Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
I'm stepping in quite late to answer one of John's questions. He asserted that what I see is what enters my eyes and what you see is what enters your eyes, and therefore we never really see the same thing. (I am paraphrasing, obviously.) I would assert that we are in is a place where plain language philosophy can help us out. Certainly what you see is not what enters your eyes. You never see complex patterns of light, you see THINGS by virtue of your sensitivity to light. Your perceptual world is full of objects and events, and those are the things you see, hear, smell, etc. (Invoke James Gibson here.) This is why we can talk about seeing different sides of the same thing, because we agree that we are seeing the same thing. One big problem in psychology (and epistemology) is that people get a little bit of scientific knowledge and then they start loosing track of the thing to be explained. Descartes, for instance, was interested in how we see the things around us, and he did a perfectly sensible thing: He leaned about the eye ball. In so doing, he learned that there was an inverted image on the back of the retina (and for now we will avoid discussion of how ubiquitous that phenomenon). This was a perfectly legitimate discovery, and it was reasonable to think that part of the explanation for how we see objects would involve understanding the role of this inverted image. However, rather than proceed with that, Descartes suddenly started asking how we see the inverted retinal image. Uhg, so many unnecessary confusions were created by this poorly conceived question! We need to try to avoid this. Incidentally, to belatedly comment on Steve's post: I am of the opinion that most neuroimaging work in psychology is motivated by similar confusions. That is not to say that fMRI and EEG can tell us nothing, but that we are not getting anywhere trying to use it to answer such poorly conceived questions. --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: echar...@american.edu On Sat, Aug 16, 2014 at 10:36 AM, John Kennison jkenni...@clarku.edu wrote: Hi Nick, One of the problems in discussing consciousness is that it seems very hard to break it down into simpler concepts. There are what might be called high-level words such as inner life, awareness, apprehension, which suggest consciousness but only to someone who already ha a sense of what consciousness is. Whereas low level words, which refer to things that can be readily measured do not seem adequate to get at the real meaning of consciousness. So we are left with metaphors. When I use words such as access and inner life they suggest a container but they are not necessarily used to denote an actual container but to describe a situation which has some of the properties of a container. However, there does seem to be a real container that describes the information I have access to. I get raw information from my body. This is not to say that my consciousness is located in my body, but that what I know about the outside world starts with how my body senses the outside world. These senses are then processed or contemplated somehow and this results in what I think I know about the world. There is no way that I can see exactly what you see because what you see comes from your body and what I see comes from my body. If we literally mean see then what you see is what enters your eyes and what I see is what enters my eyes. You might tell me about what you see, but that is not the same as seeing what you see because what you have seen has been processed by you then reformulated in terms of speech, which is then processed by me. Even if we witnessed the same event, we would have slightly different viewpoints, and our eyes are different, and, in any case, we would start interpreting the incoming rays of light as soon as they started to enter our respective eyes. You also gave examples in which I might infer what you saw. This seems to presuppose I have a theory of what Nick is all about or some means of making inferences. (I don't have a well-articulated theory of Nick, but I do arrive at conclusions about what to make of you. I'm not certain how I do this, but I am certain that I do it all the time, quite effortlessly and almost automatically.) At any rate this drawing of inferences does not seem to be seeing exactly what you see, but a way (not necessarily very accurate) of getting a rough approximation of what you saw. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson [ nickthomp...@earthlink.net] Sent: Friday, August 15, 2014 9:07 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
Steve claimed that we could use the Turing test to tell if we met consciousness in a dark alley. I think, by Nick's earlier assertion, that is begging the question. Nick asserted that if Humans are conscious mad sense as an empirical claim, it must have been the case that our definitions of human and conscious do not entail an exclusive relationship to each other. That is, just looking at the definitions, it must have been the case that other things could have been conscious and that humans could have been not-conscious. The Turing test is to tell if the thing you are interacting with is a Human, right? But if non-human things can be conscious, then a Yes, No answer regarding human is not an answer regarding conscious. --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: echar...@american.edu On Sat, Aug 16, 2014 at 1:12 PM, Steve Smith sasm...@swcp.com wrote: Standard Disclaimer for most: TL;DR Steve, Thanks for getting into this for real. Well the language *was* a bit too easy pickings there for a moment. And I think *that* is also relevant to the conversation, even if I *was* being teasing and flippant. The dialog in place *was* as much about language as about consciousness. You were talking about abstractions like cup and card which are at some level simply idiomatic. To members of a modestly (let's say non-westernized) different culture, both cup and card would not mean the same thing and when you met in person and showed one another those artifacts, there might be as much surprise as recognition.I know this may be tangential to the intended point, but I still think it cannot be ignored? I keep starting to feel I have irresponsibly bent this thread, but then I remind myself that, to me anyway, the question of whether ant colonies have personalities is the same kind of question as the question of whether computers are conscious. I'm not a stickler about thread-bending myself, it is certainly a motivated tangent to the original. And don't be shy about changing the subject-line if you feel like you are being bendy. Just to bend/fork/twist it in another direction... I can't help but imagine that Ant Hill Art http://www.anthillart.com/ is a useful technique for trying to measure the personality of an ant colony (the same way the Israelis are trying to measure the personality of the Palestinians right now?).Other than being destructive testing to the max, can we say that such artifacts (the aluminum casts of the ant-hill) correlate with anything we might want to call personality of the ant-colony collectively? I might suggest mood would be a more appropriate metaphor, but still implying something familiar to consciousness. Is it not apt to refer to an ant colony as angry or calm or (when analyzing the nest structure) curious or withdrawn or aggressive? How it gets answered depends on the kind of question one takes it to be. It could be a question of fact, in which case the answer must begin with some sort of straight-forward definition of what would constitute a personality or a consciousness: how we would recognize a personality or a consciousness if we met it on a dark street in the middle of the night. Turing Test. Right? Or it could be a question of metaphysics, in which case the answer concerns the most central, and closely held presumptions of the answerer's thought. My sense is that you and John and Frank WANT the question to be of the first type, but that it is, for you truly, a question of the second type. I believe that the question *has* a significant component of the second type and that the first type is the only thing that has a chance to be measured directly. At worst, the first type of question suffers from perceptual and semantic differences, while the second suffers from being at some point strictly grounded in shared axioms. You START with the notion that at the core of every human being is an inner, private space from which she or he speaks, and without that presumption, all thought must stop. I can't quite parse this completely. I *do* think this is how we operate, or at least this is how I subjectively feel that *I* operate and for the sake of sanity or at least social embeddedness, I assume others operate in a sufficiently similar manner. I'm not sure what thought is if it isn't mediated by (if not entirely originating from) the neurological (highly coupled with and informed by the vascular, the lymphatic, etc.) system of the body. I'm not beyond granting some ground to those who want to suggest that our individual, confined to our own body, neurological systems are somehow coupled with those of others in overt (visual, aural, pheremonal, etc.) ways, or even through shared
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
John, So, in a snapshot I think A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical, however, I think it would be disingenuous to say that we could not tell them apart through interaction over time. This issue is not whether or not it is easy, but merely whether it is possible. I guess the question boils down to how you respond to challenges about philosophical zombies. These discussions normally begin with someone asserting You can imagine things that behave exactly like you and I in all ways, but not conscious. The presenter then goes on to lay out a series of riddles these creatures lead to. However, I am not sure I buy the premise. I would assert that you CANNOT imagine such creatures. Can you really imagine a creature that acts exactly like you without consciousness? Perhaps you can imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog (if you have a dog) without feeling the love that you feel. But can you imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog with being aware of your dog?!? It seems like the type of claim we allow people to get away with at the start of a philosophical discussion, because it is a pretty normal seeming premise, and we all like to play such games... but if we really stopped to consider the premise, we would not let it pass. (Obviously, this need not be read as a question to you, it is a challenge to Chalmers and others who hold those views.) Eric --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: echar...@american.edu On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 1:16 PM, John Kennison jkenni...@clarku.edu wrote: Thanks Nick, I found a few statements I would revise in what I wrote. Perhaps, I should have said that my argument seems valid rather correct. I was careless in describing Chalmers' view (He said something like: A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical). And I was being presumptuous in describing Dennett as giving a great tour of the issues --I don't know that much about the issues. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson [ nickthomp...@earthlink.net] Sent: Friday, August 22, 2014 12:37 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM]BBC News- Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, Thanks for this. But now I have to read Dennett again. I am afraid my copy is in a box in Santa Fe, so may have to come over and borrow yours for a few days. But I am in somebody else's vacation cabin in NH for the moment, so it will be a while. The following is from my shaky memory. Please don't flame me, anybody; just put your arm around my shoulders and lead me from error. There appears to be a divide amongst philosophers of science concerning how much to be a rationalist. Thomas Kuhn is the classic IRRATIONALIST An awful lot of the philosophy of science that we were all taught in graduate school is irrationalist in this sense. Even Popper, who stressed the logic of deduction in his philosophy (falsification) was irrationalist in his account of where good scientific ideas come from (bold conjectures). The hallmark of an irrationalist is a tendency to put logic words in ironic quotes, such as proof or inference or truth , or to use persuasion words (intuition pumps) that avoid invoking logical relations. So, Dennett's failure to organize the book in the manner you suggest is part and parcel of his irrationalism, as is, by the way, your observation that an argument can be effective without being clear. I want to pull back a bit my distinction between metaphysical and factual. I guess I REALLY think the distinction is relative to a particular argument. In any argument, there are the facts we argue from and the facts we argue about. There is a sense in which metaphysics consists in the facts we ALWAYS argue from. I hope I haven't shot my own high horse out from under me, here. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Friday, August 22, 2014 8:35 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Nick: I find your distinction between metaphysical questions and factual questions helpful because it clarifies the vague feeling I expressed about making some sort of error when I said that consciousness is having an inner subjective life. I no longer feel it is an error but I should categorize it as a metaphysical
