Re: Dover Intelligent-Design Case
In a message dated 12/20/2005 6:19:43 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: With regard to the judge's commentary, what I find the most disturbing is thatthis particular judge -- a Bush appointee with pretty firm "conservative" credentials -- felt it necessary to preemptively defend not just his decision, but himself, in his opinion. What does that say for the current social climate andprinciplesof judicial independence? As for determining what is or is not "science," judges do that all the time when they decide whether or not to allow expert testimony. Actually, I find disturbing the fact that the judge is thinking about whether or not he might need to defend himself. His decision is either defensible on its own merits, or it is indefensible. The judge's comments in this regard suggest that he has been reading something other than transcripts, briefs and cases, or listening to something other than his iPod. Having picked up the flavor of disapproval for a certain category of outcomes on religion cases, he has decided to import squarely into his opinion an argument in justification that simply would not be there if he only did his job and ignored Fox News and/or Radio America. Jim Henderson Senior Counsel ACLJ ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Intelligent-Design Case
Interesting that you think that a judge's job does not include being aware of the political impact of his or her decision!Am I correct in inferring, then, that you consider Brown v. Board wrongly decided on the merits and wrongly written in form and wrongly decided within the Court's processes since the external impact was certainly considered by the court?Just because a decision is defensible on its merits does not mean that one need not defend oneself.In such contentious matters a court should give a full and candid accounting of its reasoning.This is a district court making findings of fact on a 6-week record in a highly visible, important case. It is not a removed abstracted appellate decision.On Dec 21, 2005, at 8:20 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: In a message dated 12/20/2005 6:19:43 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: With regard to the judge's commentary, what I find the most disturbing is that this particular judge -- a Bush appointee with pretty firm "conservative" credentials -- felt it necessary to preemptively defend not just his decision, but himself, in his opinion. What does that say for the current social climate and principles of judicial independence? As for determining what is or is not "science," judges do that all the time when they decide whether or not to allow expert testimony. Actually, I find disturbing the fact that the judge is thinking about whether or not he might need to defend himself. His decision is either defensible on its own merits, or it is indefensible. The judge's comments in this regard suggest that he has been reading something other than transcripts, briefs and cases, or listening to something other than his iPod. Having picked up the flavor of disapproval for a certain category of outcomes on religion cases, he has decided to import squarely into his opinion an argument in justification that simply would not be there if he only did his job and ignored Fox News and/or Radio America. Jim Henderson Senior Counsel ACLJ___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-84282900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar"Nonviolence means avoiding not only external physical violence but also internal violence of spirit. You not only refuse to shoot a man, but you refuse to hate him."Martin Luther King, Jr. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Intelligent-Design Case
A careful reading of the trial transcript would indicate, I think, that such charges had already been leveled at all courts, and especially any court dealing with the issue.I see in the Dallas Morning News today thatJudge Jones hasbeen labeled an "activist," and that one of the old school board members is still questioning whether there should be any separation of church and state at all -- sometimes the parties make judges look like prophets. He may as well have paraphrased Santayana, don't you think? Those who don't read the decisions are condemned to repeat the cases, and outcomes.Ed Darrell Dallas[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:In a message dated 12/21/2005 8:42:58 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Interesting that you think that a judge's job does not include being aware of the political impact of his or her decision! Am I correct in inferring, then, that you consider Brown v. Board wrongly decided on the merits and wrongly written in form and wrongly decided within the Court's processes since the external impact was certainly considered by the court?Just because a decision is defensible on its merits does not mean that one need not defend oneself.In such contentious ma! tters a court should give a full and candid accounting of its reasoning.This is a district court making findings of fact on a 6-week record in a highly visible, important case. It is not a removed abstracted appellate decision.Steven,Of course, a judge is aware of the temper of his times. The difference between this judge on this score and other judges on this score is that this judge communicates his sensitivity to and awareness of likely coming criticism of his decision. I think that is a difference with significance. And I am not inclined to give judges a pass on this point. Some might urge that his relative inexperience on the bench might call for lenience, but isn't that like the parricide throwing himself on the mercy of the court as an orphan? After all, if the judge's showing slip must be ignored ! for inexperience why must his reasoning on the merits be valued despite his inexperience.By the way, and I don't offer this as puffery or braggadocio but I have worked on high profile, highly contentious, cases on occasion. And in all those cases, of course, we had contact with trial judges, appellate judges and supreme judges. And with two notable exceptions, Judge Jones' conduct is unmatched. Those two instances were the appearance on Nightline of Judge Patrick Kelly, USDJ, in Wichita, Kansas, while he was sitting as judge in an Operation Rescue case, to discuss the case, the demonstrations, and his order; and, the late Judge Robert Ward, USDJ, in New York City, who casually let slip his awareness of the facts underlying a contempt proceeding garnered from extra-judicial sources.Jim Henderson Senior Counsel ACLJ___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Dover Case Questions
The Dover case has me so confused that I cant see what its implications are beyond its narrow facts. A couple of questions came to mind as I read it. Maybe someone can help me sort them out. 1. One of the attorneys for the plaintiffs said last night on one of the news shows that all this (ID) would be fine if relegated to a class on comparative religion or philosophy. Why should the ostensible subject matter or title of a class make any difference? The case wasnt about policing the content of science classes but rather the establishment clause. It seems like it ought not matter which door the establishment effort enters. What am I missing here? 2. If, as the Dover court says, the Constitution forbids teaching creationism as science, then wouldnt the principal version of the now-regnant big bang theory be constitutionally prohibited as well? Its now generally accepted that the age of the observable cosmos is 12-20 billion years and thus that the universe was created (in an act of exnihilation) in a big bang. This theorys predecessor, the steady state theory, held that the cosmos had always existed and that the steady state of the universe was maintained by the continuous creation (coming into existence out of nothing) of hydrogen nuclei. Both of these theories employ the idea of creation in precisely the same sense ! as in the Dover case: the coming into existence of something (life, hydrogen nuclei, the cosmos, whatever) ab initio, ex nihilo. Its true that many modern physicists have claimed that things can come into existence from nothing by natural processes, but they do so after leaving science and inadvertently turning philosopher, thus failing to understand the difference between creation and natural generation. Surely, we cant legally distinguish the creationism of the ID proponents from the creationism of the big bang proponents solely on the basis that the former acknowledge that creation implies a creator and the latter doesnt. That would make the distinction entirely conventional, it seems.So it can't just be that it's the level of controversy within science either. Might there be "good" creationis! m and "bad" creationism now? Ive also been puzzled why some ID people havent picked up the big bang as supporting the notion that scientists themselves view creationism as a proper object of science (wrongly, I think) and as accepting the idea that the cosmos was created. One of the most interesting factors in the Dover case was the way the plaintiffs expert witness relied on Aquinas. Aquinas drew a sharp distinction between creation and natural generation (motion and change), and defended the idea that, since we cant know whether the cosmos had a beginning or end, we should keep a completely open mind on the subject philosophically and scientifically. I dont think that Aquinas would have had much difficulty accepting the idea of evolution. It looks like the plaintiff's "expert" theologian ignor! ed the stronger arguments for the plaintiffs' position in Aquinas and contented himself with disparaging the defendants' position. Maybe that was just a tactical decision. Davis Nelson ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Dover Intelligent-Design Case
