subject:"\[peirce\-l\] Re\: 1st image of triangle of boxes \(MS799.2\)"


Gary Richmond wrote:

Ben,  list,

It seems to me that you are quite right about the distinctly 
un-English use of the ordinals 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' by 
Peirce in the passages being considered. Capitalization is used for 
'terms defined' as he writes, for example, at the beginning of the NA 
and elsewhere.


You quoted Jean-Marc then commented:

J-MO If the sign was a First as you commented on CP 2-274 according to the 
cenopythagorean category Firstness, how would you explain that the sign taken 
in itself can be a quality (a First), an existent (a Second) or of the nature 
of a law (a Third)?
  
BU: It can be a First, a Second, etc., in various ways and respects. This is elementary stuff in Peirce.
It/ is/ elementary stuff for /tout le monde /(excepting apparently a 
few) and for the very good reasons offered in your recent analysis, at 
least for those with minds open to 'see' (not to suggest that Jim's 
isn't open--but can he see? :-)




I know at least 2 other people who don't think that this is elementary, 
and the ability to doubt is a requirement I think to gain knowledge.


1) Jon Awbrey with which you had a similar discussion on arisbe-l a year 
ago.

http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2005-June/002802.html

2) R.Marty in 1997 on peirce-l (I found this mail in my archives, I 
doubt it is available anywhere though since the peirce-l messages were 
not archived at that time)


=
From: marty [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Multiple recipients of list [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re:Back to the ground : putting in order the house?

[...] Personally I choose Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness for the 
comprehension and Primans, secondans and tertians for the elements of 
the  extension. Thus one avoids confusions with the words first, second 
and  third used as ordinals, the major confusion occurring with CP 2-274 :


..quote..

A sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine 
triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of 
determining a  Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same 
triadic relation to its Object in which it stand itself to the same Object.


end of 
quote...


It is clear that the sign isn't always a Priman (a First), otherwise how 
can we understand the classification of the signs in which the sign can 
be a priman, a secundan or a tertian? First , here, cannot be confused 
with firstness; using priman the confusion is not possible

=


/JM

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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Joseph Ransdell wrote:

Here is a verifying passage:, from the neglected Argument paper

Peirce: CP 6.452
 The word God, so capitalized (as we Americans say), is the 
definable proper name, signifying Ens necessarium; in my belief Really 
creator of all three Universes of Experience.
 Some words shall herein be capitalized when used, not as vernacular, 
but as terms defined. Thus an idea is the substance of an actual unitary 
thought or fancy; but Idea, nearer Plato's idea of {idea}, denotes 
anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully 
represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent 
it.


Joe Ransdell
  


Why not hit the search button again while you're at it?

Here are some texts where Peirce capitalizes words, to refer to ordinals:

CP 4.553
Convention the *Second;*  Of the Matter of the Scripture, and the 
Modality P1 of the Phemes expressed.


CP 4.567
The more scientific way would be to substitute for the *Second* and 
*Third* Permissions the following Permission:


CP 6.472 The purpose of Deduction, that of collecting consequents of the 
hypothesis, having been sufficiently carried out, the inquiry

enters upon its *Third* Stage

CP 2.92 A Sign is anything which is related to* a Second thing*, its 
Object, in respect to a Quality, in such a way as to bring *a Third 
thing*, its Interpretant, into relation to the same Object, and that in 
such a way as to bring *a Fourth *into relation to that Object in the 
same form, ad infinitum.


I don't see how anyone who understands English can claim that a Second 
thing, a Third thing or a Fourth do not refer to ordinals but to 
categories.


/JM



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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

Benjamin Udell wrote:

Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker!

66~~
*A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.*
~~99

Normal English? With capitalization of the ordinals, no less? In English we would say a "given thing," "a second thing," etc. English is characterized by intransigent normalcy. So Peirce is going to use some capitalized ordinals without explicit referents, as if he were talking about Firsts, Seconds, Thirds in the usual Peirce way, in order to say simply "something," "another thing," and "a third thing"? Peirce is complicated but he is not sadistic toward the reader.

but that's exactly what Peirce says in 2.92:

"A Sign is anything which is related to a Second thing,
its Object, in respect to a Quality, in such a way as to bring a Third
thing, its Interpretant, into relation to the same Object, and that
in such a way as to bring a Fourth into relation to that Object
in the same form, ad infinitum."

in other texts Peirce simply wrote "a Second ..." dropping the noun
which he probably thought was redundant and did not add any
information. Sometimes he writes explicitly "Category the Second", or
"of the nature of the Second" - in that case there is no ambiguity that
this is the category that he's referring to.

it is ironic that a Frenchman has to teach you Peirce's English, isn't
it ? ;-)

/JM

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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-23 Thread Jim Piat


Ben wrote:



Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker!



66~~
*A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine 
triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of 
detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic 
relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.*

~~99


Dear Ben, Folks--

Yes, but Peirce also wrote (chapter 20 Trichotomic of The Essential Peirce 
Vol 1 page 281  line two of paragraph two)  that  A sign is a third 
mediating between the mind addressed and the object represented.


So I find this confusing.   A Peircean categorical third is not a 
caterogical first.  A first relates only to iself. There is firstness of 
thirdness but a third is not a first. In my understanding a sign is 
pre-eminently a third. Yet, Peirce obviously does say above that a sign is a 
First that stands in such a genuinely triadic relation to a second and so 
on.   What do you make of this?  I find it contradictory to speak of  mere 
firstness functioning as thirdness.  The quality of thirdness makes sense to 
me but firstness (as a Peircean category)  in a triadic relation to 
secondness seems to me a contradiction. So I think we need to seek a 
different intepretation of Peirce when he say a sign is a First which stands 
in such genuine triadic relation to a second...


Yes, all signs(which are thirds) are also firsts because they have 
qualities.  Likewise all signs are seconds because they exist and have 
effects.  But signs are neither mere Firsts nor mere Seconds.  Furthermore, 
no First (as a mere first in Peirce's categorical sense) stand in triadic 
relations to anything because to stand in a triadic relation is the essence 
not of firstness but of thirdness.   That's the line of thinking that leads 
me to believe Jean-Marc has a point  -- at least in so far as the 
interpretation of this particular quote is concerned.


The above notwithstanding,  I do think  Peirce meant for his three 
trichotomies of signs* to highlight to certain aspects of signs which to me 
are clearly related to his theory of catergories which I take to be the 
foundation of his theory of signs.  In particular I think his first 
trichotomy forgrounds the quality of signs themselves as either 
hypotheticals, singulars or generals; the second trichotomy addresses the 
ways in which signs can refer to their objects by means of qualitative 
similarity,  existential correlation, or convention; and the the third 
trichotomy addresses the fact that a sign can represent either a  mere 
quality, an object or another sign.  For me this suggest a three by three 
matrix of sign aspects based on Peirce's categories.


As Joe cautions, Peirce's classifications of signs were a work in progress. 
All the more so for my own limited understanding of Peirce.


* I'm working from Peirce's discussion Three Trichotomies of Signs as 
presented on page 101 of Justus Buchler's _Philosophical Writings of Peirce_


Best,
Jim Piat



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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-23 Thread Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen

Benjamin,

In the discourse below, I think the cause of your problems in reasoning are
at least partly caused by misinterpretation of the qualisigns and further
aspects of the sign you are talking about at that moment. Well actually that
seems to be a logical conclusion, but I just want to say...think about it.
Best would be by applying some abduction-retroduction process there.

Make a clear division between a correlate and a non-correlate division of
trichonomies. Whether the sign you talk about belongs to the first
(correlate) or the second (non-correlate) when talking about it.

Maybe, just maybe, CS Peirce is telling us that a sign itself can not be an
actual existent or a law. Signs do not exist, or can not form a law, it are
the anothernesses around and the way of applying the signs that can lead
to an actual existen or a law. In that case, both first correlate and first
non-correlate sign are indeed always/mostly a matter of first. In the
CONTEXTS he is talking about.

About this context, I would like to address some other phrase I saw in some
other mail I received just now:

 Yes, but Peirce also wrote (chapter 20 Trichotomic of The Essential Peirce
Vol 1 page 281  line two of paragraph two)  that  A sign is a third
mediating between the mind addressed and the object represented.

IF Peirce really says so and it would be the case in HIS theory of signs,
then the sign here is another sign then the sign mentioned in places where
he says a sign is first (correlate?) or a mode of firstness. I myself think
it has to do with the context of thoughts and non-thoughts. But am not sure
about that just some first thought of me without having read enough for
proving it or so. Just mention this because it might be valuable for
insight. Difference in context or the sign itself may be some other
difference of course.

Kind regards,

Wilfred

-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Verzonden: vrijdag 23 juni 2006 8:22
Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum
Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

Gary, Joe, list,

Thank you but -- of course! -- I've run into a problem that has bothered far
better scholars than me.

Peirce: CP 2.238
238. Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, according
as the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively, is a mere
possibility, an actual existent, or a law. These three trichotomies, taken
together, divide all triadic relations into ten classes [see footnote to
235]. These ten classes will have certain subdivisions according as the
existent correlates are individual subjects or individual facts, and
according as the correlates that are laws are general subjects, general
modes of fact, or general modes of law.

So I said, if the sign is a mere quality, then it's a qualisign, and that
raises the question of what it would be if it were an actual existent or a
law.
But if the sign were an actual existent, that would just as well raise the
question of what it would be if it were a quality or a law.
And so forth.

So I haven't really shown that the first trichotomy arises especially when
First is a mere possibility, and the second trichotomy arises especially
when the Second Correlate is an actual existent, and the third trichotomy
arises especially when the Third Correlate is a law. Instead, well, yes,
when the Third Correlate is a law, then the sign may be rheme, dicisign, or
argument. But when the Second Correlate is an actual existent, I say its
sign may be an icon or an index. And it goes downhill from there.


Can I squeeze out a solution where I say, the Second Trichotomy doesn't
arise until the Second Correlation is at least an actual existent, because
othewise it is a mere possibility, to be represented only by a qualisign,
and not even be distinct from the qualisign? Well, then why can't an iconic
sinsign represent a mere possibility? Maybe because the possibility must
have some actualized aspects, even if only very partial ones, in order for
its qualisign to be embodied in an iconic sinsign. But then I'd have to work
out a way where the interpretant isn't really distinct from sign  object
unless the interpretant is a law (and is a legisign). I don't know about
this direction.

Now, let's see whether I over-interpreted the word respectively.

CP238. Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy,
according as the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively, is
a mere possibility, an actual existent, or a law.

Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, according as
the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively =
Respective trichotomies for the First, Second, Third correlates

and that respectively does not further cross-reference such as to lead to

according as the First Correlate is a mere possibility, or as the Second
Correlate is an actual existent, or as the Third Correlate is a law.

That would have been a second respectively

[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-23 Thread Gary Richmond





Jim, Ben, List, 

Jim Piat wrote:
Yes, but Peirce also wrote (chapter 20 Trichotomic of The
Essential Peirce Vol 1 page 281 line two of paragraph two) that "A
sign is a third mediating between the mind addressed and the object
represented".
  
  
So I find this confusing. 

There are so many complexities in all this, Jim, that I am sure this
must be an on-going discussion. But please forgive my earlier 'fresh'
comment as these are issues which surely need to be addressed. As for
the TRICHOTOMIC document (which I am very familiar with since it was
one of the core documents--along with A Guess at the Riddle) which got
me thinking about developing Peirce's applied science of trichotomic as
trikonic, that is, in diagrammatic form. Now you can imagine that the
very passage you refer to had me bug-eyed on first reading. I think,
however, that one has to consider the various ways the term 'sign' is
used in Peirce as he struggles as a 'backwoodsman' with his new science
of semeiotic and its terminology. In the following excerpt, for
example, which introduces a very famous passage defining the sign
relationship, Peirce makes a point of distinguishing representamina
from signs. Now there's been for sure a great deal of controversy about
what this particular passage means. Peirce writes:
CP 1.540 .. . . I must begin the examination
of representation by defining representation a little more accurately.
In the first place, as to my terminology, I confine the word
representation to the operation of a sign or its relation to the object
for the interpreter of the representation. The concrete subject that
represents I call a sign or a representamen. I use these two words,
sign and representamen, differently. 

As suggested, I can't say that his ensuing comments actually clarify
this issue. But in any event they lead to the famous passage:
CP 1.541 My definition of a representamen is as
follows:
 A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second,
called its OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic
relation being such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant
to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some
interpretant.
Now here it seem clear enough to at least some scholars (for example,
Kelly Parker in his monograph on continuity in Peirce) that he is
talking about a genuine triadic relationship in the categorial
sense in which the representamen is a first (suspending for a
moment the possible other ways in which 'sign' might be employed as in
the TRICHOTOMIC passage you referred to--btw, do you or anyone else
know of any other place where he refers to 'sign' as a third?) I know
only of this one, which I think may illuminate the passage being
considered in so far as Peirce notes that "in genuine Thirdness, the
first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds."
CP 1.537 Now in genuine Thirdness, the first,
the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or
thought, while in respect to one another they are first, second, and
third. The first is thought in its capacity as mere possibility; that
is, mere mind capable of thinking, or a mere vague idea. The second is
thought playing the role of a Secondness, or event. That is, it is of
the general nature of experience or information. The third is thought
in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the information into the
mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is informing
thought, or cognition. But take away the psychological or accidental
human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a
sign.
CP 1.538 Every sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it
can only be a sign of that object in so far as that object is itself of
the nature of a sign or thought. For the sign does not affect the
object but is affected by it; so that the object must be able to convey
thought, that is, must be of the nature of thought or of a sign. Every
thought is a sign.
But I won't say more about this passage just yet as I was just reminded
of it and need to reflect more on it. But is is at least suggestive
to me as to a way to possibly proceed.

But continuing, why, you ask, should a sign be a first? Peirce suggests
that the answer is because a representamen within this genuine triadic
semeiotic relationship has a 'character' (early on, the ground)--now,
character, quality, etc. are firstnesses:
CP 1.564 . . . A very broad and important class
of triadic characters [consists of] representations. A representation
is that character of a thing by virtue of which, for the production of
a certain mental effect, it may stand in place of another thing. The
thing having this character I term a representamen, the mental effect,
or thought, its interpretant, the thing for which it stands, its object.
One sees that this trichotomic relationship will flow into and finally
characterize even the very branches of logic as semeiotic so that
Peirce writes:
CP 2.229 . In

[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-23 Thread Gary Richmond





PS I should have added this excerpt in relation to the TRICHOTOMIC
passage as it reminds us that categorial Thirdness == mediation and
that all three elements in a genuine trichotomic relationship mediate
between the other two in some sense. 
CP 1.328 I. . .. Thirdness, in the sense of the
category, is the same as mediation. For that reason, pure dyadism is an
act of arbitrary will or of blind force; for if there is any reason, or
law, governing it, that mediates between the two subjects and brings
about their connection. The dyad is an individual fact, as it
existentially is; and it has no generality in it. The being of a
monadic quality is a mere potentiality, without existence. Existence is
purely dyadic.
and this one where we learn that "Thirdness. . .is only a synonym for
Representation."
CP 5.104 Now Thirdness is nothing but the
character of an object which embodies Betweenness or Mediation in its
simplest and most rudimentary form; and I use it as the name of that
element of the phenomenon which is predominant wherever Mediation is
predominant, and which reaches its fullness in Representation.
CP 5.105 . Thirdness, as I use the term, is only a synonym for
Representation, to which I prefer the less colored term because its
suggestions are not so narrow and special as those of the word
Representation. Now it is proper to say that a general principle that
is operative in the real world is of the essential nature of a
Representation and of a Symbol because its modus operandi is the same
as that by which words produce physical effects. Nobody can deny that
words do produce such effects. Take, for example, that sentence of
Patrick Henry which, at the time of our Revolution, was repeated by
every man to his neighbor:
and this one in which we are reminded that in Peirce's thinking that
"the three categories. . .have in truth [an] enormous importance for
thought."
CP 5.77 Fn P1 Para 1/3 p 52 Grant me that the
three categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, or Quality,
Reaction, and Representation, have in truth the enormous importance for
thought that I attribute to them, and it would seem that no division of
theories of metaphysics could surpass in importance a division based
upon the consideration of what ones of the three categories each of
different metaphysical systems have fully admitted as real constituents
of nature.


Gary Richmond wrote:

  
  
Jim, Ben, List, 
  
Jim Piat wrote:
  Yes, but Peirce also wrote (chapter 20 Trichotomic of The
Essential Peirce Vol 1 page 281 line two of paragraph two) that "A
sign is a third mediating between the mind addressed and the object
represented". 

