Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[smitra]

On 02-06-2017 02:07, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 2/06/2017 7:28 am, smitra wrote:

On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe.

For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR 
"paradox", and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our 
belonging  to macrosuperposition.


The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without
collapse. As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were
unable to demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in 
Bell's

theorem - all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and
that is what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in
any other interpretation.

Bruce


In the MWI there are only trivial common cause like effects. There is 
no non-locality in some mysterious sense like there is in the CI where 
somehow there is a non-local effect but you don;t have information 
transfer. The mistake most people make when arguing that the MWI 
doesn't resolve the problem is that they can't get their head around 
the fact that even when Alice and Bob meet and Alice has not yet 
communicated everything  that's necessary to Bob, that the Alice that 
Bob sees has yet to collapse in the branch corresponding to whatever 
she is going to say (Bob's consciousness is thus located in many 
different branches of Alice, even if the atoms in his body will be in 
different states due to decoherence).


I think that either you or someone else said something like this when
this was last discussed. I have a couple of points to make:

1. This is not quantum mechanics, or the many worlds interpretation of
QM. It is your own idiosyncratic theory that has no bearing on the
question of non-locality in QM.

2. Even in its own terms, this theory is nothing more than an
undisguised appeal to magic. You want consciousness to be unrelated to
the decohered body. That conflicts with the overwhelming experimental
evidence in favour of the supervenience on consciousness on the
physical brain -- they move in lockstep, so if your body has decohered
having obtained a particular measurement result, all copies (if there
be such) of this consciousness are conscious of the same measurement
result. By the identity of indiscernibles, there is then only one body
and one consciousness. That is what QM and MWI tell you, any
deviations are simple fantasy.

Bruce




Suppose Alice and Bob are robots with classical processors, the  states 
of each register can only be 0 and 1. Whatever Bob is conscious of must 
then be contained in the bitstring that specifies the state his 
processor is in. Decoherence has  no effect on that bitstring. Until 
that time that Bob asks Alice about her setting of her polarizer, Bob's 
consciousness is exactly the same across the different branches in which 
Alice gives a different answer, despite rapid decoherence.


Real human beings can be expected to fit well within this model. It is 
known that there typically is a lot of information present in the 
unconscious mind that we're not aware of. So, your consciousness could 
be identical across many branches even if your brain had split and the 
unconscious mind is already diverging.  Take e.g. experiments where you 
are making a random choice and on the basis on functional MRI scans the 
experimenters are able to predict your choice before you have even made 
up your mind.


So, this is same good old QM in the MWI where an observer's 
consciousness  is modeled as a finite state machine described by a 
finite bitstring. We can then work in the basis where the observables 
for the bits of the bitstrings are all diagonal, this then corresponds 
to the observer having a definite conscious experience.


In practice, what this means is that you can be in a macroscopic 
superposition long after decoherence has for all practical purposes made 
the superposition inaccessible to be probed using interference or other 
experiments.


For example, if a spin is polarized in the positive x-direction and the 
z-component is measured, and I'm not aware of the outcome of the result 
then my consciousness, as specified by the bitstring that contains all 
the information that I'm aware of,  cannot possibly contain the result 
of the outcome of the measurement before I'm told what the result is.


 In a sector where my consciousness is described by bitstring X after 
the spin has been measured, the state will have to be of the form:


1/sqrt(2) |X> [|up, Universe(up)> + |down, Universe(down> ]

where Universe(up)  and Universe(down) are different states of the rest 
of the universe, but my consciousness is described by X and this is not 
affected by the decoherence caused by measuring the spin. In general 
there will be a summation of such terms where X takes different values 
and Universe(up) and Universe(down) will then depend on X, however, I 
can only ever find myself in a branch were X takes some 

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruce Kellett]

On 2/06/2017 12:00 pm, smitra wrote:

On 02-06-2017 02:07, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 2/06/2017 7:28 am, smitra wrote:

On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe.

For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR 
"paradox", and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of 
our belonging to macrosuperposition.


The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without
collapse. As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were
unable to demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in Bell's
theorem - all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and
that is what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in
any other interpretation.

Bruce


In the MWI there are only trivial common cause like effects. There 
is no non-locality in some mysterious sense like there is in the CI 
where somehow there is a non-local effect but you don;t have 
information transfer. The mistake most people make when arguing that 
the MWI doesn't resolve the problem is that they can't get their 
head around the fact that even when Alice and Bob meet and Alice has 
not yet communicated everything that's necessary to Bob, that the 
Alice that Bob sees has yet to collapse in the branch corresponding 
to whatever she is going to say (Bob's consciousness is thus located 
in many different branches of Alice, even if the atoms in his body 
will be in different states due to decoherence).


I think that either you or someone else said something like this when
this was last discussed. I have a couple of points to make:

1. This is not quantum mechanics, or the many worlds interpretation of
QM. It is your own idiosyncratic theory that has no bearing on the
question of non-locality in QM.

2. Even in its own terms, this theory is nothing more than an
undisguised appeal to magic. You want consciousness to be unrelated to
the decohered body. That conflicts with the overwhelming experimental
evidence in favour of the supervenience on consciousness on the
physical brain -- they move in lockstep, so if your body has decohered
having obtained a particular measurement result, all copies (if there
be such) of this consciousness are conscious of the same measurement
result. By the identity of indiscernibles, there is then only one body
and one consciousness. That is what QM and MWI tell you, any
deviations are simple fantasy.

Bruce




Suppose Alice and Bob are robots with classical processors, the states 
of each register can only be 0 and 1. Whatever Bob is conscious of 
must then be contained in the bitstring that specifies the state his 
processor is in. Decoherence has  no effect on that bitstring. Until 
that time that Bob asks Alice about her setting of her polarizer, 
Bob's consciousness is exactly the same across the different branches 
in which Alice gives a different answer,


False.


despite rapid decoherence.

Real human beings can be expected to fit well within this model. It is 
known that there typically is a lot of information present in the 
unconscious mind that we're not aware of. So, your consciousness could 
be identical across many branches even if your brain had split and the 
unconscious mind is already diverging. Take e.g. experiments where you 
are making a random choice and on the basis on functional MRI scans 
the experimenters are able to predict your choice before you have even 
made up your mind.


So, this is same good old QM in the MWI where an observer's 
consciousness  is modeled as a finite state machine described by a 
finite bitstring. We can then work in the basis where the observables 
for the bits of the bitstrings are all diagonal, this then corresponds 
to the observer having a definite conscious experience.


The definite conscious experience of relevance here is of observing and 
recording the result of the spin measurement.


In practice, what this means is that you can be in a macroscopic 
superposition long after decoherence has for all practical purposes 
made the superposition inaccessible to be probed using interference or 
other experiments.


For example, if a spin is polarized in the positive x-direction and 
the z-component is measured, and I'm not aware of the outcome of the 
result then my consciousness, as specified by the bitstring that 
contains all the information that I'm aware of,  cannot possibly 
contain the result of the outcome of the measurement before I'm told 
what the result is.


 In a sector where my consciousness is described by bitstring X after 
the spin has been measured, the state will have to be of the form:


1/sqrt(2) |X> [|up, Universe(up)> + |down, Universe(down> ]

where Universe(up)  and Universe(down) are different states of the 
rest of the universe, but my consciousness is described by X and this 
is not affected by the decoherence caused by measuring the spin. In 
general there will be a summation of such 

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruce Kellett]

On 1/06/2017 10:19 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Jun 2017, at 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 31 May 2017, at 04:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 30/05/2017 9:35 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 30 May 2017, at 11:28, Telmo Menezes wrote:


I get your point with decoherence.
Again, I would say that it all depends on theories of mind. What 
does
mind supervene on? Perhaps it is true that every single coupling 
with

the environment prevents the current observer state to become
compatible with other branches. But can we be sure? I feel that such
certainties come from a strong belief in emergentism (which I cannot
disprove, but find problematic).


It is impossible to recohere the past, FAPP.

But only FAPP. To make the blue T-rex interfereing with the 
red-T-rex, we must erase the trace of particle interaction between 
the T-rex in its whole light-cone, and this without forgetting the 
particles "swallowed" by the black-holes, etc. It is just 
completely impossible, but to derive from that the unicity of the 
past, is, it seems to me (and you if I understood well) is invalid.


I think the recoherence of paths that have completely decohered is 
more than just FAPP impossible, I think it is impossible in 
principle. One major problem with recoherence in general is that 
information leaks from the paths at the speed of light (as well as 
less slowly for other interactions). Since this vital information 
goes out along the light cone, it can never be recaptured and 
returned to the original interaction.


In QM + special relativity OK. (note that to me QM + special 
relativity => no collapse (and even the Many dreams, but we have 
agreed to disagree on this if I remember well).


