Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe that the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't). If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from mandatory coverage by employers under the Affordable Care Act, wouldn't the analysis be just the same (imposition of a uniform policy to avoid religious conflict, avoid any need to create controversial exceptions for religious entities, avoid piece-meal litigation, and ease administration of the overall scheme), even though the impetus for change derived from a demand by some for religious accommodation? On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 6:48 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote: River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012), http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/RiversvMohr.pdf . ** ** Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053 My SSRN papers are here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
I agree entirely; I mention this partly because I occasionally hear pork bans as examples of quintessential violations of the Establishment Clause, though I don't think they would be. To be sure, a general pork ban might have a different motivation than a prison decision not to serve pork. But at the same time even a general pork ban could certainly be an attempt to accommodate a religious group by minimizing the risk that its members will accidentally ingest pork (or that its members might be put in a position where their employment would require the handling or even sampling of pork). And just as the state of California is free to ban the sale of horsemeat for human consumption (as it did in 1998), so it should be free to ban the sale of pork - not that I'd ever endorse that as a policy matter! Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 4:32 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe that the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't). If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from mandatory coverage by employers under the Affordable Care Act, wouldn't the analysis be just the same (imposition of a uniform policy to avoid religious conflict, avoid any need to create controversial exceptions for religious entities, avoid piece-meal litigation, and ease administration of the overall scheme), even though the impetus for change derived from a demand by some for religious accommodation? On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 6:48 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote: River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012), http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/RiversvMohr.pdf . Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edumailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053 My SSRN papers are here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge
It is interesting to compare reactions in Europe to similar situations. In 2010, French politicians strongly criticized a restaurant chain that decided to serve only halal meat in 8 of its restaurants with a large Muslim clientele. Agriculture Minister Bruno Le Maire said: When they remove all the pork from a restaurant open to the public, I think they fall into communalism, which is against the principles and the spirit of the French republic. See: http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2010/02/french-politicians-criticize-restaurant.html In 2007 in Britain, a primary school in Kingsgate attempted to accommodate religious needs of its growing Muslim student body by serving only Halal meat in its lunch menus. A number of parents objected, arguing that the school was forcing their children to to conform to someone else's culture. See http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2007/02/british-parents-protest-halal-menus-in.html Howard Friedman -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Wed 4/11/2012 7:46 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge I agree entirely; I mention this partly because I occasionally hear pork bans as examples of quintessential violations of the Establishment Clause, though I don't think they would be. To be sure, a general pork ban might have a different motivation than a prison decision not to serve pork. But at the same time even a general pork ban could certainly be an attempt to accommodate a religious group by minimizing the risk that its members will accidentally ingest pork (or that its members might be put in a position where their employment would require the handling or even sampling of pork). And just as the state of California is free to ban the sale of horsemeat for human consumption (as it did in 1998), so it should be free to ban the sale of pork - not that I'd ever endorse that as a policy matter! Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 4:32 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe that the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't). If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from mandatory coverage by employers under the Affordable Care Act, wouldn't the analysis be just the same (imposition of a uniform policy to avoid religious conflict, avoid any need to create controversial exceptions for religious entities, avoid piece-meal litigation, and ease administration of the overall scheme), even though the impetus for change derived from a demand by some for religious accommodation? On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 6:48 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote: River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012), http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/RiversvMohr.pdf . Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edumailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053 My SSRN papers are here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012), http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/RiversvMohr.pdf . Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge
If anyone is interested in the European controversy between animal rights advocates and Muslim and Jewish minorities on animal slaughter, here is a comprehensive, not too dated, article on the subject: Pablo Lerner and Alfredo Mordechai Rabello The Prohibition of Ritual Slaughtering (Kosher Shechita and Halal) and Freedom of Religion of Minorities, XXII Journal of Law and Religion 1 (2006-07) Marie A. Failinger Professor of Law Editor, Journal of Law and Religion Hamline University School of Law 1536 Hewitt Avenue Saint Paul, MN 55104 U.S.A. 651-523-2124 (work phone) 651-523-2236 (work fax) mfailin...@hamline.edu (email) Ira Lupu icl...@law.gwu.edu 4/12/2012 9:39 AM I think that at least part of the objections in Europe to serving only halal meat in some restaurants involves objections to methods of halal animal slaughter which (like kosher slaughter) may not be consistent with European standards for humane treatment of animals in their use as food. Halal only means all diners are complicit in the that particular slaughtering process. On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 11:08 PM, Friedman, Howard M. howard.fried...@utoledo.edu wrote: It is interesting to compare reactions in Europe to similar situations. In 2010, French politicians strongly criticized a restaurant chain that decided to serve only halal meat in 8 of its restaurants with a large Muslim clientele. Agriculture Minister Bruno Le Maire said: When they remove all the pork from a restaurant open to the public, I think they fall into communalism, which is against the principles and the spirit of the French republic. See: http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2010/02/french-politicians-criticize-restaurant.html In 2007 in Britain, a primary school in Kingsgate attempted to accommodate religious needs of its growing Muslim student body by serving only Halal meat in its lunch menus. A number of parents objected, arguing that the school was forcing their children to to conform to someone else's culture. See http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2007/02/british-parents-protest-halal-menus-in.html Howard Friedman -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Wed 4/11/2012 7:46 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge I agree entirely; I mention this partly because I occasionally hear pork bans as examples of quintessential violations of the Establishment Clause, though I don't think they would be. To be sure, a general pork ban might have a different motivation than a prison decision not to serve pork. But at the same time even a general pork ban could certainly be an attempt to accommodate a religious group by minimizing the risk that its members will accidentally ingest pork (or that its members might be put in a position where their employment would require the handling or even sampling of pork). And just as the state of California is free to ban the sale of horsemeat for human consumption (as it did in 1998), so it should be free to ban the sale of pork - not that I'd ever endorse that as a policy matter! Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 4:32 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe that the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't). If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from mandatory coverage by employers under the Affordable Care Act, wouldn't the analysis be just the same (imposition of a uniform policy to avoid religious conflict, avoid any need to create controversial exceptions for religious entities, avoid piece-meal litigation, and ease administration of the overall scheme), even though the impetus for change derived from a demand by some for religious accommodation? On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 6:48 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote: River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012), http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/RiversvMohr.pdf . Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edumailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053 (
