Re: [jdev] manifesto DANE does not cut it

2013-11-19 Thread Ralf Skyper Kaiser
Hi Tony, DNSSEC is a step into the right direction. I do not dispute that and salute the jabber community for recognizing this. DNSSEC reduces the risk of an active attack. DNSSEC does not eliminate that risk. On the client/user side this is not sufficient. DNSSEC wont give the user the

Re: [jdev] manifesto DANE does not cut it

2013-11-19 Thread Ralf Skyper Kaiser
Hi Tony, DNSSEC is a step into the right direction. I do not dispute that and salute the jabber community for recognizing this. DNSSEC reduces the risk of an active attack. DNSSEC does not eliminate that risk. DNSSEC in fact only marginally reduces this risk considering the real-world attacks

Re: [jdev] manifesto DANE does not cut it

2013-11-19 Thread Simon Tennant
I don't think anyone here is advocating for downgrading security or not respecing human rights. I do think that we're being pretty sanguine about not letting the perfect become the enemy of the good and incrementally upgrading XMPP's security. Good security is based on layering trust and trust

Re: [jdev] manifesto DANE does not cut it

2013-11-19 Thread Ashley Ward
On 19 Nov 2013, at 11:58, Ralf Skyper Kaiser sky...@thc.org wrote: This attack and vulnerability in the TLS authentication has been recognized by all major browser manufactures. Pinning (on top of DNSSEC) is being implemented as we speak. Why jabber tries so hard of being less secure than

Re: [jdev] manifesto DANE does not cut it

2013-11-19 Thread Ralf Skyper Kaiser
Hi On Tue, Nov 19, 2013 at 12:26 PM, Ashley Ward ashley.w...@surevine.comwrote: On 19 Nov 2013, at 11:58, Ralf Skyper Kaiser sky...@thc.org wrote: This attack and vulnerability in the TLS authentication has been recognized by all major browser manufactures. Pinning (on top of DNSSEC) is

Re: [jdev] manifesto DANE does not cut it

2013-11-19 Thread Thijs Alkemade
On 19 nov. 2013, at 12:58, Ralf Skyper Kaiser sky...@thc.org wrote: Hi On Tue, Nov 19, 2013 at 11:37 AM, Simon Tennant si...@buddycloud.com wrote: I don't think anyone here is advocating for downgrading security or not respecing human rights. I do think that we're being pretty

Re: [jdev] manifesto DANE does not cut it

2013-11-19 Thread Ralf Skyper Kaiser
Hi, On Tue, Nov 19, 2013 at 12:29 PM, Thijs Alkemade th...@xnyhps.nl wrote: On 19 nov. 2013, at 12:58, Ralf Skyper Kaiser sky...@thc.org wrote: Hi On Tue, Nov 19, 2013 at 11:37 AM, Simon Tennant si...@buddycloud.com wrote: Automatic key pinning works for SSH, because private keys

Re: [jdev] manifesto DANE does not cut it

2013-11-19 Thread Thijs Alkemade
On 19 nov. 2013, at 14:07, Ralf Skyper Kaiser sky...@thc.org wrote: Hi, On Tue, Nov 19, 2013 at 12:29 PM, Thijs Alkemade th...@xnyhps.nl wrote: On 19 nov. 2013, at 12:58, Ralf Skyper Kaiser sky...@thc.org wrote: Hi On Tue, Nov 19, 2013 at 11:37 AM, Simon Tennant

Re: [jdev] manifesto DANE does not cut it

2013-11-19 Thread Ashley Ward
On 19 Nov 2013, at 12:30, Ralf Skyper Kaiser sky...@thc.org wrote: Pinning does not require any protocol change in its simplest form. It can be done with just minor changes on the client side. Agreed - in its simplest form you could use it on the c2s connection to ensure the server’s

Re: [jdev] manifesto DANE does not cut it

2013-11-19 Thread Ralf Skyper Kaiser
On Tue, Nov 19, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Ashley Ward ashley.w...@surevine.comwrote: On 19 Nov 2013, at 12:30, Ralf Skyper Kaiser sky...@thc.org wrote: Pinning does not require any protocol change in its simplest form. It can be done with just minor changes on the client side. Agreed - in its

Re: [jdev] manifesto DANE does not cut it

2013-11-19 Thread Peter Saint-Andre
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 11/19/13 9:21 AM, Ralf Skyper Kaiser wrote: On Tue, Nov 19, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Ashley Ward ashley.w...@surevine.com mailto:ashley.w...@surevine.com wrote: On 19 Nov 2013, at 12:30, Ralf Skyper Kaiser sky...@thc.org mailto:sky...@thc.org

Re: [jdev] manifesto DANE does not cut it

2013-11-18 Thread Tony Finch
Ralf Skyper Kaiser sky...@thc.org wrote: The user has to trust ALL keys and not just the single ROOT KEY. That's true, but the amount of trust you have to put in high-level DNSSEC keys is relatively limited. DNSSEC is aware of zone cuts, and high-level keys cannot authenticate domain names

Re: [jdev] manifesto DANE does not cut it

2013-11-15 Thread Ralf Skyper Kaiser
On Thu, Nov 14, 2013 at 6:11 PM, Matt Miller linuxw...@outer-planes.netwrote: On Nov 14, 2013, at 10:43 AM, Ralf Skyper Kaiser sky...@thc.org wrote: On Thu, Nov 14, 2013 at 4:49 PM, Matt Miller linuxw...@outer-planes.net wrote: On Nov 14, 2013, at 9:34 AM, Ralf Skyper Kaiser

Re: [jdev] manifesto DANE does not cut it

2013-11-15 Thread Winfried Tilanus
On 15-11-13 10:30, Ralf Skyper Kaiser wrote: Hi, 1. You are a gay person in Iran 2. An Atheist in Saudi Arabia (or a women) 3. Leonardo da Vinci and dare to suggest that the earth is round 4. A black person wishing to sit in the front row of a bus 5 ... One of the lessons from Snowden is

Re: [jdev] manifesto DANE does not cut it

2013-11-15 Thread Ralf Skyper Kaiser
Hi, Definition: - POST-Prism means the time after PRISM. What we know now. It does not imply that PRISM ever carried out a DNSSEC or DNS attack. Sorry if this was not clear. - Khomeini: Sorry, you are right. He is dead. Use Khamenei. Sorry for the typo. Makes zero difference. Let's stay