[peirce-l] Re: What fundamental psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Dear Folks, I notice that Peirces lst three methods of fixing believe are part of the fourth or scientific method.Science is basically a method that gathers multiplebeliefs and combines them with reason to produce warranted belief. Individual belief (without resort to any authority other than oneself) is the method of tenacity -- I belief X because it is believable to me. When individual beliefs are combined the authority of others is introduced as a basis for belief. When these multiple beliefs (or one's individual beliefs) are combined in some reasonsed or logical way (for example taking their average) then one has has achieved the a priori or method of taste. Finally if one bases all beliefs not merely on unexamined conviction but instead relies on observation of events -- and combines multiple such observational beliefs in a reasoned way, the method of science has been achieved. Inother wordsthe three issues being juggledas a basis for belief are (1) single vs multiple beliefs (2) observation vs spontaneous conviction (3) reasoned vs unreasoned combining of beliefs. I haven't said this well but what I'm trying to get at is that the scientific method relies on multiple observation combined in a reasoned way. And this method incorporates all the essential aspect of each of the three prior methods. Science rests ultimately on combined unwarranted beliefs of individuals. At some point there must be an observation taken as face valid and this is the core of the individual observation. We know however that individual observations are inadequate because they only include one POV. So we combine multiple individual observations. I say observation, butthe term observationis just a way of directing individual beliefs to a common focus. The reasoned part of the scientific method has to do with the manner in which beliefs or observations are combined. Basically this is the logic of statistics. The simplest example being taking an average. I notice too that Peirce's discussion of knowledge provided by Joe touches on some of these same issues. BTW I don't mean for my sketchy account to be definitive -- just suggestive. So in conclusion I would say the FOB paperdescribes thethe components of the scientific method -- mulitple,individual observations or beliefs comined in a reasoned way. The basic foundation of all individual beliefs or observation is a kind of unexamined individualrealism takenat face value (tenacity).Countered bythe beliefs of others (based on the same tenacity) provides the method of authority. Combining these beliefs in a reasoned way adds the third "a priori" method. And finally insisting that these combined three methods focus on the same question introduces the notion of objectivity vs subjectivitywhich completes the elements of the scientific method for fixing belief. Sorry for the repitition. Don't have time just now to clean this up but wanted toput my two cents in the discussion. Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamental psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Dear Folks, Part of what I'm trying to say is that its not as though the scientific method were an entirely independent alternative to the other three methods. On the contrary the scientific method is built upon and incorporates the other three methods. The lst threeare not discredited methods they are the building blocks of the scienfic method. What gives sciences its power is that in combining the three methods (plus the emphasis upon observation -- which can or can not be part of the method of tenacity)it gives a more reliable basis for belief than any of the other three methods alone. But as for one and two -- yes I'd say they are the basis of the whole structure. Tenacity and authority can both include reason and observation. So if we include reason and observation in the lst two then we have all the elements of the scientific method. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamental psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Jim Piat and list: Jim, your analysis (see below) agrees with something I worked out on this from a different but complementary perspective some years ago in the process of teaching from "The Fixation of Belief" in my intro classes. I've also used it here a number of times but perhaps never explained adequately how I had derived it. I regard your analysis as a sort of verification of mine (or mine as a verification of yours) since it is clear that you did in fact come up with it from a different perspective. When that happens it is like the sort of corroboration or verification one gets which Peirce refers to in that marvelous passage where he says: ==quote Peirce CP 5.407= . . . all the followers of science are animated by a cheerful hope that the processes of investigation, if only pushed far enough, will give one certain solution to each question to which they apply it. One man may investigate the velocity of light by studying the transits of Venus and the aberration of the stars; another by the oppositions of Mars and the eclipses of Jupiter's satellites; a third by the method of Fizeau; a fourth by that of Foucault; a fifth by the motions of the curves of Lissajoux; a sixth, a seventh, an eighth, and a ninth, may follow the different methods of comparing the measures of statical and dynamical electricity. They may at first obtain different results, but, as each perfects his method and his processes, the results are found to move steadily together toward a destined centre. So with all scientific research. Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to a fore-ordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No modification of the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate opinion. This great hope is embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality. ===end quote= Anyway, my analysis goes like this. Like you, I think of the fourth method as including the first three in a sense, though I would put it more exactly as including that distinctive element in each of the three which they respectively take account of. (Whether or not it would be possible to conceive of the third method as doing something analogous with the first two, and the second method as doing something analogous with the first method -- which would make for a very nice symmetry in the whole account -- I do not know since I have never tried to work that out.) The frame I use here is the formulation for the necessary components of what I call a "primary research publication", meaning by that the kind of publication often called in the sciences a "primary publication", in which one is making a research claim in the form of a report to other researchers in the same field about a conclusion one has come to about the subject-matter of common interest to those in the field, though only provisionally, on the assumption that others will or would come to the same conclusion about it provided that they were to start from the same agreed upon understanding of the subject-matter, already and independently established and thus to be taken for granted, and on the basis of this prior agreement were to draw an inference -- described as such in this paper -- from some specified premises to the conclusion which constitutes the research claim the paper is making. In other words, in putting the paper forth as a publication one is addressing one's research colleagues -- one's research peers -- and saying, in effect: "Here is a conclusion I have come to about our subject-matter, and I believe that you -- any of you -- will agree with me on this if you start from where I am starting [the premises of this particular claim] and draw the following inference [which could be any of the three basic types of inference -- deductive, inductive, or abductive -- or any co-ordinated sequence of such inferences] to this conclusion." This could be the description either of an observational or an experimental procedure, which are essentially the same thing since a scientific observation is one which is understood to occur consequent upon certain specified conditions of observation being met. Thus implicit in the making of the research claim is something essential in each of the methods. The essential element of the first method, which concerns only the conviction of the individual (which could be an individual group or team, by the way), is there at the most fundamental level of the claim: " I have come to the following conviction or conclusion . . .
