On 01 Mar 2014, at 10:15, LizR wrote:
On 1 March 2014 21:03, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Mar 2014, at 02:06, LizR wrote:
On 1 March 2014 03:22, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote:
Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept
On 2 March 2014 21:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Because 1+1=2 is elementary math, learned in high school.
1+1=2 is a fact is a non trivial philosophical statement, which
involved a non trivial notion like fact. I have seen people discussing ad
nauseam on what is a fact, and
On 02 Mar 2014, at 10:49, LizR wrote:
On 2 March 2014 21:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Because 1+1=2 is elementary math, learned in high school.
1+1=2 is a fact is a non trivial philosophical statement,
which involved a non trivial notion like fact. I have seen people
On 01 Mar 2014, at 02:06, LizR wrote:
On 1 March 2014 03:22, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote:
Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept Yes Doctor
the rest of comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true,
? You might elaborate on this.
On 1 March 2014 21:03, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Mar 2014, at 02:06, LizR wrote:
On 1 March 2014 03:22, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote:
Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept Yes Doctor the
rest of comp follows.
On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote:
On 26 February 2014 15:16, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com
wrote:
Hi Liz
In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition
of you has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split.
Well what definition of 'you' do you
? ISTM that
going through the histories is a notion that splits in the 3p and 1p
views.
It splits the 1-p views, as in the 3-1 views, the 1-views themselves never
split.
I meant something different. The 3p view of a history is a matter of the
relations that obtain eternally between its
effect me.
You said that we have to interview all copies and I agree.
After the interviews this is what we find:
W has not refuted it.
M has not refuted it.
W M have confirmed it.
In the 3-1 views.
I guess you're right, after all you invented the 3-1 views so you
must know what
On Fri, Feb 28, 2014 at 11:26 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Sorry, I was guessing something along the lines of FPI = first person
interpretation.
???
!!!
You are the one describing the FPI as a crazy discovery.
No, I'm the one who keeps saying that first person
most probable universal neighbors.
Won't this still be effectively satisfied by Hoyle's heuristic?
ISTM that going through the histories is a notion that splits in
the 3p and 1p views.
It splits the 1-p views, as in the 3-1 views, the 1-views themselves
never split.
I meant something
On 1 March 2014 03:22, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 26 Feb 2014, at 03:31, LizR wrote:
Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept Yes Doctor the rest
of comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true,
? You might elaborate on this. What is the rest, and why do you
On 28 Feb 2014, at 19:14, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Feb 28, 2014 at 11:26 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Sorry, I was guessing something along the lines of FPI = first
person interpretation.
???
!!!
You are the one describing the FPI as a crazy discovery.
No, I'm the one
or not in the pesronal diaries of
the copies, that is the 1-views, and it systematically describes only
the 3-1- views, which is nice and correct, but not asked for.
She should have said: whatever she knows she will see, she should
expect (with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite.
But, If she
mathematics.
Bruno
All the best
Chris
From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:33:21 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2014-02-26 7:31 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:
Hi Liz
I meant changed from
relative statistics on his
most probable universal neighbors.
Won't this still be effectively satisfied by Hoyle's heuristic? ISTM
that going through the histories is a notion that splits in the 3p
and 1p views.
It splits the 1-p views, as in the 3-1 views, the 1-views themselves
never split
predict all external events that could effect me.
You said that we have to interview all copies and I agree. After the
interviews this is what we find:
W has not refuted it.
M has not refuted it.
W M have confirmed it.
In the 3-1 views.
I guess you're right, after all you invented the 3-1
your hands in the air demanding more and more to unceremoniously
and uncritically ditch is no-ones idea of fun.
All the best
Chris.
--
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 20:26:52 +1300
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
From: lizj...@gmail.com
probability'
whilst he is insisting, indeed founding his reputation on the claim that 'no
probabilistic axiom is required in quantum theory' be my guest. Im always up
for a laugh.
All the best
Chris.
From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 10:43:33 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better
.
--
From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 10:43:33 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2014-02-25 8:43 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:
Hi Quentin
*That's nonsense, *
The point
Man would fit that description; so the Helsinki Man
will see both Washington and Moscow.
In the 3-1 views. Not in the 1-1 views.
In who's 1-1 view?
I said that we have to interview all copies.
