At 05:13 AM 7/26/2007, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Suppose that the method is 0-10 RV. Suppose that everyone but you has voted,
and now you're going to cast the final ballot. As in actual elections, you
don't know how others have voted, though you have some sort of probability
estimates, such as
At 06:11 AM 7/26/2007, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I forgot to include this in Smith exposes our false statements:
Smith said that sometimes extreme rating is suboptimal in RV. So, Smith,
when is that so?
First of all, the original statement was general, and so Smith simply
gave a simple
At 09:08 AM 7/26/2007, Steve Eppley wrote:
It proposes several better methods, including a
simple but probably very effective patch for IRV: letting candidates
withdraw after the votes are cast.
Nice. This could eliminate the center squeeze effect, making IRV much better.
Of course, this is kind
At 06:01 AM 7/26/2007, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I'd said that the SU claim depends on sincere voting. Smith wants to
believe that I was saying that, in general, one can't say anything
about SU unless voting is sincere. But I didn't say that. Does Smith
know what the means? The definite article
At 02:15 PM 7/25/2007, Chris Benham wrote:
How can it be best strategy to vote approval-style in Range 99, but
with the voters using a more
restricted ratings ballot some other way of voting becomes better?
2
Isn't that what has been claimed already by others? I.e., by
restricting the ratings to
At 09:17 AM 7/27/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi,
I've now looked at your work, and I believe you have shown that when
your value of a candidate is exactly equal to your expectation from the
election, then if the midrange rating is available to you, that is the
rating you should use. At least some
At 10:48 AM 7/27/2007, greg wolfe wrote:
When you own shares through a mutual fund you have essentially
assigned your proxies to the mutual fund's management. You
get no say in how they are voted. For example, if you invest in
a socially responsible index fund through a mutual fund company
such
At 04:11 PM 7/31/2007, Juho wrote:
I'm still wondering if you felt that D was the rightful
winner in the basic example where sincere opinions were 1000 AB,
1000 CD, 1 DB (or 1000 ABC=D, 1000 CDA=B, 1 DBA=B).
I'm not getting into the main discussion here, but wanted to answer
the question
At 06:25 PM 7/31/2007, Peter Barath wrote:
Range voting is a generalisation of approval voting where you can
give each candidate any score
between 0 and 1. Optimal strategies never vote anything other than
0 or 1, so range voting
complicates ballots and confuses voters for little or no
At 02:04 AM 8/2/2007, Juho wrote:
The votres' stated preferences are easy to collect but in a
competitive environment voters tend to exaggerate. I guess the basic
problem is the feeling you get when Bush wins Gore and you have voter
G=100, B=80 and your neighbour has voted B=100, G=0.
But your
At 03:22 AM 8/18/2007, Juho wrote:
I forgot to mention this special case that doesn't touch the main
theme of this mail stream but is maybe worth noting anyway.
An example with two parties, ABC and DEF. The voters have zero
information. But the strategy of the DEF party pays off and they will
At 10:48 PM 8/20/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
That's still pretty strange... What about IRV with equal rankings allowed?
Well, I suggested it long ago as a simple improvement. Voters can
essentially vote it as Approval if they want.
In an Approval election, if all the candidates you approve are
At 04:01 PM 8/22/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
To be clear, I thought you were claiming that any method (not just a
Condorcet method) that allows such votes could simply be called a mix
of Condorcet and Approval. That's why I brought up ER-IRV.
Oh. That is so blatantly false that it did not even
At 11:38 AM 8/22/2007, Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
A concrete example: true ratings are
55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0
45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0
THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)!
approval, would work if voters approval cutoff is below 80, as would
At 02:55 AM 8/22/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
A common situation: 2 factions 1 good compromise.
The goal: Make sure the compromise wins.
The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority.
A concrete example: true ratings are
55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0
45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0
THE
At 09:16 AM 8/25/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
I don't think nearly half of the electorate should pay the other
half for getting what is the more just solution in my eyes. Perhaps
that is a difference in culture?
No. It's an understanding of what utilities mean. If A does not win,
the supporters
At 09:09 AM 8/25/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Abd ul-Rahman!
Range *is* a majoritarian method since a majority can elect whomever
it wants by bullet voting.