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce and knowledge
Clark and list, Thanks for the reference to Timothy Williamson.I do not see any direct connection to Peirce but one could be made in terms of factoringbeliefs or maybe dispositionsinto prime/composite and contents into narrow/broad.I don't know how all of this would work. The unpublished paper ( Can cognition be factorized into internal and external components?) I looked at was attempting to adjust the internal states of the knower to the environment in such a way that one could act on their beliefs. Part of the trick was to get the contents just "broad" enough that action goes through and the theory is workable. Supposing you want to buy a black stove, just how satisfieddo you have to be that this stove is black before you buy it? In any case, where is the principle of justification in the Baldwin quote? Condition #1 is true. Condition #2 is believed. Condition #3 is a character of a "satisfaction." Peirce says, "it would be logically impossible that this character should ever belong to satisfaction in a proposition not true." In other words, in a less than perfect cognition, one is never justified in believing a false proposition. This seems incredibly strong and parallels the ideal theory of truth. In effect, justification can only ever be approached. Jim W -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Wed, 27 Sep 2006 5:18 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Peirce and knowledge On Sep 27, 2006, at 12:19 PM, Joseph Ransdell wrote: This word is used in logic in two senses: (1) as a synonym for Cognition, and (2), and more usefully, to signify a perfect cognition, that is, a cognition fulfilling three conditions: first, that it holds for true a proposition that really is true; second, that it is perfectly self-satisfied and free from the uneasiness of doubt; third, that some character of this satisfaction is such that it would be logically impossible that this character should ever belong to satisfaction in a proposition not true. Thanks for that quote Joe. I'd not seen that one before. It's interesting to compare his (2) with the traditional sense of justified true belief. All three elements are there but the emphasis on perfectCognition makes me wonder whether he's really adopting the traditional sense at all or something more akin to a mental state ala Williamson's recent influential book. (Well, influential in a peculiar sense since no one I've met actually buys Williamson's arguments) Clark Goble --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce and knowledge
On Sep 28, 2006, at 10:56 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:Thanks for the reference to Timothy Williamson. I do not see any direct connection to PeirceNote I wasn't pushing for a direct connection. Far from it. More the idea that knowledge is a basic cognitive state. However I think Peirce clearly is an externalist although one can certainly talk about internalism in his discussions. Although I personally tend to see a lot of the externalist/internalist debate largely a semantic one. (i.e. they are debates over what certain terms mean and whether they can in their meaning be divided into external and internal components) I don't find that particular linguistic approach to philosophy helpful myself and like how Chomsky handles things - talking about mental states and then adding a superscript to be just those that are internal. (i.e. avoiding the semantic debate within philosophy entirely)In terms of Peirce I think the issue is less about mind than about the sign and internal and external aspects of the sign. In terms of mind proper I think assigning the issue of internalism to Peirce is difficult since I don't see a huge difference between Peirce's view of mind and say Davidson's anomalous monism. But that means that translating mental states or descriptions into physical ones that would make the internal/external divide meaningful is near impossible.But in terms of knowledge proper I wasn't really pushing to equate Williamson and Peirce. I think Williamson's view ends up being idiosyncratic and hard to accept. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamental psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
But I would disagree with this part of what you say, Jim. Considered simply as methods in their own rights, I don't think one wants to speak of them as being incorporated AS methods within the fourth method. As a methodic approach to answering questions the method of tenacity is surely just a kind of stupidity, and it seems to me that the turn to authority, not qualified by any further considerations -- such as, say, doing so because there is some reason to think that the authority is actually in a better position to know than one is -- apart, I say, from that sort of qualification, the turn to authority as one's method seems little more intelligent than the method of tenacity, regarded in a simplistic way. The third method, supposing that it is understood as the acceptance of something because it ties in with -- coheres with -- a system of ideas already accepted, does seem more intelligent because it is based on the properties of ideas, which is surely more sophisticated than acceptance which is oblivious of considerations of coherence. But it is also the method of the paranoid, who might reasonably be said to be unintelligent to a dangerous degree at times. But I think that what you say in your other message doesn't commit you to regarding the methods themselves as "building blocks", which is a mistaken metaphor here. It is rather that what each of them respectively appeals to is indeed something to which the fourth method appeals: the value of self-identity, the value of identification (suitably qualified) with others. the value of recognition of a universe -- all of which are redeemed as valuable in the fourth method by the addition of the appeal to the force majeure of the real given the right sort of conditions, i.e. objectiviy. Joe [EMAIL PROTECTED]/ - Original Message From: Jim Piat [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Thursday, September 28, 2006 3:56:39 AMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamental psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?Dear Folks,Part of what I'm trying to say is that its not as though the scientific method were an entirely independent alternative to the other three methods. On the contrary the scientific method is built upon and incorporates the other three methods. The lst threeare not discredited methods they are the building blocks of the scienfic method. What gives sciences its power is that in combining the three methods (plus the emphasis upon observation -- which can or can not be part of the method of tenacity)it gives a more reliable basis for belief than any of the other three methods alone. But as for one and two -- yes I'd say they are the basis of the whole structure. Tenacity and authority can both include reason and observation. So if we include reason and observation in the lst two then we have all the elements of the scientific method. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
