List,
The question is being too easily dismissed. For Peirce, its not that introspection doesn't exist, but that its results are unreliable for the purposes at hand, namely, a theory of cognition and the deduction of categories. The overall anti-Cartesian emphasis of Peirce's early work is reasonably clear. There is no epistemological privilage granted 1st person reports of the sort "auto-phenomenology" grants. (for instance, Husserl) It is not scientific enough. Dennett's program would agree. Peirce also has the famous example of the writing pen. At least one of the points of that example is to suggest that the mind is not simply localized in the brain. If so, it is less of a "serious problem" how to explain or otherwise translate back and forth between a localized brain and the content of consciousness. Dennett could agree. Nothing above denies or affirms the reality of the content of consciousness. It just displaces consciousness from the brain and drains the Cartesian metaphor of a theater, the content of which is mine. Finally, there are numerous examples of phenomenological method in later Peirce writings that downplay acts of attention and focus instead on content. Some might say this avoids the problem. We seem to need consciousness to relate to content through acts of attention. Hence, we speak of the "content of consciousness." Thus, we need to account for consciousness in terms of the subjective relate of an act of attention. ( "I" attends-to "it.") Of course, there is no relate of an act of attention if consciousness is identical to its content. There are passages in the phenomenology where Peirce does seem to do this. ie. "immediate consciousness") It is non-relational. But immediate consciousness is an abstraction that takes no account of time. If we take account of time, the ego is always appearing as "it." One can ask again about that other pole of an act of attention especially when attention is directed towards a tactile pain in their own body. Rather than an ink stand, the "mind is in the body" so to speak and my body is in pain. No doubt we understand the concept and have all experienced the feeling. But are the results of introspection unreliable? Is there not a gradation of epistemological privelage? I tend to think Dennett and Peirce would agree that there is no way to formulate some issues as a scientific problem.
Jim W
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Sent: Fri, 8 Sep 2006 12:06 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Dennett
Oh well hell, Steve! You have burst my bubble! (Sorry... I'll get serious now...)
It struck me as Peirceian because, if I'm not mistaken, Peirce denied that there was such a thing as "introspection". He also seemed to affirm the idea that individuals are "less real" than generality... or rather that all individuals are instances of general categories and therefore less real as individuals. I also get the impression that what we call mind or subjective experience is more objective or public than we realize... and this seems to coincide with Dennett's heterophenomenology...the idea that an objective observer might be able to read someone's subjective experience better than the subject him/herself.
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R. Jeffrey Grace
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---It struck me as Peirceian because, if I'm not mistaken, Peirce denied that there was such a thing as "introspection". He also seemed to affirm the idea that individuals are "less real" than generality... or rather that all individuals are instances of general categories and therefore less real as individuals. I also get the impression that what we call mind or subjective experience is more objective or public than we realize... and this seems to coincide with Dennett's heterophenomenology...the idea that an objective observer might be able to read someone's subjective experience better than the subject him/herself.
On 9/7/06, Steven Ericsson-Zenith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
My firm response is that I do not see how it could be.
With respect,Steven
On Sep 7, 2006, at 5:04 PM, R Jeffrey Grace wrote:
Folks,
Pardon me if this has been brought up before, but does anyone know if Daniel Dennett's Heterophenomenology, which maintains that all subjective states are ultimately objective states, is influence by Peirce or if this is even something similar to Peirce's view?
Thanks for any comments...
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R. Jeffrey Grace
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R. Jeffrey Grace
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