Re: Accommodation
Ellis says that religious exemptions violate a requirement that laws be secular in purpose and effect, which is what is required by the religion clauses, as originally understood and as interpretetd by the court. Both the original understanding half of this claim, and the as interpreted by the court half of this claim, are based on a misunderstanding of secular purpose. As to original understanding, there is essentially no evidence that anyone in the founding generation thought that regulatoroy exemptions for religious practice raise establishment issues. They debated such exemptions on the merits, extensively in the case of exemptions from military service, and they made all sorts of arguments pro and con. But in all that debate, no one said anything like, And if we grant such an exemption, it will be an establishment -- or a preference, or anything of the sort. Shameless plug: I collected this evidence in Notre Dame Law Review in 2006, in an article with a title something like Regulatory Exemptions and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause. As to the Court, it has repeatedly and unanmously upheld regulatory exemptions, in Amos and in Cutter, and repeatedly and unanimously approved them in dictum, in Smith and Kiryas Joel. And in Texas Monthly, where everyone but White reaffirmed Amos. White said nothing, but he wrote Amos. The forbidden religious purpose of the Lemon test is a purpose to advance or inhibit religion, as the original formulation in Schempp makes clear. A purpose to leave religion alone, or to avoid the human suffering imposed and social conflict created by prohibiting religious practice, is not a purpose to advance religion. Avoiding suffering and conflict are eminently secular purposes. In terms of their effect on religion, an exemption cannot be considered apart from the regulatory burden. When religion is first regulated and then exempted, the net effect is neutral. On Thu, 12 Apr 2012 21:10:40 + West, Ellis ew...@richmond.edu wrote: Marie, I certainly have no objections to exemptions in general just as I have no objections to laws in general from which persons are often exempted—provided the laws (and exemptions?) are secular in purpose and effect, which is what is required by the religion clauses, as originally understood and as interpreted by the Court. Moreover, in my comment, I did not state an objection to religion-based exemptions. I simply asked how such exemptions could be considered secular in nature. I do not think it works to answer that just because all kinds of secular exemptions are granted, religion-based exemptions should be granted or else there is discrimination against religion. According to that logic, if all kinds of “normal” laws give aid, financial and otherwise, to specific secular endeavors (business, health care, education, etc.), then it follows that such aid should be given to specific religions or religious beliefs/activities, or else the government would be guilty of discriminating against religion. But, of course, that kind of “discrimination against religion” is what the establishment clause prohibits. Finally, I would simply add that if the exemptions were conscience-based, as opposed to religion-based, then there would not be an issue. Just as the Court said in dealing with exemptions from the draft, if the government wants to protect religious consciences, it must protect secular consciences as well. Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edu From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marie A. Failinger Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 4:22 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Accommodation Ellis, the government accommodates people all of the time. By law, it is required to accommodate certain groups of people--e.g., to build ramps so that citizens can get into public buildings, to provide waivers of rules to certain people who get public benefits. I can't legally insist that the government build me a ramp, but a disabled person can. Is that impermissible? I think not--the government has seen that some people have a particular burden in fully functioning as citizens, and allowed for it. In practice, the government accommodates a lot more people. Every time a cop stops you and decides not to give you a ticket for speeding, he/she is essentially accommodating you---he/she is not applying a law that he should, because of some circumstance he/she has discovered about you that is distinctive (you're rushing to the hospital, for example.) A permissible accommodation for a group (including a religious group) is simply a circumstance in which government says, we have seen that X number of people or this particular group needs to have us apply our discretion to do right by them and not disadvantage them because
RE: Accommodation
Ellis, you are right that I didn't respond directly to your question of what secular means. And, I agree that religious entities and persons should get everything that non-religious entities and persons do is too broad a brush to explain what the issue is here. I guess my answer sort of implied some combination of an ontological plus ethical definition---i.e., in this world, the way we live our lives each day in the real world, seeing and (ethically) respecting how we are different from each other. If I (individually or as a government surrogate) see that you are different because you are religious (claiming to be or acting religious:), I think that is a secular judgment, as it does not require a theological or religious belief or argument to come to the conclusion that you're different--it is an observation that everyone can make regardless of his or her religious belief or lack thereof. If I change my behavior because of this difference I see in you, because I think you are entitled to human dignity and part of recognizing your human dignity is respecting your difference in how I treat you, I think that is a secular moral decision if by secular we mean anyone holding any belief can come to that conclusion if he accepts the starting premise. (Of course, as we know, there is a debate about whether that premise is necessarily religious.) If as a result of my behavioral change, your daily material life is made less onerous, it seems to me that effect does not depend on religious tradition or thinking and therefore is secular in the sense I am using it. I I guess this points out that secular or religious can also be a code for asking what the purposes of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses are, and whether these purposes have been achieved by a governmental rule or act, which seems to be what you are asking. But, it seems to me more direct and careful to ask the question whether the purpose of the Clauses has been achieved by a government act rather than to ask if a purpose or effect IS secular or religious. (And there I stop, too many books on that.. . ) Though I am sympathetic to your cause of focusing on conscience rather than specific religious traditions here, I don't think that automatically solves the problem of what secular means if we are looking at purposes of the Clauses. It simply widens the circle of those who are being accommodated to include more traditions than the usual suspects including traditions that are usually lumped together as secular humanism, while excluding others who would not plausibly describe their request for an exemption as conscience-driven or based on a particular philosophical or moral tradition. Is an accommodation then secular because it includes more or even most traditions of thinking about moral problems, not just the ones that are usually labeled as religious? If secular means showing respect for difference as I have suggested, then maybe yes. If it's meant to mean, this exemption applies to everybody no matter why they want an exemption, then maybe no. Then there is the complication of religions like mine that believe that the law of God is written on the hearts of all persons, and that's where decisions of conscience come from, even from so-called non-believers. If we broaden the circle of the exempted to include all who act out of conscience but not anybody else, have we just accepted a theological (natural law) view and therefore violated the secular requirement? Or have we observed in the material world that people seem to have consciences, normatively decided that's a good thing to have in our society, and therefore decided to incentivize them to exercise their consciences regularly, a secular reason? Time to stop before I get completely confused:) Marie A. Failinger Professor of Law Editor, Journal of Law and Religion Hamline University School of Law 1536 Hewitt Avenue Saint Paul, MN 55104 U.S.A. 651-523-2124 (work phone) 651-523-2236 (work fax) mfailin...@hamline.edu (email) West, Ellis ew...@richmond.edu 4/12/2012 4:10 PM Marie, I certainly have no objections to exemptions in general just as I have no objections to laws in general from which persons are often exempted—provided the laws (and exemptions?) are secular in purpose and effect, which is what is required by the religion clauses, as originally understood and as interpreted by the Court. Moreover, in my comment, I did not state an objection to religion-based exemptions. I simply asked how such exemptions could be considered secular in nature. I do not think it works to answer that just because all kinds of secular exemptions are granted, religion-based exemptions should be granted or else there is discrimination against religion. According to that logic, if all kinds of “normal” laws give aid, financial and otherwise, to specific secular endeavors (business, health care, education, etc.), then it follows that such aid should be given to
RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
Sure avoiding litigation is a secular purpose, but only if one assumes that RFRA and RLUIPA, the basis of the litigation, are secular in purpose and effect, but that is precisely the issue. Suppose these two laws did not exist. Then would the prison policy in question be secular in nature? The avoidance of conflict might also be a secular purpose, but it would justify all kinds of exemptions, not just religion-based exemptions, because persons object to all kinds of laws for all kinds of reasons. For example, as Prof Levinson suggested in an earlier post, it would justify a uniform vegetarian diet for all prisoners. Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edu From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 4:36 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Avoiding litigation (and there are many, many RLUIPA and free exercise cases about prison diets) and other forms of conflict, and having the efficiencies of a uniform diet for all prisoners, sound like secular purposes to me. On Thu, Apr 12, 2012 at 3:34 PM, West, Ellis ew...@richmond.edumailto:ew...@richmond.edu wrote: Although the District Court may be correct in saying that the primary purpose of the policy is not to establish the religion of Islam or to promote the practice of Islam, it does concede that the policy makes accommodating a multitude of religious practices and beliefs easier and more economical. Would someone explain to me how that purpose and/or effect is secular in nature? Even though Prof. Lupu may be correct in saying that this particular policy is good way of accommodating religious beliefs/practices, his comment simply assumes that a policy of accommodating religious beliefs/practices is secular in nature. How so? Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536tel:804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edumailto:ew...@richmond.edu From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 7:32 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe that the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't). If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from mandatory coverage by employers under the Affordable Care Act, wouldn't the analysis be just the same (imposition of a uniform policy to avoid religious conflict, avoid any need to create controversial exceptions for religious entities, avoid piece-meal litigation, and ease administration of the overall scheme), even though the impetus for change derived from a demand by some for religious accommodation? On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 6:48 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote: River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012), http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/RiversvMohr.pdf . Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edumailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053tel:%28202%29994-7053 My SSRN papers are here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edumailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053 My SSRN papers are here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg ___ To post, send message to
Bans on sale of pork vs. bans on sale of horsemeat
In 1998, California banned the sale of horsemeat for human consumption, based on nonrational aesthetic / moral judgments about the impropriety of eating horses. Say that a state bans the sale of pork for human consumption, based on the desire to minimize the risk that people would accidentally eat it (and thus violate their nonrational religious objections to eating pork), or that people would be economically pressured by restaurants, food processing plants, and so on into serving it or even tasting it (as a chef often must when he's cooking a dish). If the horsemeat ban is constitutional, why wouldn't the pork ban is constitutional. Eugene -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw- boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Douglas Laycock Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 2:52 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics; West, Ellis Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge By the way, I agree that imposing a religious practice on everyone else is deeply problematic. Perhaps justifable in the prison context, where many rights have been forfeited anyway. But a ban on the sale of pork in the civilian economy could not be justified as a religious exemption. On Thu, 12 Apr 2012 21:38:41 + West, Ellis ew...@richmond.edu wrote: I should have added to the post below that the policy might create as much conflict as it eliminates, just as would a vegetarian diet. Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edu From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of West, Ellis Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 5:21 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Sure avoiding litigation is a secular purpose, but only if one assumes that RFRA and RLUIPA, the basis of the litigation, are secular in purpose and effect, but that is precisely the issue. Suppose these two laws did not exist. Then would the prison policy in question be secular in nature? The avoidance of conflict might also be a secular purpose, but it would justify all kinds of exemptions, not just religion-based exemptions, because persons object to all kinds of laws for all kinds of reasons. For example, as Prof Levinson suggested in an earlier post, it would justify a uniform vegetarian diet for all prisoners. Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edumailto:ew...@richmond.edu From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucl a.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]mailto:[mailto:religionlaw- boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 4:36 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Avoiding litigation (and there are many, many RLUIPA and free exercise cases about prison diets) and other forms of conflict, and having the efficiencies of a uniform diet for all prisoners, sound like secular purposes to me. On Thu, Apr 12, 2012 at 3:34 PM, West, Ellis ew...@richmond.edumailto:ew...@richmond.edu wrote: Although the District Court may be correct in saying that the primary purpose of the policy is not to establish the religion of Islam or to promote the practice of Islam, it does concede that the policy makes accommodating a multitude of religious practices and beliefs easier and more economical. Would someone explain to me how that purpose and/or effect is secular in nature? Even though Prof. Lupu may be correct in saying that this particular policy is good way of accommodating religious beliefs/practices, his comment simply assumes that a policy of accommodating religious beliefs/practices is secular in nature. How so? Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536tel:804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edumailto:ew...@richmond.edu From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucl a.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-bounces@l ists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 7:32 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe that the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't). If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from mandatory coverage by employers under the Affordable Care Act, wouldn't the analysis be just the same (imposition of a uniform policy to avoid
RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClausechallenge
You are right. Except many of the cases in which prisoners are requesting kosher food involve inmates who are not Jewish (at least in the halachic sense). E.g. many times Muslims, having no hope of getting halal food, request kosher food which is apparently an acceptable alternative under Shariah law. Or groups like the Hebrew Israelites request a kosher diet. It is not clear whether these kinds of religious requests are from prisoners who care about the same strictures as traditional Orthodox Jews do. Howard Friedman -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Eric Rassbach Sent: Thu 4/12/2012 11:39 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClausechallenge Chip is right that the supposedly inhumane methods of kosher/halal slaughter (something US law defines as humane, btw) is one of the main public justifications for banning the practice. But as our brief in the New Zealand kosher slaughter ban case pointed out -- http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/NZ-kosher-brief-FINAL.pdf -- more often than not this is pretext. For example, this was the same justification the anti-Semites of the 1930s used for banning the practice in several European countries. As we point out in our brief, one of the first things the Nazis did upon taking power was to pass a law banning kosher slaughter, supposedly in order to awaken and strengthen compassion as one of the highest moral values of the German people. I don't think it's too much of a stretch to guess that anti-Muslim sentiment may be a subterranean motivation for the humane practices argument in the Netherlands, France and elsewhere. The ironic part for me of the Mohr case was that my main experience of stand-alone prison pork bans is as a proposed compromise to settle kosher accommodation lawsuits. Of course pork bans don't work as a method of kosher accommodation, though prison administrators keep hoping that they do. In our now 6-year-old lawsuit against the Texas prison system (now on a return trip to the 5th Circuit), Texas at one point floated a pork ban as a solution, which only served to show that they didn't understand how kashrus works. Eric From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu [icl...