Reasoning in QM without SR is not very profitable. Besides, QM + SR 
does not particularly imply MWI -- it is perfectly possible to have a 
consistent collapse model of QM+SR. I know you don't agree because of 
the non-locality implied by EPR, but this non-locality is not removed 
in MWI, regardless of what you might say.


I don't see it, and the mast time we discuss this, we conclude on some 
vocabulary problem. When there is no collapse, measurement tells to 
people light separated in which branch theiy belongs, but to exploits 
that information, they need to come into contact.


Last time we discussed this, no resolution was achieved. In QM, with or 
without collapse, decoherence and the transition from the pure state to 
a mixture gives a definite measurement result. Without collapse, 
different branches get different results, but once obtained, these 
results are fixed, and are not affected by whether Alice and Bob 
exchange information or not.


Consequently, indispensable phase information is lost *in 
principle*, so the recoherence is, in general, impossible.


OK. (I was reasoning in naive classical QM)

Of course, with carefully constructed systems, where the loss of 
information along the light cone is prevented, recoherence is 
possible in special circumstances, but not in general.


From this, the uniqueness of the past of any decoherent history is 
assured. So deriving the unicity (if I understand this use of the 
word) is by no means invalid -- it is proved.


In QM + SR. OK.

Even if one encounters one of those rare situations in which 
recoherence is achieved, that still does not invalidate the 
uniqueness of the past history -- recoherence, if it occurs, simply 
means that no new branches are formed at that point, so the 
decoherent history remains unique.


OK. That might suggest that we identify our indistinguishible past 
in arithmetic, if we assume mechanism. I use the Y = II principle, 
or the "quantum" linearity of the tensor product "@": we have that  
a @ (b + c) = (a @ b) + (a @ c).


That makes sense.


Linearity is the heart of QM. It is linearity that allows 
superpositions, and leads to all the "quantum weirdness".


I agree. Both "linearities" (the quantum evolution, and the tensor 
products).



...
But those state difference are accessible to the observers, and 
indeed, only this makes the analogy with step 3 working.


In MWI, the differences are not observable by anyone. Any observer 
has access to only one branch, so only one copy. They can say nothing 
about the other branch.


The difference are not observable, but are very gross, like seeing a 
cat dead, or alive. Linearity prevent any direct view of that 
difference, but it exists, when we assume QM (and non collapse).


It is not linearity that prevents macro-superpositions -- it is 
decoherence and the reduction to a mixed state. The difference between 
the measurement outcomes exists whatever interpretation of QM you impose.


...
Of course, it assures them in all branches, where indeed Aspect like 
experiences can be made. It seems to me that we did agree on this: 
that non-locality does not entail any physical influence in the 
past. That does happen in the unique universe view though; even if 

​Primordial Black Holes

[John Clark]

The January 4 2017 event gives more support to the idea Dark Matter
​is​

​made of ​
primordial Black Holes born a nanosecond after the Big
​B​ang
 and were never stars. The spin of one of the Black
​H​
oles is not in the same direction
​as ​
the other
​​
 and
​of ​
​their orbit,
 binary stars almost always are. If there were born at different times and
at different places the universe is now so spread out it is unlikely there
would be enough time for the two to find each
​other ​
and go into orbit, but very very early in the universe thing
​s​
 were much more crowded and that would be more likely to happen.  If LIGO
can eve
​r​
 find a merger where one of the Black Holes was less than 3 solar masses
that would be the smoking gun, that
​guy ​
would have to be primordial.

In addition, some rival theories to Einstein's say gravitational waves
don't all travel at the same speed but depends on their frequency, this
merger was twice as far away as the previous two so it's the best test yet
of that , and Einstein wins again, all the waves move at the same speed
(presumably light speed) regardless of frequency.

John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruce Kellett]

On 2/06/2017 7:28 am, smitra wrote:

On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe.

For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR 
"paradox", and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our 
belonging  to macrosuperposition.


The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without
collapse. As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were
unable to demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in Bell's
theorem - all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and
that is what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in
any other interpretation.

Bruce


In the MWI there are only trivial common cause like effects. There is 
no non-locality in some mysterious sense like there is in the CI where 
somehow there is a non-local effect but you don;t have information 
transfer. The mistake most people make when arguing that the MWI 
doesn't resolve the problem is that they can't get their head around 
the fact that even when Alice and Bob meet and Alice has not yet 
communicated everything  that's necessary to Bob, that the Alice that 
Bob sees has yet to collapse in the branch corresponding to whatever 
she is going to say (Bob's consciousness is thus located in many 
different branches of Alice, even if the atoms in his body will be in 
different states due to decoherence).


I think that either you or someone else said something like this when 
this was last discussed. I have a couple of points to make:


1. This is not quantum mechanics, or the many worlds interpretation of 
QM. It is your own idiosyncratic theory that has no bearing on the 
question of non-locality in QM.


2. Even in its own terms, this theory is nothing more than an 
undisguised appeal to magic. You want consciousness to be unrelated to 
the decohered body. That conflicts with the overwhelming experimental 
evidence in favour of the supervenience on consciousness on the physical 
brain -- they move in lockstep, so if your body has decohered having 
obtained a particular measurement result, all copies (if there be such) 
of this consciousness are conscious of the same measurement result. By 
the identity of indiscernibles, there is then only one body and one 
consciousness. That is what QM and MWI tell you, any deviations are 
simple fantasy.


Bruce


The apparent non-locality is then purely an artifact on making such 
assumptions about localization in branches when that's wrong to do.


Saibal



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruce Kellett]

On 1/06/2017 10:52 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Jun 2017, at 13:02, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 1/06/2017 8:21 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 31 May 2017, at 09:15, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 31/05/2017 4:40 pm, Pierz wrote:


>> On 5/30/2017 7:30 PM, Pierz wrote:
>>> Thanks for these clarifications Bruce. I find your
explanations to be very lucid and helpful - they also confirm
my own understanding. IIRC, you weren't a particular fan of
MWI when I last conversed with you on this list. I wonder if
you'd care to comment on my original argument on this thread -
which has of course now been swamped by the usual brawls. Does
not a single history + the physical insignificance of the
notion of a current moment mean that there is also only a
single possible future?
>> I don't see how that follows.  In the usual model of
forking in the future direction every current moment has a
single history, but multiple futures.


Multiple futures = MWI, surely.


Not necessarily. If you insist on Schrödinger determinism, then 
yes, by reification of the wave function. But if the wave function 
is only epistemological, then there is only one probabilistic future.


How could an epistemological wave interfere all by itself? It seems 
simpler to say that the wave is real, but that the local, one 
branch, perception is epistemological.


I think you misunderstand this use of the word "epistemological". 
When it is said that the wave function is merely epistemological, 
what is meant that it is merely a calculational device: the wave 
function encapsulates our knowledge of the system of interest, and 
tells us how to calculate the probabilities of various outcomes. In 
other words, it is not a 'real' wave in space-time.


Yes. That is the problem. How a non real wave in space time can 
interfere really in space-time? Of course, the answer is simple with 
the MWI, but asks for real infuence at a distance with the Mono-world 
assumption.


The epistemological understanding does not have a non-real wave in 
space-time interfering in real space-time. It is merely a calculational 
device to get the QM probabilities, it doesn't interfere with anything. 
In MWI there is a real problem -- how can a complex wave existing in 
N-dimensional configuration space influence anything in 3-dimensional 
space-time?



When I say a single history, I mean that from the Big Bang 
forward, the universe only followed one branch.


And that can lead into the future, only one probabilistic future.


>>
>>> And if the future is predetermined in this way, isn't this
a serious issue for single universe models of QM? How can the
outcome of quantum events be both inevitable and random?
>> Having a single future isn't the same as being determined.
 A single future in which situation A is sometimes followed by
B and sometimes by C is still random.


It depends on perspective. It's true that from 1p, it looks 
random. But from 3p, it is static and always the same, and in this 
sense determined.


Not true, the 3p view of the future is still just a single 
probabilistic world line. It is only the bird view, from outside 
space and time, that gives the appearance that there are multiply 
existing futures. Neither we from the 1p perspective, or from 
outside ourselves in the 3p perspective, can we ever see any of the 
other branches predicted by MWI.


Yes, like in WM-duplication.


No, that is a serious mistake. Unitary evolution of the wave function 
is not at all like the person duplication experiments. The main 
difference is that the duplicates of the Helsinki man are never in a 
pure quantum state.


That was not the point. The comparison is on the reasult measurement, 
not on the reason of the parallel states. With mechanism, the reason 
are the same (the first person indeterminacy). With collapse, we need 
magic.


The teleportation to W or M is of separate classical entities, There 
is no superposition principle for duplicated persons.