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
Eric, As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the denial of the other. Dennett says that a zombie is simply impossible. If we tried to create a computer that could think like a human, it would be conscious --perhaps even if it just did a good job of analyzing things the way humans did --even without loving pets, etc. (I say perhaps, because I'm not sure what Dennett actually means.) Chalmers says (I think) that even if we created a physically object that was identical to a human, it wouldn't necessarily be conscious --which I find too extreme. When I said I favored Chalmers, I meant that it seems plausible that consciousness might not simply emerge if a system behaves in a sufficiently sophisticated way. --the way the system is constructed could make a difference. But these are only top of my head guesses. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Eric Charles [eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:04 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, So, in a snapshot I think A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical, however, I think it would be disingenuous to say that we could not tell them apart through interaction over time. This issue is not whether or not it is easy, but merely whether it is possible. I guess the question boils down to how you respond to challenges about philosophical zombies. These discussions normally begin with someone asserting You can imagine things that behave exactly like you and I in all ways, but not conscious. The presenter then goes on to lay out a series of riddles these creatures lead to. However, I am not sure I buy the premise. I would assert that you CANNOT imagine such creatures. Can you really imagine a creature that acts exactly like you without consciousness? Perhaps you can imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog (if you have a dog) without feeling the love that you feel. But can you imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog with being aware of your dog?!? It seems like the type of claim we allow people to get away with at the start of a philosophical discussion, because it is a pretty normal seeming premise, and we all like to play such games... but if we really stopped to consider the premise, we would not let it pass. (Obviously, this need not be read as a question to you, it is a challenge to Chalmers and others who hold those views.) Eric --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: echar...@american.edumailto:echar...@american.edu On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 1:16 PM, John Kennison jkenni...@clarku.edumailto:jkenni...@clarku.edu wrote: Thanks Nick, I found a few statements I would revise in what I wrote. Perhaps, I should have said that my argument seems valid rather correct. I was careless in describing Chalmers' view (He said something like: A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical). And I was being presumptuous in describing Dennett as giving a great tour of the issues --I don't know that much about the issues. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.commailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson [nickthomp...@earthlink.netmailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net] Sent: Friday, August 22, 2014 12:37 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM]BBC News- Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, Thanks for this. But now I have to read Dennett again. I am afraid my copy is in a box in Santa Fe, so may have to come over and borrow yours for a few days. But I am in somebody else's vacation cabin in NH for the moment, so it will be a while. The following is from my shaky memory. Please don't flame me, anybody; just put your arm around my shoulders and lead me from error. There appears to be a divide amongst philosophers of science concerning how much to be a rationalist. Thomas Kuhn is the classic IRRATIONALIST An awful lot of the philosophy of science that we were all taught in graduate school is irrationalist in this sense. Even Popper, who stressed the logic of deduction in his philosophy (falsification) was irrationalist in his account of where good scientific ideas come from (bold conjectures). The hallmark of an irrationalist is a tendency to put logic words in ironic quotes, such as proof or inference or truth , or to use persuasion words (intuition pumps) that avoid invoking logical
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
Hey, wait a minute, guys! You have lost me. What is this consciousness of which you speak. I am not sure I have one and I need you to describe it to me in a way that I can recognize it. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:50 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Eric, As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the denial of the other. Dennett says that a zombie is simply impossible. If we tried to create a computer that could think like a human, it would be conscious --perhaps even if it just did a good job of analyzing things the way humans did --even without loving pets, etc. (I say perhaps, because I'm not sure what Dennett actually means.) Chalmers says (I think) that even if we created a physically object that was identical to a human, it wouldn't necessarily be conscious --which I find too extreme. When I said I favored Chalmers, I meant that it seems plausible that consciousness might not simply emerge if a system behaves in a sufficiently sophisticated way. --the way the system is constructed could make a difference. But these are only top of my head guesses. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Eric Charles [eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:04 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, So, in a snapshot I think A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical, however, I think it would be disingenuous to say that we could not tell them apart through interaction over time. This issue is not whether or not it is easy, but merely whether it is possible. I guess the question boils down to how you respond to challenges about philosophical zombies. These discussions normally begin with someone asserting You can imagine things that behave exactly like you and I in all ways, but not conscious. The presenter then goes on to lay out a series of riddles these creatures lead to. However, I am not sure I buy the premise. I would assert that you CANNOT imagine such creatures. Can you really imagine a creature that acts exactly like you without consciousness? Perhaps you can imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog (if you have a dog) without feeling the love that you feel. But can you imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog with being aware of your dog?!? It seems like the type of claim we allow people to get away with at the start of a philosophical discussion, because it is a pretty normal seeming premise, and we all like to play such games... but if we really stopped to consider the premise, we would not let it pass. (Obviously, this need not be read as a question to you, it is a challenge to Chalmers and others who hold those views.) Eric --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: echar...@american.edumailto:echar...@american.edu On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 1:16 PM, John Kennison jkenni...@clarku.edumailto:jkenni...@clarku.edu wrote: Thanks Nick, I found a few statements I would revise in what I wrote. Perhaps, I should have said that my argument seems valid rather correct. I was careless in describing Chalmers' view (He said something like: A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical). And I was being presumptuous in describing Dennett as giving a great tour of the issues --I don't know that much about the issues. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.commailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson [nickthomp...@earthlink.netmailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net] Sent: Friday, August 22, 2014 12:37 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM]BBC News- Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, Thanks for this. But now I have to read Dennett again. I am afraid my copy is in a box in Santa Fe, so may have to come over and borrow yours for a few days. But I am in somebody else's vacation cabin in NH for the moment, so it will be a while. The following is from my shaky memory. Please don't flame me, anybody; just put your arm around my shoulders and lead me from error. There appears to be a divide amongst philosophers of science
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
Hey, wait a minute, guys! You have lost me. What is this consciousness of which you speak. I am not sure I have one and I need you to describe it to me in a way that I can recognize it. No you don't... and if you don't know that, then you are not a truly conscious being, but rather a clever simulacrum of one. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:50 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Eric, As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the denial of the other. Dennett says that a zombie is simply impossible. If we tried to create a computer that could think like a human, it would be conscious --perhaps even if it just did a good job of analyzing things the way humans did --even without loving pets, etc. (I say perhaps, because I'm not sure what Dennett actually means.) Chalmers says (I think) that even if we created a physically object that was identical to a human, it wouldn't necessarily be conscious --which I find too extreme. When I said I favored Chalmers, I meant that it seems plausible that consciousness might not simply emerge if a system behaves in a sufficiently sophisticated way. --the way the system is constructed could make a difference. But these are only top of my head guesses. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Eric Charles [eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:04 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, So, in a snapshot I think A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical, however, I think it would be disingenuous to say that we could not tell them apart through interaction over time. This issue is not whether or not it is easy, but merely whether it is possible. I guess the question boils down to how you respond to challenges about philosophical zombies. These discussions normally begin with someone asserting You can imagine things that behave exactly like you and I in all ways, but not conscious. The presenter then goes on to lay out a series of riddles these creatures lead to. However, I am not sure I buy the premise. I would assert that you CANNOT imagine such creatures. Can you really imagine a creature that acts exactly like you without consciousness? Perhaps you can imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog (if you have a dog) without feeling the love that you feel. But can you imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog with being aware of your dog?!? It seems like the type of claim we allow people to get away with at the start of a philosophical discussion, because it is a pretty normal seeming premise, and we all like to play such games... but if we really stopped to consider the premise, we would not let it pass. (Obviously, this need not be read as a question to you, it is a challenge to Chalmers and others who hold those views.) Eric --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: echar...@american.edumailto:echar...@american.edu On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 1:16 PM, John Kennison jkenni...@clarku.edumailto:jkenni...@clarku.edu wrote: Thanks Nick, I found a few statements I would revise in what I wrote. Perhaps, I should have said that my argument seems valid rather correct. I was careless in describing Chalmers' view (He said something like: A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical). And I was being presumptuous in describing Dennett as giving a great tour of the issues --I don't know that much about the issues. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.commailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson [nickthomp...@earthlink.netmailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net] Sent: Friday, August 22, 2014 12:37 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM]BBC News- Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, Thanks for this. But now I have to read Dennett again. I am afraid my copy is in a box in Santa Fe, so may have to come over and borrow yours for a few days. But I am in somebody else's vacation cabin in NH for the moment, so it will be a while. The following is from my shaky memory. Please don't flame me, anybody; just
