For the last three years, I've operated a mail alias,
[EMAIL PROTECTED], that publicly archives and forwards
to the government authorities announcements of the public
availability of cryptographic software. The idea
was that since current US export regulations require
notifying the government any
At most airports, they've moved most of the screening to the security
checkpoint, where they do the dump search of the people with the
on the boarding pass and the lucky random selectees. For flights
with people on them, they also have TSA people to screen them
at the gate. I've not
Sad, sad news.
Roger's pioneering contributions to our art speak (volumes) for
themselves, and our field is diminished by the loss of his future
insights.
But I will miss him most for his enormous generosity, his sharp wit,
and his personal integrity.
-matt
Obit: Roger
SMB writes:
I'm struck by the similarity of this attack to Matt Blaze's master key
paper. In each case, you're guessing at one position at a time, and
using the response of the security system as an oracle. What's crucial
in both cases is the one-at-a-time aspect -- that's what makes the
John,
Your snipe at NASA is probably uncalled for. A sentence fragment
quoted from a spokesperson at press conference almost certainly
does not reflect the professional judgment of the people who designed
the system.
As someone who is occasionally quoted (and just as often misquoted)
in the
For those who are interested, the final version of my paper on
cryptology and locks is available at
http://www.crypto.com/papers/mk.pdf
(the old version is still online at mk20020915.pdf in the same directory).
This is a 4MB file (it contains a bunch of moderate resolution images).
-matt
The tragic part is that there are alternatives. There are several
lock designs that turn out to resist this threat, including master
rings and bicentric locks. While these designs aren't perfect, they
I think it is worth pointing out that, while master ring systems (and
master-keyed
Matt Blaze wrote:
Once I understood the basics, I quickly discovered, or more accurately
re-discovered, a simple and practical rights amplification (or
privilege escalation) attack to which most master-keyed locks are
vulnerable.
http://www.crypto.com/masterkey.html
Matt
Actually even in their Biaxial design the sidebar hole is always on the
bottom pin, and so the master shares the angle with the change keys.
-matt
There is, however, a newer medeco design that uses a drill-hole
instead of a groove. With that design you can have the pin twist be
different at
Patents were originally intended, and are usually used (for better
or for worse), as a mechanism for protecting inventors and their
licensees from competition. But I've noticed a couple of areas where
patents are also used as a security mechanism, aiming to prevent the
unauthorized production of
Isn't it about a million times more probable that the industry's main
concern was PEOPLE RIPPING DVDS AND TRADING THE FILES?
Well, zone locking helps curb this because it *reduces* the market for each
copy. The finer the zone locking resolution, the more effort an attacker needs
to make
17 USC 1204 (a) In General. - Any person who violates section 1201 or
1202 willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private
financial gain -(1) shall be fined not more than $500,000 or imprisoned
for not more than 5 years, or both, for the first offense...
Does this
The following is the preliminary list of accepted papers for
Financial Cryptography 2002. For information on the conference,
including registration, see
http://fc02.ai
Paper: 017
Authors: Markus Jakobsson
Title: Low-Cost Hash Sequence Traversal
-
Paper: 020
Authors: Markus
General Chair:
Nicko van Someren (nCipher)
Program Committee:
Matt Blaze, Program Chair (ATT Labs)
Dan Boneh (Stanford University)
Stefan Brands (Zero Knowledge)
Dan Geer (@stake)
Ian Goldberg (Zero Knowledge)
Angelos Keromytis (Columbia University)
Paul Kocher (Cryptography Research)
Ron
that
September 11th will be remembered as the day that everything changed
in America. Yes, everything changed yesterday, but we needn't allow
it to change us.
Matt Blaze
New York, 12 September 2001
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
to authors: December 23, 2001
Camera-ready papers due: February 4, 2002
General Chair:
Nicko van Someren (nCipher)
Program Committee:
Matt Blaze, Program Chair (ATT Labs)
Dan Boneh (Stanford University)
Stefan Brands (Zero Knowledge)
Dan Geer (@stake)
Ian Goldberg (Zero Knowledge)
Angelos Keromytis
Adi Shamir and his colleagues have some interesting
new results on RC4 with a practical attack against WEP.
With Adi's permission, I've made available a (PostScript)
copy of a draft of his paper at:
http://www.crypto.com/papers/others/rc4_ksaproc.ps
(Fortunately, as far as I know WEP isn't
On the Other Other Hand, I vaguely remember a neat paper by Matt Blaze
some years ago that shows that certain classes of back doors, like
good back doors in conventional crypto systems, are equivalent in
difficulty to building a public key system. Anyone remember the name
of the paper
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