I agree that the judge overreached here, and that helping students so inclined reconcile the science with their faith is not what made the Dover program problematic. A sensible and constitutional policy would do precisely this, by explaining the methodological difference between scientific approaches to the question and common religious approaches to the question. Douglas Laycock University of Texas Law School 727 E. Dean Keeton St. Austin, TX 78705 512-232-1341 512-471-6988 (fax) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Marc Stern Sent: Wed 12/21/2005 9:40 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Dover Intelligent-Design Case The excerpt below appears at p 44 of the ID cases slip onion .The judge, I think ,reads the disclaimer for more than it says ( I do no tread the disclaimer as saying that students cannot consider what id s taught in class or that they must accept their parents view) and in any event the proposition that a school can not tell students that ultimate judgments about the correctness of what it has taught are not within its domain strikes me as wholly wrong. Am I wrong? Marc D. Stern Second, by directing students to their families to learn about the Origins of Life, the paragraph performs the exact same function as did the Freiler disclaimer: It reminds school children that they can rightly maintain beliefs taught by their parents on the subject of the origin of life, thereby stifling the critical thinking that the class's study of evolutionary theory might otherwise prompt, to protect a religious view from what the Board considers to be a threat. Id. at 345 (because disclaimer effectively told students that evolution as taught in the classroom need not affect what they already know, it sent a message that was contrary to an intent to encourage critical thinking winmail.dat___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
On Dec 21, 2005, at 11:03 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:The Dover case has me so confused that I can’t see what its implications are beyond its narrow facts. A couple of questions came to mind as I read it. Maybe someone can help me sort them out. 1. One of the attorneys for the plaintiffs said last night on one of the news shows that “all this” (ID) would be fine if relegated to a class on “comparative religion” or philosophy. Why should the ostensible subject matter or title of a class make any difference? The case wasn’t about policing the content of science classes but rather the establishment clause. It seems like it ought not matter which door the establishment effort enters. What am I missing here?That schools can teach about religious beliefs in suitable classes (World Ideologies, Comparative Religion, Belief Systems, Impact of Beliefs on Society, etc.). The problem is that the requirement to teach a religious belief in a science class is clearly favoring or tending to establish religion. Teaching science is not. Teaching about religions is not. Teaching English is not. Etc. The same problem would arise if the school mandated teaching only one religion or mandated teaching English using only the Bible as the only source of literature. 2. If, as the Dover court says, “the Constitution forbids teaching creationism as science”, then wouldn’t the principal version of the now-regnant “big bang” theory be constitutionally prohibited as well? It’s now generally accepted that the age of the observable cosmos is 12-20 billion years and thus that the universe was “created” (in an act of exnihilation) in a big bang. This theory’s predecessor, the steady state theory, held that the cosmos had always existed and that the “steady state” of the universe was maintained by the continuous “creation” (coming into existence out of nothing) of hydrogen nuclei. Both of these theories employ the idea of “creation” in precisely the same sense ! as in the Dover case: the coming into existence of something (life, hydrogen nuclei, the cosmos, whatever) ab initio, ex nihilo. It’s true that many modern physicists have claimed that things can come into existence from nothing by natural processes, but they do so after leaving science and inadvertently turning philosopher, thus failing to understand the difference between creation and natural generation. Surely, we can’t legally distinguish the creationism of the ID proponents from the creationism of the big bang proponents solely on the basis that the former acknowledge that creation implies a creator and the latter doesn’t. That would make the distinction entirely conventional, it seems. So it can't just be that it's the level of controversy within science either. Might there be "good" creationis! m and "bad" creationism now?The big bang theory does not say there was a god that made the bang. It just says that something happened at a point before time that started things off. And we really don't know what it was (though the current brane theories give us some clues -- though they tend to have the same ultimate problem -- how were the brane's created?).The ID creation theory is that there was a creator. That is not the same thing at all. And we can indeed distinguish the two on that basis. I’ve also been puzzled why some ID people haven’t picked up the big bang as supporting the notion that scientists themselves view creationism as a proper object of science (wrongly, I think) and as accepting the idea that the cosmos was created. One of the most interesting factors in the Dover case was the way the plaintiffs’ expert witness relied on Aquinas. Aquinas drew a sharp distinction between creation and natural generation (motion and change), and defended the idea that, since we can’t know whether the cosmos had a beginning or end, we should keep a completely open mind on the subject philosophically and scientifically. I don’t think that Aquinas would have had much difficulty accepting the idea of evolution. It looks like the plaintiff's "expert" theologian ignor! ed the stronger arguments for the plaintiffs' position in Aquinas and contented himself with disparaging the defendants' position. Maybe that was just a tactical decision. Davis Nelson___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-85672900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Washington, DC 20008
Re: Dover Case Questions
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 2. If, as the Dover court says, the Constitution forbids teaching creationism as science, then wouldnt the principal version of the now-regnant big bang theory be constitutionally prohibited as well? Its now generally accepted that the age of the observable cosmos is 12-20 billion years and thus that the universe was created (in an act of exnihilation) in a big bang. This theorys predecessor, the steady state theory, held that the cosmos had always existed and that the steady state of the universe was maintained by the continuous creation (coming into existence out of nothing) of hydrogen nuclei. Both of these theories employ the idea of creation in precisely the same sense ! as in the Dover case: the coming into existence of something (life, hydrogen nuclei, the cosmos, whatever) ab initio, ex nihilo. Its true that many modern physicists have claimed that things can come into existence from nothing by natural processes, but they do so after leaving science and inadvertently turning philosopher, thus failing to understand the difference between creation and natural generation. Surely, we cant legally distinguish the creationism of the ID proponents from the creationism of the big bang proponents solely on the basis that the former acknowledge that creation implies a creator and the latter doesnt. That would make the distinction entirely conventional, it seems.So it can't just be that it's the level of controversy within science either. Might there be "good" creationis! m and "bad" creationism now? I think you misunderstand big bang cosmology. Big bang cosmology has nothing to do with creation ex nihilo, but only to do with the state of the universe at a given point in the past. Science can only go back so far (to the beginning of Planck time). There is clearly a difference between claiming that the current space-time continuum was the result of a singular expansion event (which is what big bang cosmology says) and claiming that all of existence was "created" by a supernatural being. These are not "creation" in the same sense at all, as one deals solely with natural phenomena that can be observed and tested, while the other deals with supernatural phenomena. Whatever opinions one might have about whether big bang cosmology may support or inform one or another theological or philosophical view, those opinions are not a part of the science itself. The word "created" does not just mean "had a beginning", as you seem to imply here, it means "resulting from a willful act". Big bang cosmology may indicate that the universe, at least in its current form had a beginning but it does not mean that it was the result of a willful act - and that is the clear distinction between the two types of arguments you are conflating. Ive also been puzzled why some ID people havent picked up the big bang as supporting the notion that scientists themselves view creationism as a proper object of science (wrongly, I think) and as accepting the idea that the cosmos was created. Oh, they have. Michael Behe mentioned the big bang so many times during his testimony that as the second day of his cross examination began, Judge Jones asked the plaintiffs' attorney how long he expected that cross-ex to last. He replied that it would be proportional to the number of times the big bang is mentioned. The judge said, "So we could be here all day." The attorney replied, "It may be a while." The problem with the analogy, in addition to what I stated above, is the differences in how big bang advocates and ID advocates behaved after proposing their ideas. Behe's argument was that the big bang was initially rejected by some because it had religious implications and Id is also rejected because it has religious implications. But big bang advocates like George Gamow didn't start a PR campaign to get his ideas into science classrooms and rant and rave about the "hidebound reactionaries of the Steady State orthodoxy" or the "Stalinist tactics of the Steady State Priesthood". They went to work developing a coherent model, proposing testable hypotheses and devising ways to test them, and when those tests validated their ideas, the big bang was accepted. Contrast that with the ID movement, which has never published a single piece of research that supports ID or developed a coherent model from which one might derive testable hypotheses, but has instead carried on an enormous political and public relations campaign to gain access to public school science classrooms. The analogy is clearly incomplete. One of the most interesting factors in the Dover case was the way the plaintiffs expert witness relied on Aquinas. Aquinas drew a sharp distinction between creation and natural generation (motion and change), and defended the idea that, since we cant know whether the cosmos had a beginning or end, we should keep a completely open mind on the subject philosophically and scientifically. I dont think that Aquinas
Thomas More Center's spin and distortion