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
Rebuttal by shame! If you have to ask you can't afford it. -- rec -- On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Steve Smith sasm...@swcp.com wrote: Hey, wait a minute, guys! You have lost me. What is this consciousness of which you speak. I am not sure I have one and I need you to describe it to me in a way that I can recognize it. No you don't... and if you don't know that, then you are not a truly conscious being, but rather a clever simulacrum of one. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:50 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Eric, As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the denial of the other. Dennett says that a zombie is simply impossible. If we tried to create a computer that could think like a human, it would be conscious --perhaps even if it just did a good job of analyzing things the way humans did --even without loving pets, etc. (I say perhaps, because I'm not sure what Dennett actually means.) Chalmers says (I think) that even if we created a physically object that was identical to a human, it wouldn't necessarily be conscious --which I find too extreme. When I said I favored Chalmers, I meant that it seems plausible that consciousness might not simply emerge if a system behaves in a sufficiently sophisticated way. --the way the system is constructed could make a difference. But these are only top of my head guesses. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Eric Charles [eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:04 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, So, in a snapshot I think A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical, however, I think it would be disingenuous to say that we could not tell them apart through interaction over time. This issue is not whether or not it is easy, but merely whether it is possible. I guess the question boils down to how you respond to challenges about philosophical zombies. These discussions normally begin with someone asserting You can imagine things that behave exactly like you and I in all ways, but not conscious. The presenter then goes on to lay out a series of riddles these creatures lead to. However, I am not sure I buy the premise. I would assert that you CANNOT imagine such creatures. Can you really imagine a creature that acts exactly like you without consciousness? Perhaps you can imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog (if you have a dog) without feeling the love that you feel. But can you imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog with being aware of your dog?!? It seems like the type of claim we allow people to get away with at the start of a philosophical discussion, because it is a pretty normal seeming premise, and we all like to play such games... but if we really stopped to consider the premise, we would not let it pass. (Obviously, this need not be read as a question to you, it is a challenge to Chalmers and others who hold those views.) Eric --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: echar...@american.edumailto:echar...@american.edu On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 1:16 PM, John Kennison jkenni...@clarku.edumailto:jkenni...@clarku.edu wrote: Thanks Nick, I found a few statements I would revise in what I wrote. Perhaps, I should have said that my argument seems valid rather correct. I was careless in describing Chalmers' view (He said something like: A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical). And I was being presumptuous in describing Dennett as giving a great tour of the issues --I don't know that much about the issues. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.commailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson [nickthomp...@earthlink.netmailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net] Sent: Friday, August 22, 2014 12:37 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM]BBC News- Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, Thanks for this. But now I have to read Dennett again. I am afraid my copy
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
Rebuttal by shame! If you have to ask you can't afford it. grin you saw right through me! -- rec -- On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Steve Smith sasm...@swcp.com mailto:sasm...@swcp.com wrote: Hey, wait a minute, guys! You have lost me. What is this consciousness of which you speak. I am not sure I have one and I need you to describe it to me in a way that I can recognize it. No you don't... and if you don't know that, then you are not a truly conscious being, but rather a clever simulacrum of one. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://home.earthlink.net/%7Enickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:50 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Eric, As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the denial of the other. Dennett says that a zombie is simply impossible. If we tried to create a computer that could think like a human, it would be conscious --perhaps even if it just did a good job of analyzing things the way humans did --even without loving pets, etc. (I say perhaps, because I'm not sure what Dennett actually means.) Chalmers says (I think) that even if we created a physically object that was identical to a human, it wouldn't necessarily be conscious --which I find too extreme. When I said I favored Chalmers, I meant that it seems plausible that consciousness might not simply emerge if a system behaves in a sufficiently sophisticated way. --the way the system is constructed could make a difference. But these are only top of my head guesses. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Eric Charles [eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com mailto:eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:04 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, So, in a snapshot I think A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical, however, I think it would be disingenuous to say that we could not tell them apart through interaction over time. This issue is not whether or not it is easy, but merely whether it is possible. I guess the question boils down to how you respond to challenges about philosophical zombies. These discussions normally begin with someone asserting You can imagine things that behave exactly like you and I in all ways, but not conscious. The presenter then goes on to lay out a series of riddles these creatures lead to. However, I am not sure I buy the premise. I would assert that you CANNOT imagine such creatures. Can you really imagine a creature that acts exactly like you without consciousness? Perhaps you can imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog (if you have a dog) without feeling the love that you feel. But can you imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog with being aware of your dog?!? It seems like the type of claim we allow people to get away with at the start of a philosophical discussion, because it is a pretty normal seeming premise, and we all like to play such games... but if we really stopped to consider the premise, we would not let it pass. (Obviously, this need not be read as a question to you, it is a challenge to Chalmers and others who hold those views.) Eric --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 tel:%28202%29%20885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 tel:%28202%29%20885-1190 email: echar...@american.edu
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
But you are nonetheless correct. All this reminds me of the old joke: A skeptic asks God, How do I know that I exist? God replies, And who is asking? Frank Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz Santa Fe, NM 87505 mailto:wimber...@gmail.com wimber...@gmail.com mailto:wimbe...@cal.berkeley.edu wimbe...@cal.berkeley.edu Phone: (505) 995-8715 Cell: (505) 670-9918 From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Steve Smith Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:41 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Rebuttal by shame! If you have to ask you can't afford it. grin you saw right through me! -- rec -- On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Steve Smith sasm...@swcp.com wrote: Hey, wait a minute, guys! You have lost me. What is this consciousness of which you speak. I am not sure I have one and I need you to describe it to me in a way that I can recognize it. No you don't... and if you don't know that, then you are not a truly conscious being, but rather a clever simulacrum of one. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://home.earthlink.net/%7Enickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:50 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Eric, As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the denial of the other. Dennett says that a zombie is simply impossible. If we tried to create a computer that could think like a human, it would be conscious --perhaps even if it just did a good job of analyzing things the way humans did --even without loving pets, etc. (I say perhaps, because I'm not sure what Dennett actually means.) Chalmers says (I think) that even if we created a physically object that was identical to a human, it wouldn't necessarily be conscious --which I find too extreme. When I said I favored Chalmers, I meant that it seems plausible that consciousness might not simply emerge if a system behaves in a sufficiently sophisticated way. --the way the system is constructed could make a difference. But these are only top of my head guesses. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Eric Charles [eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:04 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, So, in a snapshot I think A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical, however, I think it would be disingenuous to say that we could not tell them apart through interaction over time. This issue is not whether or not it is easy, but merely whether it is possible. I guess the question boils down to how you respond to challenges about philosophical zombies. These discussions normally begin with someone asserting You can imagine things that behave exactly like you and I in all ways, but not conscious. The presenter then goes on to lay out a series of riddles these creatures lead to. However, I am not sure I buy the premise. I would assert that you CANNOT imagine such creatures. Can you really imagine a creature that acts exactly like you without consciousness? Perhaps you can imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog (if you have a dog) without feeling the love that you feel. But can you imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog with being aware of your dog?!? It seems like the type of claim we allow people to get away with at the start of a philosophical discussion, because it is a pretty normal seeming premise, and we all like to play such games... but if we really stopped to consider the premise, we would not let it pass. (Obviously, this need not be read as a question to you, it is a challenge to Chalmers and others who hold those views.) Eric --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 tel:%28202%29%20885-3867fax: (202) 885-1190 tel:%28202%29%20885-1190 email: echar...@american.edumailto:echar...@american.edu On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 1:16 PM, John Kennison jkenni...@clarku.edumailto:jkenni...@clarku.edu wrote: Thanks Nick, I found a few statements I would revise in what I wrote. Perhaps, I should have said that my argument seems valid rather correct. I was careless in describing Chalmers' view (He said something like: A
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
