HTS, and whatever degree some may be collaborating with Turkey or even “proxified” or otherwise, do not determine the state of the region. Countless articles, studies, research, for anybody interested in reading (and a warning, this does require going beyond the Apoist media outlets) have described the people’s movements, their continued resistance, to HTS’s anti-democratic encroachments, and also to other brigades often enough. Revolutionary councils, LCCs, civil organisations etc that continue to act in as-democratic-a-fashion-as-possible given the atmosphere of years of Assad siege and bombardment, including free elections etc. The presence of the armed groups is part of the defence of this little piece of freedom the people have cut out from the horrific regime; many are simply the neighbours and family members of civil oppositionists and ordinary civilians; the groups are thus unable to fully impose the level of repression some may want to (especially HTS); yet at the same time, the long-term military presence does lead to extensive violations, to many of these groups being only an imperfect, at best, armed representation of the revolutionary masses. I must say I’ve been stunned over the years when everyone wants to know if there are any “left-wing” armed groups, as if that is the measure of whether or not there is some kind of revolution, or at least how strong the “secular” forces etc are. Certainly, politics is important – the ultimate failure of the revolution has political as well as military dimensions, of course – however, that does not determine whether or not there is a revolutionary situation. The masses in revolt for basic democratic rights is what is at the base of all the armed groups, even, in a highly distorted way, among the rank and file of HTS. That at least is the materialist way of looking at the issue. Without wanting to engage in self-promotion, I attempted to grapple with these issues in my article Ghouta: Key Issues behind the apocalypse: Armed and Civil Uprising, Class and Islam. The same can be applied to Idlib. There are countless excellent articles out there, for anyone who wants to read beyond the “Assad versus jihadis” simpleton universe, maybe I could compile a reading list. Now, all that said, what of the armed groups. I find on this question I disagree somewhat with both Chris and Michael. Both appear to consider the bulk of non-HTS rebel formations in the northwest as irredeemable “Turkish proxies”. I’ll return to this. They disagree on HTS: Chris considers it to be a reactionary anti-democratic group whose politics are at odds with the 2011 revolution; I agree with this description in general, but with the nuance I already spoke of above; for Chris, this labelling appears to justify the idea that the heroic YPG should consider traversing Syria from east to west, which would mean passing through Assad territory, in order to attack Idlib it liberate it from both HTS and from the “Turkish proxies” (and only regrets that this is not feasible at present); in fact, while Chris denies that the YPG is considering doing this together with Assad, what he writes suggests that would be merely a tactical question! Get this Chris (and Nick): if the YPG ever did carry out such an abomination, then Louis Bander analogy would be entirely justified. In contrast, Michael sees HTS as supportable not only against Assad (with which I agree) but also against the “Turkish proxies”, which are essentially just creatures of the Astana sell-out. What’s more, he says that due to their different relations with US imperialism (the YPG tightly allied with it, HTS an enemy which has been bombed for years by it), that the YPG must be considered a reactionary force in comparison with the YPG. While having opposite views on HTS, both therefore think that the defeat of the “Turkish proxies” by either HTS or YPG would be a justifiable thing, despite whatever tactical considerations there may be. Like both comrades, I vigorously condemned the Turkish invasion of Afrin, and especially the participation in it by numerous rebel brigades from northern Aleppo. In general, I have no objection to using the term Turkish proxies for those brigades who directly took part. However, once again I would draw comrades’ attention to the nature of rebel brigade activity in Syria, and to materialist realities. And this applies both to HTS and to the Turkish aligned groups. It is also important to remember that not every FSA/rebel group in the region did participate in the Afrin operation; for example, the large FSA front in Idlib, Jaysh al-Issa, had no presence in northern Aleppo; and also, by the way, has been anti-Astana, has maintained the fight against Assad, and at times it was only HTS and FSA Jaysh al-Issa – ideological opposites – on the front lines against Assad while Islamist groups like Ahrar al-Sham stood on the sidelines, over the last year or so. Chris says “The "Turkish-backed militants" are proxy groups which were used as auxiliaries in Turkey's invasion of Afrin - groups such as Ahrar al-Sham and Faylaq al-Sham.” Here is the problem. Not only are there different FSA groups in northern Aleppo and in Idlib; but even those in Idlib who are part of a “franchise” brigade whose north Aleppo chapter did take part, such as those Chris mentions here, cannot be classified as “proxies” in the same way. There is a highly localised reality to the Syrian horror; when a person chooses to join Ahrar al-Sham in Idlib, that person does not fill out a form pledging full ideological agreement, let alone agreement with the political choices made by Ahrar in another province; rather, the factors include access to arms, access to some funds to help feed a family, who happens to be powerful in the locality, traditional family connections etc. When you are