That does not contradict what I wrote. Being a majoritarian method
does not make the method Majority Criterion compliant.
I did
At 09:01 AM 8/25/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Steve,
Although Jobst may not have intended this assumption, I will continue to
make the assumption that the B minority's preference intensity for the
compromise C over A is much greater than the A majority's preference
intensity for A over
At 02:59 AM 8/26/2007, rob brown wrote:
Vote trading generally means the ballots can't be secret, so
elections would be inherently corruptible by anyone with money.
This is commonly assumed. But it probably is not true. First of all,
the ballots don't have to be personally identified, all that
At 01:07 AM 8/27/2007, rob brown wrote:
On 8/26/07, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED][EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
At 02:59 AM 8/26/2007, rob brown wrote:
Vote trading generally means the ballots can't be secret, so
elections would be inherently corruptible by anyone with money
At 07:37 PM 8/29/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
the ratings that Jobst fed us as a distraction.
You're doing it again -- please stop it.
That was not an insult. It made the challenge more interesting. I'm
sorry that you thought it critical.
Election-Methods mailing list - see
At 07:31 PM 8/29/2007, Paul Kislanko wrote:
I'd suggest that the zeroes in the last column are improbable if C is
acceptable to both A and B voters. That all A-first voters like C almost as
much as A but don't like B (or all B voters like C almost as much as B but
don't like A) is so improbable I
At 12:23 AM 8/30/2007, Paul Kislanko wrote:
If I understand the meaning of the original example correctly, the answer is
Asset voting.
Give every voter 100 points. By the conditions given, both the A and B
voters think C is 80% as good as their true favorite, so give 5/9 of their
points to their
At 04:18 AM 8/30/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Abd ul-Rahman,
I am most concerned about majority *consent.* Jobst is ignoring the
fact that I'm suggesting majority *consent* for decisions;
What exactly is majority consent? In my understanding consent
means *all* voters share some opinion...
At 04:23 AM 8/30/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
The only thing I wish is that you try to be post shorter messages,
since I really have trouble to read that much!
Sorry, don't have time!
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
At 08:19 AM 8/30/2007, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
That isn't how asset voting works. You assign your vote to the elector
that you most trust. The elector can then assign the vote to any candidate
after negotitation.
Actually, what Paul wrote about was the original Asset proposal. I
proposed
At 09:48 AM 8/30/2007, Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
In personal economics a diversified portfolio helps reduce risk, I see
no reason why in fractional asset should not follow the same logic. by
diversifying the people or groups you give your votes to you reduce risk
of your vote being corrupted.
This is being cc'd to [EMAIL PROTECTED], a new list for the
discussion of FA/DP issues. Those interested in FA/DP, even if only
to block this dangerous and unprecedented extension of power to the
great unwashed, or, at the opposite end, to save us all from wasting
our time with this ridiculous
Mr. Kislanko wrote directly to me, which I prefer not be done unless
there is a specific reason for a personal communication, immediately
disclosed. I'm responding to the list.
At 12:35 AM 8/31/2007, Paul Kislanko wrote:
Any question about what method works that is turned into how a question
At 04:19 PM 8/31/2007, Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
I believe we have made an abrupt left hand turn with this analogy.
buy destroying the eggs, I intended that would happen if you voted
in a manner (on any bill) that you did not approve of.
I think that instead of you voted he meant your
At 04:26 PM 8/31/2007, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Several people have worked on preventing selling, removing, or altering
votes (Ronald Rivest, Warren Smith, and others). I probably have
overlooked it, but has there been any work done on preventing people from
*adding* fraudulent votes -- the
At 08:32 PM 9/3/2007, Warren Smith wrote:
3. For voting methods whose ballots are NOT just rank-orderings,
(e.g. approval and range voting) there is no such thing as truncation.
But it still is possible to cast a plurality-style range or approval vote.
Actually, I use the word truncation with
At 10:33 PM 9/5/2007, Forest W Simmons wrote:
As for the prisoner's dilemma problem, I wonder if the possibility of
defection could be eliminated by having trading parties sit down and
sign binding agreements during formal trading.
