Thanks for your response, Joe. I remain unconvinced; perhaps a look at
the relevant pages of W3 will help me see things your way. I'll be
traveling for the rest of this week, but will look into that upon my
return. Here I'll just offer a quick gesture or two about how our
disagreement looks from my side.
Nothing in what you say below seems to me to show that the other methods
are not based (in the sense my interpretation needs) on the two laws I
suggested Peirce had in mind. The official view of "Fixation" seems to
be that the only non-question-begging standard that can be imposed on a
method is that it fix belief well. Tenacity tries to do so very simply
and directly, and we are supposedly shown that such a simple and direct
method won't in fact do a very good job. In (very loosely) Hegelian
fashion, as several folks have recently suggested, we learn what a
successful belief-fixing method will have to take into account in order
to work, at least for people like us (i.e. readers of papers about the
theory of inquiry). So we go from a cheap and easy attempt to satisfy
our desire for stable belief to a more sophisticated standard of
satisfaction (this is a bastardization of one of Peirce's later comments
on "Fixation," but you get the idea), and we realize that we've only
made explicit the standard that was implicitly there all along (this is
another Hegelian strand of the paper). I'm being a bit quick here, but
my suggestion is that the other methods do take into account the
psychological laws Peirce alluded to (as I read him); they even give
those laws a kind of pride of place. But they take into account a lot
of other things (disagreement, observational evidence, consistency)
*because*, given those psychological laws, nothing else will satisfy us;
nothing less will produce stable beliefs. Clearly, a lot more needs to
be said here, but my point is that I don't see anything in your message
inconsistent with this reading.
Furthermore, it just seems implausible to me that Peirce would toss in
that line about the tenacious person basing his method on two
psychological laws without giving the reader a pretty clear indication
of what he (Peirce) had in mind. I realize that this is closer to a
conclusion than an argument, but the "why didn't he say X if he meant
X?" style of objection that you offered to my reading of the passage
seems to me more persuasive when used against your reading. I think
that some sense can be made of what he meant by "based on" in that
passage. I may well be wrong. But as a group it doesn't seem to me
that we've gotten very far in developing an account of what he expected
the reader to understand by the "two psychological laws," and that does
seem to me an important desideratum.
Sorry that this is a bit quick. I'll continue participating in the
discussion if my internet access permits me to do so.
Jeff
Joseph Ransdell wrote:
Jeff Kasser (JK) says:
JK: First, I'm not sure what sort of special relationship the two
psychological laws in question need to bear to the method of
tenacity. If they're in fact psychological (i.e. psychical) laws,
then it would be unsurprising if the other methods of inquiry made
important use of them. I thought that the only special connection
between the laws and tenacity is that the method tries to deploy those
laws simply and directly.
REPLY
(by JR = Joe Ransdell):
JR: Peirce says, of the tenacious believer:
". . . if he only succeeds -- basing his method, as he does, on two
fundamental psychological laws . . .".
That seems to me plainly to be saying that the method of tenacity is
based on two fundamental psychological laws. It would be odd for him
to say "basing his method, like every other is based, on two
psychological laws" in a passage in which he is explaining that method
in particular. And if he wanted to say that this method is different
from the others in that it applies these laws "simply and directly"
whereas the others do not then I would expect him to say something to
indicate what an indirect and complicated use of them would be like.
Also, to say that use of such laws (whatever they may be) occurs in
all four methods would contradict what he frequently says in the
drafts of the essay and seems to think especially important there but
which does not appear in the final version of the paper except in "How
to Make Our Ideas Clear", where it is not emphasized as being of
special importance, namely, that in the fourth method the conclusions
reached are different from what was held at the beginning of the
inquiry. This is true in two ways. First, because in the fourth
method one concludes to something from premises (the starting points)
which are not identical to the conclusion with which the inquiry ends;
and, second, because, sometimes, at least, the starting points of
different inquirers in the same inquiring community in relation to the
same question will be different because the initial observations
which function as the basis for the conclusions ultimately drawn are
different (as in the passage two or three pages from the end of "How
to Make Our Ideas Clear" about investigation into the velocity of
light.) Great weight is put upon that sort of convergence as at least
frequently occurring in the use of the fourth method. Moreover, the
third method is not one in which use of the two laws is characteristic
since it depends upon a tendency for people to come to agreement in
the course of discussion over some period of time though they do not
agree initially. (There is no convergence toward truth but only
toward agreement, since use of the third method in respect to the same
question in diverse communities can result in the settlement of
opinion by agreement in diverse communities which will, however, often
leave the various communities is disagreement with one another about
what they have severally come to internal agreement on.
