Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Pierz]

On Sunday, May 28, 2017 at 10:28:52 AM UTC+10, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Thu, May 25, 2017 at 06:30:07PM -0700, Pierz wrote: 
> > Recently I've been studying a lot of history, and I've often thought 
> about 
> > how, according to special relativity, you can translate time into space 
> and 
> > vice versa, and therefore how from a different perspective we can think 
> of 
> > the past as distant in space rather than time: my childhood being 40 
> light 
> > years away, rather than 40 years for instance. I can visualise my own 
> body 
> > as a sort of long, four dimensional tendril through spacetime, of which 
> I 
> > only ever see a three-dimensional cross-section. This is the block 
> universe 
> > idea of course. What occurred to me recently was that the past, in any 
> > physical theory I know of, is "locked down". There is only a single 
> history 
> > consistent with the present (ignoring the microscopic ambiguities of 
> > quantum interference effects), but the present is consistent with 
> multiple 
> > futures. 
>
> This assumption is wrong. There are many histories (pasts) consistent 
> with our present. If we don't know some fact about the past (eg 
> T. Rex's colour), then pasts with different colours of T.Rexes are all 
> compatible with our present. Only when we make a measurement that 
> distinguishes between different facts about the past, do we eliminate 
> some of those pasts from the compatibility list. 
>
> I think there's a confusion there between human ignorance and physical 
ambiguity - the same confusion expressed in the Schrödinger's Cat thought 
experiment. The resolution of that paradox lies in decoherence. The fact of 
the cat's death or survival spreads into the environment in a myriad of 
ways, whether or not we are measuring them: the cat's cooling after death, 
the shift of its weight as it falls and so on. At that point it is not in a 
superposition any more. We are merely ignorant of its state. I would argue 
the same applies to the colour of T. Rex. The past is not in a 
superposition of possible values, but we are ignorant of those values. Now 
I think it is interesting to contemplate the possibility that more than one 
macroscopic history (one with green and one with red T. Rexes) might lead 
to the same present, but I think it extremely unlikely - that would 
constitute a macroscopic quantum interference effect. I suspect only one 
possible colour is consistent with the present, even though it looks 
superficially like any colour is possible.


There are, however, arrows of time - past and future are asymmetric, 
> the future is more uncertain than the past. But I don't see how you 
> can leverage that into support for the MWI. 
>
>
>
> -- 
>
>  
>
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
>  
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>  
>
>

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Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[David Nyman]

On 28 May 2017 4:46 a.m., "Russell Standish"  wrote:

On Sat, May 27, 2017 at 09:24:31PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> Regarding special relatively and collapse, I think the point is that two
> observers in different reference frames can have different presents. Two
> humans walking past each other on the sidewalk may have presents that
> include the Andromeda Galaxy hours apart in time. (See "Andromeda
> Paradox"). So if something on Earth collspses the wave everywhere and
> instantly (in the present) which present is it collapsed in?
>
> I think this even more clearly shows the incompatibility between collapse
> theories and special relatively, beyond just pointing to the FTL
influences
> as violations; this shows now we have to somehow use an objective
reference
> frame which relatively tells us does not exist. And this leads to collapse
> events happening in different times/places for different observers, even
> ones walking past each other on a sidewalk.
>

Forgetting about JC's peepee for the minute, ISTM that relativity is
exclusively a 3p theory, whereas QM is both a 1pm and 3p theory. The
1p version of QM looks rather like Copenhagen, with wavefunction
collapses, and the 3p looks more like Everett, with deterministic wave
functions and many worlds.

The incompatibility between relativity and wave function collapse can
be seen as a manifestation of the incommensurate nature of the 1p/3p
distinction.


Isn't there an ineliminably 1p aspect of relativity in that here and now
can only be defined with respect to a particular point of view? But perhaps
you mean that this point of view can be described univocally in a purely 3p
manner without the equivalent of 'collapse'. There is of course no
provision in the formalism for 'counterfactual' continuations. Perhaps it's
that limitation that makes it incommensurable with a QM that can be parsed
in either way.

David


Cheers

--


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 May 2017, at 02:07, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 26/05/2017 6:53 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 May 2017, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 26/05/2017 9:11 am, David Nyman wrote:

On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker"  wrote:

I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations.   
"Invoke" is a pejorative attribution.  The physical universe is  
an inference to explain appearances (and a very successful one at  
that).


Vocabulary. The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell  
me if you're reasoning in a different theory), that the inference  
is to a particular *selection* of computations from the  
computational plenitude. And why is that? Because they 'explain'  
the appearances. But do they really? Are those computations - in  
and of themselves - really capable of 'explaining' why or how  
they, and no others, come to be uniquely selected for our  
delectation? Are they really capable of 'explaining' why or how  
those selfsame appearances come to be present to us?


I think you and Brent are using different notions of  
"explanation". As I understand your (David's) position, it is a  
notion of "explanation" originating with Plato: Plato's theory of  
Forms offered at the same time both a systematic explanation of  
things and also a connected epistemology of explanation.  
(Summaries from Jonathan Cohen in the Oxford Companion to  
Philosophy.) In other words, the Platonic ideal is that "Ontology  
precedes epistemology", to vary Brent's slogan. In the case of  
mechanism, the ontology is the natural numbers (plus arithmetic)  
and for an explanation to be acceptable, everything has to follow  
with the force of logical necessity from this ontology.


As I understand Brent's position (and that is essentially the same  
as my position), his concept of "explanation" follows the  
tradition of British empirical philosophy, stemming from Bacon,  
through Hume, to Russell and others. In this tradition, to explain  
an observed characteristic is to show its relationship to a law in  
accordance with which the characteristic occurs or can be made to  
occur, and there is a hierarchy of such laws -- the more  
comprehensive laws are deemed more probable. This leads to the  
dominant model for explanation in the natural sciences, which  
requires the citation of one or more laws which, when conjoined  
with the statement of relevant facts, entail the occurrence of the  
phenomenon or uniformity that is to be explained. This does not  
rely on any assumed ontology; hence, "Epistemology precedes  
ontology".


Wherever we want to derive a technology from scientific knowledge,  
we shall need to know what causes a desired effect. So we need to  
distinguish between different levels of explanation, in that  
while, for example, the disappearance of a patient's infection may  
be causally explained by his antibiotic injection, the operation  
of that causal process is in its turn to be explained by  
correlational laws of biochemistry. Hence, the understanding of  
consciousness in any effective way will be linked to the creation  
of effective AI.


This is the paradigm of current scientific practice. Sure, as  
Bruno says, this stems ultimately from an Aristotelian approach to  
science rather than the Platonic approach. But the history of  
Western thought has shown the scientific, or Aristotelian,  
approach to have been overwhelmingly more successful, both in  
developing technology and in reaching understanding of the nature  
of reality.


Aristotle's Matter was a good simplifying hypothesis. I agree that  
it has led to some success. But that does not make it true,


For the pragmatic instrumentalist, "truth" is not of primary concern.


I agree. Computationalism is an hypothesis in metaphysics. Metaphysics  
does not concern a pragmatic person, unless he postulate pragmatism as  
a metaphysics, but this is not serious after the failure of positivism  
(even Wittgenstein eventually defended this).






What is relevant is explanation in terms of predictive success.


But this is true for scientific metaphysics. That is why I insist that  
the point I make is not that comp is true, but that it is testable.





The scientific realist might reject instrumentalism, but suggestions  
about the underlying ontology have always been shown inadequate in  
the past -- this being the famous 'negative induction' against  
scientific realism.


Yes, but that might be, by itself, the sign that we have not yet got  
the right metaphysical theory. Now, with comp, we have a large choice  
of equivalent simple ontology, and I use arithmetic for it, as people  
learned it in high school.






and the price of it has been the burying of many interesting  
problem (given away to the clergy). Physicalism simply fail to  
explain the apparent existence of the physical reality,


Why should there be an explanation for this?


That is a personal question of taste. Why to try to 

Re: Peepee

[David Nyman]

On 28 May 2017 2:09 a.m., "John Clark"  wrote:

On Sat, May 27, 2017  David Nyman  wrote:

​>
>> ​>​
>> ​
>> Data feels something?
>>
>
> ​
> ​> ​
> Yes.​
>
>
>
>> ​
>> ​>
>> ​>>​
>> ​
>> Data feels something in a way?​
>>
>
> ​
> ​> ​
> Yes.​
>
>
> Ah, now I see what you mean. Proof by repetitive assertion.
>

​I'm glad you see what I mean, but unfortunately I don't see what you mean.
​You asked questions and I answered them without equivocation to the best
of my ability.


