I think Marty's second point below about the Court's somewhat positive reception to the least restrictive means argument is important because it provides a basis for resolving this case in Hobby Lobby's favor that is relatively limited in its application. Clement argues that this is a unique case because it is simply about who should pay for insurance coverage that could easily be provided by the government or other private entities (insurers). Clement explicitly distinguishes this case from cases involving religious objections to anti-discrimination laws because the government cannot mitigate the harms to third parties if accommodations to such laws are granted.
If the Court accepts that argument in its opinion, the door would be open for for-profit, privately held businesses to assert RFRA claims, but the opinion would say little to encourage claimants to believe that they would succeed on the merits in such lawsuits when there is harm to third parties that cannot be avoided by alternative regulatory approaches -- which is the case when anti-discrimination laws are at issue. Alan ________________________________ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] on behalf of Marty Lederman [lederman.ma...@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, March 25, 2014 1:19 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Hobby Lobby transcript is here: http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13-354_5436.pdf Audio should be available later in the week. I'd be curious to hear what others who attended thought of the argument. I'll mention only three things of particular note: First, several of the Justices, including Justice Kennedy, appeared to be at least somewhat sympathetic to the argument I've been stressing that the employers' religion might not be substantially burdened because they have the option of not offering a plan (which might well save them money). Second, there appeared by the end of the argument to be a very real possibility of a judgment that the government must advance its interests through the less restrictive means of offering its secondary accommodation (payment required of the issuer or the TPA) to for-profit corporations, as well. This idea seemed to have traction with Justices of varying perspectives, and neither advocate resisted it much -- indeed, Paul Clement appeared to go out of his way in rebuttal to encourage it, and to stress that he had hinted at it on page 58 of the Hobby Lobby brief. Third, Justices Alito and Scalia tried to argue that RFRA goes much further than codifying the pre-Smith FEC doctrine . . . but I am very doubtful there are five votes for that.
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