There is something of importance going on in his understanding of this
particular point, Jeff, about the relationship of the starting points
of inquiry to the conclusion of it that has to do with the logic of
the movement from the first to the fourth method, as is evident in the
draft material from 1872 in Writings 3, but is more difficult to
discern in the final version where the discussion of the four methods
is partially in the Ideas article as well as the Fixation article,
which are really all of a piece.
JK: Next, can you help me see more clearly how the passage you quote
in support of your suggestion that Peirce has in mind laws concerning
the properties of neural tissue, etc. is supposed to yield *two*
psychological (in any sense of "psychological," since you rightly
point out that idioscopic laws might be fair game at this point)
laws? I don't love my interpretation and would like to find a way of
reading Peirce as clearer and less sloppy about this issue. But I
don't see how your reading leaves us with two laws that Peirce could
have expected the reader to extract from the text.
JR: I don't think he necessarily expected the readers to extract them
from the text, Jeff, since it would not be necessary for his purposes
there for the reader to do so. It is possible that in fact he did
provide some explicit clues, at least, to what he had in mind in some
draft version not yet generally available, but I don't find any place
in what is in print (in Writings 3 and CP 7 in the section on the
Logic of l873) where there is any explicit attempt at identifying
them. It may only be a learned allusion to what someone of the time
would be familiar with from the inquiries into psychological matters
that were starting up around that time in Europe.
If they pertained to the first method but not the fourth he would
not have any logical need to make sure that the reader knew what he
was alluding to, given that his aim in the paper was primarily to
establish an understanding of the fourth method only. As regards why
I think the two psychological laws might have had something to do with
neural responsiveness, I say this because of the reference to that
sort of consideration at the end of section 3 of the Fixation
article. Whatever these laws are, though, they would have to be ones
that could be instantiated by the will of the person threatened with
the prospect of losing a belief, such that a result would be the
reinforcement of the shaky belief such as would be involved in
deliberately avoiding any further exposure to possible doubt-inducing
ideas and in the repeating of reassuring experiences. But how to
formulate anything like that which might pass muster as a
psychological law simply escapes me.
Joe
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
----- Original Message ----
From: Jeff Kasser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Peirce Discussion Forum <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Thursday, October 5, 2006 2:15:49 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What
This is intriguing stuff, Joe and I'd like to hear more about what you
have in mind.
First, I'm not sure what sort of special relationship the
two psychological laws in question need to bear to the method of
tenacity. If they're in fact psychological (i.e. psychical) laws,
then it would be unsurprising if the other methods of inquiry made
important use of them. I thought that the only special connection
between the laws and tenacity is that the method tries to deploy those
laws especially simply and directly.
Next, can you help me see more clearly how the passage you quote in
support of your suggestion that Peirce has in mind laws concerning the
properties of neural tissue, etc. is supposed to yield *two*
psychological (in any sense of ""psychological," since you rightly
point out that idioscopic laws might be fair game at this point)
laws? I don't love my interpretation and would like to find a way of
reading Peirce as clearer and less sloppy about this issue. But I
don't see how your reading leaves us with two laws that Peirce could
have expected the reader to extract from the text.
Thanks to you and to both Jims and the other participants; Ithis
discussion makes me resolve to do less lurking on the list (though
I've so resolved before).
Jeff
-----Original Message-----
From: Joseph Ransdell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2006 15:57:59 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce
referring to?
Jeff Kasser says:
JK: First, as to the question in the heading of your initial message,
it seems to me that Peirce can only be referring to the antecedents of
the two conditional statements that motivate the method of tenacity in
the first place. These are stated in the first sentence of Section V
of "Fixation." "If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of
inquiry, and if belief is of the nature of a habit, why should we not
attain the desired end, by taking any answer to a question which we
may fancy, and constantly reiterating it to ourselves, dwelling on all
which may conduce to that belief, and learning to turn with contempt
and hatred from anything which might disturb it." In the context of
the paper, this would seem to make fairly straightforward sense of the
idea that tenacity rests on "two fundamental psychological
laws." Peirce sure seems to think that it should be apparent to the
reader on which "laws" tenacity rests, and so I don't think we're to
wander too far afield
from the paper itself in determining which the laws are.