Last night on the PBS Newshour, the head of the Thomas More Law Center said this: RICHARD THOMPSON: Well, first of all [ID is] a scientific theory and therefore it's proper to be in the science class. After all, all the Dover area school board did was make students aware that there is a controversy in this area and that there is an alternative theory, and that's the theory of intelligent design. This judge should not place himself in the position of determining which scientific theory is valid and which is not. A thousand decisions is not going to change the law of gravity, nor is a thousand judicial decisions going to determine whether intelligent design is a valid theory. That should be left up to the scientists. It should be left up to the debate that the scientific community was involved with. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec05/design_12-20.html Doesn't this go beyond spin and amount to blatant misrepresentation? After all, Judge Jones did not find that ID is not a valid scientific theory, he found it is not science, period. (I reproduce the judge's summary of this finding below.) This may seem a picky semantic distinction, but I don't think it is, and I don't believe Thompson thinks it is either. If Thompson wanted to explain to his viewers why ID *is* science -- i.e., on what basis he disagrees with the judge's analysis regarding scientific method, logic, testing, and peer review -- that would have been one thing. And it would have been a much steeper challenge. Instead, by inserting an illegitimate premise and telling viewers (the vast majority of whom will not read any part of the opinion) that the decision was about a judge arbitrarily choosing between theories that are actively competing within the marketplace of legitimate science, rather than about science vs. non-science, it seems to me the defendant's counsel deftly undermines the credibility of the judge and the decision in the public mind. And such attacks from the right, aimed at distorting and oversimplifying judicial work, are part of a pattern with which we've all become familiar. Steve Sanders From the opinion at 64: After a searching review of the record and applicable caselaw, we find that while ID arguments may be true, a proposition on which the Court takes no position, ID is not science. We find that ID fails on three different levels, any one of which is sufficient to preclude a determination that ID is science. They are: (1) ID violates the centuries-old ground rules of science by invoking and permitting supernatural causation; (2) the argument of irreducible complexity, central to ID, employs the same flawed and illogical contrived dualism that doomed creation science in the 1980's; and (3) ID's negative attacks on evolution have been refuted by the scientific community. As we will discuss in more detail below, it is additionally important to note that ID has failed to gain acceptance in the scientific community, it has not generated peer-reviewed publications, nor has it been the subject of testing and research. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
Where the class happens to fall in the course catalog, in one sense, does seem completely irrelevant. But the reason why we have this fight is because whether ID is taught as science or something else will determine whether it is taught as true. If it's taught outside of science class, it will likely be taught from a purely descriptive point of view: this is how ID movement historically developed, it had these progenitors, it was motivated by these concerns, etc. But if it is taught as science, however, then it will be taught as true (or at least as a strong candidate for being true). That's why Dover wanted this in the science curriculum, and why Dr. Mirecki (no friend of ID) wanted it taught in a religious-studies class. Whether it's being taught in science or religious-studies class, I think, is just a proxy for whether it's being taught descriptively or as true. I would assume that nothing of substance would change if Dover moved the discussion of ID into a religion class, but then there tried to teach ID as true -- but do others disagree? Chris On Dec 21, 2005, at 11:03 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The Dover case has me so confused that I cant see what its implications are beyond its narrow facts. A couple of questions came to mind as I read it. Maybe someone can help me sort them out. 1. One of the attorneys for the plaintiffs said last night on one of the news shows that all this (ID) would be fine if relegated to a class on comparative religion or philosophy. Why should the ostensible subject matter or title of a class make any difference? The case wasnt about policing the content of science classes but rather the establishment clause. It seems like it ought not matter which door the establishment effort enters. What am I missing here? ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Dover Case Questions
"In the absence of some external force which is not bound by the laws of science, the evidence that we CAN test tells us that evolution is what happened. If there was a supernatural actor in the process, however, then all bets are off because science cannot test the supernatural." That is what they say when they are being careful. Some are sloppy, and some deliberately overreach, but that's the claim.Chris Lund might havemeant that putting ID in the biology class or the comparative religion class is a proxy for whether to teach that ID's claim to be science is true. Or he might have simply meant that government can't teach that a religious view is true, nor can it teach that a religious view is false. Where ever you put ID in the curriculum, the government would have to be agnostic about its supernatural claims. Douglas Laycock University of Texas Law School 727 E. Dean Keeton St. Austin, TX 78705 512-232-1341 (phone) 512-471-6988 (fax) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brad M PardeeSent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 12:36 PMTo: Law Religion issues for Law AcademicsSubject: Re: Dover Case Questions I think Chris reveals something significant here. Among the evolution supporters I have heard (and I'm not presuming that they speak for all evolutionists everywhere), it does not seem to be enough to say that intelligent design is outside the realm of science. They seem to think it's necessary to go further and say that ID is not true. But if the evolutionists who say ID is outside the realm of science because it's untestable really believe that it's untestable, then they have absolutely no basis for saying it's false because, by their own definition, they can't test it. The absolute best that they should be able to say is, "In the absence of some external force which is not bound by the laws of science, the evidence that we CAN test tells us that evolution is what happened. If there was a supernatural actor in the process, however, then all bets are off because science cannot test the supernatural." But that's not what they say. They say a) ID is not testable, but b) even though we can't test it, we will still draw conclusions about it and call it false. I'm sorry, but if you can't test it, then you can't draw conclusions about it. After all, aren't responsible scientific conclusions the result of testing? That's why people like me often view the scientific community's test-less rejection of ID as more of an attempt to protect their hallowed turf instead of actually describe what did or didn't happen. Brad Chris wrote on 12/21/2005 12:06:52 PM: Where the class happens to fall in the course catalog, in one sense, does seem completely irrelevant. But the reason why we have this fight is because whether ID is taught as science or something else will determine whether it is taught as true. If it's taught outside of science class, it will likely be taught from a purely descriptive point of view: this is how ID movement historically developed, it had these progenitors, it was motivated by these concerns, etc. But if it is taught as science, however, then it will be taught as true (or at least as a strong candidate for being true). That's why Dover wanted this in the science curriculum, and why Dr. Mirecki (no friend of ID) wanted it taught in a religious-studies class. Whether it's being taught in science or religious-studies class, I think, is just a proxy for whether it's being taught descriptively or as true. I would assume that nothing of substance would change if Dover moved the discussion of ID into a religion class, but then there tried to teach ID as true -- but do others disagree? Chris ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
Brad M Pardee wrote: I think Chris reveals something significant here. Among the evolution supporters I have heard (and I'm not presuming that they speak for all evolutionists everywhere), it does not seem to be enough to say that intelligent design is outside the realm of science. They seem to think it's necessary to go further and say that ID is not true. But if the evolutionists who say ID is outside the realm of science because it's untestable really believe that it's untestable, then they have absolutely no basis for saying it's false because, by their own definition, they can't test it. The absolute best that they should be able to say is, "In the absence of some external force which is not bound by the laws of science, the evidence that we CAN test tells us that evolution is what happened. If there was a supernatural actor in the process, however, then all bets are off because science cannot test the supernatural." But that's not what they say. They say a) ID is not testable, but b) even though we can't test it, we will still draw conclusions about it and call it false. I'm sorry, but if you can't test it, then you can't draw conclusions about it. After all, aren't responsible scientific conclusions the result of testing? That's why people like me often view the scientific community's test-less rejection of ID as more of an attempt to protect their hallowed turf instead of actually describe what did or didn't happen. I think you're missing critical distinction here. When scientists say that ID is not testable, they primarily mean two things - that supernatural causes are not testable in science, even in principle (which is a true statement) and that ID does not lead to any hypotheses that could either confirm or disconfirm the existence of such a supernatural designer (which is also a true statement). But there are arguments offered to defend ID that are, in fact, falsifiable and some of them have been falsified. Those arguments are not positive statements or hypotheses that are derived from an ID model (no such model exists), but are rather negative arguments against the ability to explain certain things as being produced by evolution. Thus, for example, many of Michael Behe's arguments concerning irreducible complexity may be tested. When he claims that the blood clotting cascade is irreducibly complex - that if you take away any component of the system it would fail to function and therefore cannot have developed through an evolutionary process - this claim can be tested, and it has been tested. And it turns out not to be true - there are animals with perfectly functional blood clotting systems that lack some of the components of the allegedly irreducibly complex system (dolphins, for example, lack factor VII or Hagemann factor yet their blood clots just fine). There is a difference between a negative argument such as this, which can be tested, and a vague model relying on supernatural causation (ID), which cannot. Ed Brayton ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case