So I find this confusing. 
  
  


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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)





Gary Richmond wrote:

  
  
...btw, do you or anyone else
know of any other place where he refers to 'sign' as a third?) I know
only of this one, which I think may illuminate the passage being
considered in so far as Peirce notes that "in genuine Thirdness, the
first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of
thirds."
  CP 1.537 Now in genuine Thirdness, the first,
the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or
thought, while in respect to one another they are first, second, and
third. 


this is almost a Lapalissade, what is Peirce saying here?
nothing more than that in a triadic relation, there are three things, a
first thing, a second thing and a third thing. (I'm using
non-capitalized words for ordinals and the capitalized words 'First',
'Second', 'Third' to denote classes of relations or categories)

Take any of these 3 things and they will mediate between the one
(first) and the other (second).

this is true of all 3 members of the relation, that is to say that all
members
are genuine Thirds in that they mediate between a first member and
another member of the relation.

which one *is* the first, which one *is* the second, which one *is* the
third?
the question makes no sense. Give me the relation, then I'll tell you
which members, within the relation, is the first, the second and the
third relate..

Now when a first thing among the three is considered in itself (i.e as
a First *within the relation*), the second thing can then be considered
as "other than" the first (i.e. as a Second in opposition to the first
thing *still within the relation*), and the third thing is considered
as mediating between the first and the second, (i.e in its role as a
Third). There you have both the categories and the ordinals.

order has no importance. Take any member of the relation, it will
mediate between the other two.

then there is the phenomenological nature of the elements that are in
the relation, when we say, the sign is a quality (a First) or an
existent (a Second) or a law (a Third), this is again different from
what's described above.

there are also different forms of connections between the elements of
the relation (by Firstness, by Secondness, or by Thirdness) when
describing the relations between the relates (S-O and S-I for instance)

/JM



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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-23 Thread Jim Piat


Dear Joe and Frances,

This is not directly to your concerns but may be of some related interest:

On page 106 of Volume 1 of the Essential Peirce (chapter 6 --On a New Class 
of Observations, Suggested by the Principles of Logic)  I find the following 
Peirce   QUOTE:



It is usually admited that there are two classes of mental representation, 
Immediate Representations or Sensations and Mediate Representations or 
Conceptions.


CLOSE QUOTE

The caps are not mine.

Best wishes,
Jim Piat



Where does Peirce talk about an immediate representamen (or an 
immediate

sign)?  I can't think of any use he would have for such a term.

Joe Ransdell


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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-22 Thread Joseph Ransdell

I was intending to warn Ben against adopting a bullying tone toward you, as 
his frustration seemed to be mounting.  Perhaps a mistake on my part but a 
response in part to your own complaints about his tone, which you were 
construing as an attempt to silence you.   Also I had been about to answer 
you with the same point that Ben made and didn't want to feel required to 
duplicate it.

Joe

.
- Original Message - 
From: Jean-Marc Orliaguet [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 1:18 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Joseph Ransdell wrote:
 Ben:

 I don't think you or your position would lose any credibility by
 letting Jean-Marc have the last word on the matter.

 Joe Ransdell

That's unfair in my opionion. Being accused of not answering, I answer
to Ben with counter-arguments and now the question should be shoved
under the carpet ...

/JM

 - Original Message -
 *From:* Benjamin Udell mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 *To:* Peirce Discussion Forum mailto:peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
 *Sent:* Wednesday, June 21, 2006 4:14 PM
 *Subject:* [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

 Jean-Marc:

 In reading Joe's response to you, I am reminded that you still
 haven't taken a stand on the three main trichotomies and their
 categorial correlations. If you do in fact understand the
 correlations, you may feel that it destroys your argument to admit
 that you understand them. But then it comes to the same thing.






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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-22 Thread Jean-Marc Orliaguet


Joseph Ransdell wrote:
I was intending to warn Ben against adopting a bullying tone toward you, as 
his frustration seemed to be mounting.  Perhaps a mistake on my part but a 
response in part to your own complaints about his tone, which you were 
construing as an attempt to silence you.   Also I had been about to answer 
you with the same point that Ben made and didn't want to feel required to 
duplicate it.


Joe
  


OK,

I searched the web  for trichotomies + categories, found this article 
which I think is symptomatic of the risk entailed by mixing trichotomies 
with categories:


http://www.chass.toronto.edu/french/as-sa/ASSA-No10/No10-A2.html

I reads half-way through the article:
= QUOTE ==
The first division of the three trichotomies is identical with Firstness 
and the representamen, and it consists of Qualisign, Sinsign and 
Legisign. It is worth noticing that the first trichotomy consists of 
(non)sign, i.e. signs which do not relate to anything; they are monadic 
and exist sui generis. But still, they form the basis for the creation 
of meaning.

= END QUOTE ==

there is a confusion here: the first trichotomy is concerned with signs 
that *are* signs - it does not produce would-be signs or non-signs 
cut from all relations.


this echoes what Bernard mentioned in a previous message, namely the 
false impression that classifications create objects when in reality 
these objects have no existence outside the context of the classification.


/JM


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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-22 Thread Jean-Marc Orliaguet



before answering, I'd like to comment on an obvious confusion (see below)

Benjamin Udell wrote:

[...]
-- are defined by reference to the Sign, the Object, and the 
Interpretant, respectively.  The Sign is the First, the Object is the 
Second, and the Interpretant is the Third. In CP227-229, which leads 
toward the discussion of the trichotomies:

66~~
*A _/Sign/_, or _/Representamen/_, is a First which stands in such 
genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _/Object/_, as to be 
capable of detemining a Third, called its _/Interpretant/, to assume 
the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to 
the same Object.*

~~99
 
So that settles that.
 
[]
 
66~~
*A _/Sign/_, or _/Representamen/_, is a First which stands in such 
genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _/Object/_, as to be 
capable of detemining a Third, called its _/Interpretant/, to assume 
the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to 
the same Object.*

~~99
 
In the first trichotomy, the Sign or First is classed in terms of its 
own category. The first trichotomy is of the Sign or First classed in 
terms of _/its own/_ cenopythagorean category, _/irrespectively 
of/_ its Second or Object and _/irrespectively of/_ its Third or 
Interpretant. There's firstness.
 
In the second trichotomy, the Sign or First is classed in terms of its 
relation to its Second. The second trichotomy is of the Sign or First 
classed in terms of the cenopythagorean category of that in _/respect 
or regard/_ of which it represents its Second or Object and 
_/irrespectively of/_ its Third or Interpretant. There's 
secondness. (If said respect/regard is of a quality, then the 
respect/regard is a ground.)
 
In the third trichotomy, the Sign or First is classed in terms of its 
relation to its Third. The third trichotomy is of the Sign or First 
classed in terms of the cenopythagorean category in which its Third or 
Interpretant will represent the First or Sign as representing its 
Second or Object. There's thirdness.
 
[...]

Best, Ben Udell


It is unfortunate that Peirce used the terms 'First', 'Second' and 
'Third' in the place of ordinals when he used the same vocabulary for 
the categories.


In the texts that you chose the terms do not refer to categories, they 
simply refer to 3 things presented in a given order, as in the English 
language, when you say: first I will make some coffee, secondly I 
will get some bread and thirdly I'll eat breakfast.


One cannot deduce from that that making coffee is firstness, getting 
some bread is secondness and that eating breakfast in thirdness


If the sign was a First as you commented on CP 2-274 according to the 
cenopythagorean category Firstness, how would you explain that the sign 
taken in itself can be a quality (a First), an existent (a Second) or of 
the nature of a law (a Third)?


this is what I meant in a previous message: you are mixing the 
categories with ordinals. You have just confirmed my earlier intuition.


/JM

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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-22 Thread Benjamin Udell

Jean-Marc, list

 It is unfortunate that Peirce used the terms 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' in 
 the place of ordinals when he used the same vocabulary for the categories.
 In the texts that you chose the terms do not refer to categories, they simply 
 refer to 3 things presented in a given order, as in the English language, 
 when you say: first I will make some coffee, secondly I will get some 
 bread and thirdly I'll eat breakfast.

No. Wrong. Referring to a First and a Second and a Third is _not_ normal 
English and certainly not normal written English. It distinctively coheres, 
rather glaringly to anybody fluent in English, with the specific sense lent to 
that set of forms by Peirce. Peirce's manner of using those ordinal words is so 
distinctly un-English that one sees whole discussions about Peirce which avoid 
quoting him saying such things, because it sounds strange in English.

 One cannot deduce from that that making coffee is firstness, getting some 
 bread is secondness and that eating breakfast in thirdness

 If the sign was a First as you commented on CP 2-274 according to the 
 cenopythagorean category Firstness, how would you explain that the sign taken 
 in itself can be a quality (a First), an existent (a Second) or of the nature 
 of a law (a Third)?

It can be a First, a Second, etc., in various ways and respects. This is 
elementary stuff in Peirce.

At this point, I honestly think that you are grasping at straws. I'm sorry, but 
it's over.

Best, Ben Udell


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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-22 Thread Jean-Marc Orliaguet

Benjamin Udell wrote:

Jean-Marc, list

It is unfortunate that Peirce used the terms 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' in
the place of ordinals when he used the same vocabulary for the categories.
In the texts that you chose the terms do not refer to categories, they simply refer to 3 things presented in
a given order, as in the English language, when you say: first I will make some coffee,
secondly I will get some bread and thirdly I'll eat breakfast.

No. Wrong. Referring to a First and a Second and a Third is _not_ normal
English and certainly not normal written English. It distinctively coheres, rather glaringly to anybody
fluent in English, with the specific sense lent to that set of forms by Peirce. Peirce's manner of using
those ordinal words is so distinctly un-English that one sees whole discussions about Peirce which avoid
quoting him saying such things, because it sounds strange in English.

One cannot deduce from that that making coffee is firstness, getting some bread is
secondness and that eating breakfast in thirdness

If the sign was a First as you commented on CP 2-274 according to the
cenopythagorean category Firstness, how would you explain that the sign taken
in itself can be a quality (a First), an existent (a Second) or of the nature
of a law (a Third)?

It can be a First, a Second, etc., in various ways and respects. This is
elementary stuff in Peirce.

At this point, I honestly think that you are grasping at straws. I'm sorry, but
it's over.

Best, Ben Udell

Ben,

you know the song?

A B C
It's easy as, 1 2 3
As simple as, do re mi

maybe you should consider the following definition, where Peirce to
avoid any confusion with the categories uses the letters A, B, C.

1902 - NEM IV pp. 20 - 2. Parts of Carnegie Applications .

... Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its
interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of
correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself
stand to C// ...

(source is
http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/rsources/76defs/76defs.htm)

why would A be firstness, B secondness and C thirdness?

/JM

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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-22 Thread Frances Kelly

Frances to Ben and others...

In the decadic table or model, the ten classes of signs seem to deal
with immediate objects, and dynamic objects, and sparse selections of
immediate and dynamic and final interpretants. The decagon does not
seem to deal with immediate representamens whatsoever, except perhaps
indirectly or subsequently through immediate objects.

The first class of signs, posited as qualisigns and sinsigns and
legisigns, deals with the immediate objects of a representamen, and
probably not with the representamen or sign vehicle itself alone. My
guess is that immediate representamen are posited as potisigns and
actisigns and famsigns, but are removed from the decadic table or
model of semiosis, likely for some reason of expediency by way of
illustrating the correlation and interrelation of signs. The present
condensed table or model of semiotics as offered in its many forms
does seem to serve that basic purpose well enough.

The second class of signs, posited as icons and indexes and symbols,
deals with the dynamic objects of immediate interpretants, of which
immediate rhemes are merely one class of interpretant and indeed only
one class of immediate interpretant.

The third class of signs, posited as rhemes and dicents and arguments,
deals partly with those interpretants that are respectively immediate
and dynamic and final. They are only a partial selection, because they
are not all the interpretants that are offered in semiosis. They are
however trichotomic exemplars of their respected categories, in that
rhemes are the first of three immediate interpretants offered, and
dicents are the second of three dynamic interpretants offered, and
arguments are the third of three final interpretants offered. This
condensation actually yields a diagonal layout, which is unusual for
categorical trichotomies, which are usually horizontal. Nonetheless,
even this architectonic scaffolding is not categorically consistent
with the structured trichotomies of phenomena, in that there should be
only one immediate class, but two dynamic classes, yet three final
classes. The class members of such monadic firstness and dyadic
secondness and triadic thirdness would also each fall under there own
class holder, presumably of zeroness.

It is my suspicion that all the interpretants posited for semiosis are
not all of grammatics, the first of the three grand semiotic divisions
before critics and rhetorics; and grammatics which is also the sole
basis of the decagon. One thorn here for me then is whether all the
subsequent signs of critics and rhetorics are indeed only various
kinds of grammatic or other interpretants. Another thorn here for me
is whether semiotics can be complete at least to some degree, for say
nonhuman mechanisms or organisms or even for mature humans, if only
the grammatic division of signs is present as information, to the
exclusion of critics and grammatics in any particular situation of
semiosis. This of course implies that making signs to some extent, and
thus making the logic of signs to some extent, and thus making the
ideal sought seem real to some extent, is not limited only to mature
intelligent humans.

If this speculation of mine is correct, then just what role the
decadic table or model of signs is intended to fully play as a
degenerate condensation of logical semiosis becomes unclear to me, and
there surely must be an important role. Given what is now known of
Peirce, it would not be reasonable to hold the decagon as confused.



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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-22 Thread Jim Piat



Dear Ben, Jean-Marc, list--

For what its worth,  it also struck me that Peirce's use of the terms 
first, second and third in the context cited by Jean-Marc is as 
Jean-Marc suggests  merely  a way of indicating the three elements involved 
when (A) Something --a sign, (B) stands for Something  -an object, (C) to 
something  -- an interpretant.  I think it is mistaken to suppose a sign (as 
a function) is a example of  a Peircean Firstness.  A sign (as I understand 
the matter) is pre-eminently an example of Pericean Thirdness.


OTOH is also seems to me (as Ben and others are suggesting) that Peirce's 
trichotomies of signs are in some fundamental way related to his categories 
and less arbitrary than it seems to me that Jean-Marc is suggesting.


But I make both of the above comments mainly from the standpoint of an 
interested bystander who is both enjoying and learning from this interesting 
discussion which I hope will continue.


That said, I am somewhat puzzled by what Peirce means when he refers to a 
sinsign as not actually functioning as a sign and yet having the 
characteristics of a sign.  The only tentative explanation I can come up 
with is that for Peirce all that we conceive or experience (and thus all we 
can or do speak of ) are signs.  So to speak of a quality is necessarily not 
to speak of a qaulity iself (because by defintions qualities are in or as 
themselves non existant) but to speak of the sign of a quality.  IOWs a 
sinsign is something that stands for a quality that stands for something to 
something.


And since this is more or less open forum I'd like to comment on a special 
interest of mine and that is the logic of disagreements but I will do that 
in a separate post.


Best wishes,
Jim Piat 


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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-22 Thread Benjamin Udell

Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker!

 66~~
 *A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine 
 triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of 
 detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic 
 relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.*
 ~~99

Normal English? With capitalization of the ordinals, no less? In English we 
would say a given thing, a second thing, etc. English is characterized by 
intransigent normalcy. So Peirce is going to use some capitalized ordinals 
without explicit referents, as if he were talking about Firsts, Seconds,  
Thirds in the usual Peirce way, in order to say simply something, another 
thing, and a third thing? Peirce is complicated but he is not sadistic 
toward the reader.

The Sign's correlate, when no further specification is provided, is the Object. 
On a New List of Categories: Secondness is reference to a correlate. The 
Object is the Correlate is the Second.
On a New List of Categories: Thirdness is reference to an interpretant. The 
Interpretant is the Third.

Argh,
Ben, on three glasses of wine

- Original Message - 
From: Jim Piat [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 10:12 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

Dear Ben, Jean-Marc, list--

For what its worth,  it also struck me that Peirce's use of the terms first, 
second and third in the context cited by Jean-Marc is as Jean-Marc suggests 
 merely  a way of indicating the three elements involved when (A) Something --a 
sign, (B) stands for Something  -an object, (C) to something  -- an 
interpretant.  I think it is mistaken to suppose a sign (as a function) is a 
example of  a Peircean Firstness.  A sign (as I understand the matter) is 
pre-eminently an example of Pericean Thirdness.

OTOH is also seems to me (as Ben and others are suggesting) that Peirce's 
trichotomies of signs are in some fundamental way related to his categories and 
less arbitrary than it seems to me that Jean-Marc is suggesting.

