Sorry, I forgot to compensate for an MS Outlook Express problem which
involves URLs not getting copied properly. Now taken care of.
Charles, list,
>[Charles] With this post which exhausts all I am incluned to say in
this context, I too will probably "go quiet."
>[Charles] On Sat, 26 Aug 2006 18:58:50 -0400 "Benjamin
Udell" writes:
>>[Ben] Charles, list,
>> I guess it's hard for me to let any remarks about my ideas go by
without response, but I still am inclined, as I've put it, to "go quiet."
>> Charles wrote,
>>>[Charles] .... [I would say that Bens Recognition is
included in (not outside) the Interpretant as an element of the Interpreters
contribution to its determination.] ....
>>[Ben] The recognition or recognizant, in the core narrow
sense, is _defined_ as object-experience (of the acquaintance kind)
formed collaterally to sign and interpretant in respect of the object; the
recognizant is defined as something which, Peirce (usually) says, is not gotten
from the sign and is outside the interpretant. So you're simply
contradicting the definition.
>[Charles] I have said nothing that I see as contrary to what Peirce
says about the role of collateral experience in sign processes. In the
situation where you saw smoke and went looking for a fire, seeing smoke
functioned as a sign that you took as representing something other than smoke at
at least two levels, a general and a singular. Before you found and
actually saw the fire, you interpreted seeing smoke (the sign itself, a sinsign,
distinguishable from its objects and interpretants) according to a general rule
(a legisign), something like, Wherever there is smoke there is fire. and
according to a singularization of the rule something like, With the smoke I
presently see there is presently a fire. As Peirce points out, smoke
would be uninterpretable as a sign of fire apart from your prior acquaintance
with fire (and smoke also for that matter), but seeing smoke prompting you to
look for fire and a particular fire was mediated by rules with which you were
also already acquainted and apart from which you would not have known to look
for fire. I agree that a singular instance of seeing smoke and
interpreting seeing smoke as a sign of fire occurs by means of collateral
experience that would include recognizing smoke as smoke and not a cloud of
steam or dust, fire as fire, etc. in which the interpretant of seeing smoke in
its capacity as a singular sign played no partoutside, as you say, the
interpretant. But the collateral experience would also include having
learned to act and acting as if a rule is true apart from which smoke, insofar
as it is suited to function as a sign, could not be interpreted as a sign.
What I have been trying to say is that acts of interpretation which include
recognition are semiosical, and that recognizing is an interpretant or included
in interpretants of a sign or signs that are collateral to the
interpretant of any particular sign.
(Assuming that you intend no practical difference made by differences
between "recognizing" and "recognition" etc.) -- Insofar as "recognizing" in the
current discussion is defined as "forming an experience as collateral to sign
and interpretant in respect of the object," you're saying that an experience
formed as collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object
is an interpretant of that object. That's just a contradiction, both
internally and to Peirce.
It is not an interpretant in Peirce's view, which is that
acquaintance with the object is not part of the interpretant about that
object.
From C.S. Peirce, Transcribed from Letter to Lady Welby Dec 23, 1908 (in
_Semiotics and Significs: Correspondence Between Charles S. Peirce and
Victoria Lady Welby_, ed. Charles Hardwick, Indiana U. Press, 1977, p.83) http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/interpretant.html
also at http://peircematters.blogspot.com/2005_02_01_peircematters_archive.html
. Quote:
Its Interpretant is all that the Sign conveys:
acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral
experience.
End quote.
Note that Peirce does _not_ say that _collateral_
acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral experience. Peirce is
not stating such a truism. Instead he says that acquaintance, any acquaintance
at all, must be gained by collateral experience.
There is good reason for Peirce to hold that view, since experience of the
sign of an object is not experience of that object, which in turn is because the
sign is (usually) not the object, and part of the whole point of signs is to
lead the mind to places where, in the relevant regard, experience and
observation have not gone yet but could conceivably go.
This is as true as ever even when the experienced object is a sign
experienced in its signhood or an interpretant sign experienced in its
interpretancy. It is not clear to me whether you are tacitly disputing
Peirce or believe that you are agreeing with him or are unsure of his view but
are inclined to dispute him if it comes down to it.
Peirce says that acquaintance with the system of signs is not what is meant
by "collateral." He says that he is talking about observation or acquaintance or
experience _of the object_ and that it is collateral _to the sign or
system of signs_. The semiotician's correct application of that statement
depends on the semiotician's _keeping track_ of _what is serving as
the semiotic object_.
When the sign in its signhood, or the system of signs in their signhoods,
is, itself, the semiotic object, then the same constraints involving collateral
experience are to be applied _mutatis mutandis_, and Peirce does exactly
that, in the example regarding the word _soleil_, an example which
involves somebody's gaining collateral experience regarding an object (the
Sun-sign which is the word _soleil_) about which the student has already
had signs (the teacher's definition of the word _soleil_) and involving
which the teacher proceeds subsequently to provide the student with
collateral experience.
