Ben:
I will have to leave it to Gary R. and Jim to respond to whatever it is you
are doing here. I just don't follow what is going on, what the problem is
to which what you say is an answer or clarification or whatever.. (That is
not a way of dismissing what you say, but just a personal confession of
bewilderment.)
Joe
----- Original Message -----
From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2006 5:30 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Jim, list,
A few corrections, then a discussion which may be of interest to, ahem, not
only Sir Piat, but also Sir Ransdell & Sir Richmond. Interpretants &
iconicity are dealt with, eventually. I beg a little patience on this one,
good Sir Knights, unsheathe thy swords not too quickly. (Note to self: ask
them later what, if any, effect this near-flattery had on them.)
Correction: I left "reality" accidentally off this trikon, now I've put it
where I originally meant to:
1. Term (seme, etc.) - (univocality?) -- (case in the sense of question,
issue, matter, _res_?) --- possibility.
|> 3. Argument -- validity -- law --- (conditional) necessity, reality.
2. Proposition - truth -- fact --- actuality.
Correction the second, I said: "...we did not find resemblance embodied
except in "compromise" form with indexicality, in material kinships...."
I think that Peirce would take the embodiment of mathematical diagrams as
the embodiment of icons and as not needing to be in something like the
"compromise" form with embodied indexicality which I was discussing as
"material kinship." I forgot that at that moment because I generally think
of the mathematical diagram not as an icon of its object but instead as an
instance of a sign defined by that support which it would supply to
recognition (of its experimentational & decision-process legitimacy), across
any & all disparities of appearance (and of time, place, modality,
universe-of-discourse, etc.) between said sign & its object.
\
1. If a genuine sign's ground is an abstraction which, by its categorial
character, neither opens nor closes questions (i.e. it keeps information the
same), then the ground is a reaction or resistance, a concrete factual
connection with its object. Then the sign itself is an index. (I strongly
suspect that this info-preservative kind of "abstraction" can indeed be
called an abstraction; but, if not, then not.)
2. If a genuine sign's ground is an abstraction which, by its categorial
character, only opens questions (only removes information), then the ground
is, to that extent, a quality, a semblance, a sample aspect apparent as
sustained and "carried on" by the sign so long as the sign is "true to
itself" in this. (To gain such a sign brings an increase of information, of
course, but I am focusing on the info relationship between the ground and
that from which it is abstracted.) Then the sign itself is an icon.
3. If a genuine sign's ground is an abstraction which, by its categorial
character, only closes questions (only adds information), i.e., reduces away
or "sums over" all factors seen as extraneous to the abstraction's purpose,
then the ground is, to that extent, a meaning or implication, a gist, an
effect that it will, by habitual tendency, have on the interpretant, of
making the interpretant resemble the gist, in meaningfully _appearing_ as --
without iconically resembling -- the object. (This is clarified further
down.)
4. If a genuine sign's ground is an abstraction which, by its categorial
character, both opens & closes questions (removes some information & adds
some information), then the ground is, to the extent, a validity, soundness,
legitimacy (in that respect in which the sign counts _experientially_ as the
object itself without necessarily being confused with the object at all), a
support which the sign would most naturally and directly supply to its
recognition, a support via its reacting legitimately in some respect as --
without indexically pointing to -- the object itself, and the reaction or
resistance being _with the "recognizant."_ Then the sign itself is that
which I call a "proxy." Its ground's abstraction involves a closing and
settling of questions (adding of information) as to what object-related
information is relevant, (e.g., "There are five initially selected objects
in question, it doesn't matter whether we miscounted them or whether they're
really oranges," etc.) and an opening of questions (removal of information)
(e.g., how would the five behave and interact and collaborate with us, the
mathematical observer-experimenter, sheerly in virtue of their fiveness,
supplying us with answers to _fresh and unforeseen_ questions in accordance
with _the rules_ of "fiveness"? I.e., in the concrete world, the question,
for instance, of 5^3=? is taken as closed in the sense that the "world" will
behave as determined by the answer -- but in the abstract, we come into
relief as a part of, or really a wannabe-proxy for, the world, so that we're
as the world as having "forgotten" the answer and needing to "recollect"
it.) The proxy doesn't have to be a mathematical diagram, it could be a
lawyer behaving, acting, decision-making on a client's behalf _in accordance
with the rules_ pertaining to the legal interests of said client who may be
sitting right there but insufficiently adept at representing his/her own
legal interests, or who may be elsewhere, or asleep, or non compos mentis,
or in a coma, or deceased, or even somewhat idealized from the start, as
sometimes in a class action lawsuit. Thus arises the importance of the
WOULD-BE in the definition of the proxy, defined by the legitimacy which the
sign WOULD have to the recognizant observing its object, irregardlessly of
current & prominent appearances. The icon is defined by its OWN APPEARANCE,
the sign's ACTUALIZATIONAL seeming as the object which has been or seems to
be or will likely be or is presumed to be. The icon is defined by the
appearance which it IS presenting to the capacity to feel, and NOT by the
sign's AGENTIAL POTENCY as the object which has been or seems to be or will
likely be or is presumed to be. It's an agential, decisional power which is
properly that of a proxy in matters ongoing, unpredicted, newly arising. The
imagination binds itself to _honor_ and _adhere to_ the hypothetical as
real.