The concept that I was brought to by this discussion can be
At 11:22 AM 9/21/2007, Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
The drive behind thes moves it usually that the old system fails to
translate votes into seats fairly. (Votes != Seats)
If we want to understand fair proportional representation, we must
look back to the principle of representation itself, and to
At 07:28 PM 9/23/2007, Michael Rouse wrote:
I was briefly skimming the discussion area for Instant Runoff Voting in
Wikipedia (available here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Instant-runoff_voting
), and noticed where one of the contributors complained that comparisons
to Approval Voting
At 07:28 PM 9/23/2007, Michael Rouse wrote:
I'm not trying to start an edit war on Wikipedia, but I do know there
are some proponents of both methods who have made, to my mind at least,
rather convincing arguments comparing the suitability of IRV to AV and
RV. I thought it might be interesting to
At 08:59 AM 9/24/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
The method used in the Duluth
elections, the one found unconstitutional in Brown v. Smallwood, had
three ranks on the ballot
Is this sort of information regarding U.S. Bucklin elections available
online? How did you get it?
Slogging through
At 10:41 AM 9/28/2007, Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
Not peer review, but Ka ping yee of...
http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/
has run sum simulations of election systems in 2d space
and it shows quite a few problems with IRV.
these guys (warren smith) also have some Yee diagrams
At 02:24 PM 9/28/2007, James Gilmour wrote:
I found
only one comment, on the Discussion page for Plurality Criterion,
where Voting matters is described as an on-line
IRV advocacy publication. That is a gross misrepresentation of
Voting matters. It is not an advocacy publication of
any kind.
, standard deliberative process will be used, as adapted for
on-line mailing lists, for the presentation of any questions for
poll, and the founding moderator is Abd ul-Rahman Lomax; however, it
is not his desire to continue long in that position, so nominations
for moderators will be in order at any
At 07:04 PM 10/8/2007, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
Are we saying that a bullet vote for Abraham Lincoln is insincere?
Why? The voter has essentially set an approval cutoff between
Abraham Lincoln and Adolf Hitler. In this case, that isn't even
questionable, it is quite sincere.
Which is exactly what
At 11:03 AM 10/9/2007, Chris Benham wrote:
Abd,
What do you propose if the Range winner is pairwise beaten by more
than one candidate?
Chris Benham
An obvious question of great interest to election methods experts.
Not of much interest practically speaking. If it is sum-of-votes
range,
At 12:22 PM 10/9/2007, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
As a side note on this discussion, the Green Party of California (as
well as GPUS, which adopted similar rules) uses an STV variation that
allows for leaving seats empty. We use BC-like STV with an additional
rule that, to be deemed elected, a
At 11:37 AM 10/12/2007, Chris Benham wrote:
We know that Condorcet methods are vulnerable to Burial and
Compromise, and that Range is vulnerable to Burial and what has been
called Compromise-compression
(incentive to falsely vote one or more candidates equal-top
alongside the voter's true
At 04:30 AM 12/9/2007, Jan Kok wrote:
On Dec 7, 2007 7:54 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The case in Brown v. Smallwood was one where the result
overturned by the court was clearly just, and the reversal -- a long
time after the election -- was very poor public policy
At 09:29 AM 12/9/2007, Diego Santos wrote:
2007/12/9, Jan Kok mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED][EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Well, I consider almost any form of Bucklin more palatable than IRV,
and of course it is better than Plurality.
Bucklin is not so bad, but I still think that a better ranked method
should
At 01:32 AM 12/22/2007, rob brown wrote:
Your example is for more than two candidates.
Well, it might seem that way. But there are really only two choices
that make any sense. The third pizza type was in there simply to make
the normalization scores make sense. If it's not there, there is a
At 09:47 AM 12/25/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
[...] Range, voted with full strategic
effect, reduces to Approval Voting, which may reduce to bullet
voting. It *still* is not Plurality, because it only takes a few
percent of voters adding multiple votes to eliminate the spoiler effect.
So
At 11:40 PM 1/21/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
For each round of polls I can also note the rate of agreement between the
poll winner and the sincere CW (if there is one), sincere MF (if there is
one), and social utility maximizer given the voters who show up.
Other writers have long noted this, and
I've been a tad busy. Still am.
At 12:21 PM 1/17/2008, Jan Kok wrote:
But Valadez said voters should be able to see and believe in the
election results. What could be more transparent than that? he said.
