Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness

2017-06-18 Thread Jason A. Donenfeld
On Sun, Jun 18, 2017 at 7:55 PM, Stephan Müller wrote: > But you bring up an interesting point: if it is true you say that it is hard > for people to use differnent types of APIs regarding entropy and random > numbers right (which I would concur with), and considering that you imply that > get_ran

Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness

2017-06-18 Thread Jason A. Donenfeld
On Sun, Jun 18, 2017 at 5:46 PM, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > You are effectively proposing that there ought to be a middle range of > security between prandom_32, get_random_u32/get_random_u64 and > get_random_bytes(). I think that's going to lead to all sorts of > complexity and bugs from people not

Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness

2017-06-18 Thread Stephan Müller
Am Sonntag, 18. Juni 2017, 17:46:25 CEST schrieb Theodore Ts'o: Hi Theodore, > > IMHO, users using the get_random_u64 or get_random_u32 are use cases that > > do not require a fully seeded DRNG thus do not need a cryptographically > > strong random number. Hence, I would think that the logging sh

Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness

2017-06-18 Thread Theodore Ts'o
On Thu, Jun 15, 2017 at 01:59:43PM +0200, Stephan Müller wrote: > I would think that the issue regarding the logging is relevant for > cryptographic use cases or use cases requiring strong random numbers only. > Only those use cases should be fixed eventually to wait for a fully seeded > DRNG. >

Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness

2017-06-15 Thread Stephan Müller
Am Donnerstag, 15. Juni 2017, 13:03:48 CEST schrieb Michael Ellerman: Hi Michael, > > Even with this patch, it's still pretty spammy (today's linux-next): > I would think that the issue regarding the logging is relevant for cryptographic use cases or use cases requiring strong random numbers

Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness

2017-06-15 Thread Michael Ellerman
Theodore Ts'o writes: > On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 07:48:04PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: >> This enables an important dmesg notification about when drivers have >> used the crng without it being seeded first. Prior, these errors would >> occur silently, and so there hasn't been a great way of d

Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness

2017-06-08 Thread Jason A. Donenfeld
On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 10:19 AM, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > At the very least we probably should do a logical "uniq" on the output > (e.g., if we have complained about the previous callsite, don't whinge > about it again). That seems okay to me.

Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness

2017-06-08 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 1:48 PM, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > This enables an important dmesg notification about when drivers have > used the crng without it being seeded first. Prior, these errors would > occur silently, and so there hasn't been a great way of diagnosing these > types of bugs for o

Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness

2017-06-08 Thread Theodore Ts'o
On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 07:48:04PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > This enables an important dmesg notification about when drivers have > used the crng without it being seeded first. Prior, these errors would > occur silently, and so there hasn't been a great way of diagnosing these > types of b