But I make both of the above comments mainly from the standpoint of an 
interested bystander who is both enjoying and learning from this interesting 
discussion which I hope will continue.

That said, I am somewhat puzzled by what Peirce means when he refers to a 
sinsign as not actually functioning as a sign and yet having the 
characteristics of a sign.  The only tentative explanation I can come up with 
is that for Peirce all that we conceive or experience (and thus all we can or 
do speak of ) are signs.  So to speak of a quality is necessarily not to speak 
of a qaulity iself (because by defintions qualities are in or as themselves non 
existant) but to speak of the sign of a quality.  IOWs a sinsign is something 
that stands for a quality that stands for something to something.

And since this is more or less open forum I'd like to comment on a special 
interest of mine and that is the logic of disagreements but I will do that in a 
separate post.

Best wishes,
Jim Piat


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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-22 Thread Joseph Ransdell

I agree, Ben.  Peirce used capitalization to mark his use of a term as a 
technical one, a term of art.  It is a common practice of his and I am 
certain that there is at least one place where he states this explicitly. 
Ill try to track down a verifying passage but it may be difficult to find.

Joe Ransdell

.
- Original Message - 
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 9:39 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker!

 66~~
 *A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine 
 triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of 
 detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic 
 relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.*
 ~~99

Normal English? With capitalization of the ordinals, no less? In English we 
would say a given thing, a second thing, etc. English is characterized 
by intransigent normalcy. So Peirce is going to use some capitalized 
ordinals without explicit referents, as if he were talking about Firsts, 
Seconds,  Thirds in the usual Peirce way, in order to say simply 
something, another thing, and a third thing? Peirce is complicated but 
he is not sadistic toward the reader.

The Sign's correlate, when no further specification is provided, is the 
Object. On a New List of Categories: Secondness is reference to a 
correlate. The Object is the Correlate is the Second.
On a New List of Categories: Thirdness is reference to an interpretant. 
The Interpretant is the Third.

Argh,
Ben, on three glasses of wine

- Original Message - 
From: Jim Piat [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 10:12 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

Dear Ben, Jean-Marc, list--

For what its worth,  it also struck me that Peirce's use of the terms 
first, second and third in the context cited by Jean-Marc is as 
Jean-Marc suggests  merely  a way of indicating the three elements involved 
when (A) Something --a sign, (B) stands for Something  -an object, (C) to 
something  -- an interpretant.  I think it is mistaken to suppose a sign (as 
a function) is a example of  a Peircean Firstness.  A sign (as I understand 
the matter) is pre-eminently an example of Pericean Thirdness.

OTOH is also seems to me (as Ben and others are suggesting) that Peirce's 
trichotomies of signs are in some fundamental way related to his categories 
and less arbitrary than it seems to me that Jean-Marc is suggesting.

But I make both of the above comments mainly from the standpoint of an 
interested bystander who is both enjoying and learning from this interesting 
discussion which I hope will continue.

That said, I am somewhat puzzled by what Peirce means when he refers to a 
sinsign as not actually functioning as a sign and yet having the 
characteristics of a sign.  The only tentative explanation I can come up 
with is that for Peirce all that we conceive or experience (and thus all we 
can or do speak of ) are signs.  So to speak of a quality is necessarily not 
to speak of a qaulity iself (because by defintions qualities are in or as 
themselves non existant) but to speak of the sign of a quality.  IOWs a 
sinsign is something that stands for a quality that stands for something to 
something.

And since this is more or less open forum I'd like to comment on a special 
interest of mine and that is the logic of disagreements but I will do that 
in a separate post.

Best wishes,
Jim Piat


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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-22 Thread Joseph Ransdell

Here is a verifying passage:, from the neglected Argument paper

Peirce: CP 6.452
 The word God, so capitalized (as we Americans say), is the 
definable proper name, signifying Ens necessarium; in my belief Really 
creator of all three Universes of Experience.
 Some words shall herein be capitalized when used, not as vernacular, 
but as terms defined. Thus an idea is the substance of an actual unitary 
thought or fancy; but Idea, nearer Plato's idea of {idea}, denotes 
anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully 
represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent 
it.

Joe Ransdell

- Original Message - 
From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 10:18 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


I agree, Ben.  Peirce used capitalization to mark his use of a term as a
technical one, a term of art.  It is a common practice of his and I am
certain that there is at least one place where he states this explicitly.
Ill try to track down a verifying passage but it may be difficult to find.

Joe Ransdell

.
- Original Message - 
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 9:39 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker!

 66~~
 *A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine
 triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of
 detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic
 relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.*
 ~~99

Normal English? With capitalization of the ordinals, no less? In English we
would say a given thing, a second thing, etc. English is characterized
by intransigent normalcy. So Peirce is going to use some capitalized
ordinals without explicit referents, as if he were talking about Firsts,
Seconds,  Thirds in the usual Peirce way, in order to say simply
something, another thing, and a third thing? Peirce is complicated but
he is not sadistic toward the reader.

The Sign's correlate, when no further specification is provided, is the
Object. On a New List of Categories: Secondness is reference to a
correlate. The Object is the Correlate is the Second.
On a New List of Categories: Thirdness is reference to an interpretant.
The Interpretant is the Third.

Argh,
Ben, on three glasses of wine

- Original Message - 
From: Jim Piat [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 10:12 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

Dear Ben, Jean-Marc, list--

For what its worth,  it also struck me that Peirce's use of the terms
first, second and third in the context cited by Jean-Marc is as
Jean-Marc suggests  merely  a way of indicating the three elements involved
when (A) Something --a sign, (B) stands for Something  -an object, (C) to
something  -- an interpretant.  I think it is mistaken to suppose a sign (as
a function) is a example of  a Peircean Firstness.  A sign (as I understand
the matter) is pre-eminently an example of Pericean Thirdness.

OTOH is also seems to me (as Ben and others are suggesting) that Peirce's
trichotomies of signs are in some fundamental way related to his categories
and less arbitrary than it seems to me that Jean-Marc is suggesting.

But I make both of the above comments mainly from the standpoint of an
interested bystander who is both enjoying and learning from this interesting
discussion which I hope will continue.

That said, I am somewhat puzzled by what Peirce means when he refers to a
sinsign as not actually functioning as a sign and yet having the
characteristics of a sign.  The only tentative explanation I can come up
with is that for Peirce all that we conceive or experience (and thus all we
can or do speak of ) are signs.  So to speak of a quality is necessarily not
to speak of a qaulity iself (because by defintions qualities are in or as
themselves non existant) but to speak of the sign of a quality.  IOWs a
sinsign is something that stands for a quality that stands for something to
something.

And since this is more or less open forum I'd like to comment on a special
interest of mine and that is the logic of disagreements but I will do that
in a separate post.

Best wishes,
Jim Piat


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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Joseph Ransdell wrote:

Jean-Marc says:

I am surprised that you are claiming that the classes can be traversed
by a unique, natural, ordered sequence from 1 to 10 while at the same
time you claim to have come up with a structure similar to a lattice,
these are contradictory assertions.

REPLY:
I made no such claim, I said there is an order and there is, most assuredly, 
an order, and that is not a matter of convention.  It is an order of 
presupposition -- or, from another perspective, of internal complexity --  
and it can be read from top to bottom in the lattice representation. 
Whether or to what extent it can be filled out further is something that has 
to be worked out laboriously by actually thinking the conceptions through, 
as distinct from manipulating graphical representations containing the names 
for the classes,  If the word for the structure is not lattice please 
supply the correct one.  I am referring to what Merkle calls by that name in 
his representation of Merrel's and Marty's versions of it.  The one I came 
up with is identical with that one.  I'll send it along in a separate 
message.  The only important difference is that I gave the classes nicknames 
of my own.



Joe Ransdell
  


the numbers on the boxes (1, 2, 3, ...) that you wrote are purely 
conventional. since when you are calling a class '5' and another one '3' 
you imply that 5 is bigger than 3, which in a lattice it is not.


you have to write 3-3-1, 3-3-2, 3-3-3, 1-2-3... to be correct. Check 
Marty's work for a correct presentation.


/JM




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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Bernard Morand wrote:

Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote:



the classification is obtained in a deductive the way, but the 
sequence order is arbitrary.


let us say I want to classify a group of people according to 2 
divisions:


- men / women (1st division)
- under age / adult (2nd division)

that's 4 classes, OK?

if I consider the men / women division a first dichotomy and the 
under age / adult division the second dichotomy, are you saying 
that the classes of people are magically ordered just because of that 
choice?


what are the order relations among the classes of signs? that the 
first question to answer before laying down the numerals


/JM

I think that your example funishes a good basis for reflexion 
Jean-Marc. And I am not sure you are right in this special case. A 
division among men and women is made on the basis of a discriminant, 
the sex. The other division is made on the age as a discriminant. But 
sex and age are two mutually  independant attributes of people.What is 
aimed at is to  distribute a stock of individuals among  four 
pre-given classes. Observe in passing that the purpose is not to 
define what are men or women. This activity is what is called nowadays 
data analysis for which the attributes that make the division are let 
to the choice of the classifier. These attributes can be calculated in 
order to confer some nice or formal properties to the resulting 
classification but in a sense they are arbitrary (dependant on he who 
makes the classification). Note too that the potential list of 
candidate discriminants is infinite.
I think that this is not what is at work with the classification of 
1903. If words could convey good meanings in themselves I would say 
that it is much more a categorization than a classification. There are 
not individual signs in our hands in order to put them in the one box 
or the other. We have a set of characters which are  structured 
according to the law of prescission (and not discrimination) and make 
a system. It is this law which gives a sense to the order of the 
trichotomies and which makes that the attributes used to make the 
classes are not mutually independant. For example if a sign has for 
its object an index, it cannot be an argument,but  it can be a rheme a 
dicisign. The fact that such a categorization does not require any 
individual makes it dependant only on what Peirce sometimes calls the  
formal structure of the elements of thought and consciousness (CP 
8.213). An important consequence is that such a classification enables 
to determine all what is possible (and thus impossible) contrary to 
the data analysis tradition which describes what exists. If I was to 
revive some old controversies, I would hold that Peirce was a 
precursor in structuralism :-). However a  natural classification is 
based on genealogy and final cause for Peirce, two criteria that 
structuralism did not bother with.
This is the reason why I was reproaching to Joe the use of plural in 
his figure for qualisigns, sinsigns, legisigns as if they were 
individual class members and not structural elements, as well as the 
separation of the classification into three sub-trees. In fact, it has 
no effect on the surrounding  text but nevertheless I think that the 
presentation of the figure in itself can be misleading. It  conveys an 
idea of the first trichotomy as being more material than formal (and 
also more decisive than the two others)
On the status of classifications for Peirce, there would be something 
worth adding. He often makes a distinction between what he calls 
natural classes which are built from the formal structure of 
elements with artificial classes which are built for a special 
purpose. I think that his conception of artificial classification is 
very near from the approach taken by data analysis. I wonder whether 
the Welby classification was not an artificial one. Peirce had not 
the habit of confusing himself with his scientific study but here he 
says MY second way of dividing signs. This puzzled me for several 
years.


Bernard



I would say that the only thing that one cannot divide further into 
categories is the monad. Everything else is subject to categorizations 
and thus to classifications.


the result of a classification in the example above would yield the 
following classes:


- man / of age
- woman / of age
- man / under age
- woman / of age

while the categorizations are the divisions:

- man / woman
- of age / under age

then there are no determinations in this example

to get back to the subject. I agree that the classifications involve all 
three aspects - not any one taken individually. One cannot separate 
legisign(s) from the iconic / indexical / symbolic aspects, etc.


this is probably why one can read sometimes that there are theoretically 
27 classes of signs by combination  and only 10 are possible, which is a 
non-sense- as when one takes something abstract and ones makes it a 
concrete thing (reification

[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-21 Thread gnusystems

I'd like to second what Joe says here,

[[ but my own interest in the classification system is not with what can 
be learned from it by manipulating graphical models of it but with 
understanding what use it might have when it comes to understanding how 
to apply it in the analysis and understanding of distinctively 
philosophical problems such as have formed the staple of philosophical 
concern from the time of the Greeks on.   I wonder if anyone knows of 
any attempts to do that. ]]

Specifically, i'm wondering what this classification of signs can 
contribute to the old but still vexed problem of characterizing the 
cognitive gap between humans and other animals. One has to put gap 
in quotation marks because no one seriously doubts the continuity of the 
evolutionary process which has produced human cognition (though some see 
more leaps in the process than others do). There has been some 
empirical progress on this problem recently -- in fact i'm now reviewing 
a recent book on exactly that, for the Journal of Consciousness 
Studies -- but interpreting the data remains a problem of philosophical 
concern; and the same goes for the cognitive development process of 
individual humans. The origin-of-language problem is one aspect of this.

In this light, Joe's (or any) ordinal numbering of Peirce's tenfold 
classification looks much like a developmental sequence. Part of the 
resemblance is that if we look at the two ends of the sequence, 
there's no question about which is which. Adult humans are capable of 
handling arguments, while human infants and adult monkeys are not; and i 
would presume that qualisigns are implicit in sentience itself. But 
ordering the steps or stages in between is much more problematic, 
both logically and empirically. And this is exactly where i wonder if 
semeiotic can clarify the questions about evolution and development. 
Also whether empirical studies of development or comparative psychology 
can throw some light on the proper order of sign classes. (Peirce was 
often skeptical that logic had anything to learn from psychology, but i 
think what he had in mind there was the limitations of psychological 
research in his time, and i think there's been some real progress since 
then in that respect.)

Terrence Deacon's 1997 book on the origin of language, _The Symbolic 
Species_, used symbolic in a Peircean sense, and i've seen the 
icon/index/symbol trichotomy used in a few other studies of 
consciousness; but other than that, the semiotic approach hardly 
registers in consciousness studies at all. If anyone can bring a more 
detailed Peircean analysis to bear on this kind of philosophical 
problem, i'd be happy to hear of it.

gary

}Her untitled mamafesta memorialising the Mosthighest has gone by many 
names at disjointed times. [Finnegans Wake 104]{

gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson  Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
 }{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{


---
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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


gnusystems wrote:

I'd like to second what Joe says here,

[[ but my own interest in the classification system is not with what can 
be learned from it by manipulating graphical models of it but with 
understanding what use it might have when it comes to understanding how 
to apply it in the analysis and understanding of distinctively 
philosophical problems such as have formed the staple of philosophical 
concern from the time of the Greeks on.   I wonder if anyone knows of 
any attempts to do that. ]]


Specifically, i'm wondering what this classification of signs can 
contribute to the old but still vexed problem of characterizing the 
cognitive gap between humans and other animals. One has to put gap 
in quotation marks because no one seriously doubts the continuity of the 
evolutionary process which has produced human cognition (though some see 
more leaps in the process than others do). There has been some 
empirical progress on this problem recently -- in fact i'm now reviewing 
a recent book on exactly that, for the Journal of Consciousness 
Studies -- but interpreting the data remains a problem of philosophical 
concern; and the same goes for the cognitive development process of 
individual humans. The origin-of-language problem is one aspect of this.


In this light, Joe's (or any) ordinal numbering of Peirce's tenfold 
classification looks much like a developmental sequence. Part of the 
resemblance is that if we look at the two ends of the sequence, 
there's no question about which is which. Adult humans are capable of 
handling arguments, while human infants and adult monkeys are not; and i 
would presume that qualisigns are implicit in sentience itself. But 
ordering the steps or stages in between is much more problematic, 
both logically and empirically. [...]


precisely, there isn't a linear sequence connecting qualitative 
knowledge and symbolic knowledge. This is what the lattice structure 
tells you. There are several paths instead of a linear sequence between 
1 and 10.


this is described in Marty's book - in the chapter about the correlation 
between the lattice and knowledge, epistemology, etc. There is also a 
comparison with Piaget's different stages of intellectual development.


see the original article in:
S¨miotique de l'¨pist¨mologie SEMIOSIS 10 (1978), Agis Verlag, Baden 
Baden, pp. 24-37


/JM



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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

Jean-Marc, list,

I don't even agree in the end with Peirce's classification but it's pretty 
obvious that whether one partially or totally orders the 10 classes depends on 
the criteria. And it's pretty obvious that the trichotomies are ordered (or 
orderable) in a Peircean categorial way, specifically:  
the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, 
the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and 
the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. 
If one incorporates this ordering of the trichotomies into the ordering of the 
classes, then one ends with a complete ordering of the classes. One can also so 
prioritize as to arrive simply at the partially ordered lattice. This is at 
least partly a matter of whether one prioritizes the Peircean category of the 
trichotomy (the ordinality of the parameter) or the Peircean category of the 
term IN the trichotomy (the ordinality of the parametric value). How does one 
decide? Well, one looks at it both ways, both ways have their illuminative 
aspects, so one ends up finally not choosing one way dispensing permanently 
with the other way. So there seems to be some optionality in how one orders 
these things. Jean-Marc, however, seems to believe that the ordering question 
is quite determinate, and leads inevitably to the partial ordering. He does 
this by dismissing without analyzing the certainly very categorial appearance 
of the ordering of the trichotomies. Certainly Peirce was quite conscious of 
this categorial structure of the trichotomies, since his 10-ad of trichotomies 
is obviously an attempt to extend that structure.