The ground as abstraction that only closes questions (only removes
information): Like being an appearance of the object in a different, and
very special, modality. Then the sign itself is a symbol. In other words,
it's not like the _reproduction_ of a quality in the same modality, but like
the _translation_ of a quality into another modality, but not just any other
modality, but instead one specially apt and purposed for such translations
AS translations for the interpretant, a modality in which things are
decidedly not primarily what they seem. It will often be the case that the
reason for the translation is not that the mind in question is unable to
sense the quality, but rather that the icon is not, as a practical matter,
obtainable; so instead another sign is obtained, and the interpretant then
either (a) retranslates to a reasonably approximate icon of the object; and
likewises icons of icons and icons of symbols and ICONS WHOSE OBJECTS ARE
INDICES or (b) goes far enough in the direction of such retranslation as to
feel assured in the probability of doing so if the need or desire for
further such explicitation should arise or (c) lacks the needed icons and
hopes either that they aren't really needed or that they can be supplied
later (e.g., as in "I followed the surface sense of the text, but I don't
really _understand_ it yet."). The interpretant does not translate to
indexical sinsigns per se. That would be an experiential recognition of a
reaction or resistance. The interpretant qua interpretant (as opposed to qua
interpretand) always has the generality of a quality of sense or feeling.
Hence, the interpretant is iconoid, iconlike, just as the recognition is
indexoid, indexlike. Qua interpretant it is the qualification, the
qualitatization, of that event, that "particular" universe, which is the
interpreted sign qua interpretand. The sign, qua event, itself is as a
universe, and thus is symboloid, symbollike -- this is in a different sense
than that in which the sign is sinsign, qualisign, or legisign. The sign
itself is the referring of the object to some world or universe. The
"pre-sign" object itself, qua representand & not qua representans, is as a
universal and thus is proxyoid, proxylike, like a mathematical diagram or a
node in a mathematical diagram.
1. Object (qua still to be represented)-- proxylike, quasi-noumenal but NOT
a fiction, that by which semiosis seeks to be determined, but which in its
phase of indeterminate representation, interpretation, & experience, is as a
mathematical universal, a "something" x, imaginative--volitional (such that
one wills, tries, seeks, chooses, adheres to being determined by the
object).
2. Sign (qua still to be interpreted) -- symbollike -- event, _a_ universe,
term of an alternative, intellectual--abilitative/technical/competential.
3. Interpretant -- iconlike, qualitative, sensory-intuitive--affective.
4. Recognition -- indexlike, concrete singular among more such,
commonsense-perceptual--cognitive.
Note consistent & complete pattern of inverse relationships.
1. Object, (D) proxylike -- a sign defined by relationship to object is (A)
an index.
2. Sign, (C) symbollike -- a sign defined by relationship to itself (sign)
is (B) an icon
3. Interpretant, (B) iconlike -- a sign defined by relationship to
interpretant is (C) a symbol.
4. Recognition, (A) indexlike -- a sign defined by relationship to
recognition is (D) a proxy.
1. The idealized system of motions & forces -- classical Newtonian or
pure-quantum-system -- is time-symmetric, completely deterministic in the
given relevant sense, unmuddled, pure OBJECT to us, information about which
object we can only approach indefinitely, as to a limit.
2. The material system is time-nonsymmetric, stochastic-processual, in which
the system at a given stage is only ALMOST the system at another given
stage, i.e., a SIGN to us of the system at other stage.
3. The vegetable-level biological system is time-nonsymmetric but LOCALLY
pointed thermodynamically in the opposite direction from that of its
material world, from which it filters order and is an INTERPRETANT to us.
