[peirce-l] Re: Epistemological Primacy in Peirce NLC
Steven On 9/8/06, you wrote: ... I will have to get myself an electronic version of the CP. AS: I got myself a copy from Intelex a few years back, and I am convinced that it's a product that, while not as indispensible as sliced bread, comes pretty close to that in the field of Peirce study. It's always good to have the printed CP available (and, thank Heavens, our University Library has the complete set, not very frequently borrowed, except by John Collier and myself, but THERE never the less), but the electronic version has the huge advatage of all such texts: when you need to cite, it's as easy as slicing bread! By all means get the Intelex edition - you'll not regret it. Cheers Arnold Shepperson --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Epistemological Primacy in Peirce NLC
Thank you Joe, that is helpful - I will have to get myself an electronic version of the CP.This clears up my concern regarding the term "unity" - he is using the definition that he gives to Kant's usage.CP 6.378 (1901) from "Unity and Plurality" in Baldwin's Dictionary 378. Unity is divided by Kant into analytical and synthetical. He never defines or explains these terms; but if we remember that, in his use of words, multiplicity of elements is essential to unity, it is easy to see that what he means by analytical unity is the unity of that which is given in its combined state and is analyzed by ordinary reflection. Thus we perceive a fact; and in order to express or think it we analyze it, and the relation of the percept to the elements resulting from this analysis is very inappropriately called analytical unity. ...I still have the problem however that this is vague with respect to my question - both here, and as Peirce observes, in the Critique of Pure Reason. I have not found a clear statement that would indicate either one or the other case I have put forward by either Peirce or Kant.I take the position that the process of analysis/semeiosis is one that, for the life of the organism, reduces the organism's entire experience to conceptions/signs and that this process is one of differentiation - not one of integration. I find the language of integration in Peirce and Kant and the term unity is, I think, the key to it.Reviewing Kant I can also get the sense that both interpretations are possible and so I am left to conclude on my own review that neither Kant nor Peirce had refined their models to this degree - though they may well have been heading there. I will welcome any correction to this view.Carnap makes a statement about the whole experience being primary because he seeks to justify his use of the autopsychological (solipsism) as the sole basis of his construction in his epistemology:"... we have to proceed from that which is epistemically primary, that is to say, from the "given", i.e., from experiences themselves in their totality and undivided unity..In opposition to the "atomizing" school of thought ... ... the total impression is epistemically primary..." Section 67, LSotW, Rudolf CarnapHe cites "more and more emphasis" from Schlick, esp. Schuppe, Cornelius, Gomperz - of whom I am only really familiar with Schlick. In the same section he also mentions "Reininger makes similar statements and refers to Kant." I don't know Reininger, but this suggests that Carnap was not familiar with Kant at the time.Finally, he refers to Gestalt theory.With respect,StevenOn Sep 7, 2006, at 10:14 AM, Joseph Ransdell wrote:Steven: I append to this message some quotes from Peirce that might be helpful as regards cognitive synthesis, for what it's worth. (I picked them up from a string search of the CP on "synthesis" and they looked like they might be pertinent.) --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Epistemological Primacy in Peirce NLC
Dear Steven, Your questions are very interesting to me as well. I view the conceptions Peirce speaks of as signs and was just about to write something to that effect to Ben and might yet. I read Peirce as saying their are various sensations that impinge upon uswhich we organize in such a way as to constitute signs of objects -- these signs being conceptions. And that we ourselvesare signs standing for a point of view or object we call ourselves. I don't mean by this to imply that this is all just a matter of neurology -- I think coordination with other signs is fundamental to the process by which signs are established and do their work. So I take it that the most complete organization of being is as signsand that this triadic being (of which we partake as signs) can at least conceptually be understood as comprised of a nesting of signs within which are signs, reactions and qualities. So I would say primacy belongs to the sign of which quality, reaction (distinction) and continuity are inherent parts.Sensations I take to bereactions. Of course I'm not sure any of what I'm saying here is correct. I amjoining you incalling for a discussion of the New List and the questions it raises.So, I'm not really clear on the question you are asking (the difference between the two interpretations you are putting forth), but I think the theory Peirce is referring to is the work of Kant in his critique of Pure Reason but I'm not at all sure. In any case if you are taking on The New List paragraph by paragraph and are interested in discussing each paragraph as you go I'd like to join you and hope others will as well --- I've been hoping for a systematic review of this work on the list for some time. It would be very helpful to me. Best wishes, Jim Piat From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Wednesday, September 06, 2006 8:34 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Epistemological Primacy in Peirce NLC Dear List, I want to make sure that I have interpreted Peirce correctly from his statements in On A New List of Categories (NLC). I am comparing this argument with the notion of epistemological primacy put forward by Rudolf Carnap in his The Logical Structure of the World. In the first paragraphs of NLC Peirce says: (CP1.545) Sec. 1. This paper is based upon the theory already established, that the function of conceptions is to reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity, and that the validity of a conception consists in the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity without the introduction of it. (CP1.546) Sec. 2. This theory gives rise to a conception of gradation among those conceptions which are universal. For one such conception may unite the manifold of sense and yet another may be required to unite the conception and the manifold to which it is applied; and so on. Here are my questions: Carnap argues that the entire experience of an individual holds epistemological primacy.This could be taken to concur with Peirce's argument in CP1.545 but there appear to be two interpretations possible. The source of my doubt is Peirce's use of the term "unity" in the above paragraph and his comments in the following paragraph. I want to be sure that I understand how he is using the term "unity." He may mean that concepts are differentiated in the landscape of experience and that the "manifold of sensuous impressions" is a whole and not constituted of distinctions, that distinctions in that "manifold" are what he calls "the function of conceptions." These distinctions fit my definition of "signs" and so an interpretation of CP1.545 could read that the "function of conceptions" are signs (i.e., differentiated experiences). An alternative point of view would argue that Peirce is saying the opposite of what I have said before and that he means that distinct "sensuous impressions" are brought to together as a function of conceptions. In this last case he would need an integrative mechanism for semeiosis and give epistemological primacy to "conceptions." This provides significant problems. Finally, where is the theory "already established" to which Peirce refers- in his own work or is he referring to someone else? Sincerely, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith INSTITUTE for ADVANCED SCIENCE ENGINEERING Sunnyvale, California http://iase.info ---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