@law.gwu.edu] Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 10:39 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge I think that at least part of the objections in Europe to serving only halal meat in some restaurants involves objections to methods of halal animal slaughter which (like kosher slaughter) may not be consistent with European standards for humane treatment of animals in their use as food. Halal only means all diners are complicit in the that particular slaughtering process. On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 11:08 PM, Friedman, Howard M. howard.fried...@utoledo.edumailto:howard.fried...@utoledo.edu wrote: It is interesting to compare reactions in Europe to similar situations. In 2010, French politicians strongly criticized a restaurant chain that decided to serve only halal meat in 8 of its restaurants with a large Muslim clientele. Agriculture Minister Bruno Le Maire said: When they remove all the pork from a restaurant open to the public, I think they fall into communalism, which is against the principles and the spirit of the French republic. See: http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2010/02/french-politicians-criticize-restaurant.html In 2007 in Britain, a primary school in Kingsgate attempted to accommodate religious needs of its growing Muslim student body by serving only Halal meat in its lunch menus. A number of parents objected, arguing that the school was forcing their children to to conform to someone else's culture. See http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2007/02/british-parents-protest-halal-menus-in.html Howard Friedman -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Wed 4/11/2012 7:46 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge I agree entirely; I mention this partly because I occasionally hear pork bans as examples of quintessential violations of the Establishment Clause, though I don't think they would be. To be sure, a general pork ban might have a different motivation than a prison decision not to serve pork. But at the same time even a general pork ban could certainly be an attempt to accommodate a religious group by minimizing the risk that its members will accidentally ingest pork (or that its members might be put in a position where their employment would require the handling or even
Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge
I wrote about this a while ago in Free Exercise of Religion and Animal Protection: A Comparative Perspective on Ritual Slaughter, 39 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 839 (2007). The article includes a discussion of the 2002 German constitutional amendment that made animal protection a constitutional state objective in Article 20a of the Basic Law. -- Claudia E. Haupt Professorial Lecturer in Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20052 202-994-8494 ceha...@law.gwu.edu My new book: *Religion-State Relations in the United States and **German*y www.cambridge.org/9781107015821 On Thu, Apr 12, 2012 at 1:25 PM, hamilto...@aol.com wrote: Chip is right, of course. But Eric's point requires a response. I don't I don't think PETA folks would appreciate having their sincere concerns about the humane treatment of animals traced to the Nazis. To say that humane treatment concerns are more often than not pretext and then to have as your example something out of the 1930s is singularly unpersuasive. Marci A. Hamilton Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Yeshiva University 55 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10003 (212) 790-0215 hamilto...@aol.com -Original Message- From: Eric Rassbach erassb...@becketfund.org To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Thu, Apr 12, 2012 1:14 pm Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge Chip is right that the supposedly inhumane methods of kosher/halal slaughter (something US law defines as humane, btw) is one of the main public justifications for banning the practice. But as our brief in the New Zealand kosher slaughter ban case pointed out -- http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/NZ-kosher-brief-FINAL.pdf -- more often than not this is pretext. For example, this was the same justification the anti-Semites of the 1930s used for banning the practice in several European countries. As we point out in our brief, one of the first things the Nazis did upon taking power was to pass a law banning kosher slaughter, supposedly in order to awaken and strengthen compassion as one of the highest moral values of the German people. I don't think it's too much of a stretch to guess that anti-Muslim sentiment may be a subterranean motivation for the humane practices argument in the Netherlands, France and elsewhere. The ironic part for me of the Mohr case was that my main experience of stand-alone prison pork bans is as a proposed compromise to settle kosher accommodation lawsuits. Of course pork bans don't work as a method of kosher accommodation, though prison administrators keep hoping that they do. In our now 6-year-old lawsuit against the Texas prison system (now on a return trip to the 5th Circuit), Texas at one point floated a pork ban as a solution, which only served to show that they didn't understand how kashrus works. Eric From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu [icl...@law.gwu.edu] Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 10:39 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge I think that at least part of the objections in Europe to serving only halal meat in some restaurants involves objections to methods of halal animal slaughter which (like kosher slaughter) may not be consistent with European standards for humane treatment of animals in their use as food. Halal only means all diners are complicit in the that particular slaughtering process. On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 11:08 PM, Friedman, Howard M. howard.fried...@utoledo.edumailto:howard.fried...@utoledo.edu howard.fried...@utoledo.edu? wrote: It is interesting to compare reactions in Europe to similar situations. In 2010, French politicians strongly criticized a restaurant chain that decided to serve only halal meat in 8 of its restaurants with a large Muslim clientele. Agriculture Minister Bruno Le Maire said: When they remove all the pork from a restaurant open to the public, I think they fall into communalism, which is against the principles and the spirit of the French republic. See: http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2010/02/french-politicians-criticize-restaurant.html In 2007 in Britain, a primary school in Kingsgate attempted to accommodate religious needs of its growing Muslim student body by serving only Halal meat in its lunch menus. A number of parents objected, arguing that the school was forcing their children to to conform to someone else's culture. See http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2007/02/british-parents-protest-halal-menus-in.html Howard Friedman messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge
Chip is right, of course. But Eric's point requires a response. I don't I don't think PETA folks would appreciate having their sincere concerns about the humane treatment of animals traced to the Nazis. To say that humane treatment concerns are more often than not pretext and then to have as your example something out of the 1930s is singularly unpersuasive. Marci A. Hamilton Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Yeshiva University 55 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10003 (212) 790-0215 hamilto...@aol.com -Original Message- From: Eric Rassbach erassb...@becketfund.org To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Thu, Apr 12, 2012 1:14 pm Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge Chip is right that the supposedly inhumane methods of kosher/halal slaughter (something US law defines as humane, btw) is one of the main public justifications for banning the practice. But as our brief in the New Zealand kosher slaughter ban case pointed out -- http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/NZ-kosher-brief-FINAL.pdf -- more often than not this is pretext. For example, this was the same justification the anti-Semites of the 1930s used for banning the practice in several European countries. As we point out in our brief, one of the first things the Nazis did upon taking power was to pass a law banning kosher slaughter, supposedly in order to awaken and strengthen compassion as one of the highest moral values of the German people. I don't think it's too much of a stretch to guess that anti-Muslim sentiment may be a subterranean motivation for the humane practices argument in the Netherlands, France and elsewhere. The ironic part for me of the Mohr case was that my main experience of stand-alone prison pork bans is as a proposed compromise to settle kosher accommodation lawsuits. Of course pork bans don't work as a method of kosher accommodation, though prison administrators keep hoping that they do. In our now 6-year-old lawsuit against the Texas prison system (now on a return trip to the 5th Circuit), Texas at one point floated a pork ban as a solution, which only served to show that they didn't understand how kashrus works. Eric From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu [icl...