In a message dated 12/21/2005 1:11:00 PM Central Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Assuming (as I would) that holding a doctorate gives one more credibility thansimply being a professor at some college or university, is this consistent useof titles an indication of a bias on Judge Jones' part? Or am I reading toomuch into this? Is there some more innocent explanation? Probably a good thing for them that the judge was not on their tenure committee... Donald C. Clark, Jr.Counselor at LawBannockburn Lake Office Plaza I2333 Waukegan RoadSuite 160Bannockburn, Illinois 60015(847) 236-0900 (telephone)(847) 236-0909 (facsimiles) ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Dover Case
What I always heard and sensed from teaching faculty is that professor is more appreciated than doctor since there are lots of Ph.D.'s out there who don't have teaching appointments (such as yours truly) but a professor has achieved not only the degree but the academic status. David T. Ball, J.D., Ph.D. Associate Director Ohio Legal Assistance Foundation 10 W. Broad St., Suite 950 Columbus, OH 43215 voice: 614-644-1582 fax: 614-728-3749 cell: 614-316-8222 www.olaf.org -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Steve Monsma Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 2:10 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Dover Case I've just finished reading all 139 pages. I will resist commenting on the substance of Judge Jones' opinion, but I was struck by one thing. Without exception, when referring to the plaintiffs' expert witnesses (such as Miller and Padian), he refers to them as Dr. Miller, Dr. Padian or Drs. Miller and Padian. When referring to the defendants' expert witnesses (such as Behe and Munnich) he refers to them as Professor Behe, Professor Minnich,, or Professors Behe and Munnich. (I've checked and both Behe and Minnich have earned doctorates.) Assuming (as I would) that holding a doctorate gives one more credibility than simply being a professor at some college or university, is this consistent use of titles an indication of a bias on Judge Jones' part? Or am I reading too much into this? Is there some more innocent explanation? Stephen Monsma ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
something can be true without being the full truth.2+2 = 4. That is true.But it does a poor job of fully describing nature. Or math.SetveOn Dec 21, 2005, at 2:06 PM, Perry Dane wrote: This doesn't strike me as quite right. It seems to me that real science should also not, in the public school setting, be taught as True with a capital T. To do so would be to teach, not science, but scientism, which is something entirely different. In fact, it seems to me that if a student asks a science teacher, "So is all this stuff that you're teaching us actually True," the teacher, qua teacher, should say (at a level suitable to high school students) something like: "Science is a form of methodologically-constrained inquiry built on certain assumptions such as naturalism. That inquiry has proved itself to be incredibly useful, as well as insightful. It is part of what, imperfectly but necessarily, we call secular knowledge. But precisely because it is a constrained discourse, it cannot claim, within its own four corners, to give us a full picture of Truth." -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-85672900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar/"The most precious things one gets in life are not those one gets for money."Albert Einstein ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Lofton/Re: Dover Case Questions
Bobby writes: I would argue that Steve's inference from the facts of disease, war, violence, inequity, inequality, stupidity of some design features (knees, elbows, eyes) to the conclusion that no omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect (loving) deity exists is a perfectly legitimate inference. That is, the facts of evil and suffering are incompatible with the existence of such a deity, and this incompatibility must be explained away for anyone to recognize these facts but still insist on the deity's existence. I have never been persuaded by any of the numerous attempts to rationalize this incompatibility. But we've been down this road, and I'll say no more about it. Comment: Bobby's view is caused by a lack of faith, not believing the Bible, God's Word, which tells us that, ORIGINALLY, everything made by God was very good. Then, the Fall, Adam/Eve/Serpent -- humans, substituting their own thoughts for God's commands, and, presto!, ALL things are changed by this original sin; lots of bad things happen. God did not make THIS world; WE did. John Lofton, Editor, TheAmericanView.com, Recovering Republican, saved sinner ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case
Not having read the transcript, I don't know how the experts introduced themselves or wanted to be addressed or were addressed by counsel. I suspect that Judge Jones was just following the testimony on this one. In my experience judges always referred to the witnesses as they requested to be referred to. Also, I don't think there is much difference between the two in the mind of most folk. Some professors prefer "Professor" because it is more exclusive set, but some prefer "Dr." because they think it sounds more prestigious and separates them from the non-doctor professors. At Howard University, in most departments Dr. is the typical appellation. Not in the law school though, though we all have J.Ds.So yes, IMO you are reading too much into it.On Dec 21, 2005, at 2:10 PM, Steve Monsma wrote:I've just finished reading all 139 pages. I will resist commenting on thesubstance of Judge Jones' opinion, but I was struck by one thing. Withoutexception, when referring to the plaintiffs' expert witnesses (such as Millerand Padian), he refers to them as Dr. Miller, Dr. Padian or Drs. Miller andPadian. When referring to the defendants' expert witnesses (such as Behe andMunnich) he refers to them as Professor Behe, Professor Minnich,, or ProfessorsBehe and Munnich. (I've checked and both Behe and Minnich have earneddoctorates.)Assuming (as I would) that holding a doctorate gives one more credibility thansimply being a professor at some college or university, is this consistent useof titles an indication of a bias on Judge Jones' part? Or am I reading toomuch into this? Is there some more innocent explanation?Stephen Monsma___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-85672900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar/"I do not at all resent criticism, even when, for the sake of emphasis, it for a time parts company with reality."Winston Churchill, speech to the House of Commons, 1941 ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
No, urethra design is not beside the point at all. Is there an intelligent design explanation for that design? There is an evolutionary explanation (though not wholly satisfactory to many). How could such a thing have happened, according to "intelligent design theory?" The absence of any possible answer to that question points to the lack of science behind ID. That is the whole issue.Ed Darrell DallasPerry Dane [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Robert Lipkin wrote:I would argue that Steve's inference from the facts of "disease, war,violence, inequity, inequality, stupidity of some design features (knees, elbows,eyes)" to the conclusion that no omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect(lovin! g) deity exists is a perfectly legitimate inference. That is, the factsof evil and suffering are incompatible with the existence of such a deity,and this incompatibility must be explained away for anyone to recognize thesefacts but still insist on the deity's existence.To be fair to the intelligent design folks, their argument is not that the design of the universe IS intelligent, in the sense of optimal, or efficient, or morally good, or aesthetically pleasing, but rather that certain facts of the universe point to it having been designed BY AN intelligence.This does not, of course, answer Robert's theological argument, but it does suggest that the usual anti-intelligent-design jokes about the proximity of the prostate gland to the urethra are really beside the point.Perry***Perry DaneProfessor of LawRutg! ers UniversitySchool of Law -- Camden217 North Fifth StreetCamden, NJ 08102[EMAIL PROTECTED]www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/925/Work: (856) 225-6004Fax: (856) 969-7924Home: (610) 896-5702***___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
A great teacher would indeed tell about the many experiments Darwin ran, and about the specific observations of nature around the world he made that pointed him to discover evolution theory. In a test-driven curriculum that does not test one's understanding of how science really works, there is little time for that. In a curriculum that has been battered for 40 years to get those stories out of the texts because they make evolution too clear for Texas critics of evolution, it's swimming against the stream. Good science education isn't made in the courtroom, and it's not made by school boards that micromanage, either. Ed Darrell DallasSteven Jamar [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: so! mething can be true without being the full truth.2+2 = 4. That is true.But it does a poor job of fully describing nature. Or math.Setve On Dec 21, 2005, at 2:06 PM, Perry Dane wrote: This doesn't strike me as quite right. It seems to me that real science should also not, in the public school setting, be taught as True with a capital T. To do so would be to teach, not science, but scientism, which is something entirely different.! bsp; In fact, it seems to me that if a student asks a science teacher, "So is all this stuff that you're teaching us actually True," the teacher, qua teacher, should say (at a level suitable to high school students) something like: "Science is a form of methodologically-constrained inquiry built on certain assumptions such as naturalism. That inquiry has proved itself to be incredibly useful, as well as insightful. It is part of what, imperfectly but necessarily, we call secular knowledge. But precisely because it is a constrained discourse, it cannot claim, within its own four corners, to give us a full picture of Truth."-- Prof. Steven D. Jamarvox: 202-806-8017 Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8567 2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar/"The most precious things one gets in life are not those one gets for money."Albert Einstein___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
