How Cognitive Science treats the mind and consciousness of self
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-mind/#2.4
the dominant model of the mind in contemporary cognitive science is Kantian,
Kant's conception of the mind is functionalist
to Kant, the two most important function of the mind
On 23 Oct 2012, at 14:50, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi meekerdb
There are a number of theories to explain the collapse of the
quantum wave function
(see below).
1) In subjective theories, the collapse is attributed
to consciousness (presumably of the intent or decision to make
a measurement).
Hi Jason Resch
No, have proven solipsism.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/24/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
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From: Jason Resch
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-23, 10:30:37
Subject: Re: One
On 23 Oct 2012, at 15:11, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
SNIP
ROGER: OK, but computers can't experience anything,
it would be simulated experience. Not arbitrarily available.
But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of
view of the owner or liver of the
Bruno,
What is your opinion of Cramer's Transactional Interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics TIQM,
a 4th possible interpetation of QM.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transactional_interpretation More
recently he [Cramer] has also argued TIQM to be consistent with the
Afshar experiment, while claiming
On 23 Oct 2012, at 15:35, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Nothing is true, even comp, until it is proven by experiment.
Then your own consciousness is false, which I doubt.
Then the existence even of the appearance of a physical universe is
false.
Etc.
Since Gödel, we know that,
Hi meekerdb
Just because something has no extension in space
(physical existence) doesn't mean it doesn't exist mentally,
for example in Platonia. Mathematics has no extension in space,
forms of art do not have extension in space, nor does truth
nor does goodness. Materialism is a very
On 23 Oct 2012, at 17:27, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
Bruno was born 100 years too late, he would have predicted quantum
mechanics.
Haha, thanks Saibal. But only the MW then, as 100 years ago, Gödel
didn't yet prove that computations are already in arithmetic. Without
Gödel and Church
http://www.frontiersin.org/Perception_Science/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00390/abstract
Comments?
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Stephen
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On 23 Oct 2012, at 17:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 23, 2012 10:15:15 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's what the brain does, simulate experience
On 23 Oct 2012, at 20:21, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/23/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point
of
view
On 24 Oct 2012, at 02:01, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/23/2012 5:47 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/23/2012 2:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I have not met this argument before. I have comments interspersed.
On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 08:04:35AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote:
Kant's Refutation of
SNIP
ROGER: 2) I can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific
temporal order only if I perceive
something permanent by reference to which I can determine their
temporal order. (premise)
RUSSELL: What motivates this premise?
ROGER: The permanent entity could be the first
Hi Bruno Marchal
1) OK, so particles don't need a probe to be created from the wave ?
What's different about consciousness ?
2) If comp or materialism could work, I'd be happy.
But they'd have to be able to handle the self specifically,
not just imply it.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
Hi Bruno Marchal
Anything that the brain does is or could be experience.
For computers, experience can only be simulated because
experience = self + qualia
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/24/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the
Hi Bruno Marchal
I follow leibniz's idealism, not e. So
the existing universe is just as it is, a
well founded phenomenon. I can
stub my toe and measure the speed of light.
The experiment that proves my
consciousness-- to me at least--
is that I know that I know.
Roger Clough,
Hi Bruno Marchal
The simulated experience is not a real experience.
OK ?
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/24/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time:
Hi Craig Weinberg
No, the computer can simulate knowledge by description
but not knowledge by acquaintance that you could experience.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/24/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
Hi Russell Standish
I agree.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/24/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Russell Standish
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-23, 18:20:35
Subject: Re: Kant's
Hi Stathis Papaioannou
OK, but I think you are still left with the I.
I doubted' still means there's an I present.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/24/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Stathis
Hi Stephen P. King
How can you know that the simulation is exact ?
Solipsim prevents that.
And who or what experiences the computer output ?
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/24/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content
At the risk of beating a dead horse, Cramer's Transactional Interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics TIQM, a 4th possible interpetation of QM, requires waves
coming back from the future.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transactional_interpretation More
recently he [Cramer] has also argued TIQM to be
On 24 Oct 2012, at 06:03, Stephen P. King wrote:
What difference does what they refer to matter? Eventually there
has to be some physical process or we would be incapable of even
thinking about them! The resources to perform the computation are
either available or they are not.