You can defined for the Helsinki guy. He is in a sort of (non quantum) 
superposition state in helsinki, which indeed, like in the MWI, is 
just his ignoance on which computations he belongs. I use Y = II, if 
that is still needed to say.


Your attempt to draw a parallel between person duplication in a 
laboratory and MWI is simply causing confusion. They are in no way 
similar. There is no such thing as 'a sort of non quantum 
superposition'. That is just an abuse of language. Classical 
probabilities are completely unlike quantum superpositions.




The guy in Helsinki can predict that his first person future will be 
unique, even if he knows that in the "bird" picture, that outside 
the teleportation/duplication boxes, there will be two versions of him.


That is not the "bird" picture, that is merely the objective 3p 
picture of the ordinary classical world. The bird picture is solely 
to do with the pure state that is preserved in the 

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[smitra]

On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 31 May 2017, at 04:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 30/05/2017 9:35 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 30 May 2017, at 11:28, Telmo Menezes wrote:


I get your point with decoherence.
Again, I would say that it all depends on theories of mind. What 
does
mind supervene on? Perhaps it is true that every single coupling 
with

the environment prevents the current observer state to become
compatible with other branches. But can we be sure? I feel that 
such
certainties come from a strong belief in emergentism (which I 
cannot

disprove, but find problematic).


It is impossible to recohere the past, FAPP.

But only FAPP. To make the blue T-rex interfereing with the 
red-T-rex, we must erase the trace of particle interaction between 
the T-rex in its whole light-cone, and this without forgetting the 
particles "swallowed" by the black-holes, etc. It is just completely 
impossible, but to derive from that the unicity of the past, is, it 
seems to me (and you if I understood well) is invalid.


I think the recoherence of paths that have completely decohered is 
more than just FAPP impossible, I think it is impossible in 
principle. One major problem with recoherence in general is that 
information leaks from the paths at the speed of light (as well as 
less slowly for other interactions). Since this vital information 
goes out along the light cone, it can never be recaptured and 
returned to the original interaction.


In QM + special relativity OK. (note that to me QM + special 
relativity => no collapse (and even the Many dreams, but we have 
agreed to disagree on this if I remember well).


Reasoning in QM without SR is not very profitable. Besides, QM + SR
does not particularly imply MWI -- it is perfectly possible to have a
consistent collapse model of QM+SR. I know you don't agree because of
the non-locality implied by EPR, but this non-locality is not removed
in MWI, regardless of what you might say.

Consequently, indispensable phase information is lost *in principle*, 
so the recoherence is, in general, impossible.


OK. (I was reasoning in naive classical QM)

Of course, with carefully constructed systems, where the loss of 
information along the light cone is prevented, recoherence is 
possible in special circumstances, but not in general.


From this, the uniqueness of the past of any decoherent history is 
assured. So deriving the unicity (if I understand this use of the 
word) is by no means invalid -- it is proved.


In QM + SR. OK.

Even if one encounters one of those rare situations in which 
recoherence is achieved, that still does not invalidate the 
uniqueness of the past history -- recoherence, if it occurs, simply 
means that no new branches are formed at that point, so the 
decoherent history remains unique.


OK. That might suggest that we identify our indistinguishible past in 
arithmetic, if we assume mechanism. I use the Y = II principle, or the 
"quantum" linearity of the tensor product "@": we have that  a @ (b + 
c) = (a @ b) + (a @ c).


That makes sense.


Linearity is the heart of QM. It is linearity that allows
superpositions, and leads to all the "quantum weirdness".




FWIW, you
are expressing my own understanding of the situation: there can be 
no
superposition of red and green screens or dinosaurs, or dead and 
live cats,
because there can be no quantum superposition of macroscopic 
objects.
Superpositions of wave functions are only possible for systems 
isolated from
interaction with their environment, which is why quantum computers 
are so
fricking hard to make: keeping aggregates of particles isolated 
from
interactions with the surrounding environment is exponentially 
more

difficult as the system grows in size.


The main question for me is this: can two branches hold different
observer states, if they differ only by things that are not
observable?


I would say no, intuitively. I would even say "no" just for the 
things not observed, even when observable.


I previously answered Telmo's question in the affirmative, viz., two 
fully decohered branches will hold different observer states, even if 
the differences are not observed or observable. So if some trivial 
physical event happens to your body, such as the decay of a K 40 
nucleus in your foot, this would not be noticeable, or even 
particularly observable even if you were looking for it. But such an 
event causes at least two branches to form every instant -- one in 
which the decay has occurred, and one in which it has not. And since 
this is a beta decay, a neutrino is lost along the light cone in 
every case of decay. Perfect recombination of the branches is, then, 
according to the above argument, not possible. You might object that 
this decay in my toe did not alter my conscious state -- that is 
correct, but there are now two copies of the Moscow man as in step 3,


My mistake here - I misremembered step 3.  Moscow is a 

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote:


On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote:


On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: 




On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker  wrote:

​Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "​we are to  
extract" over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in  
short, subject precedes object in the explanation. That's the  
reversal.


Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little  
bit, or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object".


​Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too  
short. But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an  
attempt to avoid ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :(

​
I would say that subjects precedes physical objects​, as physics  
becomes a first person plural notion.


​Exactly

But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we  
have to admit that the number objects still precedes (in some  
logical sense) the subject, which arises from the infinitely many  
computations which supports its self-referential modes.


​Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or  
ontological component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a  
certain objective sense, but their 'observable' or epistemological  
component can only be realised (i.e. made true) in terms of a point- 
of-view.



OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of  
us) aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a  
part of a bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which mechanism,  
and our sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express, still less  
justify, but we can "meta-prove" for the correct machine, that such  
an 0p can be reduced to first the arithmetical truth, and secondly  
(blaspheming for two seconds) the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD,  
The UM, the sigma_1 complete set.


That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction axioms  
are put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the  
existence of PA, but "for RA" PA is already dreaming.


It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not.  
Nelson believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the  
induction axioms are "viciously" circular,


​Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in  
fact always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if  
only implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of  
'data' on which to base the purported inductive generalisation was  
itself theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something  
more like "on the basis of a certain theory, let us select these  
features as data, which then might lead us to the following  
conclusion...etc.".


I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of inductive  
inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the Peano sense.  
But Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen as inductive  
inference. I agree that inductive inference is theory dependent, and  
it requires not just PA-like induction, but also the general  
assumption, usually at the metalevel that there is something to be  
observed (the <>t meta-assumption).




​
making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I  
think we can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of PA,  
despite most mathematicians believe in the consistency of much more  
(in the sense of proving abilities) powerful theory than PA, like  
ZF, Category, theory, group theory, etc.).




We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but  
that would be a bit ad hoc,


​Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind  
of the inner God-subject.


How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts  the truth. The "Bp" is like a  
finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The  
inner god is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window.


​Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed  
(wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual  
object.​


I guess that I meant "natural *number* object.





I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable  
is due to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides with  
the view of the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that S4Grz =  
S4Grz*. The soul does not split along G/G*. But that is the  
"natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of the first person subject.


​Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least  
heuristically) with monopsychism.


OK. God's solipism. To be sure, the "(outer) God" of mechanism, V, is  
not the biggest "God".  Like in Plotinus, and perhaps arguably already  
in Plato's Parmenides, God is overwhelmed by the "Noùs". Quantified  
G*, qG*, is PI-complete in the V oracle. So, 

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[David Nyman]

On 1 June 2017 at 02:59, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On 1/06/2017 6:28 am, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 31 May 2017 at 04:55, Bruce Kellett < 
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
>> On 31/05/2017 12:30 pm, Pierz wrote:
>>
>> Thanks for these clarifications Bruce. I find your explanations to be
>> very lucid and helpful - they also confirm my own understanding.
>>
>>
>> Thank you for the kind comments, I try my best to be clear.
>>
>> IIRC, you weren't a particular fan of MWI when I last conversed with you
>> on this list.
>>
>>
>> That is indeed the case. I have several reasons to be dubious about MWI.
>> Firstly, it amounts to reifying a complex valued function that resides in
>> configuration space -- I am not sure that this is a well-defined procedure.
>> Secondly, MWI doesn't really do what it claims to do, which is to provide a
>> resolution of the measurement problem in QM. MWI doesn't provide any
>> explanation of the transition from a pure state to the mixed state that is
>> required for experiments to give definite results. At the crucial point,
>> MWI simply says "then a miracle happens!" To be more explicit,
>> deterministic evolution of the wave function by the Schrödinger equation
>> gives a full account of decoherence, and the dissemination of the coherence
>> phases into the environment. This reduces the off-diagonal elements of the
>> density matrix so that the diagonal elements become *almost* orthogonal,
>> but unitary evolution can't go the whole way. The only way one can reduce
>> the pure state to a mixture is to trace over the environmental degrees of
>> freedom, which is to say that the residual phase information is simply
>> thrown away. This trace operation is non-unitary, and there is no warrant
>> for it in the SE itself, so it is, in the final analysis, just an appeal to
>> magic.
>>
>
> Bruce, is it perhaps finally an appeal to observation per se? IOW what you
> say is of course objectively the case, but perhaps in some way the
> ​residual phase information isn't relevant (i.e. can be 'traced over') in
> the synthesis of the 'observer-observation' relation. If so, this relation
> could perhaps resolve the 'eternalist' pure state (which after all
> continues simply to be 'there' in the MWI conception) subjectively into
> what would give the 'instrumental' appearance, in effect, of the
> probability density characteristic of a mixture?
>
>
> It is often argued that the density matrix is diagonalized FAPP, and FAPP
> is all that is required. Unfortunately, I don't think that that really
> works. Even though the individual off-diagonal elements might be
> arbitrarily small, there are a very large number of them (increasing as
> further environmental degrees of freedom are included). The end result is
> that the original superposition is still intact and no 'split' has in fact
> occurred -- the situation is still completely reversible. The problem I
> point to is that there is nothing in the unitary mathematics corresponding
> to "ignoring inessential degrees of freedom". That is what the partial
> trace does, but that has to be imposed by hand, it is not automatic, and
> suffers from all the old difficulties of the Heisenberg cut -- it is
> arbitrary.
>