As one who over the last few weeks has been made painfully--very painfully--aware of this design, it appears to point to the inescapable reality that there is no necessary correlation between intelligence and benevolence. VanceOn 12/21/05, Ed Darrell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: No, urethra design is not beside the point at all. Is there an intelligent design explanation for that design? There is an evolutionary explanation (though not wholly satisfactory to many). How could such a thing have happened, according to intelligent design theory? The absence of any possible answer to that question points to the lack of science behind ID. That is the whole issue.Ed Darrell Dallas Perry Dane [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Robert Lipkin wrote:I would argue that Steve's inference from the facts of disease, war,violence, inequity, inequality, stupidity of some design features (knees, elbows, eyes) to the conclusion that no omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect(lovin! g) deity exists is a perfectly legitimate inference. That is, the factsof evil and suffering are incompatible with the existence of such a deity,and this incompatibility must be explained away for anyone to recognize thesefacts but still insist on the deity's existence.To be fair to the intelligent design folks, their argument is not that the design of the universe IS intelligent, in the sense of optimal, or efficient, or morally good, or aesthetically pleasing, but rather that certain facts of the universe point to it having been designed BY AN intelligence.This does not, of course, answer Robert's theological argument, but it does suggest that the usual anti-intelligent-design jokes about the proximity of the prostate gland to the urethra are really beside the point.Perry*** Perry DaneProfessor of LawRutg! ers UniversitySchool of Law -- Camden217 North Fifth StreetCamden, NJ 08102[EMAIL PROTECTED] www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/925/Work: (856) 225-6004Fax: (856) 969-7924Home: (610) 896-5702 ***___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Vance R. KovenBoston, MA USA[EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Dover Case Questions
Ed Darrell writes: No, urethra design is not beside the point at all. Is there an intelligent design explanation for that design? There is an evolutionary explanation (though not wholly satisfactory to many). How could such a thing have happened, according to intelligent design theory? The absence of any possible answer to that question points to the lack of science behind ID. That is the whole issue. I agree that ID is not a scientific theory. I also believe that the Dover decision was correct. That said, though, one needs to be fair here. The claim of intelligent design theory is not that NO features of the biological world can be explained by evolution through natural selection. Nor is it, as I said before, that the biological world is, according to one or another criterion, well-designed. It is, rather, that there are certain features of the biological world (irreducible complexity and all that) that point to at least those features having been designed by an intelligence. It is therefore consistent with at least the bare bones of ID theory that the designer was evil, or a practical joker, or a child-god who designed us as part of the heavenly equivalent of a kindergarten art project. Perry *** Perry Dane Professor of Law Rutgers University School of Law -- Camden 217 North Fifth Street Camden, NJ 08102 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/925/ Work: (856) 225-6004 Fax: (856) 969-7924 Home: (610) 896-5702 *** ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Dover Case
I must say that I think for most people professor rates as a higher honorific than Dr. But the pattern *is* odd. sandy -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Steve Monsma Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 2:10 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Dover Case I've just finished reading all 139 pages. I will resist commenting on the substance of Judge Jones' opinion, but I was struck by one thing. Without exception, when referring to the plaintiffs' expert witnesses (such as Miller and Padian), he refers to them as Dr. Miller, Dr. Padian or Drs. Miller and Padian. When referring to the defendants' expert witnesses (such as Behe and Munnich) he refers to them as Professor Behe, Professor Minnich,, or Professors Behe and Munnich. (I've checked and both Behe and Minnich have earned doctorates.) Assuming (as I would) that holding a doctorate gives one more credibility than simply being a professor at some college or university, is this consistent use of titles an indication of a bias on Judge Jones' part? Or am I reading too much into this? Is there some more innocent explanation? Stephen Monsma ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case
But it stretches credulity that all the defense expert witnesses wanted to be addressed as professor and all the plaintiff expert witnesses wanted to be addressed as doctor. It strikes me that especially when dealing with technical, scientific experts, Doctor would usually be considered the title that gives one's positions more wieght that Professor. But this is, of course, a highly subjective judgment. Stephen Monsma [EMAIL PROTECTED] 12/21/05 2:29 PM Not having read the transcript, I don't know how the experts introduced themselves or wanted to be addressed or were addressed by counsel. I suspect that Judge Jones was just following the testimony on this one. In my experience judges always referred to the witnesses as they requested to be referred to. Also, I don't think there is much difference between the two in the mind of most folk. Some professors prefer Professor because it is more exclusive set, but some prefer Dr. because they think it sounds more prestigious and separates them from the non-doctor professors. At Howard University, in most departments Dr. is the typical appellation. Not in the law school though, though we all have J.Ds. So yes, IMO you are reading too much into it. On Dec 21, 2005, at 2:10 PM, Steve Monsma wrote: I've just finished reading all 139 pages. I will resist commenting on the substance of Judge Jones' opinion, but I was struck by one thing. Without exception, when referring to the plaintiffs' expert witnesses (such as Miller and Padian), he refers to them as Dr. Miller, Dr. Padian or Drs. Miller and Padian. When referring to the defendants' expert witnesses (such as Behe and Munnich) he refers to them as Professor Behe, Professor Minnich,, or Professors Behe and Munnich. (I've checked and both Behe and Minnich have earned doctorates.) Assuming (as I would) that holding a doctorate gives one more credibility than simply being a professor at some college or university, is this consistent use of titles an indication of a bias on Judge Jones' part? Or am I reading too much into this? Is there some more innocent explanation? Stephen Monsma ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8567 2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar/ I do not at all resent criticism, even when, for the sake of emphasis, it for a time parts company with reality. Winston Churchill, speech to the House of Commons, 1941 ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
Perry Dane wrote: That said, though, one needs to be fair here. The claim of intelligent design theory is not that NO features of the biological world can be explained by evolution through natural selection. Nor is it, as I said before, that the biological world is, according to one or another criterion, well-designed. It is, rather, that there are certain features of the biological world (irreducible complexity and all that) that point to at least those features having been designed by an intelligence. Actually, this depends on which ID advocate you're talking to at the time and that fact points up the lack of a coherent ID model. Some ID proponents, like Nancy Pearcey and Paul Nelson, are young earth creationists. For all practical purposes, they do take the position that there is nothing in the biological world, save perhaps bacterial adaptation for immunity to antibiotics, that can be explained by evolution through natural selection. That's precisely why there can't be an actual ID model for the natural history of life on earth, as there is for evolutionary theory. Does ID mean that all life forms in the earth's history were created simultaneously? Maybe. According to many ID advocates, yes. Does it mean that life on earth evolved through common ancestry but with the designer having to step in every now and then to design some particularly complex bit that can't evolve on its own? That appears to be Behe's position, at least. But those are radically different propositions, and the inclusion of both of them under a sort of mimimalist or bare bones ID assertion that *some* designer did *something* at *some point* is one major reason why ID cannot be considered a scientific theory, because it does not make any positive statements that the evidence might either confirm or refute. At least with the young earthers, they have offered a model from which we can derive testable hypotheses - the world is ~6000 years old, all animals lived on the earth simultaneously, most of them were killed off in a global flood around 4500 years ago, all of the features of the geological world are the result of that flood, and so forth. Those are all statements that lead to risky predictions that the evidence may either confirm or refute (in this case, all of them are of course soundly refuted by the evidence). So frankly, I don't think we can make statements about what intelligent design theory says or doesn't say about evolution or about natural history because there is no theory, just a very vague and minimalist statement and a set of arguments against evolution. Ed Brayton ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
Perry wrote on 12/21/2005 01:54:14 PM: It is therefore consistent with at least the bare bones of ID theory that the designer was evil, or a practical joker, or a child-god who designed us as part of the heavenly equivalent of a kindergarten art project. Or that an omniscient God who knows more than we do had a reason for creating us this way that is no more apparent to us than it is apparent to a 3 year old why he can't play with a lit candle. Brad___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case