4. The intelligent living system is time-nonsymmetric but INDIVIDUALLY
pointed variously in both directions thermodynamically -- as living thing,
it filters for order -- as intelligent, it is a sink, retaining sign-rich
disorder as recorded -- I don't know how it pulls double-direction "trick"
off -- anyway it is a RECOGNITION which we are.
The sign defined by its relationship to recogition is a proxy.
ERGO: As sign, man is most of all a proxy. At intelligent life's best, only
indefinitely approached, intelligent life is a genuine, legitimate proxy
acting & deciding on behalf of the ideal, in being determined _by_ the
ideal. Intelligent life shouldn't let it go to his/her head, though. Hard it
is to be good; harder still to confirm & solidify it by entelechy = by
staying good => continual renovation and occasional rearchitecting
(entelechy is not necessarily a freeze) amid changing & evolvable
conditions.
Best, Ben
----- Original Message -----
From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2006 11:15 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Jim, list,
Jim Piat wrote:
>>[Joe Ransdell] Good point, Gary. Still another way of thinking about it
might be to suppose that the emphasis is supposed to fall on "thing" rather
than "sign": "no sign is a real THING" rather than "no sign is a REAL
thing"; but that doesn't sound very plausible to me. I like your solution
better.
>> Joe Ransdell
>[Jim] While we're raising questions about the distinctions among such
notions as the real, the existent and the true (their relationships to the
categories etc)
Are you disagreeing with Peirce here? It's okay to disagree with him, I do
too, but I'm wondering whether that's what you're doing. Here's Peirce's
view:
1. The possible
|> 3. The (conditionally) necessary ("would have to" approx. = "should"),
the real
2. The actual, the reactive, the existent
"Truth" in Peirce's use of the word is the property of a true proposition,
its property of corresponding to fact, though it could also correspond to a
law regarded as a fact.
I'll give this a try. Keeping in mind that these are correlations, not
equations:
1. Term (seme, etc.) - (univocality?) -- (case in the sense of question,
issue, matter, _res_?) --- possibility.
|> 3. Argument -- validity -- law --- (conditional) necessity.
2. Proposition - truth -- fact --- actuality.
>[Jim] -- I'd like to throw in a related question: Does existence as a mode
>of being ever occur outside of representation or thirdness (as a mode of
>being). Or is existence (and objects conceived of as merely existing --
>ie something less than signs) something that always swims in the contiuum
>of representation.
My take has been that existent objects are always also embodied signs, but
that embodied interpretants aren't so common. I'd have to dig. I seem to
remember Peirce talking about genuine phenomenal thirdness as not being
everywhere -- but I also remember thinking that he was talking in terms of
the interpretant, and not of "just any" signs -- i.e., it was the thing
about embodied interpretants again. Peirce doesn't use the phrase "embodied
interpretant," as I recall. Gary used it & I picked it up from him.
Now, Peirce says that an index doesn't necessarily resemble its object at
all, and that it indicates its object whether we notice or not -- the
relationship with its object is one of actual resistance or reaction (when
the index a sinsign; otherwise, the relationship of its replica with the
object). If I think of such reactions, I think vaguely of forces,
variational principles, etc. And I think of effects which quantitatively and
qualitatively differ a lot from their causes.
In the case of icons, Peirce is more likely to think in terms of
mathematical diagrams. He thinks that mathematical structures and patterns
are real, and are real thirdness (I think).
However, I don't know what Peirce thinks about iconicity in statistical
patterns and processes in material nature -- I don't mean in the sense of
statistical patterns making pictures of physical objects, if that ever
happens. I mean in the sense that there are statistical processes whereby
random fluctuations and differences cancel out to a common middle or
average, and a stage of a process can be predictably similar to a current
stage depending on how recent or soon-to-arrive it is at the time of the
given curren stage. There are other kinds of widespread similarities --
typical percentages of various substances in widely dispersed material, & so
on. Now insofar as we're talking about embodied iconicity, it's not just
about resemblances, but about resemblances arising among things reactively
or resistantially related -- in other words, a lot of things with family
kinships, things made of the same kinds of stuff often from common sources
and maybe ultimately all from a common source way way back, anyway, such
that these things informatively resemble one another.