​It's certainly arbitrary in any objective sense, but could that still be
said under the observational assumptions I outlined? What I mean is that,
in an eternalist framework, transition from pure to mixed state might be
considered an emergent phenomenon relativised to some embedded
'point-of-view-of-interest'. So if what you term above "inessential degrees
of freedom" did indeed turn out to be inessential to "some fundamental
compositional principle of observer-hood" we could perhaps restore from
this the operational aspect of an apparently mixed state whilst the pure
state continued to be the case in the idealised eternalist frame. In such a
case the sense of arbitrariness you mention above might be alleviated.


>
> Then there wouldn't seem to me to be a necessary idea of 'collapse'
> involved, except in a purely epistemological sense. The term 'subjective'
> here is more in the sense of some fundamental compositional principle of
> observer-hood than a restriction to out-and-out 'waking consciousness'. I'm
> not sure if this has any necessary connection  to Lockwood's idea of a
> 'consciousness basis'. Of course quite clearly any of this would be highly
> speculative, but I'm wondering if it could make any sense in principle? I'd
> value your opinion.
>
>
> I think that something like this was what Everett had in mind when called
> this idea the "relative state model". I think he saw the observer as
> complete in every branch, so that
>
>  |psi> = (|1> + \2>)|me>|environment> --> (|1>|me_1> +
> |2>|me_2>)|environment>
>   --> |1>|me_1>|environment_1> + |2>|me_2>|environment_2>
>
> and he then considered the two parts of the development to be complete in
> 

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 Jun 2017, at 16:42, David Nyman wrote:




On 1 Jun 2017 15:20, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 01 Jun 2017, at 15:59, David Nyman wrote:




On 1 Jun 2017 14:01, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote:




On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote:


On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote:


On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: 




On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker   
wrote:


​Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "​we are to  
extract" over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or  
in short, subject precedes object in the explanation. That's  
the reversal.


Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a  
little bit, or not in case you mean "physical object" for  
"object".


​Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little  
too short. But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an  
attempt to avoid ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long- 
winded :(

​
I would say that subjects precedes physical objects​, as  
physics becomes a first person plural notion.


​Exactly

But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we  
have to admit that the number objects still precedes (in some  
logical sense) the subject, which arises from the infinitely  
many computations which supports its self-referential modes.


​Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or  
ontological component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a  
certain objective sense, but their 'observable' or  
epistemological component can only be realised (i.e. made true)  
in terms of a point-of-view.



OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of  
us) aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only  
a part of a bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which  
mechanism, and our sanity/soundness, which we cannot even  
express, still less justify, but we can "meta-prove" for the  
correct machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to first the  
arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds)  
the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1  
complete set.


That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction  
axioms are put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove  
the existence of PA, but "for RA" PA is already dreaming.


It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or  
not. Nelson believes (but seems unique in believing this) that  
the induction axioms are "viciously" circular,


​Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in  
fact always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if  
only implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection  
of 'data' on which to base the purported inductive generalisation  
was itself theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be  
something more like "on the basis of a certain theory, let us  
select these features as data, which then might lead us to the  
following conclusion...etc.".


I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of  
inductive inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the  
Peano sense. But Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen  
as inductive inference. I agree that inductive inference is theory  
dependent, and it requires not just PA-like induction, but also  
the general assumption, usually at the metalevel that there is  
something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption).




​
making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I  
think we can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of  
PA, despite most mathematicians believe in the consistency of  
much more (in the sense of proving abilities) powerful theory  
than PA, like ZF, Category, theory, group theory, etc.).




We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject,  
but that would be a bit ad hoc,


​Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the  
mind of the inner God-subject.


How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts  the truth. The "Bp" is  
like a finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at  
itself. The inner god is the outer God looking at itself through  
the Bp window.


​Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I  
assumed (wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or  
perceptual object.​


I guess that I meant "natural *number* object.





I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the  
provable is due to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view  
coincides with the view of the soul-instantiated: that is: the  
fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does not split along G/G*. But  
that is the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of the first  
person 

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 31 May 2017, at 09:15, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 31/05/2017 4:40 pm, Pierz wrote:

On Wednesday, May 31, 2017 at 3:28:18 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
Sorry.  Something funny with my verizon account.

Brent

On 5/30/2017 8:09 PM, Pierz Newton-John wrote:
> Brent, are you replying from a mobile? I’m still receiving your  
replies, as others are, on my private email. That’s what happens to  
me when I try to reply using my iPhone. The "reply to all" button  
is missing. I’ll reply to your remarks on the list if you post it  
there...

>
>
>> On 31 May 2017, at 1:05 pm, Brent Meeker   
wrote:

>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/30/2017 7:30 PM, Pierz wrote:
>>> Thanks for these clarifications Bruce. I find your explanations  
to be very lucid and helpful - they also confirm my own  
understanding. IIRC, you weren't a particular fan of MWI when I  
last conversed with you on this list. I wonder if you'd care to  
comment on my original argument on this thread - which has of  
course now been swamped by the usual brawls. Does not a single  
history + the physical insignificance of the notion of a current  
moment mean that there is also only a single possible future?
>> I don't see how that follows.  In the usual model of forking in  
the future direction every current moment has a single history, but  
multiple futures.


Multiple futures = MWI, surely.


Not necessarily. If you insist on Schrödinger determinism, then yes,  
by reification of the wave function. But if the wave function is  
only epistemological, then there is only one probabilistic future.


How could an epistemological wave interfere all by itself? It seems  
simpler to say that the wave is real, but that the local, one branch,  
perception is epistemological.






When I say a single history, I mean that from the Big Bang forward,  
the universe only followed one branch.


And that can lead into the future, only one probabilistic future.


>>
>>> And if the future is predetermined in this way, isn't this a  
serious issue for single universe models of QM? How can the outcome  
of quantum events be both inevitable and random?
>> Having a single future isn't the same as being determined.  A  
single future in which situation A is sometimes followed by B and  
sometimes by C is still random.


It depends on perspective. It's true that from 1p, it looks random.  
But from 3p, it is static and always the same, and in this sense  
determined.


Not true, the 3p view of the future is still just a single  
probabilistic world line. It is only the bird view, from outside  
space and time, that gives the appearance that there are multiply  
existing futures. Neither we from the 1p perspective, or from  
outside ourselves in the 3p perspective, can we ever see any of the  
other branches predicted by MWI.


Yes, like in WM-duplication. The guy in Helsinki can predict that his  
first person future will be unique, even if he knows that in the  
"bird" picture, that outside the teleportation/duplication boxes,  
there will be two versions of him.






The question is, what determined (from the 3p view) that the  
universe followed that particular path and not any of the others?


Why do you reject out of hand that the universe might be  
probabilistic?  It is possible 'nothing' determined which path from  
the possibilities was actually followed. All that is known are the  
probabilities for each path. We do not know that the other paths are  
followed, either 1p or 3p.


In QM, we do have evidences that many path are taken all together. if  
only the two slits.



Bruno




My assumption here is that "now" does not exist from the 3p POV and  
therefore the physical structure (whether it branches or not) of  
the past and the future is the same.


That can certainly be the case, whether there are existing  
alternative branches or not.


Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:


On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote:

On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>> ​Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "​we are to extract"
>> over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in short, subject
>> precedes object in the explanation. That's the reversal.
>>
>>
>> Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little bit,
>> or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object".
>>
>
> ​Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too short.
> But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an attempt to avoid
> ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :(
> ​
>
>> I would say that subjects precedes physical objects
>> ​,
>> as physics becomes a first person plural notion.
>>
>
> ​Exactly
>
>
>> But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we have to
>> admit that the number objects still precedes (in some logical sense) the
>> subject, which arises from the infinitely many computations which supports
>> its self-referential modes.
>>
>
> ​Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or ontological
> component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a certain objective sense,
> but their 'observable' or epistemological component can only be realised
> (i.e. made true) in terms of a point-of-view.
>
>
>
> OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of us)
> aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a part of a
> bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which mechanism, and our
> sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express, still less justify, but we
> can "meta-prove" for the correct machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to
> first the arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds)
> the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set.
>
> That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction axioms are
> put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the existence of PA,
> but "for RA" PA is already dreaming.
>
> It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not. Nelson
> believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the induction axioms are
> "viciously" circular,
>

​Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in fact
always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if only
implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of 'data' on
which to base the purported inductive generalisation was itself
theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something more like "on
the basis of a certain theory, let us select these features as data, which
then might lead us to the following conclusion...etc.".


I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of inductive
inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the Peano sense. But
Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen as inductive inference. I
agree that inductive inference is theory dependent, and it requires not
just PA-like induction, but also the general assumption, usually at the
metalevel that there is something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption).


​

> making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I think we
> can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of PA, despite most
> mathematicians believe in the consistency of much more (in the sense of
> proving abilities) powerful theory than PA, like ZF, Category, theory,
> group theory, etc.).
>
>
>> We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but that
>> would be a bit ad hoc,
>>
>
> ​Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind of the
> inner God-subject.
>
>
> How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts  the truth. The "Bp" is like a
> finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The inner god
> is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window.
>

​Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed
(wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual object.​


I guess that I meant "natural *number* object.




> I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable is due
> to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides with the view of
> the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does
> not split along G/G*. But that is the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of
> the first person subject.
>

​Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least heuristically) with
monopsychism.


OK. God's solipism. To be sure, the "(outer) God" of mechanism, V, is not
the biggest "God".  Like in Plotinus, and perhaps arguably 

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruce Kellett]

On 1/06/2017 8:21 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 31 May 2017, at 09:15, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 31/05/2017 4:40 pm, Pierz wrote:


>> On 5/30/2017 7:30 PM, Pierz wrote:
>>> Thanks for these clarifications Bruce. I find your
explanations to be very lucid and helpful - they also confirm my
own understanding. IIRC, you weren't a particular fan of MWI
when I last conversed with you on this list. I wonder if you'd
care to comment on my original argument on this thread - which
has of course now been swamped by the usual brawls. Does not a
single history + the physical insignificance of the notion of a
current moment mean that there is also only a single possible
future?
>> I don't see how that follows.  In the usual model of forking
in the future direction every current moment has a single
history, but multiple futures.


Multiple futures = MWI, surely.


Not necessarily. If you insist on Schrödinger determinism, then yes, 
by reification of the wave function. But if the wave function is only 
epistemological, then there is only one probabilistic future.


How could an epistemological wave interfere all by itself? It seems 
simpler to say that the wave is real, but that the local, one branch, 
perception is epistemological.


I think you misunderstand this use of the word "epistemological". When 
it is said that the wave function is merely epistemological, what is 
meant that it is merely a calculational device: the wave function 
encapsulates our knowledge of the system of interest, and tells us how 
to calculate the probabilities of various outcomes. In other words, it 
is not a 'real' wave in space-time.



When I say a single history, I mean that from the Big Bang forward, 
the universe only followed one branch.


And that can lead into the future, only one probabilistic future.


>>
>>> And if the future is predetermined in this way, isn't this a
serious issue for single universe models of QM? How can the
outcome of quantum events be both inevitable and random?
>> Having a single future isn't the same as being determined.  A
single future in which situation A is sometimes followed by B
and sometimes by C is still random.


It depends on perspective. It's true that from 1p, it looks random. 
But from 3p, it is static and always the same, and in this sense 
determined.


Not true, the 3p view of the future is still just a single 
probabilistic world line. It is only the bird view, from outside 
space and time, that gives the appearance that there are multiply 
existing futures. Neither we from the 1p perspective, or from outside 
ourselves in the 3p perspective, can we ever see any of the other 
branches predicted by MWI.


Yes, like in WM-duplication.


No, that is a serious mistake. Unitary evolution of the wave function is 
not at all like the person duplication experiments. The main difference 
is that the duplicates of the Helsinki man are never in a pure quantum 
state. The teleportation to W or M is of separate classical entities, 
There is no superposition principle for duplicated persons.


The guy in Helsinki can predict that his first person future will be 
unique, even if he knows that in the "bird" picture, that outside the 
teleportation/duplication boxes, there will be two versions of him.


That is not the "bird" picture, that is merely the objective 3p picture 
of the ordinary classical world. The bird picture is solely to do with 
the pure state that is preserved in the unitary evolution pure state of 
the wave function.


This is where the problems with MWI really show up. When you have a 
quantum event with, say, two possible outcomes with equal probabilities, 
such as measuring the polarization of an unpolarized photon, the initial 
probability is 0.5 for each polarization. But after the measurement, the 
probability for the observed result (horizontal or transverse as 
observed) is unity -- because the result has been observed, it is now 
certain. So how did the probability suddenly change from 0.5 to 1.0?


In the classical case, such as the duplicates of the H-man going to W or 
W, there is no problem. The system is already in a mixed state, so the 
change in probability is simply the result of getting additional 
information. Just as in the toss of the fair coin, heads and tails are 
equally likely, but the jump of the probability for 0.5 to 1.0 on 
observing the result is purely a classical epistemological effect. This 
is not true for the quantum pure state. In order for the change in 
probability to be understood epistemologically, the pure state has to be 
reduced to a mixed state (a process that is not necessary in the 
classical examples). In quantum mechanics, this change is brought about 
by the unitary processes of decoherence, and the non-unitary trace over 
the environmental degrees of freedom. This is an essential difference 
between classical and quantum physics, and the necessity for this 

Re: substitution level

[Bruno Marchal]

On 31 May 2017, at 12:44, Telmo Menezes wrote:


Creating a new thread to avoid causing decoherence on the other one :)

What if the substitution level turns out to be at a higher level  
than

quantum? E.g. at the level of the neurons and their connections and
activations levels?



That would enlarge the uncertainty spectrum on the realities we can  
access
without losing anything subjective. It would help the doctor to  
build the
artificial brain. It could also make more difficult to justify the  
smallness
of Planck constant, and to explain why the quantum seems more  
obviously
present in the micro-states, Decoherence would be easier to fight  
against,
and quantum computing would be more easy to be realized. This lakes  
me think

that the quantum level is boundary of the substitution level.


This appears to be a testable hypothesis.

I know that Penrose proposed a theory on the quantum effects inside
neurons that turned ou to be problematic because of decoherence, but
of course that doesn't mean that quantum mechanics might not play a
much more holistic role in brain activity.

I remember a presentation perhaps a decade ago by a neuroscientist at
an artificial life conference, where she showed that neurons can
operate in a chaotic regime. In fact, she claimed at the time that we
did not have the computational power to accurately simulate a single
neuron. To me, this suggests that the activation of neurons might be
governed by much subtler phenomena than simple threshold effects.
Perhaps it is conceivable that small scale quantum effects could
propagate to the macro level of the brain.

On the other hand, it is also true that artificial neural network
models with just simple threshold neurons are already Turing complete,
provided that one allows for recurrence. This proves nothing, but
purely when worrying about neuroscince / artificial intelligence, I am
a it weary of going for more complicated models when there is still so
much to explore in the simpler ones... I say this while completely
disregarding the hard problem. I have perhaps the unusual intuition
that intelligence and consciousness are quite different issues --


I share that intuition when intelligence is used in the sense of  
competence. In that case, consciousness, or conscience, might be at  
the antipode of intelligence.

That feeling is strengthened when reading the news...



although I doubt that it is possible to build a sophisticated AI that
is not conscious (or even a simple one, I don't know).


We have to distinguish Hameroff from Penrose. Hameroff believes/ 
assumes that the brain operates at the quantum level,. He assumes that  
it is a quantum computer. But a quantum computer does not violate the  
classical Church's thesis, and his hypothesis does not change the  
conclusion of Mechanism (although it makes more complex the derivation  
of physics a priori).


Elementary arithmetic is full of quantum computing machineries. I even  
suspect that the prime number distribution encodes a universal quantum  
chaotic dovetailing, but even if that is true, that should not be used  
to justify physics, because we would get the quanta, and not the  
qualia (unless the Riemann hypothesis is shown undecidable in PA (and  
thus true!).