Good, then I never want to hear you say again that the Washington Man
saying that he didn't see
On 25 Feb 2014, at 01:05, chris peck wrote:
The point is that how probability fits into MWI's determinist
framework, or any TofE really, is still an open question.
Of course, and my point is that comp aggravates that problem, as only
extends the indterminacy from a wave to arithmetic.
On 25 Feb 2014, at 10:43, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
David Deutsch does not reject probability...
Sure he does, he swaps out the Born rule for rational decision
theory (+ amendments to make it compatible with MWI). There isn't
probability, but we should act 'as if' there was. Its what he's
outcome due to digital self-duplication.
W M has been refuted.
You said that we have to interview all copies and I agree. After
the interviews this is what we find:
W has not refuted it.
M has not refuted it.
W M have confirmed it.
In the 3-1 views.
You miss this only by confusing
it.
M has not refuted it.
W M have confirmed it.
In the 3-1 views.
You miss this only by confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-view,
Who's the 1-view?
Each of them.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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On 26 February 2014 15:16, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
Hi Liz
* In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of
you has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. *
Well what definition of 'you' do you suggest we use? What is your
criterion
'if the definition of you has been
changed to accommodate the fact that you've split'
Changed from which definition?
All the best
Chris.
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 15:31:01 +1300
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On 26 February 2014 15:53, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
Hi Liz
*Assuming comp it appears to be the state(s) that could follow on from
your current brain state via whatever transitions rules are allowed by - I
assume - logical necessity. Perhaps Bruno can explain.*
let me ask
: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 19:21:00 +0100
On 25 Feb 2014, at 18:35, John Clark wrote:
provide the algorithm of prediction.
Why? What does that have to do with the price of eggs? FPI is
about
the feeling of self and prediction has
On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and
spin down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where,
in discussion of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's
step 3, he argues:
What ... should
sees both.
All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen to divert attention
from the simple error you make here, isn't it?
All the best
Chris.
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Wed, 26
the best
Chris.
--
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100
On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Greaves rejects subjective
for your has equal probability of happening...)
Quentin
All the best
Chris.
--
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100
On 25 Feb 2014
Chris.
From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:28:53 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2014-02-26 7:21 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:
Hi Bruno
Yes, it is the common confusion between 1
.
--
From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:28:53 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2014-02-26 7:21 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:
Hi Bruno
Yes, it is the common confusion between 1
on
the mind-body problem and much else besides but so what? They do far better
when it comes to probability assignment and subjective uncertainty, imho.
All the best
Chris
From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:33:21 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 26 February 2014 19:31, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
Hi Liz
* I meant changed from our everyday definition, in which we normally
assume there is only one you, which is (or is at least associated with)
your physical structure. Which we generally assume exists in one
.
Similarly, P(W) ≠ 1, P(M) ≠ 1, and P(W v M) = 1.
from the stand point of the person duplicated. Certainly for me he
doesn't manage that.
What is wrong with above?
Bruno
All the best
Chris.
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views
On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com
wrote:
This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible
futures in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course,
the version of me in each branch will be
On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
*This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures
in the MWI - but by the time I
of Oxford Dons like Deutsch and Greaves.
your theory is disproven by fact... you never see constant spin up... which
should be the case if the probability to measure spin up was one.
See above.
All the best
Chris.
From: da...@davidnyman.com
Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 16:32:01 +
Subject: Re: 3-1
On 25 February 2014 13:05, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
Since Everett there have been numerous attempts to smuggle an account of
probability back into the theory, and more recent attempts: Deutsch,
Wallace, Greaves etc., do that by abandoning the concept of subjective
frequencies of me seeing ups and downs but
not probabilities of seeing up or down.
All the best
Chris.
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 13:30:48 +1300
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On 25 February 2014 13:05, chris peck
On 25 February 2014 16:54, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
Hi Liz
* I can't see why the MWI's existing explanation of probability needs to
have anything added.*
I can't see that MWI has an explanation of probability.
*Probability in the MWI is deduced from the results of
:32:01 +
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com
In the MWI you *do* see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of you
has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. Or to put it
another way, you (now) will become you (who sees spin up) and you (who sees
spin down), which by then will be two different people.
--
You received
, 25 Feb 2014 20:26:52 +1300
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of you has
been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. Or to put
manage that.
All the best
Chris.