Indeed. Ahem! This time I'm only -- what? -- a year ahead. Keep up
this trend and pretty
At 03:20 PM 3/2/2008, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I'm curious about voting methods that take ranked ballot methods and
adapt them to range ballots. For example, with Baldwin's method, you
take drop the candidate with the lowest Borda score, recalculate,
and so on. A range variant might drop the
At 08:03 PM 3/18/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Evening, Dave
re: In New York, at least, the two major parties each do such as
appoint half the members of the Boards of Elections. and also in regard
to the related comments about party leadership, party activities,
party business, state party, and
At 05:09 PM 3/23/2008, Juho Laatu wrote:
The method now presents one very clean viewpoint. The
method introduces some clear benefits but also some
problems. I'd maybe try to find a method that would
keep most of the benefits and eliminate most of the
problems. (There could be many paths forward.)
At 11:21 PM 3/23/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Sat, 22 Mar 2008 19:35:13 -0400 Warren Smith wrote:
The YN model - a simple voting model in which range voting behaves
optimally while many competing voting systems (including Condorcet)
can behave pessimally:
At 01:27 PM 3/24/2008, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
So we eliminate, for the individual voter, the exact match candidate.
We now have a choice of candidates who agree with the voter on three
out of four issues. The problem, you will note, isn't solved on that
web page. We could make a nice neat
At 01:02 AM 3/24/2008, you wrote:
Yeah, I'm confused too. I haven't even figured out how second choices
are determined for IRV and Condorcet.
Even? That's much harder and was not specified. The first problem
is easy. Just read the thing, and don't make assumptions. It was
stated accurately.
At 12:17 PM 3/27/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Ok, I give up on poking at this one.
While the stated votes may be possible, I do not accept them as being of
enough expectability to be useful in comparison among the election systems.
Dave, you've been reading the Election Methods list for quite some
At 08:30 AM 3/30/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Sat, 29 Mar 2008 23:28:22 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 03:32 PM 3/29/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Some see forest; some see trees; who sees all?
Those who see a forest made up of trees.
Looking at the 31 voter Plurality example:
16 voted
At 10:27 PM 3/30/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Runoffs main value is recovering from a methods weaknesses until
something can be done about the method. They are too expensive to
be accepted as if a normal part of a usable method.
What is missed here is that the basic requirement for an election
At 03:55 PM 4/21/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Afternoon, Juho
re: I guess US is still a democracy in the sense that people can decide
otherwise if they so wish.
That is inaccurate. The only choices the people have are those foisted
on them by those who control the political parties that have a
At 06:24 PM 4/28/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote:
This is probably the crux of the difference in our views. There can be
no mandate when, as I said in an earlier message, The only choices the
people have are those foisted on them by those who control the political
parties that have a stranglehold on our
At 12:29 AM 5/4/2008, Kathy Dopp wrote:
However, even despite some voters using strategy because they realize
that IRV fundamentally does not work the way it is intended to, you
will undoubtedly find ample number of cases of candidates winning
elections who were not preferred by most voters.
I wanted to consider this afresh.
At 01:58 PM 4/28/2008, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Hello folks,
over the last months I have again and again tried to find a solution to
a seemingly simple problem:
The Goal
-
Find a group decision method which will elect C with near certainty in
the
At 10:52 PM 5/7/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Evening, Juho
re: I already commented earlier that the groups of three based
method that you have studied does not implement proportionality in
the traditional way.
You're right. It's not traditional, but it sure is
proportional. One of the
At 05:33 PM 5/8/2008, Juho wrote:
(If there are e.g. two parties, one small and one large, the
probability of getting two small party supporters (that would elect
one of them to the next higher level) in a group of three is so small
that in the next higher level the number of small party
At 04:29 PM 5/11/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote:
re: Only on the (country independent) technical properties of the
groups of three method.
(If there are e.g. two parties, one small and one large, the
probability of getting two small party supporters (that would elect
one of them to the next higher
Responding to this again, from a somewhat different perspective.
At 05:03 PM 5/11/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Afternoon, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
re: Mr. Gohlke, do you care to look at this?
OK. Absent a specific definition of the group of voters to which
you've assigned a ratio of 'p', 'p
At 07:10 PM 5/11/2008, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Also, IRV suffers from centre squeeze. This means that a compromise
candidate who would be mid-way between the 2 main contenders cannot
win.