On Wednesday, October 24, 2012 12:21:23 AM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/23/2012 6:33 PM, Max Gron wrote:
On Sunday, November 28, 2010 5:19:08 AM UTC+10:30, Rex Allen wrote:
On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 7:40 PM, Jason Resch jason...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 3:38 PM, Rex Allen
Hi Richard,
On 24 Oct 2012, at 13:46, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno,
What is your opinion of Cramer's Transactional Interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics TIQM,
a 4th possible interpetation of QM.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transactional_interpretation More
recently he [Cramer] has also
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
it's also true that the letter e is not Shakespeare's play Hamlet,
but its part of it.
By that analogy, you are crediting the letter e for authoring Hamlet.
The letter e did not write Hamlet and neither did one neuron
On 24 Oct 2012, at 14:31, Stephen P. King wrote:
http://www.frontiersin.org/Perception_Science/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00390/abstract
Comments?
If verified it might confirms Helmholtz intuition that perception is
unconscious anticipation.
It would be the Dt of the Bp Dt. It is natural
On Wednesday, October 24, 2012 11:17:43 AM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote:
it's also true that the letter e is not Shakespeare's play Hamlet,
but its part of it.
By that analogy, you are crediting the letter e for
As a first step below is Cramer's argument. But I might add that MWI
does not seem natural to me at all. Alas I have to invoke god and or
teleology to negate it. TIQM seems to invoke teleology.
Here for your convenience are the key sentences in his dismissal of MWI:
Many Worlds Interpretation of
On 24 Oct 2012, at 15:41, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
1) OK, so particles don't need a probe to be created from the wave ?
I don't know that. With comp we have not yet clearly a wave. Only
consistent extensions obeying some quantum logics.
Particles are result of symmetries,
On Oct 24, 2012, at 6:33 AM, Roger Cloughrclo...@verizon.net wrote:
Hi Jason Resch
No, have proven solipsism.
What?
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/24/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Jason
On 24 Oct 2012, at 15:50, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
The simulated experience is not a real experience.
OK ?
Keep in mind that I assume comp. OK? It is my working hypothesis. OK?
If we run into a contradiction, we can still abandon comp, OK?
The statement the simulated
On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
What can you do with your computer that you couldn't do five years ago?
Do a good job at understanding the human voice. Beat the 2 best human
players at Jeopardy. Drive a car safely for many miles over very rough
terrain.
2012/10/24 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 24 Oct 2012, at 14:31, Stephen P. King wrote:
http://www.frontiersin.org/**Perception_Science/10.3389/**
fpsyg.2012.00390/abstracthttp://www.frontiersin.org/Perception_Science/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00390/abstract
Comments?
If verified it
On Wednesday, October 24, 2012 12:38:21 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote:
What can you do with your computer that you couldn't do five years ago?
Do a good job at understanding the human voice. Beat the 2 best human
I dont believe that such genuine anticipation is possible, for a simple
reason: If for quantum or relativistic means the mind or the brain could
genuinely anticipate anything, this would be such a huge advantage, that
this hability would be inherited genetically by everyone of us, every human
On 10/24/2012 10:01 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
How can you know that the simulation is exact ?
Solipsim prevents that.
And who or what experiences the computer output ?
Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net
10/24/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody
On 10/24/2012 10:04 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
At the risk of beating a dead horse, Cramer's Transactional Interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics TIQM, a 4th possible interpetation of QM, requires waves
coming back from the future.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transactional_interpretation More
On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 at 1:27 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
What can you do with your computer that you couldn't do five years
ago?
Do a good job at understanding the human voice. Beat the 2 best human
players at Jeopardy. Drive a car safely for many miles over very
On 10/24/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Oct 2012, at 14:50, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi meekerdb
There are a number of theories to explain the collapse of the quantum wave
function
(see below).
1) In subjective theories, the collapse is attributed
to consciousness (presumably of the
On 10/24/2012 4:49 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
According to Descartes, the physical is that which has extension in space.
That's a common definition of existence.
That would imply that electrons and quarks don't exist.
Brent
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On 10/24/2012 4:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Oct 2012, at 15:35, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Nothing is true, even comp, until it is proven by experiment.
Then your own consciousness is false, which I doubt.
But I do experience my consciousness.
Then the existence even of
On 10/24/2012 4:56 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi meekerdb
Just because something has no extension in space
I wrote location not extension - don't misquote me.
(physical existence) doesn't mean it doesn't exist mentally,
for example in Platonia.
But existing mentally isn't the same as
On 10/24/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Oct 2012, at 06:03, Stephen P. King wrote:
What difference does what they refer to matter? Eventually there
has to be some physical process or we would be incapable of even
thinking about them! The resources to perform the computation
On 10/24/2012 5:31 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
http://www.frontiersin.org/Perception_Science/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00390/abstract
Comments?