Where most Peirceans seem to regard this matter as settled and fairly simple, 
Jean-Marc differs, which is his right.  But I don't see in any of this thread 
where Jean-Marc addresses what certainly appears to be a Peircean categorial 
orderability of the trichotomies. Instead he has merely asserted that they are 
like categories of male/female and old/young, and he has not actually pursued a 
comparison of his example with the Peircean trichotomies in order to argue for 
his counter-intuitive assertion. So I think that we're still awaiting an 
argument. If this argument is supposed to be in Robert Marty's book, then 
perhaps Jean-Marc can summarize it. If Jean-Marc is unprepared to do that, 
perhaps Robert can do it.

Best, Ben Udell

- Original Message - 
From: Jean-Marc Orliaguet [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 9:15 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


gnusystems wrote:
 I'd like to second what Joe says here,

 [[ but my own interest in the classification system is not with what can be 
 learned from it by manipulating graphical models of it but with understanding 
 what use it might have when it comes to understanding how to apply it in the 
 analysis and understanding of distinctively philosophical problems such as 
 have formed the staple of philosophical concern from the time of the Greeks 
 on.   I wonder if anyone knows of any attempts to do that. ]]

 Specifically, i'm wondering what this classification of signs can contribute 
 to the old but still vexed problem of characterizing the cognitive gap 
 between humans and other animals. One has to put gap in quotation marks 
 because no one seriously doubts the continuity of the evolutionary process 
 which has produced human cognition (though some see more leaps in the 
 process than others do). There has been some empirical progress on this 
 problem recently -- in fact i'm now reviewing a recent book on exactly that, 
 for the Journal of Consciousness Studies -- but interpreting the data remains 
 a problem of philosophical concern; and the same goes for the cognitive 
 development process of individual humans. The origin-of-language problem is 
 one aspect of this.

 In this light, Joe's (or any) ordinal numbering of Peirce's tenfold 
 classification looks much like a developmental sequence. Part of the 
 resemblance is that if we look at the two ends of the sequence, there's no 
 question about which is which. Adult humans are capable of handling 
 arguments, while human infants and adult monkeys are not; and i would presume 
 that qualisigns are implicit in sentience itself. But ordering the steps or 
 stages in between is much more problematic, both logically and empirically. 
 [...]

precisely, there isn't a linear sequence connecting qualitative knowledge and 
symbolic knowledge. This is what the lattice structure tells you. There are 
several paths instead of a linear sequence between 1 and 10.

this is described in Marty's book - in the chapter about the correlation 
between the lattice and knowledge, epistemology, etc. There is also a 
comparison with Piaget's different stages of intellectual development.

see the original article in:
S¨miotique de l'¨pist¨mologie SEMIOSIS 10 (1978), Agis Verlag, Baden 
Baden

[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

Jean-Marc, list,

Let me add that, while I don't think that you will succeed in presenting the 
argument for which I think I've shown the need, my characterization of your 
assertions as being not yet an argument is not itself a mere rhetorical move. A 
few years ago, I said that you had not presented a strong enough argument as to 
why the term triad should be restricted to the threesome of tri-valently 
referring to one another and themselves, while trichotomy should be 
restricted to three-fold divisions of terms not related by references _to_ one 
another. If I recall correctly, I said I leaned toward the terminological 
distinction but that I wasn't convinced that it should be a hard and fast rule. 
You then presented to another peirce-lister a very strong argument, via 
substituting one of these words for the other in a passage by Peirce, showing 
that the passage then deteriorated into nonsense. That convinced me both of the 
distinction's value and of Peirce's own recognition of its value (though, if I 
recall correctly, I said nothing at the time because you seemed gratuitously 
passionate against your interlocutor), and since then I've adhered (or tried to 
adhere) to the distinction.  In fact I think that acceptance of this 
terminological distinction has become pretty common, if not universal, on 
peirce-l.  Basically, you won.  I would still argue that each triad is also a 
trichotomy, but for most practical purposes of discussion, it's simpler to 
speak simply of triads versus trichotomies, and I once even suggested the term 
triastic to serve instead of 'trichotomy' as the genus where of 'trichotomy' 
(in the narrower sense) and 'triad' would be the species, but nobody seemed to 
like that word (I think it's a good candidate for the three word in the 
series monistic, dualistic).

Best, Ben Udell

- Original Message - 
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 11:36 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Jean-Marc, list,

I don't even agree in the end with Peirce's classification but it's pretty 
obvious that whether one partially or totally orders the 10 classes depends on 
the criteria. And it's pretty obvious that the trichotomies are ordered (or 
orderable) in a Peircean categorial way, specifically:  
the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, 
the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and 
the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. 
If one incorporates this ordering of the trichotomies into the ordering of the 
classes, then one ends with a complete ordering of the classes. One can also so 
prioritize as to arrive simply at the partially ordered lattice. This is at 
least partly a matter of whether one prioritizes the Peircean category of the 
trichotomy (the ordinality of the parameter) or the Peircean category of the 
term IN the trichotomy (the ordinality of the parametric value). How does one 
decide? Well, one looks at it both ways, both ways have their illuminative 
aspects, so one ends up finally not choosing one way dispensing permanently 
with the other way. So there seems to be some optionality in how one orders 
these things. Jean-Marc, however, seems to believe that the ordering question 
is quite determinate, and leads inevitably to the partial ordering. He does 
this by dismissing without analyzing the certainly very categorial appearance 
of the ordering of the trichotomies. Certainly Peirce was quite conscious of 
this categorial structure of the trichotomies, since his 10-ad of trichotomies 
is obviously an attempt to extend that structure.

Where most Peirceans seem to regard this matter as settled and fairly simple, 
Jean-Marc differs, which is his right.  But I don't see in any of this thread 
where Jean-Marc addresses what certainly appears to be a Peircean categorial 
orderability of the trichotomies. Instead he has merely asserted that they are 
like categories of male/female and old/young, and he has not actually pursued a 
comparison of his example with the Peircean trichotomies in order to argue for 
his counter-intuitive assertion. So I think that we're still awaiting an 
argument. If this argument is supposed to be in Robert Marty's book, then 
perhaps Jean-Marc can summarize it. If Jean-Marc is unprepared to do that, 
perhaps Robert can do it.

Best, Ben Udell

- Original Message - 
From: Jean-Marc Orliaguet [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 9:15 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


gnusystems wrote:
 I'd like to second what Joe says here,

 [[ but my own interest in the classification system is not with what can be 
 learned from it by manipulating graphical models of it but with understanding 
 what use it might have when it comes to understanding how to apply

[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-21 Thread Joseph Ransdell

The numbers can be ignored altogether as far as I am concerned, or one could 
use, say, the Greek alphabet instead of numbers or just leave the numbers 
off.  All that is important for me is the class names and the understanding 
that it is presuppositiional from the top down, which could be shown by 
using down-pointing arrows for connective lines.  The use I would have for 
the figure doesn't require that it have the properties required to transform 
it in the various ways graph theory requires.  For my purposes its use is 
primarily as a mnemonic for remembering what presupposes what. so that if, 
in the process of analyzing a bit of discourse, say, one has identified 
something as being of this class or that one knows ipso facto that a sign of 
this or that other class is either presupposed by it or presupposes it, 
directly or indirectly..  I imagine the use of it to be that of being able 
to figure out what is going on in or going wrong with some actual bit of 
persuasive argumentation, in a very broad sense of argumentation in which 
even a work of visual art or a piece of music might be thought of as being 
constructed argumentatively, supposing one can make good on the prospect of 
being able to understand artworks\as arguments, coherent or incoherent.  The 
application of this sort of thing to infrahuman life would be via the 
collapse of genuine into degenerate forms (in the special sense of 
degeneracy Peirce uses), the elimination of levels of reflection, and 
whatever other modifications are  necessary to account for higher 
developments of life.

This view of its use could conceivably be at odds with Peirce's own aims in 
devising graphical representations of the classes, which might require that 
the graphs have the properties you require of them because his aim was to be 
able to learn some things simply from manipulating the graphs in various 
ways.  But it seems to me that something gets lost there.  Perhaps something 
of great philosophical interest will result from the use of graph theory, 
but focus on what that might yield could be at the expense of what is lost 
by conforming to its constraints where there is no need to do so since all 
one needs is a graphical representation for mnemonic and other intuitional 
purposes.  I am not at present aware of what may in fact have been 
accomplished philosophically with the use of graph theory, but I can imagine 
it being of interest for a great many other purposes which, for all I know, 
may be far more important than the philosophical ones.  Moreover, I am not 
saying that what has been done has no philosophical interest but only that I 
am not myself aware of any such results from it -- and I lay no claim to 
being well informed about it, which I am not..  I \am just saying that what 
interests me does not seem to require anything more than I indicate above.

Anyway, one thing that occurs to me when I note that  Peirce's trek through 
the presuppositional order in 2.254 through 2.263 begins with quality and 
ends with the argument is that it seems comparable to regarding thought in 
the Kantian way as a process of unification of the manifold. as in the New 
List.  If I understand Peirce correctly, he thinks of a quality as being a 
given unity and simplicity which is, however, also regardable, reflectively, 
as if it were an achieved unity -- the achievement being forgotten once 
completed -- brought about through a unification process which builds the 
given quality from a manifold of elements of synthesized qualia, 
themselves regardable as if they are the simplified results of still prior 
qualitative elements logically synthesized in the same way.  Or looking at 
it the other way around, the completion of the argument yields a new 
quality -- the argument assumes the appearance of a new quality -- which may 
or may not play a similar role in a further synthesizing unification of the 
same sort, and so forth.  In other words, there is something comparable in 
that sequence to the line of development one finds in the New List, though 
at a finer grained level of resolution, as it were.  This is a lame 
description of what I am trying to draw attention to, intended only 
suggestively.  That passage in CP 2 is not comparable in rigor to what 
happens in the New List. to be sure, but the progression does have a 
presuppositional complexity which seems comparable..  .

Joe Ransdell



- Original Message - 
From: Jean-Marc Orliaguet [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 1:20 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Joseph Ransdell wrote:
 Jean-Marc says:

 I am surprised that you are claiming that the classes can be traversed
 by a unique, natural, ordered sequence from 1 to 10 while at the same
 time you claim to have come up with a structure similar to a lattice,
 these are contradictory assertions.

 REPLY:
 I made no such claim, I said

[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

Joe, list,



I would add a heuristic value to the mnemonic value which Joe discusses. The 
diagrams can bring patterns to light which we might otherwise miss. I think 
that Gary will want to address this, but I'll resist the opportunity to steal 
his thunder.



More generally, I think that Joe is asking a very fair where's the beef? kind 
of question, a generalized form of the question which I think Jerry Chandler 
asked only too narrowly, why are these terms important to understanding human 
communication, to which I responded in part that their applicability would be 
much broader and include application in metaphysics.



Where's the beef?  It's not a question of whether the classes lack the beef 
of illuminative applicability, rather more a question of how much actual 
productive work has been done. One could point out that one obvious move to 
bring such work into relief, would be simply to point out where actual work in 
rhetoric, the rhetoric of politics, and in metaphysics, may be considered to be 
using the legisigns qualisign, sinsign, legisign and the rest, though in 
other vocabularies. That was partly what I was tending to do in my response to 
Jerry Chandler. After all, is not the classification of signs part of an 
organon, a toolbox? But pragmaticism is not merely a toolbox of tools neutral  
inert till somebody exploits them, one way as good as another; it's not just 
the hotel or valet or whatever for various research fields. There is to 
exploit the dynamic of sign-classificational relations, with an eye to sign 
classes' 'form-generative' _content_. I think that Joe is getting at something 
like that. 



Best, Ben Udell



- Original Message - 

From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 12:23 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

The numbers can be ignored altogether as far as I am concerned, or one could 
use, say, the Greek alphabet instead of numbers or just leave the numbers off.  
All that is important for me is the class names and the understanding that it 
is presuppositiional from the top down, which could be shown by using 
down-pointing arrows for connective lines.  The use I would have for the figure 
doesn't require that it have the properties required to transform it in the 
various ways graph theory requires.  For my purposes its use is primarily as a 
mnemonic for remembering what presupposes what. so that if, in the process of 
analyzing a bit of discourse, say, one has identified something as being of 
this class or that one knows ipso facto that a sign of this or that other class 
is either presupposed by it or presupposes it, directly or indirectly..  I 
imagine the use of it to be that of being able to figure out what is going on 
in or going wrong with some actual bit of persuasive argumentation, in a very 
broad sense of argumentation in which even a work of visual art or a piece of 
music might be thought of as being constructed argumentatively, supposing one 
can make good on the prospect of being able to understand artworks\as 
arguments, coherent or incoherent.  The application of this sort of thing to 
infrahuman life would be via the collapse of genuine into degenerate forms (in 
the special sense of degeneracy Peirce uses), the elimination of levels of 
reflection, and whatever other modifications are  necessary to account for 
higher developments of life.
 

This view of its use could conceivably be at odds with Peirce's own aims in 
devising graphical representations of the classes, which might require that the 
graphs have the properties you require of them because his aim was to be able 
to learn some things simply from manipulating the graphs in various ways.  But 
it seems to me that something gets lost there.  Perhaps something of great 
philosophical interest will result from the use of graph theory, but focus on 
what that might yield could be at the expense of what is lost by conforming to 
its constraints where there is no need to do so since all one needs is a 
graphical representation for mnemonic and other intuitional purposes.  I am not 
at present aware of what may in fact have been accomplished philosophically 
with the use of graph theory, but I can imagine it being of interest for a 
great many other purposes which, for all I know, may be far more important than 
the philosophical ones.  Moreover, I am not saying that what has been done has 
no philosophical interest but only that I am not myself aware of any such 
results from it -- and I lay no claim to being well informed about it, which I 
am not..  I \am just saying that what interests me does not seem to require 
anything more than I indicate above.

 

Anyway, one thing that occurs to me when I note that  Peirce's trek through the 
presuppositional order in 2.254 through 2.263 begins with quality and ends with 
the argument is that it seems comparable

[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

Benjamin Udell wrote:

Jean-Marc, list,

I don't even agree in the end with Peirce's classification but it's pretty obvious that whether one partially or totally orders the 10 classes depends on the criteria. And it's pretty obvious that the trichotomies are ordered (or orderable) in a Peircean categorial way, specifically:
the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category,
the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and
the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant.
If one incorporates this ordering of the trichotomies into the ordering of the classes, then one ends with a complete ordering of the classes. One can also so prioritize as to arrive simply at the partially ordered lattice. This is at least partly a matter of whether one prioritizes the Peircean category of the trichotomy (the ordinality of the parameter) or the Peircean category of the term IN the trichotomy (the ordinality of the parametric value). How does one decide? Well, one looks at it both ways, both ways have their illuminative aspects, so one ends up finally not choosing one way dispensing permanently with the other way. So there seems to be some optionality in how one orders these things. Jean-Marc, however, seems to believe that the ordering question is quite determinate, and leads inevitably to the partial ordering. He does this by dismissing without analyzing the certainly very categorial appearance of the ordering of the trichotomies. Certainly Peirce was quite conscious of this categorial structure of the trichotomies, since his 10-ad of trichotomies is obviously an attempt to extend that structure.

Where most Peirceans seem to regard this matter as settled and fairly simple,
Jean-Marc differs, which is his right. But I don't see in any of this thread
where Jean-Marc addresses what certainly appears to be a Peircean categorial
orderability of the trichotomies. Instead he has merely asserted that they are
like categories of male/female and old/young, and he has not actually pursued a
comparison of his example with the Peircean trichotomies in order to argue for
his counter-intuitive assertion. So I think that we're still awaiting an
argument. If this argument is supposed to be in Robert Marty's book, then
perhaps Jean-Marc can summarize it. If Jean-Marc is unprepared to do that,
perhaps Robert can do it.

Best, Ben Udell

Which Peirceans are you thinking of? I'll tell you about the
Peirceans, concerning the ordering of the trichotomies.