From Peirce, CP 8.183, http://home.kqnet.pt/id010313/html/8.html#_ftnref33
and http://peircematters.blogspot.com/2005/02/collateral-observation-quotes.html
Quote:
If a person points to it and says, See there! That is
what we call the Sun, the Sun is not the Object of that sign. It is the Sign
of the sun, the word sun that his declaration is about; and that word we must
become acquainted with by collateral experience. Suppose a teacher of French
says to an English-speaking pupil, who asks comment appelle-t-on ça? pointing
to the Sun, . . . Cest le soleil, he begins to furnish that collateral
experience by speaking in French of the Sun itself.
End quote.
The _meaning_ of the rule "where there's smoke, there's fire" is
formed into an interpretant. The _legitimacy_ -- in whatever respect
-- of the rule "where there's smoke, there's fire," is formed into a
recognizant in that respect. You have been tracing, but misregarding as
interpretational, the pattern whereby recognition, or the recognizant, is
involved at every semiosical interstice, whether as a recognition of the
internal cogency or at least internal consistency of the proposition "where
there's smoke, there's fire," or as a recognition of its truly corresponding to
its semiotic object, or as a recognition of its validity or cogency as an
inferential outcome, or as a recognition of it in all those respects, which is a
recognition of its soundness. I've been arguing, in effect, that the Peircean
view of collateral experience contradicts regarding those recognitions as
semiosical, i.e., as a process of signs and interpretants only -- and I've
been arguing, in effect, for a redefinition of semiosis to include acquaintance,
observation, experience of the object in such experience's role as
(dis-)confirmatory of sign and interpretant, and my argument has involved my
tracing the pervasive logically determinational involvement of such experience
and my appealing to the common idea that _logic_ (which Peirce
_equates with semiotic_), is about (dis-)verification,
(dis-)establishment, (dis-)confirmation, (dis-)corroboration, etc.
>[Charles] Beyond the primitive perceptual event seeing a virtually
meaningless something, any meaning that accrues to seeing something by means
of which it is recognizably (a classification) and recognizable as (a
singularization of a clsssification) smoke rather than steam (which for a young
child it might not) is semiosical.
Again, and to the contrary, Peirce says: "Its
Interpretant is all that the Sign conveys: acquaintance with its Object must be
gained by collateral experience." Peirce seeks to confine the role of
such acquaintance to that of a precondition for semiosis. But there is nothing
there about such acquaintance's being only a bare, rudimentary, initial
experience. Whether it is initial experience, or further experience, and even
whether the experience is gained before the sign and interpretant or, as in
Peirce's _soleil_ example, after them, it is outside the sign or the
interpretant of the object.
>[Charles] Apart from acting as if rules that are linguistic and/or
embedded in habits are in some sense true or valid, neither you nor I nor anyone
else seeing smoke would look for fire, and no particular instance of seeing
smoke, following it to its source, and, sure enough, seeing fire, can verify
that a rule of thumb like, Wherever there is smoke there is fire. is
true. What if you had been unable to find a fire before the smoke
disappeared? Would you have then concluded that your seeing smoke was an
illusion of some sort?
Acting as if a rule expressed in language or embedded in habit were true or
valid may be deliberately experimental or based on the agent's experience.
In either case it is always a test, more or less called-for, more or less
intentional, more or less serious, more or less not-merely-formal, etc. It
may be meaningfully called a test of a rule insofar as, whether it was
deliberate or not, the intelligence will learn (whether such was its purpose or
not in the case) from the outcome and reinforce or revise its rules, its system,
accordingly.
You seem to be using the word "verify" in a different sense than that which
I have repeatedly stipulated that I am using the word. I have been using it as a
forest terms for the various trees of "confirmation," "corroboration,"
"establishment," etc. I doubt that Peirce uses the word in the absolute sense in
which you seem to be using it, since he says that modern students of science
have achieved their success by an improved understanding and practice of
*_verification_*.
From the Collected Papers of C.S. Peirce Vol. I, I. General Historical
Orientation, 1. Lessons from the History of Philosophy, Section 3. The Spirit of
Scholasticism, Paragraph 34, http://www.textlog.de/4220.html .