@law.gwu.edu] Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 10:39 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge I think that at least part of the objections in Europe to serving only halal meat in some restaurants involves objections to methods of halal animal slaughter which (like kosher slaughter) may not be consistent with European standards for humane treatment of animals in their use as food. Halal only means all diners are complicit in the that particular slaughtering process. On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 11:08 PM, Friedman, Howard M. howard.fried...@utoledo.edumailto:howard.fried...@utoledo.edu wrote: It is interesting to compare reactions in Europe to similar situations. In 2010, French politicians strongly criticized a restaurant chain that decided to serve only halal meat in 8 of its restaurants with a large Muslim clientele. Agriculture Minister Bruno Le Maire said: When they remove all the pork from a restaurant open to the public, I think they fall into communalism, which is against the principles and the spirit of the French republic. See: http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2010/02/french-politicians-criticize-restaurant.html In 2007 in Britain, a primary school in Kingsgate attempted to accommodate religious needs of its growing Muslim student body by serving only Halal meat in its lunch menus. A number of parents objected, arguing that the school was forcing their children to to conform to someone else's culture. See http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2007/02/british-parents-protest-halal-menus-in.html Howard Friedman messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge
Chip is right that the supposedly inhumane methods of kosher/halal slaughter (something US law defines as humane, btw) is one of the main public justifications for banning the practice. But as our brief in the New Zealand kosher slaughter ban case pointed out -- http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/NZ-kosher-brief-FINAL.pdf -- more often than not this is pretext. For example, this was the same justification the anti-Semites of the 1930s used for banning the practice in several European countries. As we point out in our brief, one of the first things the Nazis did upon taking power was to pass a law banning kosher slaughter, supposedly in order to awaken and strengthen compassion as one of the highest moral values of the German people. I don't think it's too much of a stretch to guess that anti-Muslim sentiment may be a subterranean motivation for the humane practices argument in the Netherlands, France and elsewhere. The ironic part for me of the Mohr case was that my main experience of stand-alone prison pork bans is as a proposed compromise to settle kosher accommodation lawsuits. Of course pork bans don't work as a method of kosher accommodation, though prison administrators keep hoping that they do. In our now 6-year-old lawsuit against the Texas prison system (now on a return trip to the 5th Circuit), Texas at one point floated a pork ban as a solution, which only served to show that they didn't understand how kashrus works. Eric From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu [icl...@law.gwu.edu] Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 10:39 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge I think that at least part of the objections in Europe to serving only halal meat in some restaurants involves objections to methods of halal animal slaughter which (like kosher slaughter) may not be consistent with European standards for humane treatment of animals in their use as food. Halal only means all diners are complicit in the that particular slaughtering process. On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 11:08 PM, Friedman, Howard M. howard.fried...@utoledo.edumailto:howard.fried...@utoledo.edu wrote: It is interesting to compare reactions in Europe to similar situations. In 2010, French politicians strongly criticized a restaurant chain that decided to serve only halal meat in 8 of its restaurants with a large Muslim clientele. Agriculture Minister Bruno Le Maire said: When they remove all the pork from a restaurant open to the public, I think they fall into communalism, which is against the principles and the spirit of the French republic. See: http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2010/02/french-politicians-criticize-restaurant.html In 2007 in Britain, a primary school in Kingsgate attempted to accommodate religious needs of its growing Muslim student body by serving only Halal meat in its lunch menus. A number of parents objected, arguing that the school was forcing their children to to conform to someone else's culture. See http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2007/02/british-parents-protest-halal-menus-in.html Howard Friedman -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Wed 4/11/2012 7:46 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge I agree entirely; I mention this partly because I occasionally hear pork bans as examples of quintessential violations of the Establishment Clause, though I don't think they would be. To be sure, a general pork ban might have a different motivation than a prison decision not to serve pork. But at the same time even a general pork ban could certainly be an attempt to accommodate a religious group by minimizing the risk that its members will accidentally ingest pork (or that its members might be put in a position where their employment would require the handling or even sampling of pork). And just as the state of California is free to ban the sale of horsemeat for human consumption (as it did in 1998), so it should be free to ban the sale of pork - not that I'd ever endorse that as a policy matter! Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 4:32 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe that the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't). If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from mandatory coverage by
Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge
And France clearly pushes a form of universalism as a national value in a way this country has not for some time. On Apr 12, 2012, at 10:26 AM, Finkelman, Paul paul.finkel...@albanylaw.edu wrote: The french experience with intolerance is very different than ours and thu leads to different outcomes and paths. Connected by DROID on Verizon Wireless -Original message- From: Friedman, Howard M. howard.fried...@utoledo.edu To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Thu, Apr 12, 2012 03:10:57 GMT+00:00 Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge It is interesting to compare reactions in Europe to similar situations. In 2010, French politicians strongly criticized a restaurant chain that decided to serve only halal meat in 8 of its restaurants with a large Muslim clientele. Agriculture Minister Bruno Le Maire said: When they remove all the pork from a restaurant open to the public, I think they fall into communalism, which is against the principles and the spirit of the French republic. See: http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2010/02/french-politicians-criticize-restaurant.html In 2007 in Britain, a primary school in Kingsgate attempted to accommodate religious needs of its growing Muslim student body by serving only Halal meat in its lunch menus. A number of parents objected, arguing that the school was forcing their children to to conform to someone else's culture. See http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2007/02/british-parents-protest-halal-menus-in.html Howard Friedman -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Wed 4/11/2012 7:46 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge I agree entirely; I mention this partly because I occasionally hear pork bans as examples of quintessential violations of the Establishment Clause, though I don't think they would be. To be sure, a general pork ban might have a different motivation than a prison decision not to serve pork. But at the same time even a general pork ban could certainly be an attempt to accommodate a religious group by minimizing the risk that its members will accidentally ingest pork (or that its members might be put in a position where their employment would require the handling or even sampling of pork). And just as the state of California is free to ban the sale of horsemeat for human consumption (as it did in 1998), so it should be free to ban the sale of pork - not that I'd ever endorse that as a policy matter! Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 4:32 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe that the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't). If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from mandatory coverage by employers under the Affordable Care Act, wouldn't the analysis be just the same (imposition of a uniform policy to avoid religious conflict, avoid any need to create controversial exceptions for religious entities, avoid piece-meal litigation, and ease administration of the overall scheme), even though the impetus for change derived from a demand by some for religious accommodation? On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 6:48 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote: River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012), http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/RiversvMohr.pdf . Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edumailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053 My SSRN papers are here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private.
Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
Avoiding litigation (and there are many, many RLUIPA and free exercise cases about prison diets) and other forms of conflict, and having the efficiencies of a uniform diet for all prisoners, sound like secular purposes to me. On Thu, Apr 12, 2012 at 3:34 PM, West, Ellis ew...@richmond.edu wrote: Although the District Court may be correct in saying that the primary purpose of the policy is not “to establish the religion of Islam” or to “promote the practice of Islam,” it does concede that the policy “makes accommodating a multitude of religious practices and beliefs easier and more economical.” Would someone explain to me how that purpose and/or effect is “secular” in nature? Even though Prof. Lupu may be correct in saying that this particular policy is good way of accommodating religious beliefs/practices, his comment simply assumes that a policy of accommodating religious beliefs/practices is secular in nature. How so?** ** ** ** Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edu ** ** *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Ira Lupu *Sent:* Wednesday, April 11, 2012 7:32 PM *To:* Law Religion issues for Law Academics *Subject:* Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge ** ** Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe that the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't). ** ** If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from mandatory coverage by employers under the Affordable Care Act, wouldn't the analysis be just the same (imposition of a uniform policy to avoid religious conflict, avoid any need to create controversial exceptions for religious entities, avoid piece-meal litigation, and ease administration of the overall scheme), even though the impetus for change derived from a demand by some for religious accommodation? On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 6:48 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote: River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012), http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/RiversvMohr.pdf . Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ** ** -- Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053 My SSRN papers are here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053 My SSRN papers are here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge
Nick Kristoff has an interesting piece in today's NYTimes, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/opinion/kristof-is-an-egg-for-breakfast-worth-this.html?_r=1hp decrying the treatment of chickens by egg factories. (One of my own feeble gestures, presumably predictable by reference to my economic status and politics, is that I buy eggs of cage-free chickens and don't order veal.) So I'm interested in the reference to Article 20a of the Basic Law. What if a state really does try to protect all animals against cruel treatment, including chickens, cows, pigs, harvested fish, whales in captivity, etc.? Assuming that the practices of kosher slaughter are in fact less humane than they need to be (assuming that one continues to be non-vegetarian and therefore must support the raising and then killing of animals, birds, and fish for our own consumption), is there any dispositive reason for the state to accommodate a desire for kosher meat, even in an institutional setting that offers a presumptively healthy vegetarian option? I ask this as a genuine question, since I find myself genuinely perplexed by the issue. sandy From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Claudia Haupt Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 12:43 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge I wrote about this a while ago in Free Exercise of Religion and Animal Protection: A Comparative Perspective on Ritual Slaughter, 39 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 839 (2007). The article includes a discussion of the 2002 German constitutional amendment that made animal protection a constitutional state objective in Article 20a of the Basic Law. -- Claudia E. Haupt Professorial Lecturer in Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20052 202-994-8494tel:202-994-8494 ceha...@law.gwu.edumailto:ceha...@law.gwu.edu My new book: Religion-State Relations in the United States and Germany www.cambridge.org/9781107015821http://www.cambridge.org/9781107015821 On Thu, Apr 12, 2012 at 1:25 PM, hamilto...@aol.commailto:hamilto...@aol.com wrote: Chip is right, of course. But Eric's point requires a response. I don't I don't think PETA folks would appreciate having their sincere concerns about the humane treatment of animals traced to the Nazis. To say that humane treatment concerns are more often than not pretext and then to have as your example something out of the 1930s is singularly unpersuasive. Marci A. Hamilton Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Yeshiva University 55 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10003 (212) 790-0215tel:%28212%29%20790-0215 hamilto...@aol.commailto:hamilto...@aol.com -Original Message- From: Eric Rassbach erassb...@becketfund.orgmailto:erassb...@becketfund.org To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Thu, Apr 12, 2012 1:14 pm Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge Chip is right that the supposedly inhumane methods of kosher/halal slaughter (something US law defines as humane, btw) is one of the main public justifications for banning the practice. But as our brief in the New Zealand kosher slaughter ban case pointed out -- http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/NZ-kosher-brief-FINAL.pdf -- more often than not this is pretext. For example, this was the same justification the anti-Semites of the 1930s used for banning the practice in several European countries. As we point out in our brief, one of the first things the Nazis did upon taking power was to pass a law banning kosher slaughter, supposedly in order to awaken and strengthen compassion as one of the highest moral values of the German people. I don't think it's too much of a stretch to guess that anti-Muslim sentiment may be a subterranean motivation for the humane practices argument in the Netherlands, France and elsewhere. The ironic part for me of the Mohr case was that my main experience of stand-alone prison pork bans is as a proposed compromise to settle kosher accommodation lawsuits. Of course pork bans don't work as a method of kosher accommodation, though prison administrators keep hoping that they do. In our now 6-year-old lawsuit against the Texas prison system (now on a return trip to the 5th Circuit), Texas at one point floated a pork ban as a solution, which only served to show that they didn't understand how kashrus works. Eric From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu [icl...@law.gwu.edumailto:icl...@law.gwu.edu] Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 10:39 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge
I am already on the PETA blacklist because of my Santeria goat sacrifice case, so no harm done to my relationship with them. The reason I cited examples from the 1930s is that before New Zealand's short-lived ban in 2010, all but one of the previous sharia bans were passed in the 1890-1930s timeframe. The sole exception being Iceland which passed a shechita ban in 1957 (and 19 years before that expelled all of its Jewish citizens a la Ferdinand and Isabella). This is clear from the brief I linked, which I gather you didn't read. So with respect to the sharia bans that have been enacted, I think I am on pretty solid ground to say that the humane reasons were more often than not pretext for anti-Semitism. With respect to the Netherlands specifically, I note that one of the main proponents of the kosher/halal slaughter ban is Geert Wilders who has said things like the following: Madam Speaker, the Islamic incursion must be stopped. Islam is the Trojan Horse in Europe. If we do not stop Islamification now, Eurabia and Netherabia will just be a matter of time. One century ago, there were approximately 50 Muslims in the Netherlands. Today, there are about 1 million Muslims in this country. Where will it end? We are heading for the end of European and Dutch civilisation as we know it. Where is our Prime Minister in all this? In reply to my questions in the House he said, without batting an eyelid, that there is no question of our country being Islamified. Now, this reply constituted a historical error as soon as it was uttered. Very many Dutch citizens, Madam Speaker, experience the presence of Islam around them. And I can report that they have had enough of burkas, headscarves, the ritual slaughter of animals, so‑called honour revenge, blaring minarets, female circumcision, hymen restoration operations, abuse of homosexuals, Turkish and Arabic on the buses and trains as well as on town hall leaflets, halal meat at grocery shops and department stores, Sharia exams, the Finance Minister’s Sharia mortgages, and the enormous overrepresentation of Muslims in the area of crime, including Moroccan street terrorists. This is not to say that some people don't have genuine objections to kosher/halal slaughter on the basis of humane treatment concerns. But there is clearly also religious hostility motivating many others; hopefully we can all agree that that is a bad reason for such a ban. Eric From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marc Stern [ste...