So, now we move to the next step of the argument: On what basis do any of you confidently assert that I am conscious when I say I am not? Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 1:06 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment But you are nonetheless correct. All this reminds me of the old joke: A skeptic asks God, How do I know that I exist? God replies, And who is asking? Frank Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz Santa Fe, NM 87505 mailto:wimber...@gmail.com wimber...@gmail.com mailto:wimbe...@cal.berkeley.edu wimbe...@cal.berkeley.edu Phone: (505) 995-8715 Cell: (505) 670-9918 From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Steve Smith Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:41 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Rebuttal by shame! If you have to ask you can't afford it. grin you saw right through me! -- rec -- On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Steve Smith sasm...@swcp.com mailto:sasm...@swcp.com wrote: Hey, wait a minute, guys! You have lost me. What is this consciousness of which you speak. I am not sure I have one and I need you to describe it to me in a way that I can recognize it. No you don't... and if you don't know that, then you are not a truly conscious being, but rather a clever simulacrum of one. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://home.earthlink.net/%7Enickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com ] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:50 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Eric, As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the denial of the other. Dennett says that a zombie is simply impossible. If we tried to create a computer that could think like a human, it would be conscious --perhaps even if it just did a good job of analyzing things the way humans did --even without loving pets, etc. (I say perhaps, because I'm not sure what Dennett actually means.) Chalmers says (I think) that even if we created a physically object that was identical to a human, it wouldn't necessarily be conscious --which I find too extreme. When I said I favored Chalmers, I meant that it seems plausible that consciousness might not simply emerge if a system behaves in a sufficiently sophisticated way. --the way the system is constructed could make a difference. But these are only top of my head guesses. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com ] on behalf of Eric Charles [eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com mailto:eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com ] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:04 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, So, in a snapshot I think A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical, however, I think it would be disingenuous to say that we could not tell them apart through interaction over time. This issue is not whether or not it is easy, but merely whether it is possible. I guess the question boils down to how you respond to challenges about philosophical zombies. These discussions normally begin with someone asserting You can imagine things that behave exactly like you and I in all ways, but not conscious. The presenter then goes on to lay out a series of riddles these creatures lead to. However, I am not sure I buy the premise. I would assert that you CANNOT imagine such creatures. Can you really imagine a creature that acts exactly like you without consciousness? Perhaps you can imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog (if you have a dog) without feeling the love that you feel. But can you imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog with being aware of your dog?!? It seems like the type of claim we allow people to get away with at the start of a philosophical discussion, because it is a pretty normal seeming premise, and we all like to play such games... but if we really stopped to consider the premise, we would not let it pass. (Obviously, this need not be read as a question
[FRIAM] Android Fragmentation Report August 2014 - OpenSignal
My current ancient ios iphone 4s is finally on its last legs. So I'm looking to decide between the new iPhone 6 reportedly available next month the various android devices. My ecology is basically google, so android would be preferred from that standpoint. So, this popped up in a newsletter: http://opensignal.com/reports/2014/android-fragmentation/ Now fragmentation is not a bad thing, just difficult for folks to manage, especially developers. But what is interesting is just how rich the android ecology is, but also how diverse. And yes, the article is careful to point out samsung dominance and consider some of its specific fragmentation issues/advantages. It's a well considered, non fanboi article, useful for folks deciding between various devices and form factors. I did ask an android friend at Friam how he deletes apps on his phone. He couldn't delete the ones we tried, basically samsung built-in annoyances. Anyone know how? -- Owen FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
If you say you are not conscious, I defer to your superior knowledge of the subject (you). Frank P.s. Nick and I have been through this argument before. Sent from my Verizon 4G LTE Phone (505) 670--9918 On Aug 24, 2014 11:43 AM, Nick Thompson nickthomp...@earthlink.net wrote: So, now we move to the next step of the argument: On what basis do any of you confidently assert that I am conscious when I say I am not? Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank Wimberly *Sent:* Sunday, August 24, 2014 1:06 PM *To:* 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment But you are nonetheless correct. All this reminds me of the old joke: A skeptic asks God, “How do I know that I exist?” God replies, “And who is asking?” Frank Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz Santa Fe, NM 87505 wimber...@gmail.com wimbe...@cal.berkeley.edu Phone: (505) 995-8715 Cell: (505) 670-9918 *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Steve Smith *Sent:* Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:41 AM *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Rebuttal by shame! If you have to ask you can't afford it. grin you saw right through me! -- rec -- On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Steve Smith sasm...@swcp.com wrote: Hey, wait a minute, guys! You have lost me. What is this consciousness of which you speak. I am not sure I have one and I need you to describe it to me in a way that I can recognize it. No you don't... and if you don't know that, then you are not a truly conscious being, but rather a clever simulacrum of one. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:50 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Eric, As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the denial of the other. Dennett says that a zombie is simply impossible. If we tried to create a computer that could think like a human, it would be conscious --perhaps even if it just did a good job of analyzing things the way humans did --even without loving pets, etc. (I say perhaps, because I'm not sure what Dennett actually means.) Chalmers says (I think) that even if we created a physically object that was identical to a human, it wouldn't necessarily be conscious --which I find too extreme. When I said I favored Chalmers, I meant that it seems plausible that consciousness might not simply emerge if a system behaves in a sufficiently sophisticated way. --the way the system is constructed could make a difference. But these are only top of my head guesses. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Eric Charles [eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:04 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, So, in a snapshot I think A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical, however, I think it would be disingenuous to say that we could not tell them apart through interaction over time. This issue is not whether or not it is easy, but merely whether it is possible. I guess the question boils down to how you respond to challenges about philosophical zombies. These discussions normally begin with someone asserting You can imagine things that behave exactly like you and I in all ways, but not conscious. The presenter then goes on to lay out a series of riddles these creatures lead to. However, I am not sure I buy the premise. I would assert that you CANNOT imagine such creatures. Can you really imagine a creature that acts exactly like you without consciousness? Perhaps you can imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog (if you have a dog) without feeling the love that you feel. But can you imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog with being aware of your dog?!? It seems like the type of claim we allow people to get away with at the start of a philosophical discussion, because it is a pretty normal seeming premise, and we all like to play such games... but if we really
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
Nick, Consciousness is a term that is discussed by philosophers. If you don't have one you have proved half of Chalmers' position that it is possible for zombies (humans who lack this mysterious thing called consciousness) to exist. Th other half of Chalmers' position is that conscious humans also exist. I think I provide such an example. Chalmers would then (I suspect) conclude that consciousness is not completely physical as there seem to be no obvious physical differences that would explain which humans have consciousness and which do not. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson [nickthomp...@earthlink.net] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 12:05 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Hey, wait a minute, guys! You have lost me. What is this consciousness of which you speak. I am not sure I have one and I need you to describe it to me in a way that I can recognize it. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:50 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Eric, As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the denial of the other. Dennett says that a zombie is simply impossible. If we tried to create a computer that could think like a human, it would be conscious --perhaps even if it just did a good job of analyzing things the way humans did --even without loving pets, etc. (I say perhaps, because I'm not sure what Dennett actually means.) Chalmers says (I think) that even if we created a physically object that was identical to a human, it wouldn't necessarily be conscious --which I find too extreme. When I said I favored Chalmers, I meant that it seems plausible that consciousness might not simply emerge if a system behaves in a sufficiently sophisticated way. --the way the system is constructed could make a difference. But these are only top of my head guesses. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Eric Charles [eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:04 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, So, in a snapshot I think A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical, however, I think it would be disingenuous to say that we could not tell them apart through interaction over time. This issue is not whether or not it is easy, but merely whether it is possible. I guess the question boils down to how you respond to challenges about philosophical zombies. These discussions normally begin with someone asserting You can imagine things that behave exactly like you and I in all ways, but not conscious. The presenter then goes on to lay out a series of riddles these creatures lead to. However, I am not sure I buy the premise. I would assert that you CANNOT imagine such creatures. Can you really imagine a creature that acts exactly like you without consciousness? Perhaps you can imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog (if you have a dog) without feeling the love that you feel. But can you imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog with being aware of your dog?!? It seems like the type of claim we allow people to get away with at the start of a philosophical discussion, because it is a pretty normal seeming premise, and we all like to play such games... but if we really stopped to consider the premise, we would not let it pass. (Obviously, this need not be read as a question to you, it is a challenge to Chalmers and others who hold those views.) Eric --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: echar...@american.edumailto:echar...@american.edu On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 1:16 PM, John Kennison jkenni...@clarku.edumailto:jkenni...@clarku.edu wrote: Thanks Nick, I found a few statements I would revise in what I wrote. Perhaps, I should have said that my argument seems valid rather correct. I was careless in describing Chalmers' view (He said something like: A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical). And I was being presumptuous in describing Dennett as giving a great tour of the issues --I don't know that much