Quote:
34. Mr. George Henry Lewes in his work on
Aristotle(1) seems to me to have come pretty near to stating the true
cause of the success of modern science when he has said that it was
*_verification_*. I should express it in this way: modern students
of science have been successful because they have spent their lives not in their
libraries and museums but in their laboratories and in the field; and while in
their laboratories and in the field they have been not gazing on nature with a
vacant eye, that is, in passive perception unassisted by thought, but have been
*_observing_* -- that is, perceiving by the aid of analysis -- and
testing suggestions of theories. The cause of their success has been that the
motive which has carried them to the laboratory and the field has been a craving
to know how things really were, and an interest in finding out whether or not
general propositions actually held good -- which has overbalanced all prejudice,
all vanity, and all passion. Now it is plainly not an essential part of this
method in general that the tests were made by the observation of natural
objects. For the immense progress which modern mathematics has made is also to
be explained by the same intense interest in testing general propositions by
particular cases -- only the tests were applied by means of particular
demonstrations. This is observation, still, for as the great mathematician Gauss
has declared -- algebra is a science of the eye,(2) only it is
observation of artificial objects and of a highly recondite character. Now this
same unwearied interest in testing general propositions is what produced those
long rows of folios of the schoolmen, and if the test which they employed is of
only limited validity so that they could not unhampered go on indefinitely to
further discoveries, yet the *_spirit_*, which is the most
essential thing -- the motive, was nearly the same. And how different this
spirit is from that of the major part, though not all, of modern philosophers --
even of those who have called themselves empirical, no man who is actuated by it
can fail to perceive.
End quote. [bold & italics at the Website]
>[Charles] .... What if you had been unable to find a fire before the
smoke disappeared? Would you have then concluded that your seeing smoke
was an illusion of some sort?
There is tautologously no need to adequately _verify_ such a rule's
being true for a particular case _before_ adequately verifying its being
true for that same particular case. If I hadn't been able to check yet, I would
conclude that I had had not yet sufficient opportunity to observe whether the
rule held true in that case. Now, I have actually seen large amounts of smoke
pouring out of a small enclosure, and found that the enclosure's inside was
not afire. Somebody had set off a bunch of smoke bombs in that enclosure.
Well, one could note that there were tiny fires, little rapid oxidations, inside
the smoke bombs themselves. It depends on what is meant in the saying "where
there's smoke, there's fire," which is an intentionally vague rule,
actually.
> Would you have concluded that the rule of thumb, Wherever there is
smoke there is fire. is false?
Not without adequate opportunity to (dis-)verify it. Now, as a matter of
fact, the rule of thumb "Wherever there's smoke there's fire" is used in English
much more generally than about fires. It is used about any sort of problems or
discrepancies. And in that frequent sense it is frequently regarded as being an
unreliable rule. I have sometimes heard it characterized -- by entirely
unphilosophical people and in affairs of daily private life -- as
"pure BS." This disparaged sense is one in which a suspicious appearance is
regarded as proof of wrong's being done, and is associated with people who sit
smugly in petrified mediocrity waiting for the world to make a false move. The
sense is disparaged because it involves casually shifting the burden of proof
onto the accused even when, as is often the case, the accused should have a
presumption of innocence.
>[Charles] I believe that you may be conflating Peirces distinction
between signs and replicas of signs by criticizing his theory of signs in terms
of experience and conduct mediated by signs together with sign replicas about
which Peirce has relatively little to say. I also believe that you are
ignoring Peirces critique and rejection of the possibility of universal
doubtas if doubting were as easy as lyingin his discussions of the relation
between doubt and belief. In short, it appears to me that you are
interpreting Peirce nominalistically.
To the contrary, a recognition in its singularity is not a replica of an
interpretant legisign. This is because the recognition is a kind of acquaintance
with the object, and
- a mind's interpretant legisign of an object is not that mind's
acquaintance with the object, and
- a mind's acquaintance with the interpretant legisign is not that mind's
acquaintance with its interpretant legisign's object, and
- a mind's replica of a legisign is not that mind's acquaintance with that
legisign's object or with an instance of that object, and
- a mind's acquaintance with its replica of a legisign is not that mind's
acquaintance with that legisign's object or with an instance of that
object.
Furthermore to the contrary, the doubting of a general rule or a general
proposition is not automatically a hyperbolic, universal, Cartesian doubt such
that Peirce would reject it. Above in this post, in his discussion of
verification, Peirce discusses "testing general propositions
by particular cases" as part of the normal process of research both
in modern times and in earlier times. I can only wonder what sort of testing you
think that I've been discussing.
Best, Ben
---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com |
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metap... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" ... Joseph Ransdell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metap... Charles F Rudder
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" ... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" ... Gary Richmond
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metap... Charles F Rudder
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" ... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph&qu... Joseph Ransdell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograp... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metap... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metap... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" ... Joseph Ransdell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metap... Charles F Rudder
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metap... Bernard Morand
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" ... Jim Piat
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph&qu... Bill Bailey
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograp... Bill Bailey
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograp... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photo... Jim Piat
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photo... Bill Bailey