Steve Monsma wrote: But it stretches credulity that all the defense expert witnesses wanted to be addressed as professor and all the plaintiff expert witnesses wanted to be addressed as doctor. It strikes me that especially when dealing with technical, scientific experts, Doctor would usually be considered the title that gives one's positions more wieght that Professor. But this is, of course, a highly subjective judgment. I have all of the deposition transcripts and all of the testimony transcripts. In his testimony, Behe specifically introduces himself as Professor Michael Behe and he consistently refers to other people as professor rather than doctor. There is no such pattern for Minnich. But you're right, I did a search of the ruling and his use of the two terms is completely uniform. He never refers to Behe or Minnich as anything but professor and never to any of the plaintiffs' experts as anything but Dr Ed Brayton ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Text of Chaplain Klingenschmitt's speech outside the White House
The text of my speech outside the White House yesterday is pasted below...see also today's front-page story in the Washington Times: http://www.washtimes.com/national/20051221-121224-6972r.htmGod Bless, Chaplain K.-- CHAPLAIN KLINGENSCHMITT ANNOUNCES HUNGER STRIKE IN FRONT OF THE WHITE HOUSE, 20 Dec 2005.Text of Chaplain's speech delivered on national TV: "During these holidays people practice many diverse faiths, but it seems the war against Christmas has taken a turn for the worse, and now it's become a war against the name of Jesus himself. I am a Navy Chaplain that may soon be kicked out of the Navy because I pray publicly in Jesus name. Admirals from the Pentagon, claiming to speak for the President of the United States, have already stripped me of my uniform and forbid me to pray in Jesus name in public unless I'm wearing civilian clothes.The Chief of Navy Chaplains told me in writing that if I pray publicly "in Jesus name" that I'm denigrating other faiths. That same week he told the Washington Post "we never tell chaplains how to pray" because we don't want to violate their First Amendment rights. His public statements and private statements contradict.The Naval Chaplain School teaches mandatory lectures to all junior chaplains, prohibiting Muslim chaplains from praying publicly to Allah, Jewish chaplains can't pray in Hebrew to Adonai, Roman Catho! lic chaplains aren't allowed to pray "in the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit" and evangelicals can't pray "in Jesus name." Everybody is taught to pray only to God and say "Amen." Senior chaplain evaluators with clipboards criticize our prayers.Onboard my ship, I asked my Commanding officer's permission to take turns and "share the evening prayer" with many diverse faiths, allowing my Muslim Sailor to pray to Allah, my Jewish Sailor to pray in Hebrew to Adonai, my Roman Catholic Sailor to pray "in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit" and I'd just pray "in Jesus name" every fourth night. He said "No Chaps, I don't like that. You keep saying the prayer, but you pray Jewish prayers from now on." I obeyed him and prayed only from the Psalms for 8 months.But the Director of the Naval Chaplain school told my Commanding Officer I was an "immature chaplain" because I claime! d a right to pray "in Jesus name," so my CO wrote to a Navy board to end my career saying "Chaplain Klingenschmitt over-emphasized his own faith system" (i.e. in his sermons and prayers).Now unless a Navy judge intervenes, my active duty career will be terminated next month, my family will be evicted from military housing, I'll have NO retirement after 14 years of award-winning fitness reports, because I pray "in Jesus name."General George Washington prayed "in Jesus name." And since the American Revolution chaplains have been allowed to pray according to their civilian bishop's faith, not the government's faith. Since 1860, US Code Title 10 Section 6031 has mandated, "An officer in the Chaplain Corps may conduct public worship according to the manner and forms of the church of which he is a member."But only in 1998 did the Navy establish a brand-new policy telling us if we must pray "in Jesus name" then we "ought to exclude ourselves from participation as the prayer-giver."65 Navy Chaplains have been involved in a class-action lawsuit since 1999 because of things like this, but Navy IG found "nothing wrong" so Navy JAG spends millions of taxpayer dollars defending religious discrimination.As a Lieutenant in the U.S. Navy, I'm directly appealing to my Commander-in-Chief, President George W. Bush, to sign an executive order enforcing the law that's been on the books since 1860. Now 160,000 Americans and 74 Congressmen have asked the President to sign an Executive order, not to establish new law, but just to enforce the law on the books since 1860, but the President has yet to lift his pen.I find it ironic that Franklin Graham was allowed to pray "in Jesus name" at the President's first inaugural, but now Admirals in the Pentagon who claim to represent the President are trying to take away my uniform for praying "in Jesus name." Even Senator Clinton supports me, and has written a letter of concern on my behalf. Recently the Air Force adopted similar guidelines, and now forces all their chaplains to pray "non-sectarian" prayers. But this government-sanitized prayer policy violates the First Amendment, and the Supreme Court has already ruled that "non-sectarian" prayers are unenforceable.Today I'm beginning a hunger strike, and this communion bread will be my last meal, until the President of the United States gives me back my uni
Dover Case Questions
Ed Brayton writes: Actually, this depends on which ID advocate you're talking to at the time and that fact points up the lack of a coherent ID model. This is fair enough, in a sense. Yes, to be sure, there are different versions of ID, just as there are different versions of most schools of thought. But the fact that a theory has different versions that do not cohere with each other does not mean that the theory, as a general approach, is not coherent. It's also worth adding that, outside the range of what is usually labeled as ID theory, are a whole set of other views, which are self-consciously religious/theological or meta-empirical rather than faux scientific, that posit that an intelligent God in some sense guides or stands behind or sustains or pushes or pulls or is otherwise involved in the process that science, within its own perfectly appropriate naturalistic methodological limitations, describes to us as evolution through random mutation and natural selection. Perry *** Perry Dane Professor of Law Rutgers University School of Law -- Camden 217 North Fifth Street Camden, NJ 08102 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/925/ Work: (856) 225-6004 Fax: (856) 969-7924 Home: (610) 896-5702 *** ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Dover Case Questions
Brad writes: Perry wrote on 12/21/2005 01:54:14 PM: It is therefore consistent with at least the bare bones of ID theory that the designer was evil, or a practical joker, or a child-god who designed us as part of the heavenly equivalent of a kindergarten art project. Or that an omniscient God who knows more than we do had a reason for creating us this way that is no more apparent to us than it is apparent to a 3 year old why he can't play with a lit candle. Yes. And that is part of what makes Intelligent Design Theory so theologically and religiously unsatisfactory: For the sake of trying to play in the arena of science, an effort at which it fails, much of the ID movement invokes a designer who is simply an abstract placeholder rather than the One Who Loves, and who evokes love and worship from his or her creation. There is a deeper point lurking here about the very strange terms on which the contemporary culture wars are being fought. But I'll let that pass. Perry *** Perry Dane Professor of Law Rutgers University School of Law -- Camden 217 North Fifth Street Camden, NJ 08102 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/925/ Work: (856) 225-6004 Fax: (856) 969-7924 Home: (610) 896-5702 *** ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Dover Case Questions
Brad writes: Perry wrote on 12/21/2005 01:54:14 PM: It is therefore consistent with at least the bare bones of ID theory that the designer was evil, or a practical joker, or a child-god who designed us as part of the heavenly equivalent of a kindergarten art project. Or that an omniscient God who knows more than we do had a reason for creating us this way that is no more apparent to us than it is apparent to a 3 year old why he can't play with a lit candle. Yes. And that is part of what makes Intelligent Design Theory so theologically and religiously unsatisfactory: For the sake of trying to play in the arena of science, an effort at which it fails, much of the ID movement invokes a designer who is simply an abstract placeholder rather than the One Who Loves, and who evokes love and worship from his or her creation. There is a deeper point lurking here about the very strange terms on which the contemporary culture wars are being fought. But I'll let that pass. Perry *** Perry Dane Professor of Law Rutgers University School of Law -- Camden 217 North Fifth Street Camden, NJ 08102 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/925/ Work: (856) 225-6004 Fax: (856) 969-7924 Home: (610) 896-5702 *** ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case
Also remember this was a court trial -- no jury -- so this distinction matters little in that sort of way.On Dec 21, 2005, at 3:06 PM, Steve Monsma wrote:But it stretches credulity that all the defense expert witnesses wanted to beaddressed as "professor" and all the plaintiff expert witnesses wanted to beaddressed as "doctor." It strikes me that especially when dealing with technical, scientific experts,"Doctor" would usually be considered the title that gives one's positions morewieght that "Professor." But this is, of course, a highly subjective judgment.Stephen Monsma -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-84282900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar"God, give us grace to accept with serenity the things that cannot be changed, courage to change the things which should be changed, and the wisdom to distinguish the one from the other."Reinhold Neibuhr 1943 ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Dover Case