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
In case anyone cares, the argument ends like this: I am forced into the extreme, but unassailable, position that I have consciousness as I conceptualize it but that I can't demonstrate that anyone or anything else has it. Nick's conclusion, I think, is that certain entities have an illusion that they have consciousness (behavior) but cannot explain what it is. But I may be wrong about the latter. Frank Sent from my Verizon 4G LTE Phone (505) 670--9918 On Aug 24, 2014 11:46 AM, Frank Wimberly wimber...@gmail.com wrote: If you say you are not conscious, I defer to your superior knowledge of the subject (you). Frank P.s. Nick and I have been through this argument before. Sent from my Verizon 4G LTE Phone (505) 670--9918 On Aug 24, 2014 11:43 AM, Nick Thompson nickthomp...@earthlink.net wrote: So, now we move to the next step of the argument: On what basis do any of you confidently assert that I am conscious when I say I am not? Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank Wimberly *Sent:* Sunday, August 24, 2014 1:06 PM *To:* 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment But you are nonetheless correct. All this reminds me of the old joke: A skeptic asks God, “How do I know that I exist?” God replies, “And who is asking?” Frank Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz Santa Fe, NM 87505 wimber...@gmail.com wimbe...@cal.berkeley.edu Phone: (505) 995-8715 Cell: (505) 670-9918 *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Steve Smith *Sent:* Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:41 AM *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Rebuttal by shame! If you have to ask you can't afford it. grin you saw right through me! -- rec -- On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Steve Smith sasm...@swcp.com wrote: Hey, wait a minute, guys! You have lost me. What is this consciousness of which you speak. I am not sure I have one and I need you to describe it to me in a way that I can recognize it. No you don't... and if you don't know that, then you are not a truly conscious being, but rather a clever simulacrum of one. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:50 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Eric, As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the denial of the other. Dennett says that a zombie is simply impossible. If we tried to create a computer that could think like a human, it would be conscious --perhaps even if it just did a good job of analyzing things the way humans did --even without loving pets, etc. (I say perhaps, because I'm not sure what Dennett actually means.) Chalmers says (I think) that even if we created a physically object that was identical to a human, it wouldn't necessarily be conscious --which I find too extreme. When I said I favored Chalmers, I meant that it seems plausible that consciousness might not simply emerge if a system behaves in a sufficiently sophisticated way. --the way the system is constructed could make a difference. But these are only top of my head guesses. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Eric Charles [eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:04 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, So, in a snapshot I think A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical, however, I think it would be disingenuous to say that we could not tell them apart through interaction over time. This issue is not whether or not it is easy, but merely whether it is possible. I guess the question boils down to how you respond to challenges about philosophical zombies. These discussions normally begin with someone asserting You can imagine things that behave exactly like you and I in all ways, but not conscious. The presenter then goes on to lay out a series of riddles these creatures lead to. However, I am not sure I buy the premise. I would assert that you CANNOT imagine such creatures. Can you really
Re: [FRIAM] Android Fragmentation Report August 2014 - OpenSignal
Owen sed: My current ancient ios iphone 4s is finally on its last legs. And here I feel like my iPhone 4 is downright brandy new! I've only immersed it and tore it down twice so far... It's got at least one more good dunking in it! And despite my most fierce attempts, the gorilla glass *is* tough! That said, I'm amazed at how far all of these devices (and ecology, and market) have come in a short 7? years, pretty much since the first iPhone was released (07?). Next upgrade, I'm likely to try a phablet such as the upcoming Galaxy Note 4 with a 1080p 5 screen, planned to go into the Oculus Rift as well... so... just drop it into Google Cardboard and wheee! I rarely put my phone to my ear anymore, using either headphones or speaker phone and as I more and more need reading glasses for smart-phone sized text, I will appreciate all the real-estate I can get, as long as it still fits in a pocket! Eventually they will get big enough to be harder to misplace! - Steve So I'm looking to decide between the new iPhone 6 reportedly available next month the various android devices. My ecology is basically google, so android would be preferred from that standpoint. So, this popped up in a newsletter: http://opensignal.com/reports/2014/android-fragmentation/ Now fragmentation is not a bad thing, just difficult for folks to manage, especially developers. But what is interesting is just how rich the android ecology is, but also how diverse. And yes, the article is careful to point out samsung dominance and consider some of its specific fragmentation issues/advantages. It's a well considered, non fanboi article, useful for folks deciding between various devices and form factors. I did ask an android friend at Friam how he deletes apps on his phone. He couldn't delete the ones we tried, basically samsung built-in annoyances. Anyone know how? -- Owen FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
I guess the question boils down to how you respond to challenges about philosophical zombies. These discussions normally begin with someone asserting You can imagine things that behave exactly like you and I in all ways, but not conscious. The presenter then goes on to lay out a series of riddles these creatures lead to. However, I am not sure I buy the premise. Thank you for saying this, Eric. I was reluctant to pick up this thread, because I haven't read Chalmers at length and sympathetically. What I normally get is a version of the statements above, followed with some kind of assertion that it is therefore logically possible that... exist etc. I find such statements completely incomprehensible, and I am unable to understand why anyone else thinks they have content (not that my finding something incomprehensible is a significant observation). But, since people on this list have proved generous in having their time wasted, let me try to explain why I am unable to distinguish any of this from full nonsense. Let me hereby declare to the list that I am able to imagine the existence of perpetual motion machines (First or second kind, your choice.) What is the status of that sentence? It has the virtue that the terms in it actually have definitions, which means I can address the question what its status is, something I cannot do for the foregoing statements about consciousness. It takes a bit of unpacking, which I won't waste everyone's time doing, but in the end, the notation of perpetual motion machine can be resolved to mean a sequence of successive states of matter that the laws of physics show do not exist as successive slices within any material history. Said another way, a thing that is identified by not existing. What then does it mean that I am able to make a declarative statement about imagining something for which the word, correctly resolved, has no referent? I would say it means that the above sentence satisfies the basic filters of English syntax. Good for it. Since when were the rules of syntax believed to carry more than a first-line filter against meaninglessness? Sentences in which the tokens -- marked as parts of speech by the morphology we give them -- are consistent with the rules of syntax, and in which the words themselves have not been given any reliable definition, do not seem to me to carry any logical status at all. Hence I do not see under what rule of logic it is logically possible that what I can imagine could exist, apart from the transformation rules of syntax. I don't mean, here, to refuse discussions that are carried out in approximate terms; often they are the best we can do. My point is only that, when one is as far into the fog as this topic is, and there is a choice between assuming something magical, versus simply assuming that you don't know what you are talking about and the rules of syntax don't provide much help or protection, the latter seems to me more plausible. The discussion of perpetual motion machines just provides an example where the anal-retentive can dot the i's and cross the t's to verify that it is indeed possible to make statements in which one does not know what one is talking about. Eric FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Re: [FRIAM] Android Fragmentation Report August 2014 - OpenSignal
Good observations. I'm also interested in the phablets so am hoping the (presumed) larger iPhone6 at 5.5 inches might be interesting. Had a long chat at Friam with a Note 3 in hand, and it sure is a different experience than the large phones. Let us know what you find out. -- Owen On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 1:25 PM, Steve Smith sasm...@swcp.com wrote: Owen sed: My current ancient ios iphone 4s is finally on its last legs. And here I feel like my iPhone 4 is downright brandy new! I've only immersed it and tore it down twice so far... It's got at least one more good dunking in it! And despite my most fierce attempts, the gorilla glass *is* tough! That said, I'm amazed at how far all of these devices (and ecology, and market) have come in a short 7? years, pretty much since the first iPhone was released (07?). Next upgrade, I'm likely to try a phablet such as the upcoming Galaxy Note 4 with a 1080p 5 screen, planned to go into the Oculus Rift as well... so... just drop it into Google Cardboard and wheee! I rarely put my phone to my ear anymore, using either headphones or speaker phone and as I more and more need reading glasses for smart-phone sized text, I will appreciate all the real-estate I can get, as long as it still fits in a pocket! Eventually they will get big enough to be harder to misplace! - Steve So I'm looking to decide between the new iPhone 6 reportedly available next month the various android devices. My ecology is basically google, so android would be preferred from that standpoint. So, this popped up in a newsletter: http://opensignal.com/reports/2014/android-fragmentation/ Now fragmentation is not a bad thing, just difficult for folks to manage, especially developers. But what is interesting is just how rich the android ecology is, but also how diverse. And yes, the article is careful to point out samsung dominance and consider some of its specific fragmentation issues/advantages. It's a well considered, non fanboi article, useful for folks deciding between various devices and form factors. I did ask an android friend at Friam how he deletes apps on his phone. He couldn't delete the ones we tried, basically samsung built-in annoyances. Anyone know how? -- Owen FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
