I've always been puzzled about this "quid pro quo" theory of the Religion Clauses. There is no "religion as a source of values and beliefs"; there are *religions* (or denominations) as a source of values and beliefs. Many of them may share many values, but they will also differ on many values and goals. The members of the religions will be different, too. True, there are some cultural battles in which secularists are aligned on one side and religious observers of many faiths on another. But those are only a small fraction of all potential battles over values and beliefs, it seems to me; and even in those, a person's religious denomination is likely to be as important as his felt religiosity. Is there much reason to believe that the religions -- or, perhaps more importantly, religious believers -- benefited by rigorous Free Exercise Clause protection will be the same as the ones burdened by a rigorously enforced Establishment Clause? Historically, Catholics have been quite burdened by a rigorous Establishment Clause, and have gotten very few benefits from the Free Exercise Clause, even when it was relatively rigorous. (They might have gotten some benefits from religious accommodations, such as the sacramental wine exemption, but not from the Free Exercise Clause as such.) On the other hand, the Amish have gotten some benefits from a rigorous Free Exercise Clause, but it's not clear that they have been much burdened by the Establishment Clause, even when it was relatively rigorous. I'm not even sure that the benefits of a rigorous Free Exercise Clause and the burdens imposed by a rigorous Establishment Clause will even out if you aggregate the effects on all the religions. But I don't see how such an aggregation would be proper. Or am I mistaken? Eugene Alan Brownstein writes: There are two religion clauses. They should not be interpreted in isolation from each other without regard to their impact on religion as a source of values and beliefs and as a cultural and political influence on society. Proponents of a rigorously enforced Establishment clause ought to recognize the limits placed on religion by this mandate and should support rigorous free exercise protection for religious institutions and practice. Similarly, proponents of a vigorously enforced free exercise jurisprudence should appreciate the advantages constitutional protection provides and accept Establishment Clause restrictions on the state promotion of religion. That's only part of the picture in interpreting the religion clauses, but it is certainly an important part.
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