> ​>
>> ​>>​
>> ​
>> When 'it' is being processed?
>>
>
> ​>> ​
> Yes, but I don't understand why that pronoun is hiding inside quotation
> marks, the referent is clear. ​
>
>
> ​> ​
> It can't be clear unless you can distinguish data from the particular
> physical relations
>

​I point to a tree and then point to the word "tree" written in ​ink on
paper, and it you are watching this and you are a intelligent person or
computer you get the idea that one is a symbol for the other.



> ​> ​
> there simply is no canonical way of achieving this without the implicit
> assumption of a privileged interpretation from outside the system in
> question.
>

​Well yes, but we can go outside the system and so can a computer, we do
have access to information that is not innate to our brain, that's what our
senses are for. If you were as ignorant of the outside world as you were on
the day you were born you wouldn't know anything except pleasure and pain.


> ​>> ​
> Processed by matter that obeys the laws of physics obviously.​
>
>
> ​> ​
> And how then is that supposed to produce a distinguishable outcome from
> the straightforward transition from one physical state to another?
>

​That not hard to produce because not all physical transformations are
identical just as not all ideas are identical; so they can match up. When
the electrical contacts under the "7" and the "+" and the "2" key closes a
current forms that lights up a LED next to the "9" symbol, but when the 3,
+.and 5 key is depressed a different physical current forms and a different
light goes on, this time next to a 8; and we note that when we add 7+ 2 and
3+ 5 in our head we also get 9 and 8, and being intelligent creatures we
recognize the connection between what going on in our head and what's going
on in the computer. And it works both ways, if the computer is smart enough
it will recognize that what's going on in it's microprocessor can be mapped
with  what's going on in your brain.   ​
 ​

> ​> ​
> The implication of the terms you use IMO rather too loosely
> ​
> above
>

​I ask again, which word didn't you understand?​



I've been questioning the implicit commitments that your wording conceals.
The problem is that this wording begs the very questions for which the
answer is sought. I'm afraid that's the principal reason your conclusions
strike you as so obvious.

David


​John K Clark​



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Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Pierz]

On Sunday, May 28, 2017 at 12:24:32 PM UTC+10, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, May 27, 2017, Russell Standish  > wrote:
>
>> On Thu, May 25, 2017 at 06:30:07PM -0700, Pierz wrote:
>> > Recently I've been studying a lot of history, and I've often thought 
>> about
>> > how, according to special relativity, you can translate time into space 
>> and
>> > vice versa, and therefore how from a different perspective we can think 
>> of
>> > the past as distant in space rather than time: my childhood being 40 
>> light
>> > years away, rather than 40 years for instance. I can visualise my own 
>> body
>> > as a sort of long, four dimensional tendril through spacetime, of which 
>> I
>> > only ever see a three-dimensional cross-section. This is the block 
>> universe
>> > idea of course. What occurred to me recently was that the past, in any
>> > physical theory I know of, is "locked down". There is only a single 
>> history
>> > consistent with the present (ignoring the microscopic ambiguities of
>> > quantum interference effects), but the present is consistent with 
>> multiple
>> > futures.
>>
>> This assumption is wrong. There are many histories (pasts) consistent
>> with our present. If we don't know some fact about the past (eg
>> T. Rex's colour), then pasts with different colours of T.Rexes are all
>> compatible with our present. Only when we make a measurement that
>> distinguishes between different facts about the past, do we eliminate
>> some of those pasts from the compatibility list.
>>
>> There are, however, arrows of time - past and future are asymmetric,
>> the future is more uncertain than the past. But I don't see how you
>> can leverage that into support for the MWI.
>>
>>
>>
>
> I agree, there are multiple pasts compatible with our future. Some if 
> these can't be ruled out with any possible measurements, like in the case 
> if the quantum erasure.
>

To be truly compatible, they would need to unable to be distinguished by an 
observation even in theory - as you say like the quantum eraser. I 
acknowledged that when I said "ignoring the microscopic ambiguities of 
quantum interference effects". But that such interference effects can occur 
on a macroscopic scale, extending up to multiple dinosaur histories with 
different coloured T.Rexes - that is a huge leap. One single bit of 
physical information difference destroys quantum interference effects, so I 
seriously doubt that two universes with such different information that 
their dinosaurs are different colours could ever come to interfere with one 
another.

>
> That entropy increases does mean there are more futures than pasts.
>
> Regarding special relatively and collapse, I think the point is that two 
> observers in different reference frames can have different presents. Two 
> humans walking past each other on the sidewalk may have presents that 
> include the Andromeda Galaxy hours apart in time. (See "Andromeda 
> Paradox"). So if something on Earth collspses the wave everywhere and 
> instantly (in the present) which present is it collapsed in?
>

Well collapse really only happens at the time-space location that the 
measurement interaction occurs (if I believed in collapse!). I wouldn't say 
the collapse theories are *incompatible* with SR, because mathematically 
there is no problem - any paradox comes out in the wash. Conceptually 
though, it is certainly weird that the wave somehow "knows" to collapse 
everywhere at once, especially when "at once" doesn't have a single 
meaning, as you point out.

>
> I think this even more clearly shows the incompatibility between collapse 
> theories and special relatively, beyond just pointing to the FTL influences 
> as violations; this shows now we have to somehow use an objective reference 
> frame which relatively tells us does not exist. And this leads to collapse 
> events happening in different times/places for different observers, even 
> ones walking past each other on a sidewalk.
>
> Jason
>
>
>  
>
>>
>> --
>>
>>
>> 
>> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
>> Principal, High Performance Coders
>> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
>> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>>
>> 
>>
>> --
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>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>

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Re: Answer to David 3

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 May 2017, at 21:51, David Nyman wrote:


On 26 May 2017 at 18:32, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 26 May 2017, at 14:04, David Nyman wrote:





where that elusive internal space (which we seek in vain in  
extrinsically-completed models such as physics tout court)


Here we might differ, and you might be more mechanist than me (!).  
We could have used a notion of physical truth, instead of  
arithmetical truth. What the UDA shows is that this requires to  
abandon mechanism. But if we get evidence that consciousness  
reduces the wave, or that QM is false, then we might reasonably  
consider that a physical reality exists ontologically, and well, in  
that case we must find a non computationalist theory of mind, which  
of course, in that case, will rely on the physical notion of truth.  
It is an open problem if we can use or not the same hypostases with  
non-arithmetical modal boxes. G and G* remains correct for a vast  
class of non mechanical entities.


​Well, I think, with your help, that I've reached an elementary  
understanding (or at least a better intuition) of what you mean by  
arithmetical truth and its possible application in the resolution  
of the mind-body problem.​


Arithmetical truth is easy, although its use is more delicate. It is  
easy, and it is taught in primary school (here = 6 to 12 years old).


The complexity is only in metamathematics (mathematical logic). It  
comes from the fact that we cannot define a predicate of truth, V,  
such that a machine could prove


   p  <->  V("p")  (which is the least we can ask for a truth  
predicate).


If that existed, by Gödel diagonal lemma, we could find a  
proposition k such that the machine will prove k <-> ~V(k), and so  
the machine would prove both k <-> V(k), and k <-> ~V(k), and  
eventually conclude k <-> ~k, and be inconsistent. That is of course  
the Epimenides paradox.


​Yes, so on pain of inconsistency, not everything the machine can  
say can definitely be provably true (or false).


In a way ascertainable by the machine, or the entity under  
consideration. OK.


If you and me believe that PA is arithmetically sound (like all  
mathematicians believe), and if PA proves X, then you and me can say  
that it is provably true, but PA cannot. PA can say X, but cannot say  
true('X'). PA can express "I know X" in the sense of proving  
'Beweisbar('X') & X, but not in the sense "beweisbar('X') & true('X').







​

(The predicate ~V would also exist, and the diagonal lemma says that  
for all predicate P the machine can find a solution to the formula x  
<-> P(x), that is, can find a sentence k such that the machine will  
prove k <-> P(k).


But we can define truth predicate on restricted set of sentences.

​Necessarily so, it would seem.


Yes, but it is not completely obvious.





​
And we can use richer theories. In set theory, it is easy to define  
the arithmetical truth. Of course, in the background we use the  
notion of set-theoretical truth, which, if we would define it would  
requires strong infinity axiom (ZF + kappa exists) for example.


Arithmetical truth is the simplest notion of all definition of  
truth. "AxP(x)" is true simply means that P(n) is true whatever n  
is. It is the infinite or:


P(0) v P(1) v P(2), v P(3), etc.

The amazing thing, alreadu apparent in Post 1922 and Gödel 1931, but  
quite clarified since, is that


1) we can describe the complete functioning of any universal (and  
non universal) system in the arithmetical language, but, and that is  
the key, in virtue of the true-ness of the relation between the  
numbers, the computations are not just describe in arithmetic, but  
they are emulated.