For what it's worth, there is a good argument for limiting the term Doctor to physicians (including, by the way, physicians without a doctorate such as British physicians with only an undergraduate medical degree), and referring to all non-physician Ph.D.'s as Mr. or Professor or the like. This is, for example, the traditional practice at Yale. In fact, there's a certain nice reverse snobbery to this usage. That said, all I can add is the following entirely facetious observation: Here we are contemplating whether a particular phenomenon (the use of the terms Dr. and Prof.) is (a) essentially random, (b) the mechanical product of underlying variables such as the self-description of the witnesses, the practice of the attorneys, etc., (c) an unconscious tic, or (d) dare I say it, the result of the judge's intelligent design. Escher would be proud. Perry *** Perry Dane Professor of Law Rutgers University School of Law -- Camden 217 North Fifth Street Camden, NJ 08102 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/925/ Work: (856) 225-6004 Fax: (856) 969-7924 Home: (610) 896-5702 *** ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case
For what it's worth, when I went to school in New England we always called our professors professors. When I taught in the government department at the University of Texas, my colleagues and I were routinely called Dr.. Memories are vague, but I believe I was more often called Professor when I taught at the law school in Texas briefly. In Maryland, I have been called both. Granted this does not explain what happened in Dover, but I'm wondering whether this is largely a regional thing. Mark Graber [EMAIL PROTECTED] 12/21/05 4:13 PM For what it's worth, there is a good argument for limiting the term Doctor to physicians (including, by the way, physicians without a doctorate such as British physicians with only an undergraduate medical degree), and referring to all non-physician Ph.D.'s as Mr. or Professor or the like. This is, for example, the traditional practice at Yale. In fact, there's a certain nice reverse snobbery to this usage. That said, all I can add is the following entirely facetious observation: Here we are contemplating whether a particular phenomenon (the use of the terms Dr. and Prof.) is (a) essentially random, (b) the mechanical product of underlying variables such as the self-description of the witnesses, the practice of the attorneys, etc., (c) an unconscious tic, or (d) dare I say it, the result of the judge's intelligent design. Escher would be proud. Perry *** Perry Dane Professor of Law Rutgers University School of Law -- Camden 217 North Fifth Street Camden, NJ 08102 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/925/ Work: (856) 225-6004 Fax: (856) 969-7924 Home: (610) 896-5702 *** ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Dover Case
It's possible that trial counsel for the defense thought professor would be more impressive and that trial counsel for the plaintiffs thought doctor would be more impressive. That could result in uniform usage on each side. A quick point on ID and design defects: My sense is that some (or perhaps all) ID proponents think that some features of biological systems were designed but that other features evolved, either independently of design or after implementation of an intelligent design. ID does not, I think, necessarily involve a view that all present features of biological systems were designed. It does not necessarily require that the intelligent designer intervene at every moment or be responsible for every present-day feature. Thus ID and the existence of evolutionary processes are not necessarily incompatible. That's one reason why I think some anti-ID claims are overstated, such as the claim that ID is inconsistent with a scientific understanding of how bacteria evolve immunity to antibiotics, or the claim that examples of poor design falsify ID. On the other hand, the inability to falsify ID by pointing to poor design is one reason why it may be hard to take ID at this point seriously as a scientific theory. ID seems to be underdefined. When ID proponents identify systematically (rather than item by item) which present-day features (or precursors of present-day features) are the result of intelligent design, then it will be possible to consider whether the theory matches the facts. Until then, any example of a poorly operating biological feature can be explained as the result of evolutionary processes, and in a sense ID theory will remain nonfalsifiable, with ID proponents able to cherry-pick examples that support, or seem to support, their view. At least that's my sense of the matter. Mark S. Scarberry Pepperdine University School of Law -Original Message- From: Steve Monsma [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 12:06 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Re: Dover Case But it stretches credulity that all the defense expert witnesses wanted to be addressed as professor and all the plaintiff expert witnesses wanted to be addressed as doctor. It strikes me that especially when dealing with technical, scientific experts, Doctor would usually be considered the title that gives one's positions more wieght that Professor. But this is, of course, a highly subjective judgment. Stephen Monsma [EMAIL PROTECTED] 12/21/05 2:29 PM Not having read the transcript, I don't know how the experts introduced themselves or wanted to be addressed or were addressed by counsel. I suspect that Judge Jones was just following the testimony on this one. In my experience judges always referred to the witnesses as they requested to be referred to. Also, I don't think there is much difference between the two in the mind of most folk. Some professors prefer Professor because it is more exclusive set, but some prefer Dr. because they think it sounds more prestigious and separates them from the non-doctor professors. At Howard University, in most departments Dr. is the typical appellation. Not in the law school though, though we all have J.Ds. So yes, IMO you are reading too much into it. On Dec 21, 2005, at 2:10 PM, Steve Monsma wrote: I've just finished reading all 139 pages. I will resist commenting on the substance of Judge Jones' opinion, but I was struck by one thing. Without exception, when referring to the plaintiffs' expert witnesses (such as Miller and Padian), he refers to them as Dr. Miller, Dr. Padian or Drs. Miller and Padian. When referring to the defendants' expert witnesses (such as Behe and Munnich) he refers to them as Professor Behe, Professor Minnich,, or Professors Behe and Munnich. (I've checked and both Behe and Minnich have earned doctorates.) Assuming (as I would) that holding a doctorate gives one more credibility than simply being a professor at some college or university, is this consistent use of titles an indication of a bias on Judge Jones' part? Or am I reading too much into this? Is there some more innocent explanation? Stephen Monsma ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8567 2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Washington, DC 20008
RE: Dover Case Questions
In a clear effort in futility, I wonder if it would be possible to identify some minimalist consensus on the list on this issue; one that reflects Marks thoughtful recognition of IDs current limitations (see below) as well as Brads concerns about the overreaching of some evolutionists. So suppose someone drafted a statement disclaiming scientific overreaching as in In the absence of some external force which is not bound by the laws of science, the evidence that we CAN test tells us that evolution is what happened. If there was a supernatural actor in the process, however, then all bets are off because science cannot test the supernatural. And then added to it a statement building on Marks comment that In its current form, or state of development, ID does not provide a framework for identifying testable hypothesis and as such can not be recognized as science. Is that a statement list members think school boards can constitutionally, and should, as a matter of policy, endorse? Alan Brownstein My sense is that some (or perhaps all) ID proponents think that some features of biological systems were designed but that other features evolved, either independently of design or after implementation of an intelligent design. ID does not, I think, necessarily involve a view that all present features of biological systems were designed. It does not necessarily require that the intelligent designer intervene at every moment or be responsible for every present-day feature. Thus ID and the existence of evolutionary processes are not necessarily incompatible. That's one reason why I think some anti-ID claims are overstated, such as the claim that ID is inconsistent with a scientific understanding of how bacteria evolve immunity to antibiotics, or the claim that examples of poor design falsify ID. On the other hand, the inability to falsify ID by pointing to poor design is one reason why it may be hard to take ID at this point seriously as a scientific theory. ID seems to be underdefined. When ID proponents identify systematically (rather than item by item) which present-day features (or precursors of present-day features) are the result of intelligent design, then it will be possible to consider whether the theory matches the facts. Until then, any example of a poorly operating biological feature can be explained as the result of evolutionary processes, and in a sense ID theory will remain nonfalsifiable, with ID proponents able to cherry-pick examples that support, or seem to support, their view. At least that's my sense of the matter. From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Douglas Laycock Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 10:46 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Dover Case Questions In the absence of some external force which is not bound by the laws of science, the evidence that we CAN test tells us that evolution is what happened. If there was a supernatural actor in the process, however, then all bets are off because science cannot test the supernatural. That is what they say when they are being careful. Some are sloppy, and some deliberately overreach, but that's the claim.Chris Lund might havemeant that putting ID in the biology class or the comparative religion class is a proxy for whether to teach that ID's claim to be science is true. Or he might have simply meant that government can't teach that a religious view is true, nor can it teach that a religious view is false. Where ever you put ID in the curriculum, the government would have to be agnostic about its supernatural claims. Douglas Laycock University of Texas Law School 727 E. Dean Keeton St. Austin, TX 78705 512-232-1341 (phone) 512-471-6988 (fax) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brad M Pardee Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 12:36 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Dover Case Questions I think Chris reveals something significant here. Among the evolution supporters I have heard (and I'm not presuming that they speak for all evolutionists everywhere), it does not seem to be enough to say that intelligent design is outside the realm of science. They seem to think it's necessary to go further and say that ID is not true. But if the evolutionists who say ID is outside the realm of science because it's untestable really believe that it's untestable, then they have absolutely no basis for saying it's false because, by their own definition, they can't test it. The absolute best that they should be able to say is, In the absence of some external force which is not bound by the laws of science, the evidence that we CAN test tells us that evolution is what happened. If there was a supernatural actor in the process, however, then all bets are off because science cannot test the supernatural. But that's not