REPLY:
JR: The more I think about it the less plausible it seems to me that
either of these is what he meant by the two "psychological
laws". What would the second one be: If x is a belief then x is a
habit? That doesn't even sound like a law. And as regards the first,
what exactly would it be? If a belief is arrived at then inquiry
ends? Or: If inquiry has ended then a belief has been arrived
at? But nothing like either of these seems much like something he
might want to call a psychological law. Moreover, why would he
single out the method of tenacity as based on these when they are
equally pertinent to all four methods? He does say earlier that "the
FEELING of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being
established in our nature some habit which will determine our
actions". That is more like a law, in the sense he might have in
mind, but that has to do with a correlation between a feeling and an
occurrence of a belief establishment and, again,
there is no special relationship there to the method of tenacity in
particular.
I suggest that the place to look is rather at the simple description
of the method of tenacity he gives at the very beginning of his
discussion of it when he says
"… why should we not attain the desired end by taking as answer to a
question any we may fancy, and constantly reiterating it to ourselves,
dwelling on all which may conduce to that belief, and learning to turn
with contempt and hatred from anything that might disturb it?"
This involves reiteration of effort with anticipation of it having a
result in consequence of it , and thus implicitly makes reference to a
possible sequential regularity of a lawlike nature. The two
psychological laws might then be idioscopic rather than coenoscopic
laws, having to do with the responsiveness of neural tissue to
repeated stimulation and the like, which Peirce would know something
about. It doesn't make any difference that it is not cenoscopic or
properly philosophical since he is referring to it as something the
devotee of tenacity exploits, not as something logic is based
upon. This means that in referring to the two laws he is NOT
referring to the basic principle that inquiry is driven by doubt,
construed as constituted by what would be logically described as a
formal contradiction.
Now, as regards that principle, the idea that inquiry -- thinking in
the sense of "I just can't seem to think today" or "he is a competent
thinker" -- is driven by doubt in the form of an
exerienced contradiction is not a modern idea but has its origins at
the very beginning of philosophy in the West in the practice of the
dialectical craft of Socrates. Let me quote myself, from a paper I
wrote a few years back, on the Socratic tradition in philosophy, which
I claim to be the proper logical tradition to which we should be
putting Peirce in relation
In its origins Socratic dialectic probably developed as a
modification of practices of eristic dispute that made use
of the reductio techniques of the mathematicians, perhaps
as especially modified by the Parmenidean formalists.
Socratic dialectic differs importantly from the earlier
argumentation, though, in at least two major respects,
first, by conceiving of the elenchic or refutational aspect of
the argumentation not as a basis from which one could then
derive a positive conclusion either as the contradictory of
the proposition refuted, as in reductio argumentation, or
by affirming the alternative because it was the sole
alternative available, but rather as inducing an aporia or
awareness of an impasse in thought: subjectively, a
bewilderment or puzzlement. Second, it differs also by using
the conflicting energies held in suspense in the aporia as the
motivation of inquiry. (Ransdell, "Peirce and the Socratic
Tradition in Philosophy", Proceedings of the Peirce Society, 2000)
http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/socratic.htm
Peirce could take this for granted not because of some well known
psychological laws but because of the adoption (in a modified form) of
the basic dialectical principle by Hegel and others, following upon
the use of it in the Kantian philosophy in the transcendental
dialectic of pure reason in the First Critique. I do not say that
this should also satisfy us today as sufficient to persuade us to the
acceptance of the thesis that inquiry is driven by doubt, construed as
a "dissatisfaction at two repugnant propositions". But it is possible
that Peirce did, at the time of composition of the Fixation article,
think that this would be regarded as being something no one would be
likely to dispute, or at least as something which no reader of the
Popular Science Monthly would be likely to dispute. (That Journal
was, as I understand it, a rough equivalent of the present day Nature
as regards its targeted audience, whereas the Scientific American at
that time was oriented more
towards applications and inventions than theoretical science.) It is
not obvious that logic should be based in a theory of inquiry, but it
is not clear to me that Peirce regarded that as something which had to
be argued for. In any case, none of this affects your thesis about
Peirce not regarding the Fixation as suffering from psychologism.