​In effect, they are actioned.


OK. In the out-of-time manner of the block-mindscape, in virtue of the  
true realtion existing in the number relation. It is there that many  
confuse:


 the number s(0),
the Gödel number of s(0),
the Gödel number of the Gödel number of s(0), which plays very  
different role, all important, when we translate UDA in arithmetic.


Of course, this needs a good familiarity with the understanding of the  
difference between language, theories, and truth (models).






​

I know you and some other have well understood this, but not all  
here seems to have grasped that quite important distinction, between  
truth, theories and languages. Also, I am sure you forget to apply  
this sometimes, see below. I think you don't take mechanism  
seriously enough. (as working hypothesis of course).


​Oh dear. But I've looked below and I'm not sure where I'm going  
wrong :(


May be I have just misunderstood some proposition you made.






​


But what might be a corresponding notion of physical truth? Is it  
just Brent's insistence on a completed instrumental account of  
neurocognition in terms of physical action?


Brent defines truth by physical truth. It is OK, but cannot work  
with mechanism (uda, etc.)


​But then you say below there is 

Re: Answer to David 3

[David Nyman]

On 28 May 2017 at 14:38, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 26 May 2017, at 21:51, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 26 May 2017 at 18:32, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 26 May 2017, at 14:04, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> where that elusive internal space (which we seek in vain in
>>> extrinsically-completed models such as physics tout court)
>>>
>>>
>>> Here we might differ, and you might be more mechanist than me (!). We
>>> could have used a notion of physical truth, instead of arithmetical truth.
>>> What the UDA shows is that this requires to abandon mechanism. But if we
>>> get evidence that consciousness reduces the wave, or that QM is false, then
>>> we might reasonably consider that a physical reality exists ontologically,
>>> and well, in that case we must find a non computationalist theory of mind,
>>> which of course, in that case, will rely on the physical notion of truth.
>>> It is an open problem if we can use or not the same hypostases with
>>> non-arithmetical modal boxes. G and G* remains correct for a vast class of
>>> non mechanical entities.
>>>
>>
>> ​Well, I think, with your help, that I've reached an elementary
>> understanding (or at least a better intuition) of what you mean by
>> arithmetical truth and its possible application in the resolution of the
>> mind-body problem.​
>>
>>
>> Arithmetical truth is easy, although its use is more delicate. It is
>> easy, and it is taught in primary school (here = 6 to 12 years old).
>>
>> The complexity is only in metamathematics (mathematical logic). It comes
>> from the fact that we cannot define a predicate of truth, V, such that a
>> machine could prove
>>
>>p  <->  V("p")  (which is the least we can ask for a truth predicate).
>>
>> If that existed, by Gödel diagonal lemma, we could find a proposition k
>> such that the machine will prove k <-> ~V(k), and so the machine would
>> prove both k <-> V(k), and k <-> ~V(k), and eventually conclude k <-> ~k,
>> and be inconsistent. That is of course the Epimenides paradox.
>>
>
> ​Yes, so on pain of inconsistency, not everything the machine can say can
> definitely be provably true (or false).
>
>
> In a way ascertainable by the machine, or the entity under consideration.
> OK.
>
> If you and me believe that PA is arithmetically sound (like all
> mathematicians believe), and if PA proves X, then you and me can say that
> it is provably true, but PA cannot. PA can say X, but cannot say true('X').
> PA can express "I know X" in the sense of proving 'Beweisbar('X') & X, but
> not in the sense "beweisbar('X') & true('X').
>
>
>
>
>
> ​
>
>>
>> (The predicate ~V would also exist, and the diagonal lemma says that for
>> all predicate P the machine can find a solution to the formula x <-> P(x),
>> that is, can find a sentence k such that the machine will prove k <-> P(k).
>>
>> But we can define truth predicate on restricted set of sentences.
>>
>
> ​Necessarily so, it would seem.
>
>
> Yes, but it is not completely obvious.
>
>
>
>
> ​
>
>> And we can use richer theories. In set theory, it is easy to define the
>> arithmetical truth. Of course, in the background we use the notion of
>> set-theoretical truth, which, if we would define it would requires strong
>> infinity axiom (ZF + kappa exists) for example.
>>
>> Arithmetical truth is the simplest notion of all definition of truth.
>> "AxP(x)" is true simply means that P(n) is true whatever n is. It is the
>> infinite or:
>>
>> P(0) v P(1) v P(2), v P(3), etc.
>>
>> The amazing thing, alreadu apparent in Post 1922 and Gödel 1931, but
>> quite clarified since, is that
>>
>> 1) we can describe the complete functioning of any universal (and non
>> universal) system in the arithmetical language, but, and that is the key,
>> in virtue of the true-ness of the relation between the numbers, the
>> computations are not just describe in arithmetic, but they are emulated.
>>
>
> ​In effect, they are actioned.
>
>
> OK. In the out-of-time manner of the block-mindscape, in virtue of the
> true realtion existing in the number relation.
>

​Yes, that's what I meant.
​

> It is there that many confuse:
>
>  the number s(0),
> the Gödel number of s(0),
> the Gödel number of the Gödel number of s(0), which plays very different
> role, all important, when we translate UDA in arithmetic.
>
> Of course, this needs a good familiarity with the understanding of the
> difference between language, theories, and truth (models).
>

​Indeed :(
​

>
>
>
>
> ​
>
>>
>> I know you and some other have well understood this, but not all here
>> seems to have grasped that quite important distinction, between truth,
>> theories and languages. Also, I am sure you forget to apply this sometimes,
>> see below. I think you don't take mechanism seriously enough. (as working
>> hypothesis of course).
>>
>
> ​Oh dear. But I've looked below and I'm not sure where I'm going wrong :(
>
>
> May be I have just misunderstood some proposition you made.
>
>

Re: Fwd: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 28 May 2017 5:52 a.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:



On 5/27/2017 3:20 PM, David Nyman wrote:

I think what is meant by the reversal is clear enough. The forward
> hypothesis, mechanism, is that the realization of some information
> processing in the brain, or other physical system, instantiates
> consciousness. The reverse, platonism, is that all computations exist and
> hence among them will be computations that instantiate all possible
> conscious thoughts.
> ​ ​
> And among all those thoughts there will be some that instantiate exactly
> those thoughts we have, including those thoughts of perceiving and
> inferring a physical world and other people.  Thoughts are related by
> threads of computation and consequently they can be classified into some
> that can be proven and some that are true but can't be proven.  One might
> hypothesize that this division corresponds to what is thought and is
> communicable versus what is thought but can't be communicated, i.e. the
> internal thoughts of consciousness.
>

​ Yes, although I think you could be more explicit ​that "those thoughts of
perceiving and inferring a physical world and other people" must encompass
the entire spectrum of observable physical phenomena. The relevant
computation must also precisely mirror the transformational schemas of
physics.


But that's the rub.  If the physics is instantiated by the UD computation,
is it really a "reversal"


Yes. You keep missing the point that the reversal is already with the
'psychology' of machinery at a fundamental explanatory level, such that in
a sense one can think of the entirety of experience in terms of that of a
single type of psychological agent. This is then the subjective filter that
effectively constrains stable, pervasive and thereby (crucially)
*consistently memorable* experiences from the rest of the computational
Babel. And the consequence of that subjective filtration, in conjunction
with the transformational computation that effects that its very
stabilisation, then comprises the effective physics of the experiencer,
with the caveats already mentioned. So subject precedes object in
explaining the appearance of physics. That is the reversal. And it is
necessitated by the not inconsiderable problem that the alternative
explanatory order cannot help but *omit the explanation of the experiencer
and its experiences*.

or is it just a Church-Turing version of Tegmark, i.e. replacing the
equations of quantum field theory with some computational sequences that
have the same effect at the level of our experience.


But why be so cavalier about "the level of our experience"? It's that very
level that is omitted or merely taken for granted in the conventional
explanatory order. Remember that the point of departure for all this is the
computational theory of *mind*. Nonetheless, the price of the ticket turns
out to be a computational theory of everything. Should this surprise us?


If so, in this characterisation there would indeed be an explanatory
reversal between physics and the psychology of the machine, as Bruno
phrases it.


Fine, if it actually explained something instead of saying "If this theory
is correct there must be an explanation in terms of UD computational
threads."


I think you're being excessively demanding at this stage. The reversal is
already a startling change in explanatory perspective. If it bears out, it
can lead to a complete reformulation, not of the mind-body problem in
isolation, but of the entire problem of origin and creativity. If one then
takes this in conjunction with the failure of the conventional explanatory
sequence to account in a non-question-begging manner for the very
possibility of there being an observable reality in the first place, one
can perhaps scrape together sufficient motivation to maintain a modicum of
interest.


