On 2013-10-11 15:48, ianG wrote:
Right now we've got a TCP startup, and a TLS startup. It's pretty
messy. Adding another startup inside isn't likely to gain popularity.
The problem is that layering creates round trips, and as cpus get ever
faster, and pipes ever fatter, round trips become a
Tim Hudson t...@cryptsoft.com writes:
Does anyone recollect the history behind and the implications of the (open)
SSH choice of 35 as a hard-wired public exponent?
/* OpenSSH versions up to 5.4 (released in 2010) hardcoded e = 35, which is
both a suboptimal exponent (it's less efficient that
On 10/11/13 7:34 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Phillip Hallam-Baker hal...@gmail.com writes:
Quick question, anyone got a good scheme for key stretching?
http://lmgtfy.com/?q=hkdfl=1
Yeah, that's a weaker simplification of the method I've always
advocated, stopping the hash function before the
On 10 October 2013 17:06, John Kelsey crypto@gmail.com wrote:
Just thinking out loud
The administrative complexity of a cryptosystem is overwhelmingly in key
management and identity management and all the rest of that stuff. So
imagine that we have a widely-used inner-level
On Oct 11, 2013, at 11:09 PM, James A. Donald wrote:
Right now we've got a TCP startup, and a TLS startup. It's pretty messy.
Adding another startup inside isn't likely to gain popularity.
The problem is that layering creates round trips, and as cpus get ever
faster, and pipes ever
If someone wants to try organise a pgp key signing party at
the Vancouver IETF next month let me know and I can organise a
room/time. That's tended not to happen since Ted and Jeff
don't come along but we could re-start 'em if there's interest.
S.
___
I've noticed quite a few questions on this list
recently of the form How do I do X? What is
the right cryptographic primitive for goal X? etc.
I'd like to plug the following site:
http://crypto.stackexchange.com/
Cryptography Stack Exchange
It is an excellent place to post questions like
that
On Oct 12, 2013, at 6:51 AM, Ben Laurie b...@links.org wrote:
...
AIUI, you're trying to make it so that only active attacks work on the
combined protocol, whereas passive attacks might work on the outer
protocol. In order to achieve this, you assume that your proposed
inner protocol is not
I am one of the organizers of Security BSides Delaware, otherwise known as
BSidesDE. We have already discussed having a key signing party, but if
there is any interest, I'd love for any of you to be there, and potentially
run it. Check out bsidesdelaware.com for dates, locations, and such.
It's