Only Penrose asks for an explicit non computable physical reduction of  
the waves, with some role for gravity, and is authentically non- 
computationalist. Penrose is coherent with computationalism. He keep  
physics as fundamental, but accept the price: the abandon of  
mechanism. But his argument aganist mechanism is not valid, and  
already defeated by machines like PA, ZF, etc.


Bruno






Telmo.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 31 May 2017, at 20:21, David Nyman wrote:




On 31 May 2017 18:39, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 30 May 2017, at 17:00, David Nyman wrote:




On 30 May 2017 at 14:48, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 30 May 2017, at 14:10, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Tue, May 30, 2017 at 1:35 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:






Right, I agree with you and Pierz on this. My point was more on what
you address below.


What if the substitution level turns out to be at a higher level than
quantum? E.g. at the level of the neurons and their connections and
activations levels?

That would enlarge the uncertainty spectrum on the realities we can  
access without losing anything subjective.


​A point against, I assume.


Not sure. Perhaps.






​
It would help the doctor to build the artificial brain.

​A point in favour.


Yes. Modulo it helps also the charlatans, the hackers, etc. But  
that's part of the price. In the long run, 99% of the treatment of  
information might consist in cryptography. Some amount of first  
person privacy is needed to get consistent extensions.






​
It could also make more difficult to justify the smallness of  
Planck constant, and to explain why the quantum seems more  
obviously present in the micro-states,


​Against?



Problematical for the Mechanist.

I would favor the identification of the substitution level with the  
lower classical physical state up to the "quantum isolation".  I  
think this could be proved. It is the level of the molecules, and  
their most probable histories.  The quantum fuzziness is how our  
self-description relatively to the more proable histories appears  
for the average Löbian number.






​
Decoherence would be easier to fight against,

​OK
​
and quantum computing would be more easy to be realized.

​How, if the substitution is above the quantum boundary?


Then physics is deflected from the mechanist self-reference. Put it  
bluntly: computationalism is refuted or we are in a malevolent  
Bostromian simulation (or other number conspiracies. May be, if the  
Riemann hypothesis is false, ...


Of course, it can depend to what you consider to need to survive.  
The level of substitution is defined, not for the survival, but for  
the perfect survival. Above that level, you will continue to  
survive, but
-either you will be aware of a defect, from a permanent headache to  
anything you can imagine, or not.

- Or there will be a defect (observable by a third person, or not).

Exemple: the first classical teleported human, who said after the  
experience : "it is a total success,  it is a total success,  it is  
a total success,  it is a total success,  it is a total success,  it  
is a total success,  it is a total success,  it is a total success,   
it is a total success,  it is a total success,  it is a total  
success,  it is a total success,  it is a total success,  it is a  
total success,  it is a total success,  it is a total success,  ...


And continue to say so in an asylum. Did he survived?

Above the level, you lost things. Obviously, with a digital  
*electronical* neural net, you would lost the experience of  
cannabis, alcohol, salvia, tobacco, until you find the apps on the  
net, emulating the chemical level information. Neurology is  
fundamentals, including the swarm neural play, but each neuron is a  
complex chemical factory, and cells communicates mainly by  
molecules, even when they get the cable (neurons).






​
This ​makes me think that the quantum level is boundary of the  
substitution level.


​I don't follow all of the above. Do you mean a boundary above  
which, or below which, a plausible substitution might be made?


By high level, I mean a vulgar approximation of the brain/body could  
be made, with few mega on the disk.


By low level, I mean an ultra-precise description of a big  
generalized brain, like the brain + a part of the environment  
described by the quantum superstring with 10^100 decimals. You will  
need a big disk.


Normally the relative substitution level determine the boundaries  
between the classical boolean mind and the quantum observable.


But with QM without collapse, the level is not a question of micro/ 
macro, but of independence between computations, in sense which can  
be described by using the modal logics.


In the math part, the level is in the choice of the box, the  
beweisbar provability predicate. The theology is invariant for all  
the sound (mechanical, or weakenings) extensions. But no machines  
can rationally justifies any substitution level, and it is a bit  
like a private matter.


If the brain exploits the quantum weirdness, it means that we can  
extracts information from the statistical measure on all  
computations below our substitution. That possibility is independent  
of the level, and the whole of the apparent matter exploits this,  
and should entirely emerge from this ...


Here I agree with Bohr, if you define the 

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 Jun 2017, at 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 31 May 2017, at 04:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 30/05/2017 9:35 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 30 May 2017, at 11:28, Telmo Menezes wrote:


I get your point with decoherence.
Again, I would say that it all depends on theories of mind. What  
does
mind supervene on? Perhaps it is true that every single coupling  
with

the environment prevents the current observer state to become
compatible with other branches. But can we be sure? I feel that  
such
certainties come from a strong belief in emergentism (which I  
cannot

disprove, but find problematic).


It is impossible to recohere the past, FAPP.

But only FAPP. To make the blue T-rex interfereing with the red-T- 
rex, we must erase the trace of particle interaction between the  
T-rex in its whole light-cone, and this without forgetting the  
particles "swallowed" by the black-holes, etc. It is just  
completely impossible, but to derive from that the unicity of the  
past, is, it seems to me (and you if I understood well) is invalid.


I think the recoherence of paths that have completely decohered is  
more than just FAPP impossible, I think it is impossible in  
principle. One major problem with recoherence in general is that  
information leaks from the paths at the speed of light (as well as  
less slowly for other interactions). Since this vital information  
goes out along the light cone, it can never be recaptured and  
returned to the original interaction.


In QM + special relativity OK. (note that to me QM + special  
relativity => no collapse (and even the Many dreams, but we have  
agreed to disagree on this if I remember well).


Reasoning in QM without SR is not very profitable. Besides, QM + SR  
does not particularly imply MWI -- it is perfectly possible to have  
a consistent collapse model of QM+SR. I know you don't agree because  
of the non-locality implied by EPR, but this non-locality is not  
removed in MWI, regardless of what you might say.


I don't see it, and the mast time we discuss this, we conclude on some  
vocabulary problem. When there is no collapse, measurement tells to  
people light separated in which branch theiy belongs, but to exploits  
that information, they need to come into contact.







Consequently, indispensable phase information is lost *in  
principle*, so the recoherence is, in general, impossible.


OK. (I was reasoning in naive classical QM)

Of course, with carefully constructed systems, where the loss of  
information along the light cone is prevented, recoherence is  
possible in special circumstances, but not in general.


From this, the uniqueness of the past of any decoherent history is  
assured. So deriving the unicity (if I understand this use of the  
word) is by no means invalid -- it is proved.


In QM + SR. OK.

Even if one encounters one of those rare situations in which  
recoherence is achieved, that still does not invalidate the  
uniqueness of the past history -- recoherence, if it occurs,  
simply means that no new branches are formed at that point, so the  
decoherent history remains unique.


OK. That might suggest that we identify our indistinguishible past  
in arithmetic, if we assume mechanism. I use the Y = II principle,  
or the "quantum" linearity of the tensor product "@": we have that   
a @ (b + c) = (a @ b) + (a @ c).


That makes sense.


Linearity is the heart of QM. It is linearity that allows  
superpositions, and leads to all the "quantum weirdness".


I agree. Both "linearities" (the quantum evolution, and the tensor  
products).









FWIW, you
are expressing my own understanding of the situation: there can  
be no
superposition of red and green screens or dinosaurs, or dead  
and live cats,
because there can be no quantum superposition of macroscopic  
objects.
Superpositions of wave functions are only possible for systems  
isolated from
interaction with their environment, which is why quantum  
computers are so
fricking hard to make: keeping aggregates of particles isolated  
from
interactions with the surrounding environment is exponentially  
more

difficult as the system grows in size.


The main question for me is this: can two branches hold different
observer states, if they differ only by things that are not
observable?


I would say no, intuitively. I would even say "no" just for the  
things not observed, even when observable.


I previously answered Telmo's question in the affirmative, viz.,  
two fully decohered branches will hold different observer states,  
even if the differences are not observed or observable. So if some  
trivial physical event happens to your body, such as the decay of  
a K 40 nucleus in your foot, this would not be noticeable, or even  
particularly observable even if you were looking for it. But such  
an event causes at least two branches to form every instant -- one  
in which the decay has occurred, and one in which it 

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 Jun 2017, at 03:59, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 1/06/2017 6:28 am, David Nyman wrote:
On 31 May 2017 at 04:55, Bruce Kellett   
wrote:

On 31/05/2017 12:30 pm, Pierz wrote:
Thanks for these clarifications Bruce. I find your explanations to  
be very lucid and helpful - they also confirm my own understanding.


Thank you for the kind comments, I try my best to be clear.

IIRC, you weren't a particular fan of MWI when I last conversed  
with you on this list.