  The physical theory of cognition does explain some things - like the
effect of tequila on mathematical ability, why we don't remember the
future, why we love our children, etc.


Again you keep missing the hugely crucial point that your characterisation
above implicitly includes a privileged extrinsic interpretation. It's this
latter that I've called a Wittgenstein ladder. It represents an artificial
aid to comprehension that must ultimately be let go if the final
explanation is not to beg the central question at issue. This crucial
question is of course that of *intrinsic* interpretation. In the last
analysis (which we cannot, finally, ignore) no theory of perception can
coherently rely on interpretation from any perspective but that of the
subject itself. The vital matter of *your* experience cannot ultimately be
left to the mercy of *my* interpretation. Can it?

  I have suggested several times to Bruno questions related to fundamental
physics which it seems his theory might address, e.g. why is QM based on
complex Hilbert space instead of quarteronic or octonic?  Is the wave
function ontic or epistemic? But then 

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 May 2017, at 04:30, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 27/05/2017 11:46 am, David Nyman wrote:
On 27 May 2017 at 01:44, Bruce Kellett   
wrote:


I think it is the interpretation of the data that is theory- 
dependent.


​Not at all. Data don't just sit there staring you in the face.  
What is data in terms of one theory is mere background noise in  
terms of another.


That is what it means for the *interpretation* to be theory-dependent.

This insight led Popper to reject the notion of induction. As he (I  
believe correctly) pointed out, the very notion of the data on  
which induction putatively relies is theory-dependent and hence  
primarily deductive. Conjecture and refutation is a better account  
of how science (or any consistent reasoning) actually proceeds.


I don't think that is an accurate account of Popper. It was the  
asymmetry between falsification and confirmation that lay at the  
heart of his rejection of induction. His account of scientific  
practice as "conjecture and refutation" was rather naive, and  
philosophy of science has long moved beyond this.



​
But then you have a hierarchy of theories -- what is a new cutting- 
edge theory today is tomorrow's instrument for data taking.


​

​ ​ And the reductive aspect of theory is itself an  
implicitly ontological commitment.


Not for the pragmatic instrumentalist. Even committed scientific  
realists would only claim that it is only for our best, well- 
established, theories that there is any suggestion that the  
suggested entities actually exist.


​But we're not interested in "reifying" the ontology. It merely  
represents the unexplained part of an explanatory hierarchy.


That is an unconventional definition of ontology. Perhaps one can  
say that ontology is theory-dependent in that any mature theory  
carries an implied ontology -- statistical mechanics implies an  
ontology in which atoms/molecules exist, the standard model of  
particle physics implies an ontology in which quarks and gluons  
exist -- but the theory itself does not rely on such an ontology.  
The elements of the theory may be nothing more than convenient  
fictions, as was for many years the status of quarks in the Gell- 
Mann quark model -- the predictive power of the theory would be in  
no way impaired.


That's the sense in which it exists. It's the part that's  
"independent of us" simply because, although the basis of any  
explanation that follows, it doesn't itself rely on our explaining  
it.


Quite. Atoms, quarks, and gluons, require no explanation in terms of  
the theory. They are just terms in the equations that the theory  
uses -- their existence or otherwise is not an issue for the success  
of the theory.


With the  some assumptions linking the mind of the physicists looking  
at his needle and his brain, which simplifies a lot the prediction,  
but remains to be explained. And it fails, unlike mechanism, which  
explain both the mlind and the apparent matter, even if it will take a  
million years to get something close to the "standard model" of physics.


That is OK for a pragmatic person who is not interested in the mind- 
body problem, afterlife, etc. But is not OK for those interested in  
theology.






So if a hierarchy of laws were to imply mutually inconsistent  
ontological commitments it would be to that extent incomplete and  
unsatisfactory. Indeed the holy grail of (Aristotelian?) science  
is a hierarchical "Theory of Everything" that is, in precisely  
this sense, ontologically consistent "bottom up all the way down",  
if you'll permit me a slogan of my own.


The search for such a TOE has a chequered record in the history of  
science. Some still hope that such a theory is possible, but the  
negative induction from the past record would not lead one to be  
optimistic that any such theory exists or is possible.


For these reasons I can't accept that your distinction between  
Platonic and Aristotelian modes of explanation has much real  
force. In practice, *any* effective mode of explanation must  
inexorably be constrained by its fundamental ontological  
commitments,


That is the case only on your account of "explanation". If  
explanation does not rely on an underlying ontology, then it is not  
constrained by any such assumed ontology. Not all explanations need  
be reducible to your model of explanation.


That's true of course Bruce, but I would think then that any such  
heterogeneous account of explanation is in serious danger of  
falling into inconsistency.


Why?

And so I can't agree that "my account" of a mutually-consistent  
reductive hierarchy of explanation is substantially different from  
what would generally be accepted, if only implicitly, as the  
ultimate aim of mechanistic explanation tout court. Whatever you  
say, it must ​be the case, in the final analysis, that the entire  
hierarchy of explanation must ultimately be reducible to a common  
set of 

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 May 2017, at 00:28, David Nyman wrote:



-- Forwarded message --
From: David Nyman 
Date: 27 May 2017 at 22:43
Subject: Re: Answers to David 4
To: meekerdb 


On 27 May 2017 9:19 p.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:


On 5/27/2017 5:36 AM, David Nyman wrote:
​It might. But ISTM that the entire project of explanation itself  
entails at least a hesitation before assigning anything to the  
category of 'brute fact'.​ Bruno sometimes likes to metaphorise  
whatever we accept without explanation as God, or at least as an  
aspect of a generalised notion of theology (as indeed did Einstein,  
leading to not dissimilar misunderstandings in his case). So on that  
basis you are suggesting that we accept a physical universe  
(assuming that this is what you mean by reality being what it is)  
exclusively in that role. Trouble is, computationalism as a theory  
of mind closes that option.


That's not true.  It hides a lot of assumptions about the  
reification of arithmetic and the UD and modal logic.


I did not got Brent's mail, but I saw he PM you.




Well, I have to say from my perspective this debate over reification  
is getting a mite tedious. I really don't understand why you think  
that the assumption of arithmetic as an explanatory ontology is any  
more a 'reification' than that of any other mathematical schema.  
They're all essentially inferences to an explanation of the  
observables. I'd hoped my recent posts might possibly take the  
conversation in a more interesting direction.


I don't know whay Brent comes back on this. We assume only RA. Then  
the UD, and the modal logics are entirely derived from RA, and the  
definition of observers (PA) which provably exists in RA.


There is no reification at all. But the MGA shows that in physics,  
matter is reifed when invoked to make some computations more "real"  
than other.


Bruno





  Part of the problem in these discussions is that they started with  
a definition of computationalism = "consciousness arises when some  
class of computations is implemented"


I think part of your difficulty is encapsulated by the vocabulary  
you adopt here. ISTM you have a tendency to talk about consciousness  
in implicitly ontological terms, for example as something that  
"arises". For me what's interesting is the relinquishing of such  
ineffectual notions in exchange for the analysis of the  
characteristic modes of a reflexive epistemology. It opens up a  
quite novel conceptual space for thinking about perception. Instead  
of worrying about what sort of thing or process it might be, we can  
think rather in terms of what is perceptible and what isn't, what is  
doubtable and what isn't, what is communicable and what isn't and so  
forth. Then we may begin to discern how such aspects might represent  
effective points of contact with the specifics of what we ordinarily  
call consciousness and consequently also what the natural limits of  
any such representation might be. By conceiving the thing in this  
way we also 'vaccinate' it against any reduction in ontological terms.


but then it starts to be used to encompass Bruno's whole theology as  
though we accept not only the premise but also his whole argument.


We're not required to accept it, only to adopt it provisionally. But  
seriously. In point of fact though, speculative though it may be, in  
the last analysis it's a theory of everything or else a theory of  
nothing (pace Dr Standish). Sometimes you have to push a thing to  
the limit to see what it's really about.


David



Brent



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Re: Answer to David 3

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 May 2017, at 16:53, David Nyman wrote:



On 28 May 2017 at 14:38, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 26 May 2017, at 21:51, David Nyman wrote:


On 26 May 2017 at 18:32, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 26 May 2017, at 14:04, David Nyman wrote:





where that elusive internal space (which we seek in vain in  
extrinsically-completed models such as physics tout court)


Here we might differ, and you might be more mechanist than me (!).  
We could have used a notion of physical truth, instead of  
arithmetical truth. What the UDA shows is that this requires to  
abandon mechanism. But if we get evidence that consciousness  
reduces the wave, or that QM is false, then we might reasonably  
consider that a physical reality exists ontologically, and well,  
in that case we must find a non computationalist theory of mind,  
which of course, in that case, will rely on the physical notion of  
truth. It is an open problem if we can use or not the same  
hypostases with non-arithmetical modal boxes. G and G* remains  
correct for a vast class of non mechanical entities.