I think your answer to that question is the only one possible under your epistemology. But then, given that I DO all the things that I do, “you” (in the non-adhominem sense) lose the ability to infer from some entity doing conscious-ish sorts of things that such entities are conscious, right? N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 1:46 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment If you say you are not conscious, I defer to your superior knowledge of the subject (you). Frank P.s. Nick and I have been through this argument before. Sent from my Verizon 4G LTE Phone (505) 670--9918 On Aug 24, 2014 11:43 AM, Nick Thompson nickthomp...@earthlink.net mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net wrote: So, now we move to the next step of the argument: On what basis do any of you confidently assert that I am conscious when I say I am not? Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com ] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 1:06 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment But you are nonetheless correct. All this reminds me of the old joke: A skeptic asks God, “How do I know that I exist?” God replies, “And who is asking?” Frank Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz Santa Fe, NM 87505 mailto:wimber...@gmail.com wimber...@gmail.com mailto:wimbe...@cal.berkeley.edu wimbe...@cal.berkeley.edu Phone: (505) 995-8715 tel:%28505%29%20995-8715 Cell: (505) 670-9918 tel:%28505%29%20670-9918 From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Steve Smith Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:41 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Rebuttal by shame! If you have to ask you can't afford it. grin you saw right through me! -- rec -- On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Steve Smith sasm...@swcp.com mailto:sasm...@swcp.com wrote: Hey, wait a minute, guys! You have lost me. What is this consciousness of which you speak. I am not sure I have one and I need you to describe it to me in a way that I can recognize it. No you don't... and if you don't know that, then you are not a truly conscious being, but rather a clever simulacrum of one. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://home.earthlink.net/%7Enickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com ] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:50 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Eric, As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the denial of the other. Dennett says that a zombie is simply impossible. If we tried to create a computer that could think like a human, it would be conscious --perhaps even if it just did a good job of analyzing things the way humans did --even without loving pets, etc. (I say perhaps, because I'm not sure what Dennett actually means.) Chalmers says (I think) that even if we created a physically object that was identical to a human, it wouldn't necessarily be conscious --which I find too extreme. When I said I favored Chalmers, I meant that it seems plausible that consciousness might not simply emerge if a system behaves in a sufficiently sophisticated way. --the way the system is constructed could make a difference. But these are only top of my head guesses. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com ] on behalf of Eric Charles [eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com mailto:eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com ] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:04 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, So, in a snapshot I think A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical, however, I think it would be disingenuous to say that we could not
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
John, Well, actually my position is not that I am not conscious, but that your operating definition of consciousness has little to do with anybody's answer to the question Are you conscious? and everything to do with patterns of doing. Frank is the only participant in this argument who disagrees with me about what consciousness is, and yet applies his definition consistently. I think. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 2:49 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Nick, Consciousness is a term that is discussed by philosophers. If you don't have one you have proved half of Chalmers' position that it is possible for zombies (humans who lack this mysterious thing called consciousness) to exist. Th other half of Chalmers' position is that conscious humans also exist. I think I provide such an example. Chalmers would then (I suspect) conclude that consciousness is not completely physical as there seem to be no obvious physical differences that would explain which humans have consciousness and which do not. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson [nickthomp...@earthlink.net] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 12:05 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Hey, wait a minute, guys! You have lost me. What is this consciousness of which you speak. I am not sure I have one and I need you to describe it to me in a way that I can recognize it. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:50 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Eric, As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the denial of the other. Dennett says that a zombie is simply impossible. If we tried to create a computer that could think like a human, it would be conscious --perhaps even if it just did a good job of analyzing things the way humans did --even without loving pets, etc. (I say perhaps, because I'm not sure what Dennett actually means.) Chalmers says (I think) that even if we created a physically object that was identical to a human, it wouldn't necessarily be conscious --which I find too extreme. When I said I favored Chalmers, I meant that it seems plausible that consciousness might not simply emerge if a system behaves in a sufficiently sophisticated way. --the way the system is constructed could make a difference. But these are only top of my head guesses. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Eric Charles [eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:04 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, So, in a snapshot I think A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical, however, I think it would be disingenuous to say that we could not tell them apart through interaction over time. This issue is not whether or not it is easy, but merely whether it is possible. I guess the question boils down to how you respond to challenges about philosophical zombies. These discussions normally begin with someone asserting You can imagine things that behave exactly like you and I in all ways, but not conscious. The presenter then goes on to lay out a series of riddles these creatures lead to. However, I am not sure I buy the premise. I would assert that you CANNOT imagine such creatures. Can you really imagine a creature that acts exactly like you without consciousness? Perhaps you can imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog (if you have a dog) without feeling the love that you feel. But can you imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog with being aware of your dog?!? It seems like the type of claim we allow people to get away with at the start of a philosophical discussion, because it is a pretty normal seeming premise, and we all like to play such games... but if we really stopped to consider the premise, we would not let it pass. (Obviously, this need not be read as a question to you, it is a challenge to Chalmers and others who hold those views.)
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
I may be unwinding here, but now I must contradict my assertion a moment ago that your position is consistent. Despite your definition of consciousness, your surely behave as if Ginger is conscious, do you not? So, while you are consistent with in accepting that your definition excludes me from consciousness, your behavior with respect to me (and Ginger) emphatically belies your reliance on your own definition, does it not? Now this argument could turned on me. When I say that I believe that consciousness is a high-order pattern in behavior, a pattern of patterns, if you will, is my assertion consistent with my behavior? Or do I actually behave as if I think I and others act from an inner awareness, inaccessible to others. I don’t think I do the latter, but, of course, it remains to be seen. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 2:55 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment In case anyone cares, the argument ends like this: I am forced into the extreme, but unassailable, position that I have consciousness as I conceptualize it but that I can't demonstrate that anyone or anything else has it. Nick's conclusion, I think, is that certain entities have an illusion that they have consciousness (behavior) but cannot explain what it is. But I may be wrong about the latter. Frank Sent from my Verizon 4G LTE Phone (505) 670--9918 On Aug 24, 2014 11:46 AM, Frank Wimberly wimber...@gmail.com mailto:wimber...@gmail.com wrote: If you say you are not conscious, I defer to your superior knowledge of the subject (you). Frank P.s. Nick and I have been through this argument before. Sent from my Verizon 4G LTE Phone (505) 670--9918 tel:%28505%29%20670--9918 On Aug 24, 2014 11:43 AM, Nick Thompson nickthomp...@earthlink.net mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net wrote: So, now we move to the next step of the argument: On what basis do any of you confidently assert that I am conscious when I say I am not? Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com ] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 1:06 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment But you are nonetheless correct. All this reminds me of the old joke: A skeptic asks God, “How do I know that I exist?” God replies, “And who is asking?” Frank Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz Santa Fe, NM 87505 mailto:wimber...@gmail.com wimber...@gmail.com mailto:wimbe...@cal.berkeley.edu wimbe...@cal.berkeley.edu Phone: (505) 995-8715 tel:%28505%29%20995-8715 Cell: (505) 670-9918 tel:%28505%29%20670-9918 From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Steve Smith Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:41 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Rebuttal by shame! If you have to ask you can't afford it. grin you saw right through me! -- rec -- On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Steve Smith sasm...@swcp.com mailto:sasm...@swcp.com wrote: Hey, wait a minute, guys! You have lost me. What is this consciousness of which you speak. I am not sure I have one and I need you to describe it to me in a way that I can recognize it. No you don't... and if you don't know that, then you are not a truly conscious being, but rather a clever simulacrum of one. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://home.earthlink.net/%7Enickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com ] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:50 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Eric, As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the denial of the other. Dennett says that a zombie is simply impossible. If we tried to create a computer that could think like a human, it would be conscious --perhaps even if it just did a good job of analyzing things the way
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
On 8/24/2014 1:30 PM, Eric Smith wrote: The discussion of perpetual motion machines just provides an example where the anal-retentive can dot the i's and cross the t's to verify that it is indeed possible to make statements in which one does not know what one is talking about. I'm torn: Nihilism or Constructor Theory? :-) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0zeT2npYf18 FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Re: [FRIAM] Android Fragmentation Report August 2014 - OpenSignal
On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 2:59 PM, Robert Holmes rob...@robertholmes.org wrote: On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Owen Densmore o...@backspaces.net wrote: My current ancient ios iphone 4s is finally on its last legs. That's the iphone 4s that came out in Octiober 2011? i.e. less than 3 years ago? I'm curious, what are the features that you really, really need and don't have in your 'ancient' phone? ;) It's a bit slow, for one thing. And in my experience, phones start failing at this age. It's way out of contract too, so a new phone would be pretty cheap I'm also interested in the larger screens. I find the tiny screen makes browser use pretty bad. Oh, and I also need better performance, especially with webgl development. -- Owen FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