Woo-woo. Small effect sizes which are *statistically* significant are indicative of bias
errors. I'd wager a proper Bayesian analysis of the original
On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 at 1:46 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
On 10/24/2012 10:04 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
At the risk of beating a dead horse, Cramer's Transactional Interpretation
of
Quantum Mechanics TIQM, a 4th possible interpetation of QM, requires waves
coming back
On 10/24/2012 7:56 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, October 24, 2012 12:21:23 AM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/23/2012 6:33 PM, Max Gron wrote:
On Sunday, November 28, 2010 5:19:08 AM UTC+10:30, Rex Allen wrote:
On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 7:40 PM, Jason Resch
On 10/24/2012 11:58 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 22 Oct 2012, at 21:50, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
mailto:stephe...@charter.net
On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM,
On Wednesday, October 24, 2012 2:52:06 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/24/2012 7:56 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, October 24, 2012 12:21:23 AM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/23/2012 6:33 PM, Max Gron wrote:
On Sunday, November 28, 2010 5:19:08 AM UTC+10:30, Rex Allen wrote:
On Wednesday, October 24, 2012 1:48:14 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 at 1:27 PM, Craig Weinberg
whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
wrote:
What can you do with your computer that you couldn't do five years
ago?
Do a good job at understanding the human voice. Beat
On 10/24/2012 3:11 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, October 24, 2012 2:52:06 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/24/2012 7:56 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, October 24, 2012 12:21:23 AM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/23/2012 6:33 PM, Max Gron wrote:
On Sunday,
On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 at 12:35 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Nothing is true, even comp, until it is proven by experiment.
Can you think of an experiment to verify comp ?
What is needed is an experiment showing that the behaviour of brains
can be simulated on a
On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 12:58 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
Hi Stathis Papaioannou
OK, but I think you are still left with the I.
I doubted' still means there's an I present.
There's an I present but not necessarily a world to contain it,
which is what Kant set out to prove.
On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 at 9:56 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
On Wednesday, October 24, 2012 12:21:23 AM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/23/2012 6:33 PM, Max Gron wrote:
On Sunday, November 28, 2010 5:19:08 AM UTC+10:30, Rex Allen wrote:
On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 7:40 PM, Jason
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 10:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Oct 2012, at 18:42, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 8:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi John,
On 20 Oct 2012, at 23:16, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno,
especially in my identification as
On 10/24/2012 5:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
That's right. The meaning, the what is represented, is given by
interaction
(including speech) with the environment (including others). So only a
computer
with the ability to interact can seem intelligent and therefore
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 11:04 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 6:25 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote
I think you are missing something. It is a problem that I noticed after
watching the movie The Prestige
In my opinion The Prestige is the best
On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 at 7:58 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/24/2012 5:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
That's right. The meaning, the what is represented, is given by
interaction (including speech) with the environment (including others). So
only a computer with the ability to
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 11:43 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
A top-down effect of consciousness on matter could be inferred if
miraculous events were observed in neurophysiology research. The
consciousness itself cannot be directly observed.
Hi Stathis,
This would be
If we turn the Fading Qualia argument around, what we get is a world in
which Comp is true and it is impossible to simulate cellular activity
without evoking the presumed associated experience.
If we wanted to test a new painkiller for instance, Comp=true means that it
is *IMPOSSIBLE* to model
On 10/24/2012 6:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 11:04 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 6:25 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote
I think you are missing
On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 12:59 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
If we turn the Fading Qualia argument around, what we get is a world in
which Comp is true and it is impossible to simulate cellular activity
without evoking the presumed associated experience.
If we wanted to test
On 10/24/2012 6:39 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Note that I too agree with that bit about the interpreter of information
being
needed for information to have any objective meaning.
But that's just a semantic explanation since interpreter and how we
would know
whether or not
On Wednesday, October 24, 2012 6:24:39 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
I'm with John Clark on that - if a machine functions intelligently it's
intelligent and it's probably conscious. Nothing magical about it.
It's completely magical. Saying that it isn't doesn't explain anything. If
people
Nonsense Stephan,
I totally agree with everything you copied over
but totally disagree with your interpretation of it.
Richard
On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 at 7:17 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
On 10/24/2012 2:35 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
I do not understand what you are saying
On Wednesday, October 24, 2012 10:09:16 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/24/2012 6:39 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Note that I too agree with that bit about the interpreter of information
being needed for information to have any objective meaning.