​Well, I think, with your help, that I've reached an elementary  
understanding (or at least a better intuition) of what you mean by  
arithmetical truth and its possible application in the resolution  
of the mind-body problem.​


Arithmetical truth is easy, although its use is more delicate. It  
is easy, and it is taught in primary school (here = 6 to 12 years  
old).


The complexity is only in metamathematics (mathematical logic). It  
comes from the fact that we cannot define a predicate of truth, V,  
such that a machine could prove


   p  <->  V("p")  (which is the least we can ask for a truth  
predicate).


If that existed, by Gödel diagonal lemma, we could find a  
proposition k such that the machine will prove k <-> ~V(k), and so  
the machine would prove both k <-> V(k), and k <-> ~V(k), and  
eventually conclude k <-> ~k, and be inconsistent. That is of  
course the Epimenides paradox.


​Yes, so on pain of inconsistency, not everything the machine can  
say can definitely be provably true (or false).


In a way ascertainable by the machine, or the entity under  
consideration. OK.


If you and me believe that PA is arithmetically sound (like all  
mathematicians believe), and if PA proves X, then you and me can say  
that it is provably true, but PA cannot. PA can say X, but cannot  
say true('X'). PA can express "I know X" in the sense of proving  
'Beweisbar('X') & X, but not in the sense "beweisbar('X') & true('X').







​

(The predicate ~V would also exist, and the diagonal lemma says  
that for all predicate P the machine can find a solution to the  
formula x <-> P(x), that is, can find a sentence k such that the  
machine will prove k <-> P(k).


But we can define truth predicate on restricted set of sentences.

​Necessarily so, it would seem.


Yes, but it is not completely obvious.





​
And we can use richer theories. In set theory, it is easy to define  
the arithmetical truth. Of course, in the background we use the  
notion of set-theoretical truth, which, if we would define it would  
requires strong infinity axiom (ZF + kappa exists) for example.


Arithmetical truth is the simplest notion of all definition of  
truth. "AxP(x)" is true simply means that P(n) is true whatever n  
is. It is the infinite or:


P(0) v P(1) v P(2), v P(3), etc.

The amazing thing, alreadu apparent in Post 1922 and Gödel 1931,  
but quite clarified since, is that


1) we can describe the complete functioning of any universal (and  
non universal) system in the arithmetical language, but, and that  
is the key, in virtue of the true-ness of the relation between the  
numbers, the computations are not just describe in arithmetic, but  
they are emulated.


​In effect, they are actioned.


OK. In the out-of-time manner of the block-mindscape, in virtue of  
the true realtion existing in the number relation.


​Yes, that's what I meant.
​
It is there that many confuse:

 the number s(0),
the Gödel number of s(0),
the Gödel number of the Gödel number of s(0), which plays very  
different role, all important, when we translate UDA in arithmetic.


Of course, this needs a good familiarity with the understanding of  
the difference between language, theories, and truth (models).


​Indeed :(
​





​

I know you and some other have well understood this, but not all  
here seems to have grasped that quite important distinction,  
between truth, theories and languages. Also, I am sure you forget  
to apply this sometimes, see below. I think you don't take  
mechanism seriously enough. (as working hypothesis of course).


​Oh dear. But I've looked below and I'm not sure where I'm going  
wrong :(


May be I have just misunderstood some proposition you made.






​


But what might be a corresponding notion of physical truth? Is it  
just Brent's insistence on a completed instrumental account of  
neurocognition 

Re: Peepee

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 May 2017, at 17:02, John Clark wrote:

Due to the impenetrable tangle of quotes of quotes of quotes of  
quotes ​of quotes ​that is epidemic on​ ​this list there is  
no way to tell who but​ ​somebody wrote:


​"​The point is to recognise that at a certain stage it is no  
longer scientific to ignore what is incapable of further explanation  
even with a heretofore supremely adequate intellectual toolkit.  
That's Bruno's whole point really.​"​


​Yes that is Bruno's whole point, and that's why he's wrong. ​ 
I​ ​would maintain it is supremely scientific to ignore what is  
incapable of further explanation even​ ​with a supremely adequate  
intellectual toolkit​. I would insist there is nothing else a  
logical person could do.​


In fundamental science, if something is beyong explanation, we look  
for an explanation why there is something incapable of explanations,  
especially when we use an hypothesis like Mechanism whic makes  
possible to use mathematical logic and computer science which are full  
of explanation of impossibilities of many different kinds.






 ​" ​Statements, or in effect dogmas, such as the position you  
reiterate above to the effect that there is an absolute limit to

 understanding​"​

​Turing, Godel, Chaitin, and quantum physicists have already told  
us there is a absolute limit to understanding, but even without them  
we would still have to face one very important question, does the  
chain of "how did that happen?" questions come to a end or does it  
not? If is doesn't end then there can never be complete  
understanding because there will always be more unanswered  
questions, if it does end then eventually you'll come to a brute  
fact.  There is every indication that "consciousness is the way data  
feels when it is being processed" is a brute fact



Not with mechanism. The brute "facts" of mechanism are just RA axioms,  
or equivalent.




and it's pointless to ask how did that happen. And that's why  
armchair philosophers love to spin consciousness theories on the  
internet, it's easy because no theory can be proved or disproved;  
and that's why armchair philosophers never spin intelligence  
theories, that's hard. Successful intelligence theorists aren't in  
armchairs, they're in Silicon Valley.


​I was able to figure out it was ​Bruno Marchal​ who said the  
following:​


​> ​Yes. John Clark proceeds like that too. Saying "peepee" when  
we introduce the needed pov distinctions.


And John Clark will continue to say "peepee" when Bruno Marchal​  
insists that idiotic questions like "what one and only one thing  
will happen to YOU after YOU walk into a YOU duplicating machine and  
YOU becomes 2 YOUS?" are areas for legitimate scientific research​.


You have agreed on all points and definition, but you forget to put  
them together, of when you do like above, you introduce an ambiguity  
by eliminating the "1p" precision.


It just plain obvious to everybody, that when you push on the button,  
you (whoever you become) are in front of a door, which once open, will  
show you one city, not two cities. As you don't die in the process,  
the two you will agree that the question made sense, and they will  
both understand that the first person indeterminacy was real in  
Helsinki.


You eliminate the FPI by eliminating the subject. As you need to do,  
and so you make the point for all people who believes in consciousness  
and can reason with mechanism.


Bruno




​> ​It is a theorem​ ​of machine theology

​And John Clark will continue to say:​

​"​Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious,  
never heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was  
12.​"​



 John K Clark






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Re: Peepee

[John Clark]

On Sun, May 28, 2017 at 1:40 PM, David Nyman  wrote:

​
>> ​> ​
>> And I've been questioning, this is the fourth time, which word or words
>> don't you understand.​
>>
>
> ​It is tedious to ask you again to reconsider your use of words ​about
> whose application we clearly disagree rather fundamentally.
>

​And now I ask for the fifth time, which specific words are you referring
to?

John K Clark​

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Supervenience

[David Nyman]

I recently posted a comment in reply to Russell on the topic of
supervenience, but it may have got lost in the recent posting confusion.
Anyway, I append it again below, slightly amended for comprehension in
isolation. The comments bear on physical supervenience and on whether
consciousness could be said to supervene on UD*.

1) Any coherent notion ​that particular states of consciousness supervene
uniquely on a specific physical object​ ​*qua computatio​*​ is effectively​
​poisoned by ​ambiguity with respect to how ​that object ​​can​ ​variously
​be parsed as implementing computation​​​.​ Nevertheless one could still
say, in the case of a suitable observable such as a brain, that
consciousness supervened, in the straightforward sense of covariance, on
its observed physical transitions. In this case there would be no necessary
further entailment to those transitions instantiating a computation. Indeed
this is in effect a direct implication of the comp theory itself. The claim
is that conscious states "in fact" supervene on computation, in the sense
both of covariance and fundamental explanatory relation. But at the same
time those states *must appear* to supervene, in a brutely covariant but no
longer strictly computational sense, on observed physical transitions. So
it would seem then that the implicit "theory-of-mind of observable physics"
will always appear in the form of an identity relation realised in terms of
physical action. In this sense the two theories (or more properly a duality
of the same general theory) are not strictly incompatible, but they rely on
two different explanatory relationships, which in fine must be
commensurable for the comp theory to be viable.