@ajc.org] Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 1:30 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge Except that PETA itself has in the past referred to the way commercial farm animals are raised as rep[licating conditions in concentration camps. Marc From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of hamilto...@aol.com Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 01:25 To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge Chip is right, of course. But Eric's point requires a response. I don't I don't think PETA folks would appreciate having their sincere concerns about the humane treatment of animals traced to the Nazis. To say that humane treatment concerns are more often than not pretext and then to have as your example something out of the 1930s is singularly unpersuasive. Marci A. Hamilton Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Yeshiva University 55 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10003 (212) 790-0215 hamilto...@aol.commailto:hamilto...@aol.com -Original Message- From: Eric Rassbach erassb...@becketfund.org To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Thu, Apr 12, 2012 1:14 pm Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge Chip is right that the supposedly inhumane methods of kosher/halal slaughter (something US law defines as humane, btw) is one of the main public justifications for banning the practice. But as our brief in the New Zealand kosher slaughter ban case pointed out -- http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/NZ-kosher-brief-FINAL.pdf -- more often than not this is pretext. For example, this was the same justification the anti-Semites of the 1930s used for banning the practice in several European countries. As we point out in our brief, one of the first things the Nazis did upon taking power was to pass a law banning kosher slaughter, supposedly in order to awaken and strengthen compassion as one of the highest moral values of the German people. I don't think it's too much of a stretch to guess that anti-Muslim sentiment may be a subterranean motivation for the humane practices argument in the
RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClausechallenge
This is true. It is also true that many prisoners are paranoid about their food and therefore want kosher food out of a misguided belief that it is especially safe for consumption. That said, most of those cases arise after there is a kosher accommodation in place and other prisoners seek access to it. For example, in Guzzi v. Thompson, 2008 WL 2059321 (1st Cir. 2008) I argued on behalf of the Becket Fund as amicus against a misguided district court opinion that held that only Jewish prisoners could seek kosher dietary accommodations. Guzzi claimed to be Orthodox Catholic which he said required compliance with the rules of kashrus. The lower court said in effect Catholics don't keep kosher and dismissed the case. After oral argument at the First Circuit the Commonwealth unilaterally decided to give Guzzi the kosher accommodation, presumably in an effort to preserve the lower court's decision from being vacated. So I would argue that the focus in the non-halachically-Jewish prisoner cases tends to be more (or should be) the sincerity of the prisoner rather than the exact contours of the kosher accommodation they are seeking. So far I don't think anybody has asked for glatt. From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Friedman, Howard M. [howard.fried...@utoledo.edu] Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 6:46 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClausechallenge You are right. Except many of the cases in which prisoners are requesting kosher food involve inmates who are not Jewish (at least in the halachic sense). E.g. many times Muslims, having no hope of getting halal food, request kosher food which is apparently an acceptable alternative under Shariah law. Or groups like the Hebrew Israelites request a kosher diet. It is not clear whether these kinds of religious requests are from prisoners who care about the same strictures as traditional Orthodox Jews do. Howard Friedman -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Eric Rassbach Sent: Thu 4/12/2012 11:39 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClausechallenge Chip is right that the supposedly inhumane methods of kosher/halal slaughter (something US law defines as humane, btw) is one of the main public justifications for banning the practice. But as our brief in the New Zealand kosher slaughter ban case pointed out -- http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/NZ-kosher-brief-FINAL.pdf -- more often than not this is pretext. For example, this was the same justification the anti-Semites of the 1930s used for banning the practice in several European countries. As we point out in our brief, one of the first things the Nazis did upon taking power was to pass a law banning kosher slaughter, supposedly in order to awaken and strengthen compassion as one of the highest moral values of the German people. I don't think it's too much of a stretch to guess that anti-Muslim sentiment may be a subterranean motivation for the humane practices argument in the Netherlands, France and elsewhere. The ironic part for me of the Mohr case was that my main experience of stand-alone prison pork bans is as a proposed compromise to settle kosher accommodation lawsuits. Of course pork bans don't work as a method of kosher accommodation, though prison administrators keep hoping that they do. In our now 6-year-old lawsuit against the Texas prison system (now on a return trip to the 5th Circuit), Texas at one point floated a pork ban as a solution, which only served to show that they didn't understand how kashrus works. Eric From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu [icl...@law.gwu.edu] Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 10:39 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge I think that at least part of the objections in Europe to serving only halal meat in some restaurants involves objections to methods of halal animal slaughter which (like kosher slaughter) may not be consistent with European standards for humane treatment of animals in their use as food. Halal only means all diners are complicit in the that particular slaughtering process. On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 11:08 PM, Friedman, Howard M. howard.fried...@utoledo.edumailto:howard.fried...@utoledo.edu wrote: It is interesting to compare reactions in Europe to similar situations. In 2010, French politicians strongly criticized a restaurant chain that decided to serve only halal meat in 8 of its restaurants with a large Muslim clientele. Agriculture Minister Bruno Le Maire said: When they
RE: Accommodation