That is indeed the case. I have several reasons to be dubious about  
MWI. Firstly, it amounts to reifying a complex valued function that  
resides in configuration space -- I am not sure that this is a well- 
defined procedure. Secondly, MWI doesn't really do what it claims  
to do, which is to provide a resolution of the measurement problem  
in QM. MWI doesn't provide any explanation of the transition from a  
pure state to the mixed state that is required for experiments to  
give definite results. At the crucial point, MWI simply says "then  
a miracle happens!" To be more explicit, deterministic evolution of  
the wave function by the Schrödinger equation gives a full account  
of decoherence, and the dissemination of the coherence phases into  
the environment. This reduces the off-diagonal elements of the  
density matrix so that the diagonal elements become *almost*  
orthogonal, but unitary evolution can't go the whole way. The only  
way one can reduce the pure state to a mixture is to trace over the  
environmental degrees of freedom, which is to say that the residual  
phase information is simply thrown away. This trace operation is  
non-unitary, and there is no warrant for it in the SE itself, so it  
is, in the final analysis, just an appeal to magic.


Bruce, is it perhaps finally an appeal to observation per se? IOW  
what you say is of course objectively the case, but perhaps in some  
way the ​residual phase information isn't relevant (i.e. can be  
'traced over') in the synthesis of the 'observer-observation'  
relation. If so, this relation could perhaps resolve the  
'eternalist' pure state (which after all continues simply to be  
'there' in the MWI conception) subjectively into what would give  
the 'instrumental' appearance, in effect, of the probability  
density characteristic of a mixture?


It is often argued that the density matrix is diagonalized FAPP, and  
FAPP is all that is required. Unfortunately, I don't think that that  
really works. Even though the individual off-diagonal elements might  
be arbitrarily small, there are a very large number of them  
(increasing as further environmental degrees of freedom are  
included). The end result is that the original superposition is  
still intact and no 'split' has in fact occurred -- the situation is  
still completely reversible. The problem I point to is that there is  
nothing in the unitary mathematics corresponding to "ignoring  
inessential degrees of freedom". That is what the partial trace  
does, but that has to be imposed by hand, it is not automatic, and  
suffers from all the old difficulties of the Heisenberg cut -- it is  
arbitrary.


Then there wouldn't seem to me to be a necessary idea of 'collapse'  
involved, except in a purely epistemological sense. The term  
'subjective' here is more in the sense of some fundamental  
compositional principle of observer-hood than a restriction to out- 
and-out 'waking consciousness'. I'm not sure if this has any  
necessary connection  to Lockwood's idea of a 'consciousness  
basis'. Of course quite clearly any of this would be highly  
speculative, but I'm wondering if it could make any sense in  
principle? I'd value your opinion.


I think that something like this was what Everett had in mind when  
called this idea the "relative state model". I think he saw the  
observer as complete in every branch, so that


 |psi> = (|1> + \2>)|me>|environment> --> (|1>|me_1> + |2>| 
me_2>)|environment>

  --> |1>|me_1>|environment_1> + |2>|me_2>|environment_2>

and he then considered the two parts of the development to be  
complete in themselves, so we found ourselves in one or the other  
branch. Everett had no particular commitment to the existence of the  
other branches --


Well Everett denied this, and his son, and daughter confirmed this, as  
I have read in a short biography. Everett told that he had been asked  
to withdraw any tlak on parallel world, and the term relative states  
was proposed by the editor of the journal (Review of Modern Physics).  
This seems also clear from his long text.




it was DeWitt who developed the idea of many worlds. The trouble  
here, as is well known, is that the above is still a pure state, and  
we require a reduction to a mixed state in order to be able to  
consider one or other branch on its own. The 'collapse' can be  
regarded as epistemological, but we will still need the mixed state.


OK with this.






Thirdly, the 

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 Jun 2017, at 13:02, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 1/06/2017 8:21 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 31 May 2017, at 09:15, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 31/05/2017 4:40 pm, Pierz wrote:


>> On 5/30/2017 7:30 PM, Pierz wrote:
>>> Thanks for these clarifications Bruce. I find your  
explanations to be very lucid and helpful - they also confirm my  
own understanding. IIRC, you weren't a particular fan of MWI when  
I last conversed with you on this list. I wonder if you'd care to  
comment on my original argument on this thread - which has of  
course now been swamped by the usual brawls. Does not a single  
history + the physical insignificance of the notion of a current  
moment mean that there is also only a single possible future?
>> I don't see how that follows.  In the usual model of forking  
in the future direction every current moment has a single  
history, but multiple futures.


Multiple futures = MWI, surely.


Not necessarily. If you insist on Schrödinger determinism, then  
yes, by reification of the wave function. But if the wave function  
is only epistemological, then there is only one probabilistic  
future.


How could an epistemological wave interfere all by itself? It seems  
simpler to say that the wave is real, but that the local, one  
branch, perception is epistemological.


I think you misunderstand this use of the word "epistemological".  
When it is said that the wave function is merely epistemological,  
what is meant that it is merely a calculational device: the wave  
function encapsulates our knowledge of the system of interest, and  
tells us how to calculate the probabilities of various outcomes. In  
other words, it is not a 'real' wave in space-time.


Yes. That is the problem. How a non real wave in space time can  
interfere really in space-time? Of course, the answer is simple with  
the MWI, but asks for real infuence at a distance with the Mono-world  
assumption.







When I say a single history, I mean that from the Big Bang  
forward, the universe only followed one branch.


And that can lead into the future, only one probabilistic future.


>>
>>> And if the future is predetermined in this way, isn't this a  
serious issue for single universe models of QM? How can the  
outcome of quantum events be both inevitable and random?
>> Having a single future isn't the same as being determined.  A  
single future in which situation A is sometimes followed by B and  
sometimes by C is still random.


It depends on perspective. It's true that from 1p, it looks  
random. But from 3p, it is static and always the same, and in  
this sense determined.


Not true, the 3p view of the future is still just a single  
probabilistic world line. It is only the bird view, from outside  
space and time, that gives the appearance that there are multiply  
existing futures. Neither we from the 1p perspective, or from  
outside ourselves in the 3p perspective, can we ever see any of  
the other branches predicted by MWI.


Yes, like in WM-duplication.


No, that is a serious mistake. Unitary evolution of the wave  
function is not at all like the person duplication experiments. The  
main difference is that the duplicates of the Helsinki man are never  
in a pure quantum state.


That was not the point. The comparison is on the reasult measurement,  
not on the reason of the parallel states. With mechanism, the reason  
are the same (the first person indeterminacy). With collapse, we need  
magic.



The teleportation to W or M is of separate classical entities, There  
is no superposition principle for duplicated persons.


You can defined for the Helsinki guy. He is in a sort of (non quantum)  
superposition state in helsinki, which indeed, like in the MWI, is  
just his ignoance on which computations he belongs. I use Y = II, if  
that is still needed to say.







The guy in Helsinki can predict that his first person future will  
be unique, even if he knows that in the "bird" picture, that  
outside the teleportation/duplication boxes, there will be two  
versions of him.


That is not the "bird" picture, that is merely the objective 3p  
picture of the ordinary classical world. The bird picture is solely  
to do with the pure state that is preserved in the unitary evolution  
pure state of the wave function.


I do not assume QM in that context. I was just doing an anlogy, at  
this stage.






This is where the problems with MWI really show up. When you have a  
quantum event with, say, two possible outcomes with equal  
probabilities, such as measuring the polarization of an unpolarized  
photon, the initial probability is 0.5 for each polarization. But  
after the measurement, the probability for the observed result  
(horizontal or transverse as observed) is unity -- because the  
result has been observed, it is now certain. So how did the  
probability suddenly change from 0.5 to 1.0?


Well, with the MWI, it is the same as the dropping from the Helsinki  
1/2, to the W(M) 

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote:




On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote:


On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote:


On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: 




On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker  wrote:

​Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "​we are to  
extract" over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in  
short, subject precedes object in the explanation. That's the  
reversal.


Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a  
little bit, or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object".


​Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too  
short. But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an  
attempt to avoid ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :(

​
I would say that subjects precedes physical objects​, as physics  
becomes a first person plural notion.


​Exactly

But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we  
have to admit that the number objects still precedes (in some  
logical sense) the subject, which arises from the infinitely many  
computations which supports its self-referential modes.


​Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or  
ontological component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a  
certain objective sense, but their 'observable' or epistemological  
component can only be realised (i.e. made true) in terms of a  
point-of-view.



OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of  
us) aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a  
part of a bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which  
mechanism, and our sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express,  
still less justify, but we can "meta-prove" for the correct  
machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to first the arithmetical  
truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds) the sigma  
arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set.