2) Whether or not consciousness supervenes on the dovetailer ​I think bears
on a separate ambiguity. Of course particular conscious states cannot be
understood as supervening on the dovetailer's trace as a whole because it
is by definition unchanging. Consequently there is no possibility here of
covariance.​ ISTM then that the interpretative ambiguity is that a
principle for 'singling out' particular programs and their associated
conscious states has not been made explicit. When first one then another
particular set of such correlations is successively 'selected' from the
trace as a whole then we can indeed intuit a covariance. When the implicit
selection changes, there is deemed to be a corresponding change in the
'states' of both consciousness and computation. In Bruno's work IIUC the
initial selection is simply that we start from a particular state in which
we are interested and progress by computational relations to the various
continuations. One of the reasons I like Hoyle's heuristic as a pedagogical
device is that it makes a serialisation of such 'selections' explicit and
it may consequently be easier to intuit what is supposed to be changing.

David

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Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 May 2017, at 05:46, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sat, May 27, 2017 at 09:24:31PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:


Regarding special relatively and collapse, I think the point is  
that two
observers in different reference frames can have different  
presents. Two

humans walking past each other on the sidewalk may have presents that
include the Andromeda Galaxy hours apart in time. (See "Andromeda
Paradox"). So if something on Earth collspses the wave everywhere and
instantly (in the present) which present is it collapsed in?

I think this even more clearly shows the incompatibility between  
collapse
theories and special relatively, beyond just pointing to the FTL  
influences
as violations; this shows now we have to somehow use an objective  
reference
frame which relatively tells us does not exist. And this leads to  
collapse
events happening in different times/places for different observers,  
even

ones walking past each other on a sidewalk.



Forgetting about JC's peepee for the minute, ISTM that relativity is
exclusively a 3p theory, whereas QM is both a 1pm and 3p theory. The
1p version of QM looks rather like Copenhagen, with wavefunction
collapses, and the 3p looks more like Everett, with deterministic wave
functions and many worlds.

The incompatibility between relativity and wave function collapse can
be seen as a manifestation of the incommensurate nature of the 1p/3p
distinction.


OK. And QM (without collapse) makes cosmology into 1p plural. The  
contagion of the superposition entails that we are sharing the  
"duplication boxes".


Bruno



Cheers

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Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 May 2017, at 14:23, Pierz wrote:




On Sunday, May 28, 2017 at 10:28:52 AM UTC+10, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, May 25, 2017 at 06:30:07PM -0700, Pierz wrote:
> Recently I've been studying a lot of history, and I've often  
thought about
> how, according to special relativity, you can translate time into  
space and
> vice versa, and therefore how from a different perspective we can  
think of
> the past as distant in space rather than time: my childhood being  
40 light
> years away, rather than 40 years for instance. I can visualise my  
own body
> as a sort of long, four dimensional tendril through spacetime, of  
which I
> only ever see a three-dimensional cross-section. This is the block  
universe
> idea of course. What occurred to me recently was that the past, in  
any
> physical theory I know of, is "locked down". There is only a  
single history

> consistent with the present (ignoring the microscopic ambiguities of
> quantum interference effects), but the present is consistent with  
multiple

> futures.

This assumption is wrong. There are many histories (pasts) consistent
with our present. If we don't know some fact about the past (eg
T. Rex's colour), then pasts with different colours of T.Rexes are all
compatible with our present. Only when we make a measurement that
distinguishes between different facts about the past, do we eliminate
some of those pasts from the compatibility list.

I think there's a confusion there between human ignorance and  
physical ambiguity - the same confusion expressed in the  
Schrödinger's Cat thought experiment. The resolution of that paradox  
lies in decoherence. The fact of the cat's death or survival spreads  
into the environment in a myriad of ways, whether or not we are  
measuring them: the cat's cooling after death, the shift of its  
weight as it falls and so on. At that point it is not in a  
superposition any more.


With respect to us (in our local branches). Decoherence jworks fine  
with the the many-worlds, but becomes a "magical explanation" without.  
OK?



We are merely ignorant of its state. I would argue the same applies  
to the colour of T. Rex. The past is not in a superposition of  
possible values, but we are ignorant of those values.


For all practical purpose. But there are temporal form of Bell's  
inequality violation which suggest that in principle (tacking track of  
all the particles the T-Rex interacted with (!)) we could make  
measurement showing interference of "different T-rex".





Now I think it is interesting to contemplate the possibility that  
more than one macroscopic history (one with green and one with red  
T. Rexes) might lead to the same present,


Of course, we need that, indeed.


but I think it extremely unlikely - that would constitute a  
macroscopic quantum interference effect.


But without collapse, the "unlikely" is only practical, making  
different past capable to interfere, or not. They don't need to  
interfere for existing. It is only to detect them. If you arise enough  
of your memory, you can "bactrack" up to T-rex, in principle (add the  
grain of salt).





I suspect only one possible colour is consistent with the present,  
even though it looks superficially like any colour is possible.


OK.

Bruno





There are, however, arrows of time - past and future are asymmetric,
the future is more uncertain than the past. But I don't see how you
can leverage that into support for the MWI.



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Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpc...@hpcoders.com.au
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Re: Peepee

[John Clark]

On Sun, May 28, 2017 at 6:51 AM, David Nyman  wrote:

​>> ​
> ​I ask again, which word didn't you understand?​
>
>
>
> ​> ​
> I've been questioning the implicit commitments that your wording conceals.
>

​And I've been questioning, this is the fourth time, which word or words
don't you understand.​


> ​> ​
> The problem is that this wording begs the very questions for which the
> answer is sought.
>

​I don't think there is any way you could be more vague, ​at this point I
don't even know what question you're referring to much less be able to
defend the answer.

​

 John K Clark​

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Re: Peepee

[John Clark]

On Sun, May 28, 2017 at 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​> ​
> you introduce an ambiguity by eliminating the "1p" precision. [...] You
> eliminate the FPI by eliminating the subject.


​But you've completely forgotten ​IHA.

​ John K Clark​

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Re: Answer to David 3

[David Nyman]

On 28 May 2017 at 18:02, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 28 May 2017, at 16:53, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
> On 28 May 2017 at 14:38, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 26 May 2017, at 21:51, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 26 May 2017 at 18:32, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 26 May 2017, at 14:04, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>>>



 where that elusive internal space (which we seek in vain in
 extrinsically-completed models such as physics tout court)


 Here we might differ, and you might be more mechanist than me (!). We
 could have used a notion of physical truth, instead of arithmetical truth.
 What the UDA shows is that this requires to abandon mechanism. But if we
 get evidence that consciousness reduces the wave, or that QM is false, then
 we might reasonably consider that a physical reality exists ontologically,
 and well, in that case we must find a non computationalist theory of mind,
 which of course, in that case, will rely on the physical notion of truth.
 It is an open problem if we can use or not the same hypostases with
 non-arithmetical modal boxes. G and G* remains correct for a vast class of
 non mechanical entities.

>>>
>>> ​Well, I think, with your help, that I've reached an elementary
>>> understanding (or at least a better intuition) of what you mean by
>>> arithmetical truth and its possible application in the resolution of the
>>> mind-body problem.​
>>>
>>>
>>> Arithmetical truth is easy, although its use is more delicate. It is
>>> easy, and it is taught in primary school (here = 6 to 12 years old).
>>>
>>> The complexity is only in metamathematics (mathematical logic). It comes
>>> from the fact that we cannot define a predicate of truth, V, such that a
>>> machine could prove
>>>
>>>p  <->  V("p")  (which is the least we can ask for a truth predicate).
>>>
>>> If that existed, by Gödel diagonal lemma, we could find a proposition k
>>> such that the machine will prove k <-> ~V(k), and so the machine would
>>> prove both k <-> V(k), and k <-> ~V(k), and eventually conclude k <-> ~k,
>>> and be inconsistent. That is of course the Epimenides paradox.
>>>
>>
>> ​Yes, so on pain of inconsistency, not everything the machine can say can
>> definitely be provably true (or false).
>>
>>
>> In a way ascertainable by the machine, or the entity under consideration.
>> OK.
>>
>> If you and me believe that PA is arithmetically sound (like all
>> mathematicians believe), and if PA proves X, then you and me can say that
>> it is provably true, but PA cannot. PA can say X, but cannot say true('X').
>> PA can express "I know X" in the sense of proving 'Beweisbar('X') & X, but
>> not in the sense "beweisbar('X') & true('X').
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ​
>>
>>>
>>> (The predicate ~V would also exist, and the diagonal lemma says that for
>>> all predicate P the machine can find a solution to the formula x <-> P(x),
>>> that is, can find a sentence k such that the machine will prove k <-> P(k).
>>>
>>> But we can define truth predicate on restricted set of sentences.
>>>
>>
>> ​Necessarily so, it would seem.
>>
>>
>> Yes, but it is not completely obvious.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ​
>>
>>> And we can use richer theories. In set theory, it is easy to define the
>>> arithmetical truth. Of course, in the background we use the notion of
>>> set-theoretical truth, which, if we would define it would requires strong
>>> infinity axiom (ZF + kappa exists) for example.
>>>
>>> Arithmetical truth is the simplest notion of all definition of truth.
>>> "AxP(x)" is true simply means that P(n) is true whatever n is. It is the
>>> infinite or:
>>>
>>> P(0) v P(1) v P(2), v P(3), etc.
>>>
>>> The amazing thing, alreadu apparent in Post 1922 and Gödel 1931, but
>>> quite clarified since, is that
>>>
>>> 1) we can describe the complete functioning of any universal (and non
>>> universal) system in the arithmetical language, but, and that is the key,
>>> in virtue of the true-ness of the relation between the numbers, the
>>> computations are not just describe in arithmetic, but they are emulated.
>>>
>>
>> ​In effect, they are actioned.
>>
>>
>> OK. In the out-of-time manner of the block-mindscape, in virtue of the
>> true realtion existing in the number relation.
>>
>
> ​Yes, that's what I meant.
> ​
>
>> It is there that many confuse:
>>
>>  the number s(0),
>> the Gödel number of s(0),
>> the Gödel number of the Gödel number of s(0), which plays very different
>> role, all important, when we translate UDA in arithmetic.
>>
>> Of course, this needs a good familiarity with the understanding of the
>> difference between language, theories, and truth (models).
>>
>
> ​Indeed :(
> ​
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ​
>>
>>>
>>> I know you and some other have well understood this, but not all here
>>> seems to have grasped that quite important distinction, between truth,
>>> theories and languages. Also, I am sure you forget to apply 