But that's just a semantic explanation
On Wednesday, October 24, 2012 10:05:40 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 12:59 PM, Craig Weinberg
whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
wrote:
If we turn the Fading Qualia argument around, what we get is a world in
which Comp is true and it is impossible to simulate cellular
On 23 Oct 2012, at 14:04, Roger Clough wrote:
Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism
Problematic Idealism (Berkeley's idealism, not that of Leibniz) is
the thesis that we cannot
prove that objects outside us exist. This results directly from
Descartes' proposition
that the only
On 24 Oct 2012, at 15:43, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Anything that the brain does is or could be experience.
For computers, experience can only be simulated because
experience = self + qualia
In the theory I represent the self by the B.Bp = my self believes
p. (I can
On 10/24/2012 6:59 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
If we turn the Fading Qualia argument around, what we get is a world in which Comp is
true and it is impossible to simulate cellular activity without evoking the presumed
associated experience.
If we wanted to test a new painkiller for instance,
On 22 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/22 Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Rusell,
How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources?
On 10/24/2012 10:20 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Nonsense Stephan,
I totally agree with everything you copied over
but totally disagree with your interpretation of it.
Richard
OK, please tell me how else the math is to be understood.
On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 at 7:17 PM, Stephen P. King
Stephan,
The compactified dimensions curl-up into particles
that resemble a crystalline structure
with some peculiar properties
compared to ordinary particles,
but nevertheless just particles.
What about that do you not understand?
Richard
On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 at 11:16 PM, Stephen P. King
On 24 Oct 2012, at 15:48, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
I follow leibniz's idealism, not e.
You mean not B (Berkeley) ?
Comp is demanding; it takes the best in L and B. That gives Plotinus,
somehow.
So
the existing universe is just as it is, a
well founded phenomenon.
That
On Oct 24, 2012, at 9:02 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/24/2012 6:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 11:04 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 6:25 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
wrote
I think you are missing
On 10/24/2012 11:25 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Stephan,
The compactified dimensions curl-up into particles
that resemble a crystalline structure
with some peculiar properties
compared to ordinary particles,
but nevertheless just particles.
What about that do you not understand?
Richard
Dear
On Wednesday, October 24, 2012 10:54:52 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/24/2012 6:59 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
If we turn the Fading Qualia argument around, what we get is a world in
which Comp is
true and it is impossible to simulate cellular activity without evoking
the presumed
Please inform ST Yau of your views. He will be interested for sure.
I have informed him of my paper and he found it interesting.
Personally I think your perspective is intellectualism.
Richard
On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 12:14 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
On 10/24/2012 11:25 PM,
On 10/24/2012 8:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Oct 24, 2012, at 9:02 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/24/2012 6:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 11:04 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 Oct 2012, at 15:17, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Numbers and calculations are not subjective,
Right.
for they are mindless.
Hmm... OK.
Which means they can't experience anything.
They're dead in the water.
This is too ambiguous. I can say that you are right. Numbers
On 10/24/2012 9:23 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Or what if we don't care? We don't care about slaughtering cattle, which
are pretty
smart
as computers go. We manage not to think about starving children in Africa,
and they
*are*
humans. And we ignore the looming disasters
On 10/25/2012 12:46 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Please inform ST Yau of your views. He will be interested for sure.
I have informed him of my paper and he found it interesting.
Personally I think your perspective is intellectualism.
Richard
Dear Richard,
Your point is well made. It is quite
On Thursday, October 25, 2012 1:10:24 AM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/24/2012 9:23 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Or what if we don't care? We don't care about slaughtering cattle, which
are pretty smart
as computers go. We manage not to think about starving children in
Africa, and they
On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 12:00 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/24/2012 8:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Oct 24, 2012, at 9:02 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/24/2012 6:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 11:04 AM, John Clark
On 10/24/2012 10:19 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, October 25, 2012 1:10:24 AM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/24/2012 9:23 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Or what if we don't care? We don't care about slaughtering cattle,
which are
pretty smart
as computers go.
On 23 Oct 2012, at 16:39, Roger Clough wrote:
Computers, materialism and subjective/objective dyslexia
In materialism there is no self, it is implied.
In computationalism there is no matter, it is implied (apparent).
This works in most cases, except if the case involves the
self or
On Thursday, October 25, 2012 1:29:24 AM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/24/2012 10:19 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, October 25, 2012 1:10:24 AM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/24/2012 9:23 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Or what if we don't care? We don't care about slaughtering cattle,
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