Peirce does not seem to have regarded biological phenomena as involving
genuine thirdness. He includes biology in the physical wing of cenoscopy. He
says that if a sunflower's turning sunward could reproduce another
sunflower's turning sunward without the second sunflower's having directly
reacted with the sunlight, then the first sunflower's turning sunward would
be a genuine a representamen (to the second sunflower) -- in the sense that
a sign entails a mind, while a representamen does not, a distinction which
he later dropped. And of course the second sunflower's turning sunward would
be an interpretant representamen. If we look inside vegetable organisms,
rather than among them, we might have better chances of finding genuine
semiosis. However, although there is a lot of what we now call decoding,
there doesn't appear to be the kind of learning & retention that allows
chains of interpretants onward indefinitely, which is an essential part of
what Peirce means by "interpretant" and semiosis.
My view has been that retention in some useful form happens only with
learning and testing of signs, interpretants and systems & "codes" of
interpretation, and this involves recognitions which are neither mere claims
(=signs) nor mere construals (=interpretants). I suspect that, instead, the
info-theoretic setup is what there is at the vegetable level --
there are sources but not semiotic objects for the vegetable,
there are encodings but not signs/representamens for the vegetable,
there are decodings but not interpretants by the vegetable, and
there are recipients but not recognitions by the vegetable -- also, the
recipient of the signal seems to be the evolutionary process itself, whose
"disconfirming" of the vegetable's decodings tends to involve removal of
said vegetable from the gene pool. The individual vegetable does not learn,
or even biologically evolve. Biological evolution is by trial and error,
and, while biological evolution itself might be described as a capacity
which has "evolved" in some ways (at least in regard to genetic change &
stability), I don't know in what sense one would call it a learning process.
However, we were discussing indices & icons, and then instead of moving on
to symbols, I switched to interpretants. What about symbols? Now, certainly
one can take planets as symbols -- Jupiter for power, Mars for war, Venus
for love -- yet, for a scientific intelligence, is there anything in nature,
at least at the biological level, which could be taken as symbols? Since we
did not find resemblance embodied except in "compromise" form with
indexicality, in material kinships, perhaps we have to look for some such
"compromise" form in the case of symbols too. I don't know how to think of
it except in terms of one's witnessing an organism decoding a stimulus and
reacting in terms of that stimulus's "meaning" or "importance" for the
organism by the standard of its species, gender, developmental phase, etc.
The stimulus is an encoded signal for the organism but is a genuine symbol
for us because we actually interpret it in a way that continues generating
interpretants in us. But it's like a symbol in another language, the
conventions are not ours but those of the vegetable species, etc. But it's
not just a cause of a mere reaction because we're understanding it in terms
of its "meaning" for the organism, in terms of the organism's interests; the
organism's response is guided by functionality, ends. Well, this seems to
complicated, I feel like there should be something simpler, and what
happened to the "compromise" with indexicality that I was talking about?
There should be a salient reactional or material connection between symbol &
object, if we're to be consistent with the above icon case. Well, I guess
there is that, with vegetable organisms. Anyway, that's enough for the time
being!
>[Jim] My personal understanding is that Peirce views objects as something
>which we abstract from triadic or representational experience. IOWs in the
>act of perceiving an object we are engaged in representation. However, I do
>not take this interpretation of Peirce to mean that Peirce is arguing that
>objects do not exist outside of our representation of them because clearly
>he is not saying this. The fact that objects exist (and are thus real in
>his definitional sense of the real as that which exist apart from what we
>imagine) does not mean that we have access or experience of objects apart
>from the triadic or representational mode of being of which they are
>inextricably embedded. Nor I might add does it mean that objects as we
>experience them representationally are necessarily other than what they
>are -- in contrast to the view that we experience objects through some
>distorting lens. What we experience is always a part of the truth -- our
>error is not that what we perceive is distorted but that we mistake the
>small part of the truth that we perceive (from our limited POV) as being
>the whole truth!
Sometimes our error is that what we perceive is distorted, but just not
always (one hopes!). Take Gary's notion that Queens is a part, a "borough"
(quaint term!) of New York City -- next thing you know he'll be claiming
that there are enormous bridges spanning the East River! Or, more seriously,
let's say that somebody actually believed that Queens is NOT part of New
York City. Or how about this, an actual case, a guy I knew believed that
there are stable water-valleys in the ocean, places where the water doesn't
find its level. But, yes, sometimes our error is just overestimation of the
completeness of what we know. don't know about Peirce's thinking that we
abstract objects from representational experience in some sense that we
don't likewise abstract signs. Besides that, a lot of what you say sounds to
me like that which Peirce is saying.