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[smitra]

On 28-05-2017 04:24, Jason Resch wrote:

On Saturday, May 27, 2017, Russell Standish 
wrote:


On Thu, May 25, 2017 at 06:30:07PM -0700, Pierz wrote:

Recently I've been studying a lot of history, and I've often

thought about

how, according to special relativity, you can translate time into

space and

vice versa, and therefore how from a different perspective we can

think of

the past as distant in space rather than time: my childhood being

40 light

years away, rather than 40 years for instance. I can visualise my

own body

as a sort of long, four dimensional tendril through spacetime, of

which I

only ever see a three-dimensional cross-section. This is the

block universe

idea of course. What occurred to me recently was that the past,

in any

physical theory I know of, is "locked down". There is only a

single history

consistent with the present (ignoring the microscopic ambiguities

of

quantum interference effects), but the present is consistent with

multiple

futures.


This assumption is wrong. There are many histories (pasts)
consistent
with our present. If we don't know some fact about the past (eg
T. Rex's colour), then pasts with different colours of T.Rexes are
all
compatible with our present. Only when we make a measurement that
distinguishes between different facts about the past, do we
eliminate
some of those pasts from the compatibility list.

There are, however, arrows of time - past and future are
asymmetric,
the future is more uncertain than the past. But I don't see how you
can leverage that into support for the MWI.


I agree, there are multiple pasts compatible with our future. Some if
these can't be ruled out with any possible measurements, like in the
case if the quantum erasure.

That entropy increases does mean there are more futures than pasts.




Jason



Unitary time evolution implies that the number of states cannot change. 
Entropy, when defined as the logarithm of the real number of states a 
closed system (or the entire universe) can really be in, does not 
increase it will always stay the same due to unitary time evolution.


Entropy as used in thermodynamics has to be defined using a coarse 
graining procedure, this will then be the logarithm of the number of 
microstates that have the same macroscopic properties as the system 
under consideration (the coarse graining is then implied by the notions 
of "macro" and "micro", as soon as you specify exactly how you draw the 
line here).


But note here that saying that there are an X number of microstates 
compatible with the macrostate of the glass of water on my table, 
doesn't mean that the glass of water can really be in any one of the X 
states.  If I were to do a  free expansion experiment where a gas 
containing N molecules  in a perfectly isolated cylinder had doubled its 
volume, then the entropy increase of N Log(2) does not mean that after 
the expansion there are really a factor of  2^N more possible states the 
gas can be in.


The unitary time evolution of the original state when the boundary is 
removed gives a one to one mapping between the initial and the final 
states, therefore after the free expansion the gas can really only be in 
exactly the same number of states. But there are then 2^N times more 
other states that will have the same macroscopic properties as the real 
states the gas really can be in. So, we have a number of fictitious 
states of (2^N - 1 ) times the original number of states that we cannot 
distinguish from the real states.


Unlike the real states, the fictitious states will most likely not 
evolve back to the original volume under time reversal. But this is not 
a property that's visible at the macroscopic scale.


One can then ask why entropy is a useful concept is it refers to the 
number of fictitious states the system can actually not be in? What do 
we make of the "equal prior probability postulate" used in statistical 
physics if it is actually not true? The reason is that one is ultimately 
doing statistics with the microscopic degrees of freedom, and in 
statistics all you need is a representative sample. Taking averages over 
a larger set will yield the same answer as computing the average over a 
more restrictive set, provided the properties you are interested in are 
statistically the same in that larger set. And mathematically it's 
easier to compute the former.



Saibal



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Re: Peepee

[David Nyman]

On 28 May 2017 at 18:10, John Clark  wrote:

> On Sun, May 28, 2017 at 6:51 AM, David Nyman 
> wrote:
>
> ​>> ​
>> ​I ask again, which word didn't you understand?​
>>
>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> I've been questioning the implicit commitments that your wording
>> conceals.
>>
>
> ​And I've been questioning, this is the fourth time, which word or words
> don't you understand.​
>

​It is tedious to ask you again to reconsider your use of words ​about
whose application we clearly disagree rather fundamentally. There have been
very extensive discussions in this list on precisely this topic, all of
which in your own case have pretty much run into the sand. These selfsame
issues are also extensively covered in the literature. Consequently I don't
feel continuing in that vein would serve much purpose here.

David.

>
>
>> ​> ​
>> The problem is that this wording begs the very questions for which the
>> answer is sought.
>>
>
> ​I don't think there is any way you could be more vague, ​at this point I
> don't even know what question you're referring to much less be able to
> defend the answer.
>
> ​
>
>  John K Clark​
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: Answers to David 4

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, May 28, 2017 at 03:54:03PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> That is a personal question of taste. Why to try to unify GR and QM?
> If they works well in their domain, we could just keep both. But

There are physical domains where both theories are required. For
example the nature of the event horizon of a black hole, which is
currently not well described theoretically (eg the firewall problem).

So its not just a question of personal taste, at least if you're an
astrophysicist. Six pack Joe could probably get by fine without either
Relativity or QM, of course :).

Cheers
-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruce Kellett]

On 29/05/2017 9:45 am, Pierz wrote:
WRT to this whole multi-coloured T-Rex business, there is a simpler 
point to be made. My original argument was in favour of MWI. Now 
whether, in MWI, macroscopic histories can merge is surely an 
interesting puzzle. But /without /MWI, there cannot be any ambiguity 
about the colour of T-Rexes. In a single universe interpretation of 
QM, T-Rexes were blue or they were red and they can't exist in a 
superposition of both. The past can't turn back into a mush of 
probabilities, because that would imply either that there is some "3p" 
significance to the concept of "now", or that the past consists of 
many worlds. In other words I am asserting that, /sans MWI,/ any 
ambiguity about the past is a matter of ignorance, not of quantum 
uncertainty. Otherwise you are saying that past moments which once 
were well defined are somehow dissolved back into ambiguity by the 
passage of time. But that would be privileging the now with some kind 
of absolute significance, which is untenable. All nows are equal.


Another way of stating my argument is that the following three 
propositions are mutually incompatible:


  * There is a single history
  * There is no objective significance to the concept of the current
moment ("now")
  * The future is objectively uncertain

You can take your pick which of those propositions you reject, but 
it's logically impossible to support all three.


I would say that there is only one history leading to our present state. 
Whether you take an MWI view or a collapse view, the wave function 
branches deterministically at every point, so if you follow your current 
twig back down to the main trunk etc, there will be a unique path. If 
there are points along this path where there has been no decoherence, so 
the potentially separate worlds never form into distinct worlds (the 
potential branches recombine), then you will pass through such potential 
branches as though they were solid stems.


There is another question as to whether we are in a superposition, of 
say red and green T.Rexes, but that they are in separate decohered 
worlds and the overlap function is zero FAPP, as Russell says. I don't 
think such a question has a definitive answer. Despite what some people 
say, viz., that in the QM MWI, everything that is possible happens in 
some branch or other, I don't think that the branches of the quantum 
tree necessarily pass through every point in the possibility space. 
Quantum evolution in the Everettian picture is strictly deterministic, 
so if some apparently possible state of affairs is not consistent with 
the initial conditions, then if will never appear anywhere. Given any 
particular imagined possibility, one cannot say whether it occurs in 
some world or other, or in no world whatsoever.