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 07:56:14 +0100
On 22 Feb 2014, at 21:09, LizR wrote to Clark (with the above pap =
the FPI of step 3
uncertainty. So, I can accept MWI and
reject the probability sums Bruno derives and be in good company.
See here:
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136
All the best
Chris.
From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese
On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
*This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures
in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of
me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me,
On 24 February 2014 14:04, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
Hi Liz
* Let's also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be sent
to, and that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send you to A or
B with equal probability based on some quantum coin flip. But by
/abs/quant-ph/0312136
All the best
Chris.
--
From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 01:04:53 +
Hi Liz
* Let's also suppose you don't know
On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 1:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Did the Helsinki Man see Washington and Moscow? Yes.
In the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view.
In who's 1-1 view? You'll probably say in The Helsinki Man's, but his
view is just of Helsinki. Perhaps you mean the future 1
The above pap is only a small step in an argument (and it only reproduces
a result obtained in the MWI, anyway).
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On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 7:45 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 1:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Did the Helsinki Man see Washington and Moscow? Yes.
In the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view.
In who's 1-1 view? You'll probably say in The
-man and the M-man.
but his view is just of Helsinki. Perhaps you mean the future 1
view of the Helsinki Man. If so then anybody who can remember
having the past 1 view of the Helsinki Man would fit that
description; so the Helsinki Man will see both Washington and Moscow.
In the 3-1 views
On 22 Feb 2014, at 21:09, LizR wrote to Clark (with the above pap =
the FPI of step 3):
The above pap is only a small step in an argument (and it only
reproduces a result obtained in the MWI, anyway).
OK, but the MWI is a big thing, relying on another big thing: QM.
The FPI assumes
On 21 February 2014 16:48, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
Hi Liz
*Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you
to another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life.
Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be
On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we
have to interview all the copies.
Then don't just talk to the Moscow Man and say that is enough to disprove
the prediction that the Helsinki Man will see
2014-02-21 19:07 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:
On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we
have to interview all the copies.
Then don't just talk to the Moscow Man and say that is enough
On 21 February 2014 14:48, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
Hi Liz
Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you to
another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life.
Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be
On 21 Feb 2014, at 19:07, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is
simple: we have to interview all the copies.
Then don't just talk to the Moscow Man and say that is enough to
disprove
On 19 Feb 2014, at 19:36, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux
allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding
the argument that you can't meet your doppelganger,
So you want me to defend my case but
On 19 Feb 2014, at 20:53, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:
On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux
allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding
the argument that you can't meet
of another debate, as UDA importantly does
not assume QM.
Bruno
From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 20:53:46 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last week.
But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could
say exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed.
and
people because both
remember being the Helsinki man.
yes, and that is why the confirmation is asked to the 2 people. There
is nothing ambiguous. W or M win, W M lost. Given the precise
question of the 1p views, viewed from the 1p-views, and not on the 3-1
views.
It is quasi primary
but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up to 1 in MWI
scenarios.
All the best
Chris.
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 20:45:39 +0100
On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59
or at least half
of it.
All the best
Chris.
From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 03:48:43 +
Hi Liz
Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter
transmitter sends you
On Fri, Feb 21, 2014 at 03:48:43AM +, chris peck wrote:
My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar
system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I
don't know about the possibility of accidents. But,
If I know that there is a
+1100
From: li...@hpcoders.com.au
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On Fri, Feb 21, 2014 at 03:48:43AM +, chris peck wrote:
My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar
system A is 1. I
something on this, you lose.
You are just using the pronouns in the ambiguous way of Clark, and
like him, just describe the 3-1 views, instead of the 1-1 views asked.
Best,
Bruno
All the best
Chris.
From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: 3-1
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 20:45:39 +0100
On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I can say today that I am the guy having
On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding the
argument that you can't meet your doppelganger,
So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use logic
in doing so. No can do.
2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:
On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:
Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding the
argument that you can't meet your doppelganger,
So you want me to defend my case but
Chris.
From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 20:53:46 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:
On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
You are looking at a geiger counter pointing at a radioactive source. On
average, it clicks about once every other second. Do you expect to hear it
click in the next second?
What is wrong with the above question? It seems to me exactly equivalent in
probability terms to do you expect to see
:53:46 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:
On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:
Be consistent reject MWI on the same
' in the mistaken belief that it has a
legitimate place in Everettian MWI.
All the best
Chris.