>[Jim] This view raises the question (I guess I'm trying to suggest an
>answer to my own questions -- so my larger question is how does this
>solution seem to yall) what then is the distinction between objects such
>as trees and objects such as the word tree which are replicas of signs (or
>representamen of representations -- is that the correct usage of these
>terms btw). My answer is that both are abstractions. All are signs. So
>called objects are merely signs that we have not interpreted as signs. So
>called objects are signs in the universal mind of god or the universe --
>but it is only when we use these objects as signs for other objects that we
>think of them as signs. IOWs what we have here is a confusion of level and
>meta level -- a sort of category mistake. All is a sign -- all things
>are signs and all of reality is merely a matter of signs interpreting
>signs. Indeed the modes of being called qualtiy reaction and
>interpretation can each be conceptually abstracted from the all inclusive
>reality of a universe of signs which is itself a sign -- but all
>experience (in the fullest sense of the word) is a matter of
>representation. At least I take this to be the overall thrust of
>Peirce's comments though I must admit that in some context and on some
>occassions his comments do seem to suggest that we can experience or know
>objects or reactions without representation.
Why "so-called" objects that are "really" signs? There couldn't be semiotic
objects or signs without each other. I don't see Peirce as seeing objects as
less real than signs, or, to put it another way, object-roles as less real
than sign-roles. The only case where in some sense signs may drop out of the
picture is in idealized isolated mechanical systems in which complete
knowledge of any stage tells you EVERYTHING about all stages before and
after, such that familiarity with any stage would count as familiarity with
all stages. You know the object whole in its any single moment. Only thing
is, you'd have to interrupt this isolated "perfect" system in order to
measure it. So you never get to know it. And I can't think even of an
idealized case of signs where objects drop out of the picture -- it sounds
like a mirror maze waiting for something opaque to be reflected in and
throughout it.
That's it. My brain has stopped working. That may already have been evident.
Good evening!
Best regards,
Ben
[Jim] > But as to the specific quote above -- I'm inclined to go with the
reading you suggest above, Joe. Gary's reading (while a good way of
illustrating the question or problem) changes the logic of Peirces
statement. Yours, for me, clarifies Peirces remark in what strikes me as a
most plausible way. Signs are not mere things -- however real. In fact,
as I've argued above, what we call things are actually abstracted from
signs. Things are mere replicas of signs as Gary has pointed out.
-- on a related note: Wittgenstein points out (according to PMS Hacker)
that when we say such things as "I have a pain" supposing we are describing
an internal object such as the sensation of pain we are instead actually
expressing the pain itself. The expression is less an indicative symbol of
pain as an exclamatory index of pain. I mention this because I think it
may have some bearing on the issue of the so called internal vs external
nature of experience. IOWs some seemingly symbolic sentences are actually
merely indexes -- dressed up in the traditional form of symbolic sentences.
This misunterpretation of how we are using language when speaking of such
things as feeling and thoughts (as I understand Wittgenstein) accounts for
much of the confusion we have about private language intuition and the like.
I think Peirce may be saying saying something similar.
And finally, (trying to squeeze a lot into this quick weekend note) -- I
found a passage of Leo Strauss on interpretation vs explanation (and how to
read texts in general) that I think is interesting both in terms of our
reading of this text as well as giving some insight into Strauss. He comes
off to me as not so sinister as I'd feared -- and in fact rather straight
forward. This "secret/privledged reading stuff is merely a common sense
admonition to be mindful of the context in which a writer is or was
expressing his views. Minorities are of necessity generally more aware of
this than those whose consciousness is limited by being of the majority
opinion. As Peirce has said all development is a matter of eliminating
options. On that which everyone agrees -- interpretation, development and
consciousness stops. Which is the danger of mistakenly supposing agreement
determines truth rather than truth being one factor that tends to promote
agreement over the long haul. Perhaps truth is the only factor that
promotes lasting agreement, but the trouble here is that lasting is a very
long time so mere agreement by itself (without consideration of the time
element) turns out to be a very poor measure of truth. Actually I think
our individual perceptions (even including illusions and delusions) are
excellent and indeed the only measure of personal truth -- but we must be
ever vigilent not to mistake our narrow individual truths (limited across
time and space) as the whole truth. But anyway I will try to post a short
Strauss passage later. Just musing as usual. I'm greatly enjoying this New
Elements and related discussion.
Best wishes,
Jim Piat
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