I can't emphasize enough how important it is, for political purposes,
to point out that this criticism
At 01:15 AM 5/12/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On May 11, 2008, at 10:00 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
However, I had not even thought of the need to
count all state-level races at the State-level, rather than the county
level, or about some of the other issues you mentioned.
I don't see that as a
At 10:36 AM 5/12/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
So instead of enforcing a trustworthy central counting system in those
states, you're asking me to believe that all the county registrars are
fine, upstanding honest people who would never manipulate an election
if they could get away with it?
At 12:46 PM 5/22/2008, Juho wrote:
Happens to me sometimes. I write interspersed, and some space
accumulates at the bottom, and I don't see the rest of the original
message. Sorry.
When considering your interest to avoid strong party style groupings
to take control of the political life, and
At 12:46 PM 5/22/2008, Juho wrote:
Note that there are also cases where the groupings can not be
hidden. For example two white persons and one black person in a room
might easily elect a white person even if the back person said
nothing about the skin colours and all of them would behave
At 02:23 PM 5/25/2008, Juho wrote:
On May 25, 2008, at 4:16 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
How about Asset Voting? It is a truly brillig method. Simple.
Invented over a hundred and twenty years ago.
I didn't include Asset Voting or related features since it includes
cabinet negotiations
There is a brief article on Wikipedia about Asset Voting, see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asset_Voting
As this is a neutral mailing list, and because I suspect that a fair
number of Wikipedia registered editors subscribe to this list, I'm
placing a notice here that the article is currently
At 10:55 AM 6/6/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote:
ou might be interested to know I just learned of a paper written by
Professor Jane Mansbridge of the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University. It concerns candidate selection
and is the first work I've seen that provides an academic
At 11:50 PM 6/11/2008, Greg wrote:
The FairVote document that debunks Dopp's claims is available at:
http://www.fairvote.org/dopp
Or, more accurately, attempts to debunk. Ms.
Dopp is a voting security expert, not an election
methods expert, and some of her statements can be
flawed,
2. Dopp: Requires centralized vote counting procedures at the state-level
IRV creates no need to centralize the counting
or the ballots themselves, although that is one
possible counting procedure -- and indeed a
central count is often sensible for smaller
jurisdictions. But all that is
7. Dopp: Difficult and time-consuming to manually count
Manual counts can take slightly longer than
vote-for-one elections, but aren't difficult,
unless many different races on a ballot need to
go to a runoff count. As cited earlier, Irish
election administrators can count more than a
6. Dopp: Makes post election data and exit poll
analysis much more difficult to perform
To date, IRV election can make it easier to do
post-election and exit poll analysis. Because
optical scan counts with IRV require capturing
of ballot images, San Francisco (CA) and
Burlington (VT)
10. Dopp: IRV entrenches the two-major-political party system
IRV neither entrenches nor overthrows the
two-party system. It simply ensures no candidate
wins over majority opposition. If a minor party
has the support to earn a majority of vote, it
can win in an IRV election. If not, it
11. Dopp: Could deliver unreasonable outcomes
.
Unreasonable outcomes are less likely with IRV
than with any other single-seat voting method in use today.
Top-two runoff? Approval Voting (used in a number
of professional societies)? Borda Count, used in
various forms in a few places for
At 11:04 PM 6/12/2008, Greg wrote:
Abd, inappropriately started the trend of cc'ing me on these messages.
So despite the fact that I am signed up for this list on digest mode,
I am receiving each of these messages individually. Please return to
the polite practice of replying only to the list.
At 08:11 PM 6/12/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Jun 12, 2008, at 12:53 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
But it isn't so fast, necessarily. In San Francisco, one election
required 19 rounds of eliminations, as I recall. They took a month,
I think, to issue the results.
SF has always been
Dopp: 13:Costly.
The two main expenses associated with the
transition to IRV are voting equipment upgrades
and voter education. Both of these are one-time
costs that will be quickly balanced out by the
savings coming from eliminating a runoff
election in each election cycle. In San
15. Dopp: Violates some election fairness principles
.