--
From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 20:53:46 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On 17 Feb 2014, at 19:49, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 at 1:14 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
what exactly is the question? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND
PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.
The question is what do you [blah blah]
DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS
On 18 February 2014 02:35, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 2/17/2014 5:57 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2014 20:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But it is unambiguous under comp ex hypothesi: i.e. any classically
adequate copy of me is equivalent to me. Under
On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 17 Feb 2014, at 19:49, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 at 1:14 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
what exactly is the question? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND
PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.
On 2/17/2014 10:25 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-02-18 3:35 GMT+01:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net:
On 2/17/2014 5:57 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2014 20:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But
2014-02-19 1:21 GMT+01:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 2/17/2014 10:25 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-02-18 3:35 GMT+01:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 2/17/2014 5:57 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2014 20:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But it is
On 18 Feb 2014, at 19:52, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 3:33 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
if Mr. he is the fellow who is experiencing Helsinki right now
then the correct prediction would be Mr. he will see neither
Washington NOR Moscow.
Simple calculus
2014-02-17 3:55 GMT+01:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 2/16/2014 6:17 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2014 01:35, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Well then, facing duplication, would your expectation change to that
of personally experiencing a simultaneous two-valued
On 17 Feb 2014, at 01:02, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/16/2014 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Feb 2014, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/16/2014 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But of course if you're trying to ascertain the nature of
personal identity none of this matters, it doesn't matter
On 17 Feb 2014, at 03:55, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/16/2014 6:17 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2014 01:35, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Well then, facing duplication, would your expectation change to
that of personally experiencing a simultaneous two-valued outcome?
And if the
On 17 February 2014 13:02, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But it is your insistence that the H-man write either M or W but not
both as his expectation. So then one must ask Why not both?. The
answer is obviously, They are physically different and will start to form
different memories
On 17 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I don't know what I would personally experience because I is ambiguous
after duplication.
But it is unambiguous under comp ex hypothesi: i.e. any classically
adequate copy of me is equivalent to me. Under this hypothesis if I am
On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 at 1:14 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
what exactly is the question? Be specific and DON'T HIDE BEHIND
PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.
The question is what do you [blah blah]
DON'T HIDE BEHIND PRONOUNS WITH NO CLEAR REFERENT.
You = the unique 1p
On 2/17/2014 4:45 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
I don't know what I would personally experience because I is ambiguous
after
duplication.
But it is unambiguous under comp ex hypothesi: i.e. any
On 17 February 2014 20:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But it is unambiguous under comp ex hypothesi: i.e. any classically
adequate copy of me is equivalent to me. Under this hypothesis if I am
duplicated both the resulting continuations are equivalent immediately
posterior to
On 2/17/2014 5:57 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2014 20:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
But it is unambiguous under comp ex hypothesi: i.e. any classically
adequate copy
of me is equivalent to me. Under this hypothesis if I am duplicated
2014-02-18 3:35 GMT+01:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 2/17/2014 5:57 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2014 20:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But it is unambiguous under comp ex hypothesi: i.e. any classically
adequate copy of me is equivalent to me. Under this
On 15 Feb 2014, at 19:30, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 1:21 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
The 3-1 view is the 3p view on the 1p views, note the plural,
after the duplication.
That is far more convoluted than it need to be, it's really not all
that
On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 , Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
A typical observation will be the diary of the guy in W assess that
he is in W, and (perhaps) that he could not have predicted that,
That is incorrect, the Helsinki Man could have successfully predicted
that the Washington
On 2/16/2014 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But of course if you're trying to ascertain the nature of personal identity none of
this matters, it doesn't matter if the predictions were correct or not.
We are not trying to ascertain the nature of personal identity at all. I can be amnesic
on who
On 16 Feb 2014, at 17:46, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 , Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
A typical observation will be the diary of the guy in W assess
that he is in W, and (perhaps) that he could not have predicted that,
That is incorrect, the Helsinki Man could have
On 16 Feb 2014, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/16/2014 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But of course if you're trying to ascertain the nature of personal
identity none of this matters, it doesn't matter if the
predictions were correct or not.
We are not trying to ascertain the nature of
On 16 February 2014 18:10, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But that's the ambiguity I see. When you ask the H-man, Where do you
think you will be? he has to provide some interpretation to the word
you. My immediate, intuitive thought was, I expect to be in both
places. Which depends on
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