Nick, Yes, I think Ginger (dog) has consciousness and I behave as if she does. She declines to discuss it. I don't exclude you from consciousness I just defer to your assertion that you don't have it. You behave as if you have it but how can I contradict your claim that you don't? You say consciousness is a pattern of patterns and I say, approximately, it's what I experience. You might say that water is H2O and I say it's what I drink. Both are true? I'm not so sure about the patterns. Frank (505) 670--9918 On Aug 24, 2014 3:13 PM, Nick Thompson nickthomp...@earthlink.net wrote: I may be unwinding here, but now I must contradict my assertion a moment ago that your position is consistent. Despite your definition of consciousness, your surely behave as if Ginger is conscious, do you not? So, while you are consistent with in accepting that your definition excludes me from consciousness, your behavior with respect to me (and Ginger) emphatically belies your reliance on your own definition, does it not? Now this argument could turned on me. When I say that I believe that consciousness is a high-order pattern in behavior, a pattern of patterns, if you will, is my assertion consistent with my behavior? Or do I actually behave as if I think I and others act from an inner awareness, inaccessible to others. I don’t think I do the latter, but, of course, it remains to be seen. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank Wimberly *Sent:* Sunday, August 24, 2014 2:55 PM *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment In case anyone cares, the argument ends like this: I am forced into the extreme, but unassailable, position that I have consciousness as I conceptualize it but that I can't demonstrate that anyone or anything else has it. Nick's conclusion, I think, is that certain entities have an illusion that they have consciousness (behavior) but cannot explain what it is. But I may be wrong about the latter. Frank Sent from my Verizon 4G LTE Phone (505) 670--9918 On Aug 24, 2014 11:46 AM, Frank Wimberly wimber...@gmail.com wrote: If you say you are not conscious, I defer to your superior knowledge of the subject (you). Frank P.s. Nick and I have been through this argument before. Sent from my Verizon 4G LTE Phone (505) 670--9918 On Aug 24, 2014 11:43 AM, Nick Thompson nickthomp...@earthlink.net wrote: So, now we move to the next step of the argument: On what basis do any of you confidently assert that I am conscious when I say I am not? Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank Wimberly *Sent:* Sunday, August 24, 2014 1:06 PM *To:* 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment But you are nonetheless correct. All this reminds me of the old joke: A skeptic asks God, “How do I know that I exist?” God replies, “And who is asking?” Frank Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz Santa Fe, NM 87505 wimber...@gmail.com wimbe...@cal.berkeley.edu Phone: (505) 995-8715 Cell: (505) 670-9918 *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Steve Smith *Sent:* Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:41 AM *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Rebuttal by shame! If you have to ask you can't afford it. grin you saw right through me! -- rec -- On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Steve Smith sasm...@swcp.com wrote: Hey, wait a minute, guys! You have lost me. What is this consciousness of which you speak. I am not sure I have one and I need you to describe it to me in a way that I can recognize it. No you don't... and if you don't know that, then you are not a truly conscious being, but rather a clever simulacrum of one. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:50 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Eric, As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the denial of
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
Nick, I hope that most people will give the answer yes to the question of whether I am conscious. I don't think of the criterion I gave as an operating definition --I don't claim it is useful in that way. It's sort of like trying to figure out whether someone did something deliberately. The actual meaning of doing something deliberately depends on certain assumptions (perhaps about consciousness) which might not be verifiable. But we can come up with a set of criteria for deciding whether we think that someone acted deliberately. We realize these criteria may mislead us, but they are better than nothing if we need to make a decision. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson [nickthomp...@earthlink.net] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 5:03 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, Well, actually my position is not that I am not conscious, but that your operating definition of consciousness has little to do with anybody's answer to the question Are you conscious? and everything to do with patterns of doing. Frank is the only participant in this argument who disagrees with me about what consciousness is, and yet applies his definition consistently. I think. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 2:49 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Nick, Consciousness is a term that is discussed by philosophers. If you don't have one you have proved half of Chalmers' position that it is possible for zombies (humans who lack this mysterious thing called consciousness) to exist. Th other half of Chalmers' position is that conscious humans also exist. I think I provide such an example. Chalmers would then (I suspect) conclude that consciousness is not completely physical as there seem to be no obvious physical differences that would explain which humans have consciousness and which do not. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson [nickthomp...@earthlink.net] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 12:05 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Hey, wait a minute, guys! You have lost me. What is this consciousness of which you speak. I am not sure I have one and I need you to describe it to me in a way that I can recognize it. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:50 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Eric, As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the denial of the other. Dennett says that a zombie is simply impossible. If we tried to create a computer that could think like a human, it would be conscious --perhaps even if it just did a good job of analyzing things the way humans did --even without loving pets, etc. (I say perhaps, because I'm not sure what Dennett actually means.) Chalmers says (I think) that even if we created a physically object that was identical to a human, it wouldn't necessarily be conscious --which I find too extreme. When I said I favored Chalmers, I meant that it seems plausible that consciousness might not simply emerge if a system behaves in a sufficiently sophisticated way. --the way the system is constructed could make a difference. But these are only top of my head guesses. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Eric Charles [eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:04 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, So, in a snapshot I think A conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical, however, I think it would be disingenuous to say that we could not tell them apart through interaction over time. This issue is not whether or not it is easy, but merely whether it is possible. I guess the question boils down to how you respond to challenges about philosophical zombies. These discussions normally begin with someone asserting You can
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
Hi, John, I think a third person definition of doing something deliberately would come very close to what I mean by self-conscious. (What we call self consciousness in ordinary language usually refers to being conscious of somebody else being conscious of what we are doing.) So, I see promise in what you say here. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 6:38 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Nick, I hope that most people will give the answer yes to the question of whether I am conscious. I don't think of the criterion I gave as an operating definition --I don't claim it is useful in that way. It's sort of like trying to figure out whether someone did something deliberately. The actual meaning of doing something deliberately depends on certain assumptions (perhaps about consciousness) which might not be verifiable. But we can come up with a set of criteria for deciding whether we think that someone acted deliberately. We realize these criteria may mislead us, but they are better than nothing if we need to make a decision. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson [nickthomp...@earthlink.net] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 5:03 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, Well, actually my position is not that I am not conscious, but that your operating definition of consciousness has little to do with anybody's answer to the question Are you conscious? and everything to do with patterns of doing. Frank is the only participant in this argument who disagrees with me about what consciousness is, and yet applies his definition consistently. I think. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 2:49 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Nick, Consciousness is a term that is discussed by philosophers. If you don't have one you have proved half of Chalmers' position that it is possible for zombies (humans who lack this mysterious thing called consciousness) to exist. Th other half of Chalmers' position is that conscious humans also exist. I think I provide such an example. Chalmers would then (I suspect) conclude that consciousness is not completely physical as there seem to be no obvious physical differences that would explain which humans have consciousness and which do not. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson [nickthomp...@earthlink.net] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 12:05 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Hey, wait a minute, guys! You have lost me. What is this consciousness of which you speak. I am not sure I have one and I need you to describe it to me in a way that I can recognize it. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:50 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Eric, As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the denial of the other. Dennett says that a zombie is simply impossible. If we tried to create a computer that could think like a human, it would be conscious --perhaps even if it just did a good job of analyzing things the way humans did --even without loving pets, etc. (I say perhaps, because I'm not sure what Dennett actually means.) Chalmers says (I think) that even if we created a physically object that was identical to a human, it wouldn't necessarily be conscious --which I find too extreme. When I said I favored Chalmers, I meant that it seems plausible that consciousness might not simply emerge if a system behaves in a sufficiently sophisticated way. --the way the system is constructed could make a difference. But these are only top of my head guesses. --John From:
Re: [FRIAM] Android Fragmentation Report August 2014 - OpenSignal
On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 4:24 PM, Tom Johnson t...@jtjohnson.com wrote: Given your Italian travel, be sure to check out the deals at T-mobile. I can talk to that. I got a Note 3 on T-mobile precisely because of the international data for when I travel to the UK. I learned the hard way that you really have to read the fine print. The unlimited service is limited internationally to 128k (OK for email, no good for Google maps) and you can't use your phone to tether. If you want 3G speeds and you want to tether you need to buy an international pass, which was $50 for 500MB. Having said that, I'm still very happy with my Note 3. (Love the camera) —R FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Re: [FRIAM] Android Fragmentation Report August 2014 - OpenSignal
I am able to scale up my international data service to something like 25g p/month for US$10. Or at least I was last January/February. -tj Tom Johnson Institute for Analytic Journalism -- Santa Fe, NM USA 505.577.6482(c)505.473.9646(h) Twitter: jtjohnson slideshare.net/jtjohnson/presentations http://www.jtjohnson.com t...@jtjohnson.com On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 4:55 PM, Robert Holmes rob...@robertholmes.org wrote: On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 4:24 PM, Tom Johnson t...@jtjohnson.com wrote: Given your Italian travel, be sure to check out the deals at T-mobile. I can talk to that. I got a Note 3 on T-mobile precisely because of the international data for when I travel to the UK. I learned the hard way that you really have to read the fine print. The unlimited service is limited internationally to 128k (OK for email, no good for Google maps) and you can't use your phone to tether. If you want 3G speeds and you want to tether you need to buy an international pass, which was $50 for 500MB. Having said that, I'm still very happy with my Note 3. (Love the camera) —R FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