I have a couple of other comments to make, Jeff, but I will put them
in another message which I probably won't write before tomorrow.
Joe Ransdell
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
----- Original Message ----
From: Jeff Kasser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Peirce Discussion Forum <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Sunday, October 1, 2006 3:04:13 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce
referring to?
Joe and other listers,
Thanks, Joe, for your kind words about my paper. I fear that you make
the paper sound a bit more interesting than it is, and you certainly
do a better job of establishing its importance than I did. It's
something of a cut-and paste job from my dissertation, and I'm afraid
the prose is sometimes rather "dissertationy," which is almost never a
good thing.
First, as to the question in the heading of your initial message, it
seems to me that Peirce can only be referring to the antecedents of
the two conditional statements that motivate the method of tenacity in
the first place. These are stated in the first sentence of Section V
of "Fixation." "If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of
inquiry, and if belief is of the nature of a habit, why should we not
attain the desired end, by taking any answer to a question which we
may fancy, and constantly reiterating it to ourselves, dwelling on all
which may conduce to that belief, and learning to turn with contempt
and hatred from anything which might disturb it." In the context of
the paper, this would seem to make fairly straightforward sense of the
idea that tenacity rests on "two fundamental psychological
laws." Peirce sure seems to think that it should be apparent to the
reader on which "laws" tenacity rests, and so I don't think we're to
wander too far afield from
the paper itself in determining which the laws are.
This interpretation does have two disadvantages, however. If my paper
is at all close to right, then Peirce considered these laws
"psychical" rather than "psychological," in the 1870's as well as in
the 1860's and in the latter half of his career (I don't mean that he
had the term "psychical" available in 1877, however). But this is one
of those places where the fact that Peirce was writing for *Popular
Science Monthly* can perhaps be invoked to account for some
terminological sloppiness. A second consideration is a bit more
troublesome, however. It's not easy to see how Peirce could have
considered "the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry" a
psychical or a psychological law. It seems charitable here to see
Peirce as writing a bit casually once again and to construe him as
meaning that the statement in question is a normative truth more or
less forced on us by psychological (i.e. psychical) facts. But, as
the following quote from another of your
messages indicates, Peirce was pretty quick to close the is/ought gap
with respect to this issue:
The following axiom requires no comment, beyond the remark that it
seems often to be forgotten. Where there is no real doubt or
disagreement there is no question and can be no real investigation.
So perhaps he really meant that a statement about the aim of iqnuiry
could be a (coenscopic) psychological law. This raises an issue you
mention in yet another message, viz. what exactly makes doubts
"paper" or otherwise inappropriate. There's been some good work done
on this issue, but I think Peirce's confidence that the coenscopic
data rather directly warrants his methodological conclusions is
puzzling and I'm trying to wrestle with this problem these days.
I'd like to add to remarks about your message concerning my 1999
paper, neither of which amounts to a disagreement. First, I'm
inclined to supplement your valuable considerations about the
coenscopic sense of "mind." You focus on some of our locutions
concerning minds like ours, and I'd just add the Peircean thought that
the coenscopic notion of "mindedness" extends to cases at some remove
from the human exemplar. Even something as simple as a sensor is
going to, as Peirce sees matters, need belief-like states (ways of
storing information, assumptions about what the world is like, etc.)
and doubt-like states (ways in which the world can get the sensor's
attention). This needs some working out, but Peirce seems to think
that the doubt-belief theory will hold of anything that can play a
certain role (perhaps picked out communicatively) in inquiry.
Finally, I should note that I'm perhaps less confident than you are,
Joe, that Peirce's apparent complaints about the "psychological" basis
of "Fixation" and "How To" are primarily admissions of a rhetorical
failure in allowing those who don't understand psychologism to accuse
Peirce thereof. That may account for some such passages, but I
suspect that in some cases Peirce had in mind his preferred (at the
time) notion of a philosophical grounding (in phenomenology or
semiotics or the normative sciences, etc.) and was faulting himself
for not providing a sufficiently "deep" argument for some of his
methodological claims, especially the pragmatic maxim. But you and I
are in agreement on the central point, which is that Peirce was not
accusing himself of anything worth calling psychologism.
Best to all,
Jeff
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