Re: Dover Case
Dr. Ball, Esq.: The title game is tricky. I taught at a school where many faculty did not have Ph..D.'s, leftover from an age when people with an MA could get tenure, and everyone called himself/herself professor. I quickly learned that Dr. carried great weight. At another place, where I studied, all faculty were called Mr. or Ms., not professor or doctor. Then of course there was Dr. Kissinger. I have found when I am outside the university Dr. carries a great deal more status than professor. In the end, what matters it what you do with your position and degree, not what you call yourself or someone else calls you. Most law professors of course are not Dr., despite the JD degree. Paul (Call me Paul) Finkelman, Ph.D. -- Paul Finkelman Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law University of Tulsa College of Law 3120 East 4th Place Tulsa, OK 74105 918-631-3706 (voice) 918-631-2194 (fax) [EMAIL PROTECTED] Dave Ball wrote: What I always heard and sensed from teaching faculty is that professor is more appreciated than doctor since there are lots of Ph.D.'s out there who don't have teaching appointments (such as yours truly) but a professor has achieved not only the degree but the academic status. David T. Ball, J.D., Ph.D. Associate Director Ohio Legal Assistance Foundation 10 W. Broad St., Suite 950 Columbus, OH 43215 voice: 614-644-1582 fax: 614-728-3749 cell: 614-316-8222 www.olaf.org -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Steve Monsma Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 2:10 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Dover Case I've just finished reading all 139 pages. I will resist commenting on the substance of Judge Jones' opinion, but I was struck by one thing. Without exception, when referring to the plaintiffs' expert witnesses (such as Miller and Padian), he refers to them as Dr. Miller, Dr. Padian or Drs. Miller and Padian. When referring to the defendants' expert witnesses (such as Behe and Munnich) he refers to them as Professor Behe, Professor Minnich,, or Professors Behe and Munnich. (I've checked and both Behe and Minnich have earned doctorates.) Assuming (as I would) that holding a doctorate gives one more credibility than simply being a professor at some college or university, is this consistent use of titles an indication of a bias on Judge Jones' part? Or am I reading too much into this? Is there some more innocent explanation? Stephen Monsma ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Dover Case Questions
Alan Brownstein writes: So - suppose someone drafted a statement disclaiming scientific overreaching as in 1. In the absence of some external force which is not bound by the laws of science, the evidence that we CAN test tells us that evolution is what happened. If there was a supernatural actor in the process, however, then all bets are off because science cannot test the supernatural. And then added to it a statement building on Mark's comment - that 2. In its current form, or state of development, ID does not provide a framework for identifying testable hypothesis - and as such can not be recognized as science. Is that a statement list members think school boards can constitutionally, and should, as a matter of policy, endorse? I do think that it might be salutary and just plain correct to append to all science classes (and for that matter social science classes that proceed from a presumption of methodological naturalism) the sort of disclaimer I suggested earlier. But I worry that attaching such a disclaimer specifically to the teaching of evolution improperly privileges one particular religious point of view over others. The trick is to attend to the legitimate concern that science education would inadvertently promote an ideology of scientism, while also avoiding the official promotion of religion. Perry *** Perry Dane Professor of Law Rutgers University School of Law -- Camden 217 North Fifth Street Camden, NJ 08102 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/925/ Work: (856) 225-6004 Fax: (856) 969-7924 Home: (610) 896-5702 *** ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Case Questions
Maybe they teach science differently now than when I went to school and when my boys (now ages 19 and 22) went to school, but science was inherently taught as conditional and subject to testing and change. There are things that are known facts, but there is a lot that is still unexplained -- the true nature of light, for example, and why gravity is such a weak force compared to the others, and a whole host of things in biology and geology.Isn't that enough?Why any disclaimer at all?The ID challenge is motivated not by the demonstrable concern that there is anything wrong with the science of evolution as science, but rather by the fear that it conflicts with religious beliefs.If the point is to teach the limits of our understanding, that can be and in my experience was and is taught. There are lots of questions still to which the answer is "we don't know."But the answer the IDers desire is not that we don't know or even that it is unknowable through current scientific methods, but rather that the answer to some of the questions is there is a creator.And that is religious.SteveOn Dec 21, 2005, at 6:59 PM, Alan Brownstein wrote: In a clear effort in futility, I wonder if it would be possible to identify some minimalist consensus on the list on this issue; one that reflects Mark’s thoughtful recognition of ID’s current limitations (see below) as well as Brad’s concerns about the overreaching of some evolutionists. So – suppose someone drafted a statement disclaiming scientific overreaching as in “In the absence of some external force which is not bound by the laws of science, the evidence that we CAN test tells us that evolution is what happened. If there was a supernatural actor in the process, however, then all bets are off because science cannot test the supernatural." And then added to it a statement building on Mark’s comment – that In its current form, or state of development, ID does not provide a framework for identifying testable hypothesis – and as such can not be recognized as science. Is that a statement list members think school boards can constitutionally, and should, as a matter of policy, endorse? Alan BrownsteinMy sense is that some (or perhaps all) ID proponents think that some features of biological systems were designed but that other features evolved, either independently of design or after implementation of an intelligent design. ID does not, I think, necessarily involve a view that all present features of biological systems were designed. It does not necessarily require that the intelligent designer intervene at every moment or be responsible for every present-day feature. Thus ID and the existence of evolutionary processes are not necessarily incompatible. That's one reason why I think some anti-ID claims are overstated, such as the claim that ID is inconsistent with a scientific understanding of how bacteria evolve immunity to antibiotics, or the claim that examples of poor design falsify ID. On the other hand, the inability to falsify ID by pointing to poor design is one reason why it may be hard to take ID at this point seriously as a scientific theory. ID seems to be underdefined. When ID proponents identify systematically (rather than item by item) which present-day features (or precursors of present-day features) are the result of intelligent design, then it will be possible to consider whether the theory matches the facts.Until then, any example of a poorly operating biological feature can be explained as the result of evolutionary processes, and in a sense ID theory will remain nonfalsifiable, with ID proponents able to cherry-pick examples that support, or seem to support, their view. At least that's my sense of the matter. From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of Douglas Laycock Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 10:46 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Dover Case Questions "In the absence of some external force which is not bound by the laws of science, the evidence that we CAN test tells us that evolution is what happened. If there was a supernatural actor in the process, however, then all bets are off because science cannot test the supernatural." That is what they say when they are being careful. Some are sloppy, and some deliberately overreach, but that's the claim. Chris Lund might have meant that putting ID in the biology class or the comparative religion class is a proxy for whether to teach that ID's claim to be science is true. Or he might have simply meant that government can't teach that a religious view is true, nor can it teach that a religious view is false. Where ever you put ID in the curriculum, the government would have to be agnostic about its supernatural claims. Douglas LaycockUniversity of Texas Law School727 E. Dean Keeton St.Austin, TX 78705 512-232-1341 (phone) 512-471-6988 (fax) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL
Re: Dover Case
In a message dated 12/21/2005 3:07:10 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: But it stretches credulity that all the defense expert witnesses wanted to beaddressed as "professor" and all the plaintiff expert witnesses wanted to beaddressed as "doctor." It strikes me that especially when dealing with technical, scientific experts,"Doctor" would usually be considered the title that gives one's positions morewieght that "Professor." But this is, of course, a highly subjective judgment. It strikes this reader as evidence of some kind of design. Jim Henderson Senior Counsel ACLJ ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