The question for me is not whether one knows what one is talking about in the sense of has the knowledge to speak wisely on the subject at hand. I assume that all people have enough knowledge to speak wisely about consciousness. What puzzles me is that many speakers ... perhaps most ... never use that knowledge when called upon to define consciousness, or describe their understanding of it. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Marcus G. Daniels Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 5:39 PM To: friam@redfish.com Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment On 8/24/2014 1:30 PM, Eric Smith wrote: The discussion of perpetual motion machines just provides an example where the anal-retentive can dot the i's and cross the t's to verify that it is indeed possible to make statements in which one does not know what one is talking about. I'm torn: Nihilism or Constructor Theory? :-) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0zeT2npYf18 FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
I am willing to speak about definitions of consciousness or self-consciousness or deliberateness that depend on metaphysical assumptions and to speak of operating definitions that do not depend on these assumptions. From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson [nickthomp...@earthlink.net] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 6:54 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Hi, John, I think a third person definition of doing something deliberately would come very close to what I mean by self-conscious. (What we call self consciousness in ordinary language usually refers to being conscious of somebody else being conscious of what we are doing.) So, I see promise in what you say here. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 6:38 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Nick, I hope that most people will give the answer yes to the question of whether I am conscious. I don't think of the criterion I gave as an operating definition --I don't claim it is useful in that way. It's sort of like trying to figure out whether someone did something deliberately. The actual meaning of doing something deliberately depends on certain assumptions (perhaps about consciousness) which might not be verifiable. But we can come up with a set of criteria for deciding whether we think that someone acted deliberately. We realize these criteria may mislead us, but they are better than nothing if we need to make a decision. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson [nickthomp...@earthlink.net] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 5:03 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment John, Well, actually my position is not that I am not conscious, but that your operating definition of consciousness has little to do with anybody's answer to the question Are you conscious? and everything to do with patterns of doing. Frank is the only participant in this argument who disagrees with me about what consciousness is, and yet applies his definition consistently. I think. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 2:49 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Nick, Consciousness is a term that is discussed by philosophers. If you don't have one you have proved half of Chalmers' position that it is possible for zombies (humans who lack this mysterious thing called consciousness) to exist. Th other half of Chalmers' position is that conscious humans also exist. I think I provide such an example. Chalmers would then (I suspect) conclude that consciousness is not completely physical as there seem to be no obvious physical differences that would explain which humans have consciousness and which do not. --John From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson [nickthomp...@earthlink.net] Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 12:05 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Hey, wait a minute, guys! You have lost me. What is this consciousness of which you speak. I am not sure I have one and I need you to describe it to me in a way that I can recognize it. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:50 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment Eric, As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the denial of the other. Dennett says that a zombie is simply impossible. If we tried to create a computer that could think like a human, it would be conscious --perhaps even if it just did a good job of analyzing things the way humans did --even without loving pets, etc. (I say
Re: [FRIAM] Android Fragmentation Report August 2014 - OpenSignal
On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 11:43:31AM -0600, Owen Densmore wrote: I did ask an android friend at Friam how he deletes apps on his phone. He couldn't delete the ones we tried, basically samsung built-in annoyances. Anyone know how? -- Owen I recently went through this exercise. Those apps, I assume, are stored in ROM, and so you won't be able to delete them without also flashing the ROM (which I gather is possible, though not for the faint-hearted). The best you can do is revert to the factory version, which at least frees up any space occupied on your flash memory. Not sure how you can prevent the buggers from auto-updating the next time the phone phones home though. Other apps that you downloaded you can simply delete them from the phone, and they're gone. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by environment
Eric S., This is excellent! I think you capture the place of the naive conversationalist quite well. The next step, I think, is to move towards Orwell / Peirce. Peirce would assert, I think, that the question is more than JUST a language game, and Orwell would assert, I think, a bit of a moral imperative to take the task more seriously than that. In the Orwell / Peirce move, we assert that there must be some aspect of the world you are gesturing at with the terms perpetual motion and machine and we assert that for you to really imagine a perpetual motion machine, you must ensure there is no contradiction between what you hand wave at with those terms. That is, you must see through the consequences of your imagined device, to ensure that the consequences of one trait do not contradict the consequences of the other trait. If they contradict, then you can only imagine one or the other (or be schizophrenic in at least this limited context). Most people have a pretty good grasp on motion, and what it would mean to keep moving more-or-less forever. So, we probably have little to think about there. That means that the big question is: What do you know about machines? Most people (my naive conversationalists) know very little. On that basis, I suspect that the average person CAN imagine a perpetual motion machine - they can keep the two ideas in their heads, and their ignorance stops them from ever getting stuck in a contradiction. Peirce might not respect these people much, but at least they are not lying. On the other hand, you admitted to knowing at least a bit about how machines operate, and therefore any perpetual motion and machine you imagine will ultimately contradict itself if you take the thought experiment seriously. So, YOU cannot imagine such a machine. Or, to be a bit more technical, given your definition of such a machine: You can imagine it, but not imagine it actually existing. What happens when we do that same test with the philosophical zombie? I assert that anyone** who takes the imagination experiment seriously will conclude that they cannot imagine the philosophical zombie actually existing. This is because I think 1) That consciousness is something you do and 2) that, whether or not they would say they agree with me if asked, most people go through their day in agreement with the implications of the prior point. I think that if these people took the imagination game seriously, they could not imagine an existing entity both doing and not doing consciousness at the same time. ** This is the weird general use of anyone that doesn't include literally anyone. More like: Any decently function, reasonably old person, with a fairly normal amount of social experience, etc., etc., etc. --- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: echar...@american.edu On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 3:30 PM, Eric Smith desm...@santafe.edu wrote: I guess the question boils down to how you respond to challenges about philosophical zombies. These discussions normally begin with someone asserting You can imagine things that behave exactly like you and I in all ways, but not conscious. The presenter then goes on to lay out a series of riddles these creatures lead to. However, I am not sure I buy the premise. Thank you for saying this, Eric. I was reluctant to pick up this thread, because I haven't read Chalmers at length and sympathetically. What I normally get is a version of the statements above, followed with some kind of assertion that it is therefore logically possible that... exist etc. I find such statements completely incomprehensible, and I am unable to understand why anyone else thinks they have content (not that my finding something incomprehensible is a significant observation). But, since people on this list have proved generous in having their time wasted, let me try to explain why I am unable to distinguish any of this from full nonsense. Let me hereby declare to the list that I am able to imagine the existence of perpetual motion machines (First or second kind, your choice.) What is the status of that sentence? It has the virtue that the terms in it actually have definitions, which means I can address the question what its status is, something I cannot do for the foregoing statements about consciousness. It takes a bit of unpacking, which I won't waste everyone's time doing, but in the end, the notation of perpetual motion machine can be resolved to mean a sequence of successive states of matter that the laws of physics show do not exist as successive slices within any material history. Said another way, a thing that is identified by not existing. What then does it mean that I am able to make a declarative statement about imagining something for which the word,
Re: [FRIAM] Android Fragmentation Report August 2014 - OpenSignal
re deleting apps. apps you install and some pre installed apps uninstall easily, using the app manager or google play. some bundled apps are cooked into the OS when it is compiled. so to the OS they look like system apps, which can not be removed by your user-level access. to remove these one must get root access. if your phone is designed to make rooting the phone impossible, you may need to replace the vendor supplied version of Android with a root friendly version. many Samsung phones are relatively easy to root, without replacing the OS .there are websites dedicated to providing root instructions for various brands and models of phone. once you have root, you can get and use a so-called root uninstaller, that will list all apps, even system apps, and remove them by request. danger, don't remove system apps on a whim.what is this?I don't need/trust that feature, I'll remove it is what people about to own bricks say. rooting has other benefits. macro programs like macroDroid let you add custom behaviors to your phone.rooting gives them/you more control. I use a rooted Samsung galaxy exhibit II. On Aug 24, 2014 1:44 PM, Owen Densmore o...@backspaces.net wrote: My current ancient ios iphone 4s is finally on its last legs. So I'm looking to decide between the new iPhone 6 reportedly available next month the various android devices. My ecology is basically google, so android would be preferred from that standpoint. So, this popped up in a newsletter: http://opensignal.com/reports/2014/android-fragmentation/ Now fragmentation is not a bad thing, just difficult for folks to manage, especially developers. But what is interesting is just how rich the android ecology is, but also how diverse. And yes, the article is careful to point out samsung dominance and consider some of its specific fragmentation issues/advantages. It's a well considered, non fanboi article, useful for folks deciding between various devices and form factors. I did ask an android friend at Friam how he deletes apps on his phone. He couldn't delete the ones we tried, basically samsung built-in annoyances. Anyone know how? -- Owen FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
[FRIAM] Constructor Theory!
Marcus sed: /I'm torn: Nihilism or Constructor Theory? :-) / Very nice work... http://constructortheory.org/ Seems like it goes hand-in-glove with Stu's /Adjacent Possible/s ? http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0zeT2npYf18 FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