First Peirce, among the Peirceans, gives over the years five different
orderings of the trichotomies. Beginning with the triad (S, S-Od, S-If),
then continuing with the 6 trichotomies (1904 and 1908) in different
orders and the finally with the ten trichotomies (letter to Lady Welby
1908 and 8-344) yet again in different orders - This is summarized on
page 231 of Marty's book.

None of the orderings are the same, by the way. This is for Peirce's
account.

Then two other authors Lieb (1977) and Kawama (1976) listed in the same
table propose a different ordering of the 10 trichotomies. Marty also
mentions on the same page that Jappy proposed a non-linear ordering of
the trichotomies.

Then Marty claimed that some of the trichotomies are redundant. (this is
summarized in a mail dated 2006/06/16 sent to peirce-l which you most
likely overlooked.) which would not yield to 66 classes of signs but
only 28.

Bernard Morand however claims that there is no redundancy and that each
trichotomy is independent.

is this what you call settled and fairly simple? I think you have a
very simplified understanding of these issues.

Best
/JM

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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

Jean-Marc,

I spoke of the three trichotomies, not the five or six or ten. If you don't 
address what's said, why do you bother sending posts to a place like peirce-l?
If you do not address this structure, specifically,

 the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, 
 the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and 
 the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. 

then I think that you lose this argument by sheer default.

Best, Ben UDell.

- Original Message - 
From: Jean-Marc Orliaguet [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 1:48 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Benjamin Udell wrote:
 Jean-Marc, list,

 I don't even agree in the end with Peirce's classification but it's pretty 
 obvious that whether one partially or totally orders the 10 classes depends 
 on the criteria. And it's pretty obvious that the trichotomies are ordered 
 (or orderable) in a Peircean categorial way, specifically:  
 the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, 
 the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and 
 the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. 
 If one incorporates this ordering of the trichotomies into the ordering of 
 the classes, then one ends with a complete ordering of the classes. One can 
 also so prioritize as to arrive simply at the partially ordered lattice. This 
 is at least partly a matter of whether one prioritizes the Peircean category 
 of the trichotomy (the ordinality of the parameter) or the Peircean 
 category of the term IN the trichotomy (the ordinality of the parametric 
 value). How does one decide? Well, one looks at it both ways, both ways have 
 their illuminative aspects, so one ends up finally not choosing one way 
 dispensing permanently with the other way. So there seems to be some 
 optionality in how one orders these things. Jean-Marc, however, seems to 
 believe that the ordering question is quite determinate, and leads inevitably 
 to the partial ordering. He does this by dismissing without analyzing the 
 certainly very categorial appearance of the ordering of the trichotomies. 
 Certainly Peirce was quite conscious of this categorial structure of the 
 trichotomies, since his 10-ad of trichotomies is obviously an attempt to 
 extend that structure.

 Where most Peirceans seem to regard this matter as settled and fairly simple, 
 Jean-Marc differs, which is his right.  But I don't see in any of this thread 
 where Jean-Marc addresses what certainly appears to be a Peircean categorial 
 orderability of the trichotomies. Instead he has merely asserted that they 
 are like categories of male/female and old/young, and he has not actually 
 pursued a comparison of his example with the Peircean trichotomies in order 
 to argue for his counter-intuitive assertion. So I think that we're still 
 awaiting an argument. If this argument is supposed to be in Robert Marty's 
 book, then perhaps Jean-Marc can summarize it. If Jean-Marc is unprepared to 
 do that, perhaps Robert can do it.

 Best, Ben Udell

   

Which Peirceans are you thinking of? I'll tell you about the 
Peirceans, concerning the ordering of the trichotomies.

First Peirce, among the Peirceans, gives over the years five different 
orderings of the trichotomies. Beginning with the triad (S, S-Od, S-If), 
then continuing  with the 6 trichotomies (1904 and 1908) in different 
orders and the finally with the ten trichotomies (letter to  Lady Welby 
1908 and 8-344) yet again in different orders - This is summarized on 
page 231 of Marty's book.

None of the orderings are the same, by the way. This is for Peirce's 
account.

Then two other authors Lieb (1977) and Kawama (1976)  listed in the same 
table propose a different ordering of the 10 trichotomies. Marty also 
mentions on the same page that Jappy proposed a non-linear ordering of 
the trichotomies.

Then Marty claimed that some of the trichotomies are redundant. (this is 
summarized in a mail dated 2006/06/16 sent to peirce-l which you most 
likely overlooked.) which would not yield to 66 classes of signs but 
only 28.

Bernard Morand however claims that there is no redundancy and that each 
trichotomy is independent.

is this what you call settled and fairly simple? I think you have a 
very simplified understanding of these issues.

Best
/JM




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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Benjamin Udell wrote:

Jean-Marc,

I spoke of the three trichotomies, not the five or six or ten. If you don't 
address what's said, why do you bother sending posts to a place like peirce-l?
If you do not address this structure, specifically,

  
the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, 
the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and 
the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. 



then I think that you lose this argument by sheer default.

Best, Ben UDell.
  


the same three trichotomies that you mention also appear also in the 6 
and the 10 trichotomies in a different order.


you obviously don't understand what you are writing about.
/JM

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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

Jean-Marc,

You've evaded the question again. So, we can take your default as your tacit 
admission that you don't grasp even the appearance of the categorial 
correlations with the three trichotomies. I suppose that this tacit admission 
of yours is better than nothing, but it is really quite an astonishing 
admission for you to have made. It's not particularly illuminating of the 
philosophical topic when the interlocutor simply abandons the field, but I'll 
take the win.

Best, Ben Udell

- Original Message - 
From: Jean-Marc Orliaguet [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 2:19 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Benjamin Udell wrote:
 Jean-Marc,

 I spoke of the three trichotomies, not the five or six or ten. If you don't 
 address what's said, why do you bother sending posts to a place like peirce-l?
 If you do not address this structure, specifically,

   
 the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, 
 the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and 
 the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. 
 

 then I think that you lose this argument by sheer default.

 Best, Ben UDell.
   

the same three trichotomies that you mention also appear also in the 6 
and the 10 trichotomies in a different order.

you obviously don't understand what you are writing about.
/JM

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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote:

Benjamin Udell wrote:

Jean-Marc,

I spoke of the three trichotomies, not the five or six or ten. If you 
don't address what's said, why do you bother sending posts to a place 
like peirce-l?

If you do not address this structure, specifically,

 
the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, the 2nd to 
the category in which the sign refers to its object, and the 3rd to 
the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. 


then I think that you lose this argument by sheer default.

Best, Ben UDell.
  


the same three trichotomies that you mention also appear also in the 6 
and the 10 trichotomies in a different order.


you obviously don't understand what you are writing about.
/JM



I make a precision in case you still don't understand my point:

if the 3 trichotomies (S, S-Od, S-If) are ordered in a given way, how 
can you claim that the order of the 3 trichotomies matters if it is 
changes when 3 or 6 other trichotomies are added?


I think that this is a perfectly valid answer to your question. If you 
still don't grasp it I can draw a powerpoint.


/JM

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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-21 Thread Joseph Ransdell

Jean-Marc:

What you say below suggests a chaos in Peirce's work and in the scholarship 
about it which does not exist, as regards this matter in question.   I have 
said several times here and once quite recently that all talk about Peirce's 
work on the trichotomies past the three presented in the Syllabus of Logic 
of 1903 where the stuff about the ten sign classes first appears  is about 
material in Peirce's notebooks which is very much of the nature of work in 
process that never reached even a provisionally satisfactory status in 
Peirce's own estimation.  It cannot be talked about as if it is on par, as 
representing Peirce's view, with the material in the Syllabus where the 
first three trichotomies are developed systematically and were in fact made 
publicly available by Peirce.. So far as I know, no one who is aware of this 
in virtue either of studying the MS material themselves or hearing about how 
problematic it is from me or someone else disagrees with that, so far as I 
know.  Ben's comments about the three trichotomy set which Peirce himself 
made publicly available are quite reasonable as a way of contrasting the 
present status of that with the unsettled status of the material in his 
notebooks.   I am less concerned with defending Ben, though, than I am with 
there not being a misunderstanding about the present scholarly situation. 
There is no assumption, of course, that any settlement of opinion on any of 
this is definitive or absolute. .

Joe Ransdell

- Original Message - 
From: Jean-Marc Orliaguet [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 12:48 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Benjamin Udell wrote:
 Jean-Marc, list,

 I don't even agree in the end with Peirce's classification but it's pretty 
 obvious that whether one partially or totally orders the 10 classes 
 depends on the criteria. And it's pretty obvious that the trichotomies are 
 ordered (or orderable) in a Peircean categorial way, specifically:
 the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category,
 the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and
 the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant.
 If one incorporates this ordering of the trichotomies into the ordering of 
 the classes, then one ends with a complete ordering of the classes. One 
 can also so prioritize as to arrive simply at the partially ordered 
 lattice. This is at least partly a matter of whether one prioritizes the 
 Peircean category of the trichotomy (the ordinality of the parameter) or 
 the Peircean category of the term IN the trichotomy (the ordinality of the 
 parametric value). How does one decide? Well, one looks at it both ways, 
 both ways have their illuminative aspects, so one ends up finally not 
 choosing one way dispensing permanently with the other way. So there seems 
 to be some optionality in how one orders these things. Jean-Marc, however, 
 seems to believe that the ordering question is quite determinate, and 
 leads inevitably to the partial ordering. He does this by dismissing 
 without analyzing the certainly very categorial appearance of the ordering 
 of the trichotomies. Certainly Peirce was quite conscious of this 
 categorial structure of the trichotomies, since his 10-ad of trichotomies 
 is obviously an attempt to extend that structure.

 Where most Peirceans seem to regard this matter as settled and fairly 
 simple, Jean-Marc differs, which is his right.  But I don't see in any of 
 this thread where Jean-Marc addresses what certainly appears to be a 
 Peircean categorial orderability of the trichotomies. Instead he has 
 merely asserted that they are like categories of male/female and 
 old/young, and he has not actually pursued a comparison of his example 
 with the Peircean trichotomies in order to argue for his counter-intuitive 
 assertion. So I think that we're still awaiting an argument. If this 
 argument is supposed to be in Robert Marty's book, then perhaps Jean-Marc 
 can summarize it. If Jean-Marc is unprepared to do that, perhaps Robert 
 can do it.

 Best, Ben Udell



Which Peirceans are you thinking of? I'll tell you about the
Peirceans, concerning the ordering of the trichotomies.

First Peirce, among the Peirceans, gives over the years five different
orderings of the trichotomies. Beginning with the triad (S, S-Od, S-If),
then continuing  with the 6 trichotomies (1904 and 1908) in different
orders and the finally with the ten trichotomies (letter to  Lady Welby
1908 and 8-344) yet again in different orders - This is summarized on
page 231 of Marty's book.

None of the orderings are the same, by the way. This is for Peirce's
account.

Then two other authors Lieb (1977) and Kawama (1976)  listed in the same
table propose a different ordering of the 10 trichotomies. Marty also
mentions on the same page that Jappy proposed a non-linear ordering of
the trichotomies

[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

hotomies I and III and consequently the distinction brought forth this 
trichotomie is not operative and I conclude that is redundant.
 The same argument can be advanced for the trichotomies VII and IX, 
generally for the trichotomies concerning relations betwen elements of which the 
nature is otherwise know .
 The case of tne trichotomie number X is different and I admit 
willingly that I don't see what can be a trichotomy of a triadic relation 
especially when I represent It by a branching Y. If anyone can give to me an 
idea on this matter I should be grateful to him...

 Robert Marty http://robert.marty.perso.cegetel.net/


- Original Message - 
From: "Benjamin Udell"To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: 
Friday, June 16, 2006 12:56 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: redundancies of 
trichotomies

Robert, list,I wrote,"In that case (3,2) would be a (2) 
concretive (3) legisign and (2,2) would be a (2) concretive (3) 
sinsign,..."Things are confusing enough without my typos. I 
meant,"In that case (3,2) would be a (2) concretive (3) legisign and (2,2) 
would be a (2) concretive (2) sinsign,..."- Best, Ben 
Udell
- Original Message - 

From: "Joseph Ransdell" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 4:39 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes 
(MS799.2)

Jean-Marc:What you say below suggests a chaos in Peirce's work and 
in the scholarship about it which does not exist, as regards this matter in 
question. I have said several times here and once quite recently 
that all talk about Peirce's work on the trichotomies past the three presented 
in the Syllabus of Logic of 1903 where the stuff about the ten sign classes 
first appears is about material in Peirce's notebooks which is very much 
of the nature of work in process that never reached even a provisionally 
satisfactory status in Peirce's own estimation. It cannot be talked about 
as if it is on par, as representing Peirce's view, with the material in the 
Syllabus where the first three trichotomies are developed systematically and 
were in fact made publicly available by Peirce.. So far as I know, no one who is 
aware of this in virtue either of studying the MS material themselves or hearing 
about how problematic it is from me or someone else disagrees with that, so far 
as I know. Ben's comments about the three trichotomy set which Peirce 
himself made publicly available are quite reasonable as a way of contrasting the 
present status of that with the unsettled status of the material in his 
notebooks. I am less concerned with defending Ben, though, than I am 
with there not being a misunderstanding about the present scholarly situation. 
There is no assumption, of course, that any settlement of opinion on any of this 
is definitive or absolute. .Joe Ransdell- Original Message 
- From: "Jean-Marc Orliaguet" [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: "Peirce 
Discussion Forum" peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: 
Wednesday, June 21, 2006 12:48 PMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of 
triangle of boxes (MS799.2)Benjamin Udell wrote: Jean-Marc, 
list, I don't even agree in the end with Peirce's classification 
but it's prettyobvious that whether one partially or totally orders the 10 
classes depends on the criteria. And it's pretty obvious that the 
trichotomies are ordered (or orderable) in a Peircean categorial way, 
specifically: the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, the 2nd to 
the category in which the sign refers to its object, and the 3rd to the category 
in which the sign entails its interpretant. If one incorporates this ordering of 
the trichotomies into the ordering of the classes, then one ends with a 
complete ordering of the classes. Onecan also so prioritize as to arrive 
simply at the partially orderedlattice. This is at least partly a matter 
of whether one prioritizes thePeircean category of the trichotomy (the 
ordinality of the "parameter") orthe Peircean category of the term IN the 
trichotomy (the ordinality of the"parametric value"). How does one decide? 
Well, one looks at it both ways,both ways have their illuminative aspects, 
so one ends up finally notchoosing one way dispensing permanently with the 
other way. So there seemsto be some optionality in how one orders these 
things. Jean-Marc, however,seems to believe that the ordering question is 
quite determinate, andleads inevitably to the partial ordering. He does 
this by dismissingwithout analyzing the certainly very categorial 
appearance of the orderingof the trichotomies. Certainly Peirce was quite 
conscious of thiscategorial structure of the trichotomies, since his 10-ad 
of trichotomiesis obviously an attempt to extend that 
structure. Where most Peirceans seem to regard this matter as 
settled and fairlysimple, Jean-Marc differs, which is his right. But 
I don't see in any ofthis thread where

[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-21 Thread Joseph Ransdell




Ben:

I don't think you or your position would lose any 
credibility by letting Jean-Marc have the last word on the matter. 


Joe Ransdell

  - Original Message - 
  From: 
  Benjamin Udell 
  
  To: Peirce Discussion Forum 
  Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 4:14 
  PM
  Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of 
  triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
  
  Jean-Marc:
  
  In reading Joe's response to you, I am reminded that you still haven't 
  taken a stand on the three main trichotomies and their categorial 
  correlations. If you do in fact understand the correlations, you may feel that 
  it destroys your argument to admit that you understand them. But then it comes 
  to the same thing.
  
  Then I caught this remark of yours: 
  
   Then Marty claimed that some of the trichotomies are redundant. 
  (this is summarized in a mail dated 2006/06/16 sent to peirce-l which you most 
  likely overlooked.) which would not yield to 66 classes of signs but only 
  28.
  
  Far from overlooking it, I responded to it, and am still awaiting 
  Robert's reply. I append it directly below.
  
  Best, Ben Udell
  
  - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion 
  Forum Sent: Friday, June 16, 2006 12:28 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 
  redundancies of trichotomies
  
  
  
  Robert, list,
  
   Bernard Morand mention in a message my assertion claimed in my book 
  "L'alg¨bre des signes" according to many trichotomies among the 10 
  trichotomies are redundant.
   Here are my arguments, exposed on the case of the trichotomie number 
  IV concerning "the relation of the sign to the dynamic objet" :
   By the trichotomy number I ( The sign itself, the mode of 
  apprehension of the sign itself" ) we know the categorial membership of the 
  sign ( 1, 2 or 3 ); by the trichotomy number III (the Mode of Being of the 
  dynamical object)...
  
