[This is getting tiresome. Unless someone has something *new* to say,
this is the end of the thread. --pm]
On 3 Feb 2000, lcs Mixmaster Remailer wrote:
On Wed, 2 Feb 2000, Martin Minow wrote:
http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf.
The one problem I have with the RNG, based on my
I'd like to tone this discussion down a bit and get back to basics.
First of all, I am happy to thank Intel for finally releasing the
hardware interface. I hadn't known about its release until this
thread. I'm always grateful when someone does the right thing, even
if it's late. Second, I
On Wed, 2 Feb 2000, Martin Minow wrote:
http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf.
The one problem I have with the RNG, based on my reading of the
analysis, is that programmers cannot access the "raw" bitstream,
only the stream after the "digital post-processing" that converts
the
At 09:15 AM 02/02/2000 -0800, Eric Murray wrote:
Until Intel releases the design for the RNG, I would treat it the same
as any suspect source of entropy- assume that it can contain no
entropy. That means that you whiten its output before mixing it
together with your other entropy sources (some
Lucky Green writes:
Your post is the third or forth post I have seen in the last year that
claims that Paul concluded that Intel's RNG outputs strong random numbers.
Such as when they said (http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf):
Cryptographically, we believe that the Intel RNG is
At 6:19 pm -0500 2000-01-26, Tom McCune wrote:
Just in case anyone else is interested in my findings on whether I could
use the Intel RNG with my Celeron machine:
I needed help to find the driver installation file at the Dell site
- I had searched for Intel RNG, but it can be found by searching
It may not have been mentioned here, but Intel has
released the programmer interface specs to their RNG, at
http://developer.intel.com/design/chipsets/manuals/298029.pdf.
Nothing prevents the device from being used in Linux /dev/random now.
As for the concerns about back doors, the best
lcs Mixmaster Remailer wrote:
As for the concerns about back doors, the best reference on
the design of the RNG remains cryptography.com's analysis at
http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf.
The one problem I have with the RNG, based on my reading of the
analysis, is that programmers
At 9:00 PM + 2/2/2000, lcs Mixmaster Remailer wrote:
It may not have been mentioned here, but Intel has
released the programmer interface specs to their RNG, at
http://developer.intel.com/design/chipsets/manuals/298029.pdf.
Nothing prevents the device from being used in Linux /dev/random now.
-Original Message-
From: Arnold G. Reinhold [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Wednesday, February 02, 2000 5:14 PM
To: lcs Mixmaster Remailer; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [PGP]: PGP 6.5.2 Random Number Generator (RNG) support
I respect Paul, but there is a matter of principle here
On Wed, 2 Feb 2000, Martin Minow wrote:
http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf.
The one problem I have with the RNG, based on my reading of the
analysis, is that programmers cannot access the "raw" bitstream,
only the stream after the "digital post-processing" that converts
the
On Tue, Feb 01, 2000 at 09:00:33PM -0800, Dave Del Torto wrote:
At 6:19 pm -0500 2000-01-26, Tom McCune wrote:
Just in case anyone else is interested in my findings on whether I could
use the Intel RNG with my Celeron machine:
I needed help to find the driver installation file at the Dell
At 9:15 AM -0800 2/2/2000, Eric Murray wrote:
On Tue, Feb 01, 2000 at 09:00:33PM -0800, Dave Del Torto wrote:
At 6:19 pm -0500 2000-01-26, Tom McCune wrote:
...
(A) I'm not sanguine about it being a "default" in any version of
PGP, knowing what I do and having been told more by
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