Marie, I certainly have no objections to exemptions in general just as I have no objections to laws in general from which persons are often exempted—provided the laws (and exemptions?) are secular in purpose and effect, which is what is required by the religion clauses, as originally understood and as interpreted by the Court. Moreover, in my comment, I did not state an objection to religion-based exemptions. I simply asked how such exemptions could be considered secular in nature. I do not think it works to answer that just because all kinds of secular exemptions are granted, religion-based exemptions should be granted or else there is discrimination against religion. According to that logic, if all kinds of “normal” laws give aid, financial and otherwise, to specific secular endeavors (business, health care, education, etc.), then it follows that such aid should be given to specific religions or religious beliefs/activities, or else the government would be guilty of discriminating against religion. But, of course, that kind of “discrimination against religion” is what the establishment clause prohibits. Finally, I would simply add that if the exemptions were conscience-based, as opposed to religion-based, then there would not be an issue. Just as the Court said in dealing with exemptions from the draft, if the government wants to protect religious consciences, it must protect secular consciences as well. Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edu From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marie A. Failinger Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 4:22 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Accommodation Ellis, the government accommodates people all of the time. By law, it is required to accommodate certain groups of people--e.g., to build ramps so that citizens can get into public buildings, to provide waivers of rules to certain people who get public benefits. I can't legally insist that the government build me a ramp, but a disabled person can. Is that impermissible? I think not--the government has seen that some people have a particular burden in fully functioning as citizens, and allowed for it. In practice, the government accommodates a lot more people. Every time a cop stops you and decides not to give you a ticket for speeding, he/she is essentially accommodating you---he/she is not applying a law that he should, because of some circumstance he/she has discovered about you that is distinctive (you're rushing to the hospital, for example.) A permissible accommodation for a group (including a religious group) is simply a circumstance in which government says, we have seen that X number of people or this particular group needs to have us apply our discretion to do right by them and not disadvantage them because of their particular characteristic. So we're going to make a rule accommodating this group, so that each officer looking at their individual circumstance doesn't have to make the individual decision whether their distinctive circumstance warrants not applying the law to them (i.e., not giving them the ticket.) We think all of these folks should be treated the same, no matter who the officer is. It kills me to sound like Justice Scalia, but if the government willingly accommodates all of these folks in all of these circumstances, but refuses to accommodate some folks when the only reason for their particular difference/exception is religious, isn't that discrimination on the basis of religion banned by the Free Exercise Clause? Now, you might argue that religious accommodations are different because individuals choose to be in those situations where they need an exception, but surely most religious people don't choose their situation any more than you chose to speed in order to get to the hospital faster. Finally, don't you think it is a very good thing, ethically, if we have a government that is willing in lots of circumstances to say, you as a person matter to us more than our rule, and we are willing to see you as a person? There will, of course, be a point where the law becomes incoherent if the government looks at every individual case to see what the result should be, but where it is not disruptive to the system, why shouldn't we want the government to see us as persons and not as objects to which the law needs to be applied. Marie A. Failinger Professor of Law Editor, Journal of Law and Religion Hamline University School of Law 1536 Hewitt Avenue Saint Paul, MN 55104 U.S.A. 651-523-2124 (work phone) 651-523-2236 (work fax) mfailin...@hamline.edumailto:mfailin...@hamline.edu (email) West, Ellis ew...@richmond.edumailto:ew...@richmond.edu 4/12/2012 2:34 PM Although the District Court may be correct in saying that the primary purpose of the policy is not “to establish the
RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge
Except that PETA itself has in the past referred to the way commercial farm animals are raised as rep[licating conditions in concentration camps. Marc From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of hamilto...@aol.com Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 01:25 To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge Chip is right, of course. But Eric's point requires a response. I don't I don't think PETA folks would appreciate having their sincere concerns about the humane treatment of animals traced to the Nazis. To say that humane treatment concerns are more often than not pretext and then to have as your example something out of the 1930s is singularly unpersuasive. Marci A. Hamilton Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Yeshiva University 55 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10003 (212) 790-0215 hamilto...@aol.commailto:hamilto...@aol.com -Original Message- From: Eric Rassbach erassb...@becketfund.org To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Thu, Apr 12, 2012 1:14 pm Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge Chip is right that the supposedly inhumane methods of kosher/halal slaughter (something US law defines as humane, btw) is one of the main public justifications for banning the practice. But as our brief in the New Zealand kosher slaughter ban case pointed out -- http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/NZ-kosher-brief-FINAL.pdf -- more often than not this is pretext. For example, this was the same justification the anti-Semites of the 1930s used for banning the practice in several European countries. As we point out in our brief, one of the first things the Nazis did upon taking power was to pass a law banning kosher slaughter, supposedly in order to awaken and strengthen compassion as one of the highest moral values of the German people. I don't think it's too much of a stretch to guess that anti-Muslim sentiment may be a subterranean motivation for the humane practices argument in the Netherlands, France and elsewhere. The ironic part for me of the Mohr case was that my main experience of stand-alone prison pork bans is as a proposed compromise to settle kosher accommodation lawsuits. Of course pork bans don't work as a method of kosher accommodation, though prison administrators keep hoping that they do. In our now 6-year-old lawsuit against the Texas prison system (now on a return trip to the 5th Circuit), Texas at one point floated a pork ban as a solution, which only served to show that they didn't understand how kashrus works. Eric From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu [icl...@law.gwu.edumailto:icl...@law.gwu.edu] Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 10:39 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against EstablishmentClause challenge I think that at least part of the objections in Europe to serving only halal meat in some restaurants involves objections to methods of halal animal slaughter which (like kosher slaughter) may not be consistent with European standards for humane treatment of animals in their use as food. Halal only means all diners are complicit in the that particular slaughtering process. On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 11:08 PM, Friedman, Howard M. howard.fried...@utoledo.edumailto:howard.fried...@utoledo.edumailto:howard.fried...@utoledo.edumailto:howard.fried...@utoledo.edu? wrote: It is interesting to compare reactions in Europe to similar situations. In 2010, French politicians strongly criticized a restaurant chain that decided to serve only halal meat in 8 of its restaurants with a large Muslim clientele. Agriculture Minister Bruno Le Maire said: When they remove all the pork from a restaurant open to the public, I think they fall into communalism, which is against the principles and the spirit of the French republic. See: http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2010/02/french-politicians-criticize-restaurant.html In 2007 in Britain, a primary school in Kingsgate attempted to accommodate religious needs of its growing Muslim student body by serving only Halal meat in its lunch menus. A number of parents objected, arguing that the school was forcing their children to to conform to someone else's culture. See http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2007/02/british-parents-protest-halal-menus-in.html Howard Friedman messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