  Number III being abstractive/concretive/collective.
  
  ...by the trichotomy number III (the Mode of Being of the 
  dynamical object) we know the categorial membership of the dynamic object (1,2 
  or 3). In view that the dynamical object determine the sign we have the 
  following possibilities :
   If the Mode of apprehension of the sign is 3, the Mode of Being of 
  the Dynamical object is 3 and their relation is categorically determined by 
  the pair (3,3). The sign is a symbol.
   If the Mode of apprehension of the sign is 2, the Mode of Being of 
  the Dynamical object is 3 or 2 and their relation is categorically determined 
  by the pair (3,2) or by the pair (2,2). In both cases the sign is an index. 
  (respectively legisign or sinsign)
  
  Trichotomy I, the Mode of apprehension, consists 
  of 1. qualisign, 2. sinsign, and 3. legisign. If the Mode of apprehension is 
  2, then the sign is a sinsign. So the pair (3,2) is a collective sinsign and 
  the pair (2,2) is a concretive sinsign. Yet you then say that (3,2) and (2,2) 
  are, "respectively, legisign or sinsign." Also, the collective sinsign seems 
  to be excluded by Peirce's "ususal" rules of sign-parametric combination. One 
  of us seems to have gone wrong here. Your discussion is formulated rather 
  abstractly, so I may well be the one who'se gone wrong. But would you clarify 
  this? It seems like you meant to write some permutation of this. E.g.,
  
  "If the Mode of Being of the Dynamical Object is 3, the Mode of 
  apprehension of the sign is 3 or 2, and their relation is categorically 
  determined by the pair (3,2) or by the pair (2,2). In both cases the sign is 
  an index (respectively legisign or sinsign)."
  
  In that case (3,2) would be a (2) concretive (3) legisign and (2,2) would 
  be a (2) concretive ([CORRECTED] 2) sinsign, and it would be allowed by the 
  rules of sign-parametric combination, and would cohere with saying that the 
  sign is respectively legisign or sinsign. But Peirce's parametric combination 
  rules would seem to allow the concretive sinsign to be iconic rather than 
  indexical. So, if you meant to refer to a concretive legisign and a concretive 
  sinsign, then what rule of combining sign-parametric values are you using and 
  on what basis do you rule out the apparently allowed iconic concretive 
  sinsign? I'm not saying that it shouldn't be ruled out. But that's the step 
  that renders Trichotomy IV redundant. The 10-ad of trichotomies which we're 
  discussing is far from "canonical." But still, whatare your 
  ideasthese regards? This is of interest to the question of whether you 
  keep the arrangement whereby all symbols are copulant and none of them 
  designative or descriptive.
  
   If the Mode of apprehension of the sign is 1, the Mode of Being of 
  the Dynamical object is 3 or 2 or 1 and their relation is categorically 
  determined by the pair (3,1) or by the pair (2,1)or by the pair (1,1). In the 
  three cases the sign is an icon ( respectively legisign or sinsi

[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-20 Thread Bernard Morand


Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote:



the classification is obtained in a deductive the way, but the 
sequence order is arbitrary.


let us say I want to classify a group of people according to 2 divisions:

- men / women (1st division)
- under age / adult (2nd division)

that's 4 classes, OK?

if I consider the men / women division a first dichotomy and the 
under age / adult division the second dichotomy, are you saying that 
the classes of people are magically ordered just because of that choice?


what are the order relations among the classes of signs? that the 
first question to answer before laying down the numerals


/JM

I think that your example funishes a good basis for reflexion Jean-Marc. 
And I am not sure you are right in this special case. A division among 
men and women is made on the basis of a discriminant, the sex. The other 
division is made on the age as a discriminant. But sex and age are two 
mutually  independant attributes of people.What is aimed at is to  
distribute a stock of individuals among  four pre-given classes. Observe 
in passing that the purpose is not to define what are men or women. This 
activity is what is called nowadays data analysis for which the 
attributes that make the division are let to the choice of the 
classifier. These attributes can be calculated in order to confer some 
nice or formal properties to the resulting classification but in a sense 
they are arbitrary (dependant on he who makes the classification). Note 
too that the potential list of candidate discriminants is infinite.
I think that this is not what is at work with the classification of 
1903. If words could convey good meanings in themselves I would say that 
it is much more a categorization than a classification. There are not 
individual signs in our hands in order to put them in the one box or the 
other. We have a set of characters which are  structured according to 
the law of prescission (and not discrimination) and make a system. It is 
this law which gives a sense to the order of the trichotomies and which 
makes that the attributes used to make the classes are not mutually 
independant. For example if a sign has for its object an index, it 
cannot be an argument,but  it can be a rheme a dicisign. The fact that 
such a categorization does not require any individual makes it dependant 
only on what Peirce sometimes calls the  formal structure of the 
elements of thought and consciousness (CP 8.213). An important 
consequence is that such a classification enables to determine all what 
is possible (and thus impossible) contrary to the data analysis 
tradition which describes what exists. If I was to revive some old 
controversies, I would hold that Peirce was a precursor in structuralism 
:-). However a  natural classification is based on genealogy and final 
cause for Peirce, two criteria that structuralism did not bother with.
This is the reason why I was reproaching to Joe the use of plural in his 
figure for qualisigns, sinsigns, legisigns as if they were individual 
class members and not structural elements, as well as the separation of 
the classification into three sub-trees. In fact, it has no effect on 
the surrounding  text but nevertheless I think that the presentation of 
the figure in itself can be misleading. It  conveys an idea of the first 
trichotomy as being more material than formal (and also more decisive 
than the two others)
On the status of classifications for Peirce, there would be something 
worth adding. He often makes a distinction between what he calls 
natural classes which are built from the formal structure of elements 
with artificial classes which are built for a special purpose. I think 
that his conception of artificial classification is very near from the 
approach taken by data analysis. I wonder whether the Welby 
classification was not an artificial one. Peirce had not the habit of 
confusing himself with his scientific study but here he says MY second 
way of dividing signs. This puzzled me for several years.


Bernard


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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-20 Thread Joseph Ransdell

J-MO = Jean-Marc Orliaguet
JR = Joseph Ransdell

J-M:
 Also note that the various trichotomies are not ordered. It is purely a
 convention to call a trichotomy the first, second, or third trichotomy,
 etc. So deducing an ordering of the classes from that information only,
 as it has been done many times including on this list, is incorrect.

JR:
 It is not a matter of convention only: the three trichotomies are based on
 the difference between firstness, secondness, and thirdness, which is
 sufficient in itself to make the ordering of them as first, second, and
 third something having informative content of some possible importance.

J-M:
yes, but this does no influence the results in any way, especially this
has nothing to do with ordering the classes. If one started with the
second trichotomy instead of the first, one would get let us say an
(index, sinsign, rheme) instead of a (sinsign, index, rheme) ... but in
a different order if one followed your method (3 would be 5 or something)

no, really... the order relations between the classes of signs comes
from the internal relations of determination between the sign, object
and interpretant. That is totally independent of the way in which you
perform the trichotomies.

REPLY BY JR:
The sequential order is not conventional.  Peirce begins, in CP 2.254 with 
the simplest possible sign, the qualisign,
which is so simple that its peculiar value as a sign can be due to nothing 
other than what it is by hypothesis: sign and object are the same, thus it 
can only be in icon when considered in relation to its object. That same 
simplicity constrains it to be only a rheme by constraining its interpretant 
to being the only thing it can possibly be, the quality which is the sign 
itself.
This is the first class of sign: the rhematic iconic qualisign.  When we get 
to 2.263, nine paragraphs later, for the tenth class
of signs, we have traversed a path of continually increasing complexity 
through the intervening eight classes.  In what sense of complexity?  I 
couldn't describe informatively, at this time, what that sense is, but I can 
say that if you analyze what you have at the end of the process -- the 
argument (i.e. argument symbolic legisign) -- you find that it involves an 
instance of a sign class of the ninth class (the dicent symbol legisgn or, 
for short, the proposition), which in turn involves an instance of the 
eighth and an instance of the seventh, each of which involve signs of still 
prior classes, and so forth until you end at the beginning with the 
qualisign involved.

I just now put in a few hours going through the chapter from Merkle's 
dissertation where he goes through, compares, and comments upon the many 
graphical representations of the sign concepts, including the various forms 
of the lattice structure of involvement which I described above, which is 
not constructed as a mere convention/  When I was working on this material 
myself I had constructed a representation of that as a lattice of 
involvement or presupposition of exactly the same form as that which Merrel 
and Marty had independently constructed, unknown to me, Merrel's apparently 
being before mine but I was unaware of it, and Marty's around the same time 
as mine but, again, not in my awareness.  (His book was published around the 
time my attention was diverted from working further with that sort of thing, 
which dates from the time of a convention in Perpignan in 1989 where I 
recall learning that Marty had published his magnum opus, which I never read 
because I had another agenda from that time on in virtue of something that 
happened at that convention.)  I mention all this because it is clearly 
unlikely that we would each have come up with that same peculiar lattice 
structure independently on the basis of independent decisions to so 
construct it as a matter of convention. There were logical necessities of 
involvement motivating it all the way.

I am much impressed by all that has been done graphically in representing 
the sign classification system, and especially by Luis Merkle/s masterful 
handling of it all in that part of his dissertation, as well as further work 
by others  in Brazil and elsewhere as well, but my own interest in the 
classification system is not with what can be learned from it by 
manipulating graphical models of it but with understanding what use it might 
have when it comes to understanding how to apply it in the analysis and 
understanding of distinctively philosophical problems such as have formed 
the staple of philosophical concern from the time of the Greeks on.   I 
wonder if anyone knows of any attempts to do that.

:Joe Ransdell 



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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-20 Thread Jean-Marc Orliaguet


Joseph Ransdell wrote:

J-MO = Jean-Marc Orliaguet
JR = Joseph Ransdell

J-M:
  

Also note that the various trichotomies are not ordered. It is purely a
convention to call a trichotomy the first, second, or third trichotomy,
etc. So deducing an ordering of the classes from that information only,
as it has been done many times including on this list, is incorrect.



JR:
  

It is not a matter of convention only: the three trichotomies are based on
the difference between firstness, secondness, and thirdness, which is
sufficient in itself to make the ordering of them as first, second, and
third something having informative content of some possible importance.



J-M:
yes, but this does no influence the results in any way, especially this
has nothing to do with ordering the classes. If one started with the
second trichotomy instead of the first, one would get let us say an
(index, sinsign, rheme) instead of a (sinsign, index, rheme) ... but in
a different order if one followed your method (3 would be 5 or something)

no, really... the order relations between the classes of signs comes
from the internal relations of determination between the sign, object
and interpretant. That is totally independent of the way in which you
perform the trichotomies.

REPLY BY JR:
The sequential order is not conventional.  Peirce begins, in CP 2.254 with 
the simplest possible sign, the qualisign,
which is so simple that its peculiar value as a sign can be due to nothing 
other than what it is by hypothesis: sign and object are the same, thus it 
can only be in icon when considered in relation to its object. That same 
simplicity constrains it to be only a rheme by constraining its interpretant 
to being the only thing it can possibly be, the quality which is the sign 
itself.
This is the first class of sign: the rhematic iconic qualisign.  When we get 
to 2.263, nine paragraphs later, for the tenth class
of signs, we have traversed a path of continually increasing complexity 
through the intervening eight classes.  In what sense of complexity?  I 
couldn't describe informatively, at this time, what that sense is, but I can 
say that if you analyze what you have at the end of the process -- the 
argument (i.e. argument symbolic legisign) -- you find that it involves an 
instance of a sign class of the ninth class (the dicent symbol legisgn or, 
for short, the proposition), which in turn involves an instance of the 
eighth and an instance of the seventh, each of which involve signs of still 
prior classes, and so forth until you end at the beginning with the 
qualisign involved.

...
:Joe Ransdell 
  


It increases in complexity, indeed but only for the first 2 and the last 
2 classes in a comparable way (the one being involved in the other); 
apart from these there is no total order hence no preferred way to 
order the classes from 1 to 10.


instead they are partially ordered in a lattice and finding 
counter-examples is easy:


1) the dicent indexical legisign involves and is involved in no rhematic 
symbol
2) the dicent sinsign involves and is involved in no rhematic indexical 
legisign

3) the indexical sinsign involves and is involved in no iconic legisign

I am surprised that you are claiming that the classes can be traversed 
by a unique, natural, ordered sequence from 1 to 10 while at the same 
time you claim to have come up with a structure similar to a lattice, 
these are contradictory assertions.


/JM


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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-19 Thread Jean-Marc Orliaguet


Benjamin Udell wrote:

Gary, Joe, list,
 
I downloaded the chapter from Merkle's dissertation last night and it 
downloaded quite quickly compared to the daytime when the Internet is 
busier. What graphics! Very little in the way of my shadings, very 
much in the way of exactness and complexity. If somebody asked me to 
do a graphic with, for instance, over 700 relational lines in the 
right places, I'd promise nothing! Amazing stuff. And he brings 
together and compares quite a variety of arrangements of Peircean sign 
classes and related conceptions by various scholars. If the logical 
and mathematical structure across Peirce's signs interests you, hie 
thee to Merkle's chapter 
http://www.dainf.cefetpr.br/~merkle/thesis/CH4.pdf . I saved my copy 
to disk, that way I don't cause him (or his server) bandwidth charges 
by downloading it from his server any time I want to see it.
 
Best, Ben Udell
 
So far I've looked mainly at the graphics.



For the record, it must be added that a lot of the information found in 
this very exhaustive piece of work has readily been available to 
researchers since the 80s and before, including the work done by Robert 
Marty on lattices (see the chapter on 'partially ordered sets' for an 
overview of why the linear representation of the classes of signs from 1 
to 10 is a bit of a problem...


Also note that the various trichotomies are not ordered. It is purely a 
convention to call a trichotomy the first, second, or third trichotomy, 
etc. So deducing an ordering of the classes from that information only, 
as it has been done many times including on this list, is incorrect.


/JM

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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-19 Thread Joseph Ransdell

Jean-Marc says:

For the record, it must be added that a lot of the information found in
this very exhaustive piece of work has readily been available to
researchers since the 80s and before, including the work done by Robert
Marty on lattices (see the chapter on 'partially ordered sets' for an
overview of why the linear representation of the classes of signs from 1
to 10 is a bit of a problem...

Also note that the various trichotomies are not ordered. It is purely a
convention to call a trichotomy the first, second, or third trichotomy,
etc. So deducing an ordering of the classes from that information only,
as it has been done many times including on this list, is incorrect.

REPLY:

It is not a matter of convention only: the three trichotomies are based on 
the difference between firstness, secondness, and thirdness, which is 
sufficient in itself to make the ordering of them as first, second, and 
third something having informative content of some possible importance.

And I don't recall anyone deducing the ordering of the classes from that 
information only, though I may have overlooked such a demonstration.   Could 
you be more specific about that?  Peirce himself presents the ten classes in 
a certain sequence (CP 2.254-263) which is at least in large part deductive 
in character, though whether or not the deduction that occurs there is based 
on that information only depends upon what you mean by that information 
only: what information, exactly?  This is not nitpicking.   The question of 
precisely what is going on there is an important one.

Joe Ransdell 



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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-18 Thread Joseph Ransdell

Ben and list:

As regards the question of which of the three images of the triangle of 
boxes in the manuscript material is the one which was actually relied upon 
by the editors of the Collected Papers for the image of it that appears at 
CP 2.264, it is reasonably certain that it is the second one, i.e. the one 
from MS page 540.17, that was used.  The passage in the CP that begins at 
2.233 and ends at 2.272 is derived from MS pages 540.2 through 540.23.  (If 
there is any further question about the accuracy of Hartshorne and Weiss's 
transcription of Peirce's document, let me know what passage you have in 
mind and I can check it against the original Peirce MS and make a copy of 
that page of the MS and post it, too, if that seems desirable or necessary.)

That seems to me to settle the matter of the origin of the Roman numerals: 
it is an artifact of the editorial work of Hartshorne and Weiss.  In 
addition to what Ben says below, there is also what is said in the scribbled 
note at the bottom of page MS 540.17 towards the left bottom corner, which 
is by some later editor, who is saying that the rationale for the Roman 
numerals is to be found in the footnotes to CP 2.235 and 2.243, where 
Hartshorne and Weiss are giving their interpretation of the modal principles 
underlying the tenfold classification.. It may be more legible in the copy I 
have than in the copy I distributed.  To be exact, it reads as follows: 
[See [235] and [243] for explanation of the roman numerals]  So it must be 
by some later editor, who is referring to what Hartshorne and Weiss did as 
editors of the CP.