This charge reveals either a general lack of
understanding, or intentional
miss-representation. Every single voting method
ever devised must violate some fairness
principles as some of these criteria are
mutually exclusive. Dopp's
At 03:48 PM 6/15/2008, Steve Eppley wrote:
Most analyses of spoiling (and voters' strategizing to avoid
spoiling) narrowly focus on the candidates who reached the general
election ballot. The much bigger spoiling problem is during the
nomination process, when candidates choose not to run in
At 01:17 PM 6/22/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Kathy Dopp Sent: Sunday, June 22, 2008 4:53 AM
I try not to waste time
on stupid ideas and I've already wasted over 6 weeks of this
year considering IRV which is an incredibly stupid voting
method at first glance after 15 minutes of study IMO.
So
At 12:55 AM 6/23/2008, Chris Benham wrote:
Kathy,
Imagine that Approval is used to elect the US President and
as in the current campaign the Republicans are fielding one
candidate, McCain. Does that mean that the big fight for the
Democrat nomination between Clinton and Obama we've just
At 11:18 PM 6/23/2008, Howard wrote:
I feel that the need to look for and design a system around
geographic proportionality is a waist of time (except as a sales pitch).
I believe that geographic proportionality would naturally come out
of a truly proportional system (if it was important to the
At 01:51 PM 6/24/2008, Chris Benham wrote:
- Original Message
From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED]
No. That fight is over the Democratic Party nomination and
endorsement. It means that the whole apparatus of the Democratic
Party is devoted to one candidate, which is, of course
At 02:45 PM 6/24/2008, Juho wrote:
On Jun 24, 2008, at 3:10 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Or if A and B are the strongest candidates then maybe
strategically A=10, B=0, C=0.
In Approval the voter might vote A=1,
B=0, C=0. Or if B and C are the strongest candidates then maybe A=1,
B=1, C=0
At 01:09 PM 6/23/2008, Stéphane Rouillon wrote:
After a nice discussion about keeping cool,
usually a great idea if one can manage it. On the
other hand, sometimes getting a little hot can get things done.
So now can you acknoledge that IRV is better than FPTP ?
I can accpet IRV being worst
At 02:01 AM 7/13/2008, Chris Benham wrote:
Forest,
The voter ranks all she wants to and the remaining candidates are
ranked (later, i.e. below) by the voter's
favorite or perhaps, as Steve Eppley has suggested, by the voter's
specified public ranking.
Since IRV satisfies LNH, what's the harm
At 07:26 PM 7/12/2008, Terry Bouricius wrote:
By raising one-sided objections to
any particular reform proposal that is being seriously considered, the net
effect is most likely to be to shore up the status quo, rather than to
advance one's favored method. If election method experts put their
At 07:36 AM 7/21/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
That sounds very much like Delegable Proxy, which Abd says was first
thought of by Dodgson (Lewis Carroll). In DP, as far as I understand
it, voters associate with proxies (delegates in your terminology)
and the proxies accumulate votes
At 07:26 AM 7/22/2008, Michael Allan wrote:
I'm grateful I was directed to this list. You're clearly experts. I
wish I could reply more completely right away (I should know better
than to start 2 separate threads). I'll just reply to Juho's
questions today, and tomorrow I'll look at Abd's
At 03:49 PM 7/22/2008, Juho wrote:
On Jul 22, 2008, at 14:26 , Michael Allan wrote:
What is btw the reason that there were no arrows forward from the two
leading candidates in the election snapshot picture in the references
page? Did they abstain or were their votes (not even their own vote)
At 03:59 AM 7/23/2008, Michael Allan wrote:
Juho wrote:
What is btw the reason that there were no arrows forward from the two
leading candidates in the election snapshot picture in the
references page?
Did they abstain or were their votes (not even their own vote)
not cascaded
forward
At 10:49 PM 7/23/2008, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Thought this list might be interested in this real world example of IRV.
It turns out that Fair Vote Director Rob Richie's home town of Takoma
Park Maryland, the home base for IRV, has Zero (0) zilch NADA minority
representation. And voter turnout flat
At 09:30 AM 7/27/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
As I said in the previous message, the origins of IRV are in the
Exhaustive Ballot,
and in the Exhaustive Ballot there is no possibility of looking at
the entire ballot.
Can you provide a source for the claim that the origins of IRV are
in the
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