That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction  
axioms are put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the  
existence of PA, but "for RA" PA is already dreaming.


It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not.  
Nelson believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the  
induction axioms are "viciously" circular,


​Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in  
fact always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if  
only implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of  
'data' on which to base the purported inductive generalisation was  
itself theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something  
more like "on the basis of a certain theory, let us select these  
features as data, which then might lead us to the following  
conclusion...etc.".


I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of  
inductive inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the  
Peano sense. But Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen as  
inductive inference. I agree that inductive inference is theory  
dependent, and it requires not just PA-like induction, but also the  
general assumption, usually at the metalevel that there is something  
to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption).




​
making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I  
think we can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of  
PA, despite most mathematicians believe in the consistency of much  
more (in the sense of proving abilities) powerful theory than PA,  
like ZF, Category, theory, group theory, etc.).




We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject,  
but that would be a bit ad hoc,


​Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind  
of the inner God-subject.


How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts  the truth. The "Bp" is like  
a finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The  
inner god is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window.


​Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed  
(wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual  
object.​


I guess that I meant "natural *number* object.





I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable  
is due to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides  
with the view of the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that  
S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does not split along G/G*. But that is the  
"natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of the first person subject.


​Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least  
heuristically) with monopsychism.


OK. God's solipism. To be sure, the "(outer) God" of mechanism, V,  
is not the biggest "God".  Like in Plotinus, and perhaps arguably  

LIGO has detected a third Black Hole merger

[John Clark]

On January 4 2017 LIGO  detected a third Black Hole merger and the most
distant one yet, 2.9 billion light years. A  31.2 solar mass Black Hole
collided with a 19.4 solar mass Black Hole resulting in a 48.7 solar mass
Black Hole with 2 solar masses converted into gravitational wave energy.

https://www.sciencenews.org/article/ligo-snags-another-set-gravitational-waves

John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 Jun 2017, at 15:59, David Nyman wrote:




On 1 Jun 2017 14:01, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote:




On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote:


On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote:


On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: 




On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker   
wrote:


​Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "​we are to  
extract" over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in  
short, subject precedes object in the explanation. That's the  
reversal.


Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a  
little bit, or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object".


​Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little  
too short. But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an  
attempt to avoid ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long- 
winded :(

​
I would say that subjects precedes physical objects​, as physics  
becomes a first person plural notion.


​Exactly

But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we  
have to admit that the number objects still precedes (in some  
logical sense) the subject, which arises from the infinitely many  
computations which supports its self-referential modes.


​Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or  
ontological component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a  
certain objective sense, but their 'observable' or  
epistemological component can only be realised (i.e. made true)  
in terms of a point-of-view.



OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of  
us) aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a  
part of a bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which  
mechanism, and our sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express,  
still less justify, but we can "meta-prove" for the correct  
machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to first the arithmetical  
truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds) the sigma  
arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set.


That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction  
axioms are put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove  
the existence of PA, but "for RA" PA is already dreaming.


It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or  
not. Nelson believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the  
induction axioms are "viciously" circular,


​Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in  
fact always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if  
only implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection  
of 'data' on which to base the purported inductive generalisation  
was itself theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be  
something more like "on the basis of a certain theory, let us  
select these features as data, which then might lead us to the  
following conclusion...etc.".


I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of  
inductive inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the  
Peano sense. But Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen  
as inductive inference. I agree that inductive inference is theory  
dependent, and it requires not just PA-like induction, but also the  
general assumption, usually at the metalevel that there is  
something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption).




​
making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I  
think we can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of  
PA, despite most mathematicians believe in the consistency of much  
more (in the sense of proving abilities) powerful theory than PA,  
like ZF, Category, theory, group theory, etc.).




We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject,  
but that would be a bit ad hoc,


​Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind  
of the inner God-subject.


How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts  the truth. The "Bp" is like  
a finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The  
inner god is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window.


​Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I  
assumed (wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or  
perceptual object.​


I guess that I meant "natural *number* object.





I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable  
is due to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides  
with the view of the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that  
S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does not split along G/G*. But that is  
the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of the first person subject.


​Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least  
heuristically) with monopsychism.


OK. God's solipism. To 

Re: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 1 Jun 2017 14:01, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:


On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote:



On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:


On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote:

On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>> ​Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "​we are to extract"
>> over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in short, subject
>> precedes object in the explanation. That's the reversal.
>>
>>
>> Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little bit,
>> or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object".
>>
>
> ​Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too short.
> But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an attempt to avoid
> ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :(
> ​
>
>> I would say that subjects precedes physical objects
>> ​,
>> as physics becomes a first person plural notion.
>>
>
> ​Exactly
>
>
>> But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we have to
>> admit that the number objects still precedes (in some logical sense) the
>> subject, which arises from the infinitely many computations which supports
>> its self-referential modes.
>>
>
> ​Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or ontological
> component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a certain objective sense,
> but their 'observable' or epistemological component can only be realised
> (i.e. made true) in terms of a point-of-view.
>
>
>
> OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of us)
> aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a part of a
> bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which mechanism, and our
> sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express, still less justify, but we
> can "meta-prove" for the correct machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to
> first the arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds)
> the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set.
>
> That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction axioms are
> put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the existence of PA,
> but "for RA" PA is already dreaming.
>
> It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not. Nelson
> believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the induction axioms are
> "viciously" circular,
>

​Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in fact
always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if only
implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of 'data' on
which to base the purported inductive generalisation was itself
theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something more like "on
the basis of a certain theory, let us select these features as data, which
then might lead us to the following conclusion...etc.".


I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of inductive
inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the Peano sense. But
Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen as inductive inference. I
agree that inductive inference is theory dependent, and it requires not
just PA-like induction, but also the general assumption, usually at the
metalevel that there is something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption).


​

> making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I think we
> can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of PA, despite most
> mathematicians believe in the consistency of much more (in the sense of
> proving abilities) powerful theory than PA, like ZF, Category, theory,
> group theory, etc.).
>
>
>> We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but that
>> would be a bit ad hoc,
>>
>
> ​Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind of the
> inner God-subject.
>
>
> How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts  the truth. The "Bp" is like a
> finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The inner god
> is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window.
>

​Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed
(wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual object.​


I guess that I meant "natural *number* object.




> I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable is due
> to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides with the view of
> the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does
> not split along G/G*. But that is the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of
> the first person subject.
>

​Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least heuristically) with
monopsychism.


OK. God's solipism. 

Re: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 1 Jun 2017 15:20, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:


On 01 Jun 2017, at 15:59, David Nyman wrote:



On 1 Jun 2017 14:01, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:


On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote:



On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:


On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote:

On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>> ​Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "​we are to extract"
>> over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in short, subject
>> precedes object in the explanation. That's the reversal.
>>
>>
>> Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little bit,
>> or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object".
>>
>
> ​Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too short.
> But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an attempt to avoid
> ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :(
> ​
>
>> I would say that subjects precedes physical objects
>> ​,
>> as physics becomes a first person plural notion.
>>
>
> ​Exactly
>
>
>> But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we have to
>> admit that the number objects still precedes (in some logical sense) the
>> subject, which arises from the infinitely many computations which supports
>> its self-referential modes.
>>
>
> ​Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or ontological
> component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a certain objective sense,
> but their 'observable' or epistemological component can only be realised
> (i.e. made true) in terms of a point-of-view.
>
>
>
> OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of us)
> aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a part of a
> bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which mechanism, and our
> sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express, still less justify, but we
> can "meta-prove" for the correct machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to
> first the arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds)
> the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set.
>
> That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction axioms are
> put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the existence of PA,
> but "for RA" PA is already dreaming.
>
> It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not. Nelson
> believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the induction axioms are
> "viciously" circular,
>

​Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in fact
always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if only
implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of 'data' on
which to base the purported inductive generalisation was itself
theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something more like "on
the basis of a certain theory, let us select these features as data, which
then might lead us to the following conclusion...etc.".


I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of inductive
inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the Peano sense. But
Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen as inductive inference. I
agree that inductive inference is theory dependent, and it requires not
just PA-like induction, but also the general assumption, usually at the
metalevel that there is something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption).


​

> making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I think we
> can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of PA, despite most
> mathematicians believe in the consistency of much more (in the sense of
> proving abilities) powerful theory than PA, like ZF, Category, theory,
> group theory, etc.).
>
>
>> We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but that
>> would be a bit ad hoc,
>>
>
> ​Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind of the
> inner God-subject.
>
>
> How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts  the truth. The "Bp" is like a
> finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The inner god
> is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window.
>

​Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed
(wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual object.​


I guess that I meant "natural *number* object.




> I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable is due
> to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides with the view of
> the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does
> not split along G/G*. But that is the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of
> the first person subject.