I remarked earlier in this discussion that I found a marginal note to myself 
in my copy of the CP, written many years ago when I was working with this 
material with some intensity, that I thought Hartshorne and Weiss were 
making some sort of mistake in their account of what Peirce is saying.  I 
have not yet attempted to find out why I thought this is so, but I will try 
to do that now to see if there is anything in that..

Joe Ransdell


- Original Message - 
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 1:45 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Looking at all three triangles, I get to feeling that it's unlikely that 
Pierce, having included no numbers in one triangle, would then in the other 
two triangles throw numbers in like afterthoughts and, in both triangles, 
change them, and begin and finish the numbers so that they looked a bit 
scattered and visually sloppy -- when he has written the sign class names 
with some care. Especially the MS540-17 triangle.

I had noticed in the smaller graphic image of MS540-17 that the lettering 
looked careful, with serifs -- I thought it might even be medieval style. 
But in fact it was the bolding which Peirce did, which gave a medieval 
lookto some of the lettering when seen in the smaller, less-easy-to-read 
graphic image . I keep wanting to crack a joke here about Peirce being not 
a profligate bolder but showing here that he was clearly not inexperienced 
at it .

Anyway, great work, Joe! Thanks for these images of Peirce's own writing.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 2:01 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Image came through beautifully!

Look carefully at the MS799.2 triangle of boxes and you can that the numbers 
are change from an earlier set of numbers. I originally thought that the 
little earlier numeral 8 was an extra numeral 3

CURRENT:

1 ~ 5 ~ 8 ~ 10
~ 2 ~ 6 ~ 9
~~ 3 ~ 7
~~~ 4

EARLIER:

1 ~ 2 ~ 3 ~ 4
~ 5 ~ 6 ~ 7
~~ 8 ~ 9
~~~ 10

Best, Ben


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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-18 Thread Benjamin Udell




Joe, list,

It will be interesting to find out what you thought was wrong about what 
the editors were saying. Again, thank you for your efforts in this!

So, putting things together, the only numbering by Peirce which we have 
consists in the ordinal English numbers which match the 10-box triangle at CP 
2.264 and which are in the several pages just prior to CP 2.264. The relevant 
passage is in CP 2.233 through 2.272, andis derived from MS pages 540.2 
through 540.23.

From: "Joseph Ransdell" To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Friday, June 
16, 2006 5:49 PM Subject: [peirce-l] representing the ten classes of signs 
(corrected)
66~
qualisigns icons 
rhemes (I)sinsigns 
indices rhemes 
(III)sinsigns indices 
dicisigns (IV)sinsigns icons 
rhemes 
(II)legisigns symbols rhemes 
(VIII)legisigns symbols dicents 
(IX)legisigns symbols arguments (X)legisigns indices 
rhemes (VI)legisigns 
indices dicents 
(VII)legisigns icons 
rhemes 
(V)That gives us Peirce's ordering both in the diagram of the ten-box 
triangle at CP 2.264, where Peirce inserts the Roman numerals in the boxes, and 
in the several pages just prior to that where he gives paragraph-long 
descriptions of each of the ten classes, wherein he does not use Roman numerals 
but does use ordinal English numbers (first, second, etc.). 
~99

which gives us: 

1st ~ 
rhematic iconic 
*qualisign*

2nd ~ rhematic 
*iconic sinsign*
3rd ~ *rhematic indexical 
sinsign* 
4th ~ *dicent* indexical 
*sinsign* 
5th ~  rhematic 
*iconic  legisign*
6th ~ *rhematic 
indexical legisign* 7th ~ 
*dicentindexical 
legisign* 
8th ~ *rhematic 
symbol* legisign 9th ~ 
*dicent symbol* 
legisign 10th ~ *argument* symbolic legisign 

Triangle at MS 540-17. CP 2.264 (I've added asterisks to indicate 
boldfacing, and tildes to help preserve spacing)

~ Rhematic ~~~ Rhematic ~~ *Rhematic* ~~ *Argument*
~~Iconic  *Iconic* ~~~ *Symbol*  Symbolic
*Qualisign* ~ *Legisign* ~~~ Legisign ~ Legisign

~~ Rhematic ~ *Rhematic* ~~~ *Dicent*
~~ *Iconic* ~ *Indexical* ~~~ *Symbol*
~~ *Sinsign* ~ *Legisign*  Legisign

~ *Rhematic* ~~~ *Dicent*
~ *Indexical* ~~ *Indexical*
~~ *Sinsign* ~~~ *Legisign*

~~~ *Dicent*
~~~ Indexical
~~~ *Sinsign*

One other note. As Steven Ericsson Zenith rightly pointed out, in the 
triangle of boxes in MS799.2 one doesn't see earlier numbers under 
_all_ the numbers despite how I described it. I should have said that I 
saw that as the pattern. What I actually seem to discern is:

CURRENT:1 ~ 5 ~ 8 ~ 10~ 2 ~ 6 ~ 9~~ 3 ~ 7~~~ 
4EARLIER:~~ 2 ~ 3 ~ 4~ 5 ~~ 8 The mark under the 
"2" is arguable not a "5"; it does seem very much like an earlier mark, and is 
consistent with a "5." One might also argue about the appearances of the 
supposed earlier "2"  "3". About the earlier "8" there is no doubt, and the 
earlier "4" seems pretty sure.

Best, Ben Udell
- Original Message - 

From: "Joseph Ransdell" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Sunday, June 18, 2006 9:46 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes 
(MS799.2)
Ben and list:As regards the question of which of the 
three images of the triangle of boxes in the manuscript material is the one 
which was actually relied upon by the editors of the Collected Papers for the 
image of it that appears at CP 2.264, it is reasonably certain that it is the 
second one, i.e. the one from MS page 540.17, that was used. The passage 
in the CP that begins at 2.233 and ends at 2.272 is derived from MS pages 540.2 
through 540.23. (If there is any further question about the accuracy of 
Hartshorne and Weiss's transcription of Peirce's document, let me know what 
passage you have in mind and I can check it against the original Peirce MS and 
make a copy of that page of the MS and post it, too, if that seems desirable or 
necessary.)That seems to me to settle the matter of the origin of the 
Roman numerals: it is an artifact of the editorial work of Hartshorne and 
Weiss. In addition to what Ben says below, there is also what is said in 
the scribbled note at the bottom of page MS 540.17 towards the left bottom 
corner, which is by some later editor, who is saying that the rationale for the 
Roman numerals is to be found in the footnotes to CP 2.235 and 2.243, where 
Hartshorne and Weiss are giving their interpretation of the modal principles 
underlying the tenfold classification.. It may be more legible in the copy I 
have than in the copy I distributed. To be exact, it reads as follows: 
"[See [235] and [243] for explanation of the roman numerals]" So it must 
be by some later editor, who is referring to what Hartshorne and Weiss did as 
editors of the CP.I remarked earlier in this discussion that I found a 
marginal note to myself in my copy

[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-18 Thread Benjamin Udell

Gary, Joe, list,

I downloaded the chapter from Merkle's dissertation last night and it
downloaded quite quickly compared to the daytime when the Internet is busier.
What graphics! Very little in the way of my shadings, very much in the way of
exactness and complexity. If somebody asked me to do a graphic with,for
instance,over 700 relational lines in the right places, I'd promise
nothing! Amazing stuff. And he brings together and compares quite a variety of
arrangements of Peircean sign classes and related conceptions by various
scholars. If the logical and mathematical structure across Peirce's signs
interests you, hie thee to Merkle's chapter http://www.dainf.cefetpr.br/~merkle/thesis/CH4.pdf.
I saved my copy to disk, that way I don't cause him (or his server) bandwidth
charges by downloading it from his server any time I want to see it.

Best, Ben Udell

So far I've looked mainly at the graphics.
- Original Message - From: Gary Richmond To: Peirce
Discussion Forum Sent: Sunday, June 18, 2006 6:01 PMSubject: [peirce-l]
Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

Ben, Joe, list,

I would highly recommend for those interested in further exploring the
themes of this discussion--and, yes, thanks very much to Joe, Ben and others for
providing such a wealth of valuable information, diagrams, etc.--the fourth
chapter of Luis Merkle's dissertation to which he recently posted a URL:
http://www.dainf.cefetpr.br/~merkle/thesis/CH4.pdfespecially
Sect. 4.4 (p 233 to the end of the section) and most especially his Figure 4.5
The 10 valid arrangements that satisfy the prescision constraint [the
discussion discusses the connection between prescision and categoriality] which
shows clearly how Peirce arrived at the numbering of the triangular diagram
under consideration, Figure 4.7 Ternary tree of the 10 valid arrangements
among the 27 explicating Figure 4.6 Peirce's arborescent diagram of the ten
categories of triadic signs (which he used at Harvard in 1903 to illustrate and
defend his classification of signs into 10 categories), as well as Peirce's
triangular diagram, here Figure 4.8 Peirce's diagram depicting the affinities
among the ten categories (with a very helpful insert labeled "Horizontal and
vertical adjacency," and perhaps most especially Merkle's Figure 4.9 Collapse
of the 10 valid arrangements into a triangular diagram. Merkle adds this
gloss to this figure:
By imagining the tree as enclosed in a parallelepiped,
it is possible to collapse the existing planes into a single one. The result
is a triangle with ten elements. Peirce used triangular diagrams to describe
the affinities between categories. The collapse above enables an understanding
of Peirce's diagrams in the light of ternary trees.
I spent quite a bit of time with Merkle's thesis a while back when he first
posted it (or parts of it) to the list, but was too involved in other projects
at the time to get much into--if at all--on the list. Merkle's work seems to me
to put a clear light on many of the points under consideration in this thread.
However, one caveat: the file is huge and may take some considerable time to
download. Although Merkle's primary interest seems to be informatics, Sect. 4.4
concentrates on sign relations in Peirce.

Gary

Benjamin Udell wrote:

Joe, list,
It will be interesting to find out what you thought was wrong about what
the editors were saying. Again, thank you for your efforts in
this!
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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-17 Thread Benjamin Udell

Image came through beautifully!

Look carefully at the MS799.2 triangle of boxes and you can that the numbers 
are change from an earlier set of numbers. I originally thought that the little 
earlier numeral 8 was an extra numeral 3

CURRENT:

1 ~ 5 ~ 8 ~ 10 
~ 2 ~ 6 ~ 9
~~ 3 ~ 7
~~~ 4

EARLIER:

1 ~ 2 ~ 3 ~ 4 
~ 5 ~ 6 ~ 7
~~ 8 ~ 9
~~~ 10

Best, Ben


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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-17 Thread Jean-Marc Orliaguet


Joseph Ransdell wrote:
 

[image here]

On the high-res picture it is clear that the annotations were added 
afterwards. Compare the line style of the figures and letters (1, 2, 3, 
... B) with Peirce's thicker more irregular feather pen's style. The 
handwriting is differently too compared with other manuscripts.


and why would Peirce write that some words have a brown color?

/JM

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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-17 Thread Benjamin Udell

Looking at all three triangles, I get to feeling that it's unlikely that 
Pierce, having included no numbers in one triangle, would then in the other two 
triangles throw numbers in like afterthoughts and, in both triangles, change 
them, and begin and finish the numbers so that they looked a bit scattered and 
visually sloppy -- when he has written the sign class names with some care. 
Especially the MS540-17 triangle. 

I had noticed in the smaller graphic image of MS540-17 that the lettering 
looked careful, with serifs -- I thought it might even be medieval style. But 
in fact it was the bolding which Peirce did, which gave a medieval lookto some 
of the lettering when seen in the smaller, less-easy-to-read graphic image . I 
keep wanting to crack a joke here about Peirce being not a profligate bolder 
but showing here that he was clearly not inexperienced at it .

Anyway, great work, Joe! Thanks for these images of Peirce's own writing.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 2:01 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Image came through beautifully!

Look carefully at the MS799.2 triangle of boxes and you can that the numbers 
are change from an earlier set of numbers. I originally thought that the little 
earlier numeral 8 was an extra numeral 3

CURRENT:

1 ~ 5 ~ 8 ~ 10 
~ 2 ~ 6 ~ 9
~~ 3 ~ 7
~~~ 4

EARLIER:

1 ~ 2 ~ 3 ~ 4 
~ 5 ~ 6 ~ 7
~~ 8 ~ 9
~~~ 10

Best, Ben


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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Jean-Marc,

The reference is to the ink color - the brown colored text indicated in 
two ways - the rest is in red ink.  The note maker appears to be 
identifying that Peirce used two colors of ink.  The Brown ink calls out:


1. Rhematic, Icon
2. Rhematic,
3/8.
4. Indexical
5. Rhematic
6. Rhematic
7.
8/5. Legisign
9. Legisign
10. Symbolic, Legisign

The numbering is unclear and appears to have been overwritten.  I assume 
the arrows do not indicate relations of any kind.


These color distinctions are reflected by the emboldened text in 540.17 
and the bracketing in 540.27.


With respect,
Steven


Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote:

Joseph Ransdell wrote:
 

[image here]

On the high-res picture it is clear that the annotations were added 
afterwards. Compare the line style of the figures and letters (1, 2, 
3, ... B) with Peirce's thicker more irregular feather pen's style. 
The handwriting is differently too compared with other manuscripts.


and why would Peirce write that some words have a brown color?

/JM

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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-17 Thread Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen

I think we should ask the Bill Gates foundation for this!
And also just mention the importance of this to be done wherever we can.
Regarding the bill gates foundation, maybe he should first know then where
the electronic switch idea originates from. But I guess we could give it a
try, preferably with lots of names and tittles and so on to make things
happen.

Kind regards,

Wilfred

-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 21:33
Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum
Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

Wilfred and the list:

The MS pages reproduced here are from photocopies of photocopies of the 
manuscripts which constitute Peirce's Nachlass (literary remains) insofar 
as Harvard has possession of them.  They are located in the Harvard Library,

not in the Philosophy Department, and there are 80,000 or more pages of 
them, still largely unpublished.  (There are several tens of thousands of 
pages more than that elsewhere, by the say, but the bulk of the 
philosophical stuff is largely in the Harvard collections.  Since a lot of 
the manuscripts have been rotting away for years, the librarians aren't 
eager for people to poke around in them and there has to be some special and

persuasive reason to get permission to do so at this time.

They ought, of course, to be digitized with high res color cameras and 
special lighting that minimizes the effects of the scanning on them and 
plans are supposedly in the offing to do that -- along with a vast quantity 
of other holdings there in the library which they want to digitize.  We may 
all be dead before they get around to it -- unless, of course, some 
benevolent patron with a spare million dollars or so does what he or she 
ought to be doing with his or her money; but you don't find a whole lot of 
them around these days who don't already have other things they want to 
support.  Know anyone smart enough, wealthy enough, and moral enough  to 
understand the value of doing this sort of thing for Peirce?  If so let me 
know and I can assure you it will be done.  Ask the U.S. government for it? 
Sorry, but what with the need for the manufacture and development of ever 
more fearsome weapons of mass destruction, for the financing of covert 
armies,  and for the destruction of foreign governments in the interest of 
spreading freedom and religious salvation to the grateful survivors, 
American taxpayers -- or at least  their supposed representatives -- aren't 
much inclined to support such frivolous enterprises as this at this time.

But speaking less facetiously, the digitization of the MS material so that 
the originals can be retired from use and the digitized material made 
generally available is an enormous task, far more difficult than one might 
at first suppose.  One complication that has to be taken into account stems 
from the fact that the people who were supposed to take good care of his 
work after Peirce's death in 1914 -- the people in the philosophy department

at Harvard -- savaged it dreadfully over the course of the many decades when

they were its stewards, leaving it in appalling disorder by the time it 
was finally rescued from them several decades after his death. 
Consequently, a major part of the problem in making that material generally 
available lies in the fact that it is still badly disordered even now, after

several more decades of attempts to sort it out with use of the photocopies.

This is highly labor-intensive intellectual work.  There are plans afoot for

doing all of these and other things as well,  but it requires money even to 
get a start on doing all of this.

As I said, let us know if you know where to get it.

Joe Ransdell






- Original Message - 
From: Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 1:14 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Ok..so...are these actual original notes of Peirce to be found at Harvard?
And can they be reviewed by scholars? If so I would be interested to go
there maybe some time and review it. Better to have seen it first hand.
Peirce is getting my attention more and more :-)

Is there actually some good overview of where to find what materials as
original as possible notes and so on from Charles Sander Peirce? And any
money available from institutions for thorough research?

Wilfred

-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 20:02
Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum
Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

Image came through beautifully!

Look carefully at the MS799.2 triangle of boxes and you can that the numbers
are change from an earlier set of numbers. I originally thought that the
little earlier numeral 8 was an extra numeral 3

CURRENT:

1 ~ 5 ~ 8 ~ 10
~ 2 ~ 6 ~ 9
~~ 3 ~ 7
~~~ 4

EARLIER

[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) (Correction)


Sorry, on closer inspection that should read:

1. Rhematic, Icon
2. Rhematic,
3/5. Rhematic
4. Indexical
5/8. Legisign
6.
7.
8/3.
9. Legisign
10. Symbolic, Legisign

540.17 highlighs in the same locations:

1. Rhematic, Icon
2. Rhematic,
3/5. Rhematic
4.
5/8. Legisign
6. Indexical
7.
8/3.
9. Legisign
10. Symbolic, Legisign



Steven Ericsson Zenith wrote:

Jean-Marc,

The reference is to the ink color - the brown colored text indicated 
in two ways - the rest is in red ink.  The note maker appears to be 
identifying that Peirce used two colors of ink.  The Brown ink calls out:


1. Rhematic, Icon
2. Rhematic,
3/8.
4. Indexical
5. Rhematic
6. Rhematic
7.
8/5. Legisign
9. Legisign
10. Symbolic, Legisign

The numbering is unclear and appears to have been overwritten.  I 
assume the arrows do not indicate relations of any kind.