Bruce




On Monday, May 29, 2017 at 8:17:53 AM UTC+10, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, May 28, 2017 at 06:37:09PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 28 May 2017, at 14:23, Pierz wrote:
>
>
>
> >We are merely ignorant of its state. I would argue the same
> >applies to the colour of T. Rex. The past is not in a
> >superposition of possible values, but we are ignorant of those
> >values.
>
> For all practical purpose. But there are temporal form of Bell's
> inequality violation which suggest that in principle (tacking track
> of all the particles the T-Rex interacted with (!)) we could make
> measurement showing interference of "different T-rex".
>
>

There seems to be some confusion between superposition and
interference. In crude terms, we do live in a superposition |green
T.Rex>
+ |blue T.Rex>. It may well be that |green T.Rex> and |blue T.Rex>
are
orthogonal, ie =0 (at FAPP), in which case
the
two histories do not interfere, and there is no quantum
interference phenomena.


-- 




Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellow hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au



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Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Pierz]

WRT to this whole multi-coloured T-Rex business, there is a simpler point 
to be made. My original argument was in favour of MWI. Now whether, in MWI, 
macroscopic histories can merge is surely an interesting puzzle. But *without 
*MWI, there cannot be any ambiguity about the colour of T-Rexes. In a 
single universe interpretation of QM, T-Rexes were blue or they were red 
and they can't exist in a superposition of both. The past can't turn back 
into a mush of probabilities, because that would imply either that there is 
some "3p" significance to the concept of "now", or that the past consists 
of many worlds. In other words I am asserting that, *sans MWI,* any 
ambiguity about the past is a matter of ignorance, not of quantum 
uncertainty. Otherwise you are saying that past moments which once were 
well defined are somehow dissolved back into ambiguity by the passage of 
time. But that would be privileging the now with some kind of absolute 
significance, which is untenable. All nows are equal. 

Another way of stating my argument is that the following three propositions 
are mutually incompatible:

   - There is a single history
   - There is no objective significance to the concept of the current 
   moment ("now")
   - The future is objectively uncertain

You can take your pick which of those propositions you reject, but it's 
logically impossible to support all three. 

On Monday, May 29, 2017 at 8:17:53 AM UTC+10, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Sun, May 28, 2017 at 06:37:09PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > On 28 May 2017, at 14:23, Pierz wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > >We are merely ignorant of its state. I would argue the same 
> > >applies to the colour of T. Rex. The past is not in a 
> > >superposition of possible values, but we are ignorant of those 
> > >values. 
> > 
> > For all practical purpose. But there are temporal form of Bell's 
> > inequality violation which suggest that in principle (tacking track 
> > of all the particles the T-Rex interacted with (!)) we could make 
> > measurement showing interference of "different T-rex". 
> > 
> > 
>
> There seems to be some confusion between superposition and 
> interference. In crude terms, we do live in a superposition |green T.Rex> 
> + |blue T.Rex>. It may well be that |green T.Rex> and |blue T.Rex> are 
> orthogonal, ie =0 (at FAPP), in which case the 
> two histories do not interfere, and there is no quantum interference 
> phenomena. 
>
>
> -- 
>
>  
>
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
>  
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>  
>
>

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Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, May 28, 2017 at 06:37:09PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 28 May 2017, at 14:23, Pierz wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> >We are merely ignorant of its state. I would argue the same
> >applies to the colour of T. Rex. The past is not in a
> >superposition of possible values, but we are ignorant of those
> >values.
> 
> For all practical purpose. But there are temporal form of Bell's
> inequality violation which suggest that in principle (tacking track
> of all the particles the T-Rex interacted with (!)) we could make
> measurement showing interference of "different T-rex".
> 
> 

There seems to be some confusion between superposition and
interference. In crude terms, we do live in a superposition |green T.Rex>
+ |blue T.Rex>. It may well be that |green T.Rex> and |blue T.Rex> are
orthogonal, ie =0 (at FAPP), in which case the
two histories do not interfere, and there is no quantum interference phenomena.


-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, May 29, 2017 at 11:26:18AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> 
> There is another question as to whether we are in a superposition,
> of say red and green T.Rexes, but that they are in separate
> decohered worlds and the overlap function is zero FAPP, as Russell
> says. I don't think such a question has a definitive answer. Despite
> what some people say, viz., that in the QM MWI, everything that is
> possible happens in some branch or other, I don't think that the
> branches of the quantum tree necessarily pass through every point in
> the possibility space. Quantum evolution in the Everettian picture
> is strictly deterministic, so if some apparently possible state of
> affairs is not consistent with the initial conditions, then if will
> never appear anywhere. Given any particular imagined possibility,
> one cannot say whether it occurs in some world or other, or in no
> world whatsoever.
> 

It is true that you have laid bare an unstated assumption - that the
two different coloured T. Rexes are compatible with the universe's
initial conditions, as we know them. Obviously, if it possible to
deduce the colour of T. Rexes from first principles without making any
further measurements, then we don't live in such a superposition. But I
still think that if it requires a measurement (no matter how indirect)
to determine the fact of colour, than we do live in a superposition.

Cheers
-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruce Kellett]

On 29/05/2017 2:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, May 29, 2017 at 11:26:18AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:

There is another question as to whether we are in a superposition,
of say red and green T.Rexes, but that they are in separate
decohered worlds and the overlap function is zero FAPP, as Russell
says. I don't think such a question has a definitive answer. Despite
what some people say, viz., that in the QM MWI, everything that is
possible happens in some branch or other, I don't think that the
branches of the quantum tree necessarily pass through every point in
the possibility space. Quantum evolution in the Everettian picture
is strictly deterministic, so if some apparently possible state of
affairs is not consistent with the initial conditions, then if will
never appear anywhere. Given any particular imagined possibility,
one cannot say whether it occurs in some world or other, or in no
world whatsoever.


It is true that you have laid bare an unstated assumption - that the
two different coloured T. Rexes are compatible with the universe's
initial conditions, as we know them. Obviously, if it possible to
deduce the colour of T. Rexes from first principles without making any
further measurements, then we don't live in such a superposition. But I
still think that if it requires a measurement (no matter how indirect)
to determine the fact of colour, than we do live in a superposition.


I don't think that follows. If the initial conditions are such that only 
red T. Rexes can evolve, it would still require a colour measurement to 
determine that colour. There would be no superposition of different 
coloured T. Rexes, with or without any necessary measurement. The point, 
I think, is that colour, in the sense that we are using that concept 
here, is really a classical property that does not necessarily exist in 
superpositions.


Bruce

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Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Pierz]

Russell, do you believe that Schrödinger's cat is in a superposition of 
dead and alive before we open the box?

On Monday, May 29, 2017 at 3:26:49 PM UTC+10, Bruce wrote:
>
> On 29/05/2017 2:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote: 
> > On Mon, May 29, 2017 at 11:26:18AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: 
> >> There is another question as to whether we are in a superposition, 
> >> of say red and green T.Rexes, but that they are in separate 
> >> decohered worlds and the overlap function is zero FAPP, as Russell 
> >> says. I don't think such a question has a definitive answer. Despite 
> >> what some people say, viz., that in the QM MWI, everything that is 
> >> possible happens in some branch or other, I don't think that the 
> >> branches of the quantum tree necessarily pass through every point in 
> >> the possibility space. Quantum evolution in the Everettian picture 
> >> is strictly deterministic, so if some apparently possible state of 
> >> affairs is not consistent with the initial conditions, then if will 
> >> never appear anywhere. Given any particular imagined possibility, 
> >> one cannot say whether it occurs in some world or other, or in no 
> >> world whatsoever. 
> >> 
> > It is true that you have laid bare an unstated assumption - that the 
> > two different coloured T. Rexes are compatible with the universe's 
> > initial conditions, as we know them. Obviously, if it possible to 
> > deduce the colour of T. Rexes from first principles without making any 
> > further measurements, then we don't live in such a superposition. But I 
> > still think that if it requires a measurement (no matter how indirect) 
> > to determine the fact of colour, than we do live in a superposition. 
>
> I don't think that follows. If the initial conditions are such that only 
> red T. Rexes can evolve, it would still require a colour measurement to 
> determine that colour. There would be no superposition of different 
> coloured T. Rexes, with or without any necessary measurement. The point, 
> I think, is that colour, in the sense that we are using that concept 
> here, is really a classical property that does not necessarily exist in 
> superpositions. 
>
> Bruce 
>

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