bombed every day and the threat of a regime returning which used to kidnap, torture and disappear your children hovers over, you do not decide who to join based on agreement with the invasion of Afrin in another province or on agreement with jihadist ideologies. Again – all this applies equally to “jihadist” HTS and “Turkish proxy” Ahrar al-Sham and also to “pure as snow” (not) FSA groups. That is why I disagree with Michael’s and RCIT’s view of the HTS v other rebels conflict in Idlib. On one hand, I agree that the brigades that have a closer relationship with Turkey – especially Ahrar – have been sucked into the Astana process, and HTS is correct in rejecting it. However, not every conflict on the ground can be squeezed into that issue, no matter how important. This would be the correct stand if there were a Turkey-inspired attack on HTS positions by the Turkish-backed rebels as part of the Astana agreement, under Russian pressure, to force a surrender, and did not correspond to any other issues on the ground. However, the reality is much more complex. Seems to me the rebel brigades will aim to hold onto Idlib, no matter what decisions are made over their heads, because the people of Idlib are their brothers and sisters. I’m not sure how they can be fully utilised to force a full surrender. In any case, the conflict early last year was actually initiated by HTS. HTS has long had a hegemonic attitude to other groups, long before the Astana process; and it has also long been responsible for the largest amount of (and worst) rebel violations and repression. There ahs been constant resistance to HTS from the revolutionary councils and civil organisations, which has nothing to do with the Astana process. Now, during the last conflict earlier this year, people drove HTS out of 30-40 towns; there were many cases of people rising up to evict HTS as the other rebels (led by Ahrar) approached. I know that in some cases there was the opposite too though. And other cases where people in towns demonstrated for both sides to stop the fighting, to unite against the regime; and other cases where town councils demanded that both groups of fighters do as they please to each other but neither were wanted inside the town borders. We also need to be careful to not use the same methods as the bogus “anti-imperialist” left when analysing issues such as who is “most reactionary.” I think Michael’s statement that the PYD is more reactionary than HTS due to their different relations with US imperialism borders on this same methodology; “anti-imperialism” considers regimes like that of Assad or Khameini to be “less reactionary” than those of the Gulf or Egypt due to allegedly being “anti-imperialist” etc (not that that makes sense, with the Egyptian regime fully backing Assad, and of course with the US/Iran-backed Iraqi regime, the “anti-imps” are in a real quandry). No, the measure must remain their actions in relation to the masses, and, with all my criticisms of PYD policy, the fact that it is far more progressive on the ground than HTS is simply undeniable reality; night and day. However, that “on the ground” depends a lot on where – is it where the YPG/SDF has a natural base (above all Kurdish regions) or not. Where they are conquering and expelling people, those uprooted are unlikely to go around exclaiming how brilliant their policy is regarding women’s emancipation or local council democracy. Thus, here’s the thing: if the rebel groups that took part in the Afrin operation alongside Turkey are forever irredeemable “proxies” as a result, even their chapters in other provinces, then we must also consider the PYD/YPG to be irredeemable “proxies” since they did exactly the same in revers 2 years earlier, when the Afrin YPG attacked Arab-majority, rebel-controlled Tal Rifaat and northern Aleppo region with the direct support of the imperialist and murderous Russian airforce. They seized this region and expelled the population. *Many of the rank and file cadres* who took part in the invasion of Afrin were refugees from that YPG operation, and they saw their participation either as revenge or as taking back. Of course they were deluded -the really odd thing is that while Kurdish Afrin is now under the control of Turkish-backed Arab rebel brigades, the Tal Rifaat region is still under YPG control!! Neither the YPG, nor the FSA, nor Islamists, whether Turkish-backed or not, nor HTS, are angels nor demons, none are fully free from significant foreign influence – that is the Syrian reality – and none a full “proxies.” I’ll leave off with this article to help comrades think about why people join certain brigades. Supporters of the revolution have often had a schematic division in their minds between the “purest” – the civil, unarmed, rebellion – through the armed but democratic/secular (officially) FSA, through Islamists and finally onto jihadists (Nusra/HTS). Many understood that sometimes people who should be in the FSA ended up in an Islamist brigade or even Nusra/HTS due to material reasons. But those who emphasised purity could say well that is the armed rebels, so of course they also commit violations etc. This article pulls down these barriers even further: it is the story of how many *civil activists* in Idlib – unarmed, democratic, secular, “modern”, whatever buzzword you want – have been joining armed groups *including HTS* since Trump cut off all funding to the civil society groups. Hard reality trumps romanticism: http://syriadirect.org/news/‘we’ve-been-forced-to-take-up-arms’-idlib-civil-society-workers-turn-to-factions-in-wake-of-us-funding-freeze/ _________________________________________________________ Full posting guidelines at: http://www.marxmail.org/sub.htm Set your options at: http://lists.csbs.utah.edu/options/marxism/archive%40mail-archive.com