These color distinctions are reflected by the emboldened text in 
540.17 and the bracketing in 540.27.


With respect,
Steven


Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote:

Joseph Ransdell wrote:
 

[image here]

On the high-res picture it is clear that the annotations were added 
afterwards. Compare the line style of the figures and letters (1, 2, 
3, ... B) with Peirce's thicker more irregular feather pen's style. 
The handwriting is differently too compared with other manuscripts.


and why would Peirce write that some words have a brown color?

/JM

---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]



---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]



---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com

[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-17 Thread Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen

So, who are the we who need how to get the money? I mean, are there already
people working on getting things digitalized? SO yes, 80.000 pages is a lot.
But I can hardly imagine it would cost more than 1 dollar per page or so to
get it digitalized? And should be able to do that job within 2 years or so?
With more people and some more equipment, some months?? Yes and maybe
special lightning. But still not milliard dollar I suppose?? I think it is
first of all needed to get exact figures about what such digitalization of
only the Peirce pages at Harvard would cost. The camera's we would
probably be able to just borrow or get from some good supplier of this
stuff. And time to do so decreasing it to just put more persons on the job.

I myself would be willing to think about ways to get this done. As it also
interests me a lot. And it is just important that this happens as soon as
possible.

Does anyone here have contact info for the Charles Peirce Society. And any
other foundation or society working on encouragement of study/communication
of Charles Sander Peirce. And maybe some good contact address at Harvard,
the people there responsible for the Peirce collection. 

Kind regards,

Wilfred

-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 21:33
Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum
Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

Wilfred and the list:

The MS pages reproduced here are from photocopies of photocopies of the 
manuscripts which constitute Peirce's Nachlass (literary remains) insofar 
as Harvard has possession of them.  They are located in the Harvard Library,

not in the Philosophy Department, and there are 80,000 or more pages of 
them, still largely unpublished.  (There are several tens of thousands of 
pages more than that elsewhere, by the say, but the bulk of the 
philosophical stuff is largely in the Harvard collections.  Since a lot of 
the manuscripts have been rotting away for years, the librarians aren't 
eager for people to poke around in them and there has to be some special and

persuasive reason to get permission to do so at this time.

They ought, of course, to be digitized with high res color cameras and 
special lighting that minimizes the effects of the scanning on them and 
plans are supposedly in the offing to do that -- along with a vast quantity 
of other holdings there in the library which they want to digitize.  We may 
all be dead before they get around to it -- unless, of course, some 
benevolent patron with a spare million dollars or so does what he or she 
ought to be doing with his or her money; but you don't find a whole lot of 
them around these days who don't already have other things they want to 
support.  Know anyone smart enough, wealthy enough, and moral enough  to 
understand the value of doing this sort of thing for Peirce?  If so let me 
know and I can assure you it will be done.  Ask the U.S. government for it? 
Sorry, but what with the need for the manufacture and development of ever 
more fearsome weapons of mass destruction, for the financing of covert 
armies,  and for the destruction of foreign governments in the interest of 
spreading freedom and religious salvation to the grateful survivors, 
American taxpayers -- or at least  their supposed representatives -- aren't 
much inclined to support such frivolous enterprises as this at this time.

But speaking less facetiously, the digitization of the MS material so that 
the originals can be retired from use and the digitized material made 
generally available is an enormous task, far more difficult than one might 
at first suppose.  One complication that has to be taken into account stems 
from the fact that the people who were supposed to take good care of his 
work after Peirce's death in 1914 -- the people in the philosophy department

at Harvard -- savaged it dreadfully over the course of the many decades when

they were its stewards, leaving it in appalling disorder by the time it 
was finally rescued from them several decades after his death. 
Consequently, a major part of the problem in making that material generally 
available lies in the fact that it is still badly disordered even now, after

several more decades of attempts to sort it out with use of the photocopies.

This is highly labor-intensive intellectual work.  There are plans afoot for

doing all of these and other things as well,  but it requires money even to 
get a start on doing all of this.

As I said, let us know if you know where to get it.

Joe Ransdell






- Original Message - 
From: Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 1:14 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


Ok..so...are these actual original notes of Peirce to be found at Harvard?
And can they be reviewed by scholars? If so I would be interested to go
there maybe some time

[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

My understanding is that this would not be a project within the bounds 
of those that interest the Gates Foundation.  The focus there is on 
raising the standards of public education - not arbitrary scholarly 
endeavors.


With respect,

Steven

Joseph Ransdell wrote:

Wilfred says::

I think we should ask the Bill Gates foundation for this!
And also just mention the importance of this to be done wherever we can.
Regarding the bill gates foundation, maybe he should first know then where
the electronic switch idea originates from. But I guess we could give it a
try, preferably with lots of names and tittles and so on to make things
happen.

That's an idea worth investigating, Wilfred, particularly in view  of the 
fact that Bill Gates is presently retiring from active control of Microsoft 
and devoting himself exclusively to his and his wife's philanthropical 
concerns -- then, too, he was a student at Harvard -- and I will see to it 
that it is investigated.   Foundations usually have an initial filtering 
system that can be checked out for possible entry into an inner sanctum 
where you might be permitted to make your case for support.  It seems to be 
more the exception than the rule for them to leave it open enough for much 
in the way of purely scholarly projects to be capable of slipping through at 
this time, but there are ways of construing the interest which this 
particular project might have that might find some possibilities there. 
I'll see what I can find out about the prospects and let you know what I 
find out soon.


Joe Ransdell


- Original Message - 
From: Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen [EMAIL PROTECTED]

To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 2:50 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


I think we should ask the Bill Gates foundation for this!
And also just mention the importance of this to be done wherever we can.
Regarding the bill gates foundation, maybe he should first know then where
the electronic switch idea originates from. But I guess we could give it a
try, preferably with lots of names and tittles and so on to make things
happen.

Kind regards,

Wilfred

-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 21:33
Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum
Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

Wilfred and the list:

The MS pages reproduced here are from photocopies of photocopies of the
manuscripts which constitute Peirce's Nachlass (literary remains) insofar
as Harvard has possession of them.  They are located in the Harvard Library,

not in the Philosophy Department, and there are 80,000 or more pages of
them, still largely unpublished.  (There are several tens of thousands of
pages more than that elsewhere, by the say, but the bulk of the
philosophical stuff is largely in the Harvard collections.  Since a lot of
the manuscripts have been rotting away for years, the librarians aren't
eager for people to poke around in them and there has to be some special and

persuasive reason to get permission to do so at this time.

They ought, of course, to be digitized with high res color cameras and
special lighting that minimizes the effects of the scanning on them and
plans are supposedly in the offing to do that -- along with a vast quantity
of other holdings there in the library which they want to digitize.  We may
all be dead before they get around to it -- unless, of course, some
benevolent patron with a spare million dollars or so does what he or she
ought to be doing with his or her money; but you don't find a whole lot of
them around these days who don't already have other things they want to
support.  Know anyone smart enough, wealthy enough, and moral enough  to
understand the value of doing this sort of thing for Peirce?  If so let me
know and I can assure you it will be done.  Ask the U.S. government for it?
Sorry, but what with the need for the manufacture and development of ever
more fearsome weapons of mass destruction, for the financing of covert
armies,  and for the destruction of foreign governments in the interest of
spreading freedom and religious salvation to the grateful survivors,
American taxpayers -- or at least  their supposed representatives -- aren't
much inclined to support such frivolous enterprises as this at this time.

But speaking less facetiously, the digitization of the MS material so that
the originals can be retired from use and the digitized material made
generally available is an enormous task, far more difficult than one might
at first suppose.  One complication that has to be taken into account stems
from the fact that the people who were supposed to take good care of his
work after Peirce's death in 1914 -- the people in the philosophy department

at Harvard -- savaged it dreadfully over the course of the many decades when

they were its stewards, leaving it in appalling disorder by the time

[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


For completeness:

http://www.gatesfoundation.org/ForGrantSeekers/EligibilityAndGuidelines/

Steven

Steven Ericsson Zenith wrote:
My understanding is that this would not be a project within the bounds 
of those that interest the Gates Foundation.  The focus there is on 
raising the standards of public education - not arbitrary scholarly 
endeavors.


With respect,

Steven

Joseph Ransdell wrote:

Wilfred says::

I think we should ask the Bill Gates foundation for this!
And also just mention the importance of this to be done wherever we can.
Regarding the bill gates foundation, maybe he should first know then 
where
the electronic switch idea originates from. But I guess we could give 
it a

try, preferably with lots of names and tittles and so on to make things
happen.

That's an idea worth investigating, Wilfred, particularly in view  of 
the fact that Bill Gates is presently retiring from active control of 
Microsoft and devoting himself exclusively to his and his wife's 
philanthropical concerns -- then, too, he was a student at Harvard -- 
and I will see to it that it is investigated.   Foundations usually 
have an initial filtering system that can be checked out for possible 
entry into an inner sanctum where you might be permitted to make your 
case for support.  It seems to be more the exception than the rule 
for them to leave it open enough for much in the way of purely 
scholarly projects to be capable of slipping through at this time, 
but there are ways of construing the interest which this particular 
project might have that might find some possibilities there. I'll see 
what I can find out about the prospects and let you know what I find 
out soon.


Joe Ransdell


- Original Message - From: Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen 
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 2:50 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


I think we should ask the Bill Gates foundation for this!
And also just mention the importance of this to be done wherever we can.
Regarding the bill gates foundation, maybe he should first know then 
where
the electronic switch idea originates from. But I guess we could give 
it a

try, preferably with lots of names and tittles and so on to make things
happen.

Kind regards,

Wilfred

-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 21:33
Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum
Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

Wilfred and the list:

The MS pages reproduced here are from photocopies of photocopies of the
manuscripts which constitute Peirce's Nachlass (literary remains) 
insofar
as Harvard has possession of them.  They are located in the Harvard 
Library,


not in the Philosophy Department, and there are 80,000 or more pages of
them, still largely unpublished.  (There are several tens of 
thousands of

pages more than that elsewhere, by the say, but the bulk of the
philosophical stuff is largely in the Harvard collections.  Since a 
lot of

the manuscripts have been rotting away for years, the librarians aren't
eager for people to poke around in them and there has to be some 
special and


persuasive reason to get permission to do so at this time.

They ought, of course, to be digitized with high res color cameras and
special lighting that minimizes the effects of the scanning on them and
plans are supposedly in the offing to do that -- along with a vast 
quantity
of other holdings there in the library which they want to digitize.  
We may

all be dead before they get around to it -- unless, of course, some
benevolent patron with a spare million dollars or so does what he or she
ought to be doing with his or her money; but you don't find a whole 
lot of

them around these days who don't already have other things they want to
support.  Know anyone smart enough, wealthy enough, and moral enough  to
understand the value of doing this sort of thing for Peirce?  If so 
let me
know and I can assure you it will be done.  Ask the U.S. government 
for it?
Sorry, but what with the need for the manufacture and development of 
ever

more fearsome weapons of mass destruction, for the financing of covert
armies,  and for the destruction of foreign governments in the 
interest of

spreading freedom and religious salvation to the grateful survivors,
American taxpayers -- or at least  their supposed representatives -- 
aren't
much inclined to support such frivolous enterprises as this at this 
time.


But speaking less facetiously, the digitization of the MS material so 
that

the originals can be retired from use and the digitized material made
generally available is an enormous task, far more difficult than one 
might
at first suppose.  One complication that has to be taken into account 
stems

from the fact that the people who were supposed to take good care of his
work after Peirce's death in 1914 -- the people in the philosophy

[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

2006-06-17 Thread Joseph Ransdell

Yes, there is already a movement afoot and maybe more than one, and all of 
the things you mentioned are being considered or coming under consideration. 
If you'll give me two or three days to get some information together for you 
on this in a systematic way, I'll try to convey to you and others on the 
list who may be interested in this sort of project a definite idea of what 
is being and might be done and what you might be able to do to help and also 
to get your own ideas on this.  It will take a collaborative effort to do it 
and there are indeed shortcuts that can be taken to get it moving, I 
believe.  But bear with me for just a couple of days so I can figure out how 
to organize the discussion effectively without interfering with the normal 
discussion function of the list.   I should say, perhaps, that the people at 
Harvard won't be of any special help at this particular time, but there are 
contacts with the Peirce Society that will be to the point.

Joe Ransdell

.
- Original Message - 
From: Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 3:12 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)


So, who are the we who need how to get the money? I mean, are there already
people working on getting things digitalized? SO yes, 80.000 pages is a lot.
But I can hardly imagine it would cost more than 1 dollar per page or so to
get it digitalized? And should be able to do that job within 2 years or so?
With more people and some more equipment, some months?? Yes and maybe
special lightning. But still not milliard dollar I suppose?? I think it is
first of all needed to get exact figures about what such digitalization of
only the Peirce pages at Harvard would cost. The camera's we would
probably be able to just borrow or get from some good supplier of this
stuff. And time to do so decreasing it to just put more persons on the job.

I myself would be willing to think about ways to get this done. As it also
interests me a lot. And it is just important that this happens as soon as
possible.

Does anyone here have contact info for the Charles Peirce Society. And any
other foundation or society working on encouragement of study/communication
of Charles Sander Peirce. And maybe some good contact address at Harvard,
the people there responsible for the Peirce collection.

Kind regards,

Wilfred

-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 21:33
Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum
Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

Wilfred and the list:

The MS pages reproduced here are from photocopies of photocopies of the
manuscripts which constitute Peirce's Nachlass (literary remains) insofar
as Harvard has possession of them.  They are located in the Harvard Library,

not in the Philosophy Department, and there are 80,000 or more pages of
them, still largely unpublished.  (There are several tens of thousands of
pages more than that elsewhere, by the say, but the bulk of the
philosophical stuff is largely in the Harvard collections.  Since a lot of
the manuscripts have been rotting away for years, the librarians aren't
eager for people to poke around in them and there has to be some special and

persuasive reason to get permission to do so at this time.

They ought, of course, to be digitized with high res color cameras and
special lighting that minimizes the effects of the scanning on them and
plans are supposedly in the offing to do that -- along with a vast quantity
of other holdings there in the library which they want to digitize.  We may
all be dead before they get around to it -- unless, of course, some
benevolent patron with a spare million dollars or so does what he or she
ought to be doing with his or her money; but you don't find a whole lot of
them around these days who don't already have other things they want to
support.  Know anyone smart enough, wealthy enough, and moral enough  to
understand the value of doing this sort of thing for Peirce?  If so let me
know and I can assure you it will be done.  Ask the U.S. government for it?
Sorry, but what with the need for the manufacture and development of ever
more fearsome weapons of mass destruction, for the financing of covert
armies,  and for the destruction of foreign governments in the interest of
spreading freedom and religious salvation to the grateful survivors,
American taxpayers -- or at least  their supposed representatives -- aren't
much inclined to support such frivolous enterprises as this at this time.

But speaking less facetiously, the digitization of the MS material so that
the originals can be retired from use and the digitized material made
generally available is an enormous task, far more difficult than one might
at first suppose.  One complication that has to be taken into account stems
from the fact that the people who were supposed to take good care

[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)