Jim,
[Jim Willgoose:] I am playing at trying to reject it. ("poss.Bs
poss.~Bs") I have accepted it more often than not.
Now you tell me.
[Jim] I also understand the difference between discussing formal
properties that hold between propositions (modal or non-modal) and forming a
"1st
Jim, list,
This remains interesting, but, generally, this forum is too addictive for
me! I have to get on with practical matters which are, at this point, getting
over my head. So I'm unsubscribing for a few months. Thanks for people's
interest, Gary, Joe, Jim P., Jim W.,Bernard, and any
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] Peirce says,
"Very many writers assert that everything is logically possible which
involves no contradiction. Let us call that sort of logical possibility,
essential, or formal, logical possibility. It is not the only logical
possibility; for in this sense, two
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] (I responded to your later message first.) I agree with
a lot here.The idea that there are objective possibilities that are true,
regardless of our knowledge, has beenarguably the central issue in
discussions of philosophical realism for 2500 years. The idea of
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] Well, I guess the passage doesn't discuss modal
propositions if you disallow rephrasing "this stove is possibly black" with 'It
is possible that "this stove is black."' There is certainly a logic of
possibility at work.Why aren' t these modal propositions?It is just
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] The proposition "She is possibly pregnant" is easily
understood by all. I overstated my case. (nor is their a potential
contradiction) But I think it masks a problem for the theory of cognition, and
furthermore,not all ordinary expressions are as clear as they might
Jim,
I should add, upon re-reading your comments, that the idea of possibility
that I've been discussing has pretty much been in terms of ignorance, but it
seems to me that the terms don't need to be essentially in terms of ignorance.
If one is talking about a future event, then the reason
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] There is a difference between treating possibility
epistemically or treating it ontologically. "Possibly black' and
"possibly non-black" are (sub) contraries, indeterminate with respect to a state
of information. But since we are considering "this stove," and not
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] You say,
"The question is WHETHER the stove is black -- yes, no, novelly,
probably, optimally, if only if..., etc. What is required for assertion or
proposition or judging or even conceiving the situation is that the mind can
apprehend whether the stove is, isn't, may
Jim, list,
[Jim Wilgoose] It is a little difficult to assess matters since I have
been focusing on the NLC and you are looking more broadly at the corpus. You say
you do it differently. Nevertheless,I will try to locate a problem
area.
[Jim] You say,
[Ben] The disparity of Peirce's
Bill, list,
Peirce does disgtinguish between direct and immediate. See Joe's post from
Feb. 15, 2006, which I reproduce below. It's not very clear to me at the
mmoment what Peirce means by without the aid of any subsidiary instruments or
operation. -- which is part of how he means direct. I
6 Aug 2006 18:58:50 -0400 "Benjamin
Udell"writes:
[Ben] Charles, list,
I guess it's hard for me to let any remarks about my ideas go by
without response, but I still am inclined, as I've put it, to "go quiet."
Charles wrote,
[Charles] [I would say that Be
Joe, list,
Joe, I don't know why it seems to you like I'm suddenly releasing a "tirade
of verbal dazzle." The prose there looks pretty mundane to me and I certainly
didn't mean it intimidate you. Generally when I write such prose I'm just trying
to present links in arguments, keep from
Gary, Charles, Joe, Jim,
Jacob, list,
[Ben] Object and signs are roles. They are logical roles, and their
distinction is a logical distinction
[Gary] As I see it, it's not that simple because of the dynamical
object, the fact of inter-communication as well as internal inference,
etc.
I
Jim, Charles, Gary, Joe,
Jacob, list,
(Let me note parenthetically that, in my previous post, I used the word
"mind" in a number of places where I probably should have used the word
"intelligence," given the far-reaching sense which the word "mind" can take on
ina Peircean context.)
Jim
Charles, Joe, Gary, Jim, Jacob, list,
[Charles] Following up on Joe's saying:
[Joe] "If I am understanding you correctly you are saying that all
semeiosis is at least incipiently self-reflexive or self-reflective or in other
words self-controlled AND that the adequate philosophical
Charles, Joe, Gary, Jim, Jacob, list,
The occasion here is that Charles wrote, "I am still trying to find out if
I have any grasp at all of what you think the (Interpretant -- Sign -- Object)
relation omits." The idea that one can't even grasp what I'm saying leads me to
make one last try.
Charles, Joe, Gary, Jim, list,
Currently, I'm focused on answering Joe's recentest post to me,
particularly in regard to the question of how to argue that some very
complicated complexus of objects, signs, and interpretants will not amount to a
verification. My focus there has as much to do
Jacob, Joe, Gary, Jim, list,
[Jacob] Theres been a lot of debate on this issue of verification, and it
almost sounds like patience is being tried. If I could just give my input
about one remark from the last posting; I hope it helps some.
[Jacob] Ben wrote: I dont know how Peirce and others
Joe, Gary, Jim, list,
[Joe] Ben Says:
[Ben] I don't know how Peirce and others have missed the distinct
and irreducible logical role of verification. I keep an eye open regarding that
question, that's about all. I don't have some hidden opinion on the question.
Tom Short argued that there
Gary, Joe, Jim, list,
(continued,3rd part)
[Gary] Again, you maintain that the "logically determinational role" of
"such recognition" cannot be denied and yet I can't even find it! For me it is
less a matter of its being denied than my not even missing it (clearly you've
fixed your own
Joe, Gary, Jim, list,
I forgot that I had wanted to make a remark on the Pragmatic Maxim in the
present connection.
[Joe] I forgot to say something about the supposed problem of
distinguishing sense from nonsense. That's what the pragmatic maxim is all
about, isn't it?
The Pragmatic
Gary, Joe, Jim, list,
(continued, 2rd part)
[Gary] It does seem most likely and natural that there are a number of
corrections and additions to be made in regard to Peirce's theories. For
example, Ben points to the need for contemporary research fields to find their
places within Peirce's
Bill, Jim, list,
[Bill] I pretty well agree with the following two paragraphs [by Jim, much
further down now -- Ben]. I'd like to make some friendly amendments, however.
I don't think one sign carries more evidential weight than another, but then
I'm not clear on what you mean because I
this, but I can find nothing in my notes that says where that passage is. Does
anyone else recall this, I wonder, or have I merely hallucinated it?)
Joe Ransdell
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Friday, July 28
Jim, list,
[Ben] That signs and interpretations convey meaning, not experience or
acquaintance with their objects, is not only Peirce's view but also the
common idea of most people. For instance, most people might agree that
expertise can sometimes be gained from books about their subject,
Joe, list,
I thought I was so concise that it was okay to pull the topic in my favorite
direction, since it seemed brief. But I have to make some additions and
corrections.
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l
Joe, list,
Thank you for your response, Joe. Comments interspersed below.
- Original Message -
From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2006 1:29 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: MS 399.663f On the sign as surrogate
Joe, list,
The transcription of Peirce's re-write of the On a New List of Categories
is exciting and valuable. For one thing, at last now we know what happened to
the categories of Being and Substance. They're still there; he just no longer
calls them categories.
I've been kind of distracted
Jim, list,
You got me thinking this time!
Your comment below raises another related thought:
I agree about nummbers as othernesses. Other is not unlike an ordinal form
of the phrase more.
What I meant to suggest in my earlier remarks was that other was akin to the
notion of quantity as
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!Wilfred,
My changing an other to another was merely a morphological correction. It's
merely a rule in English. I'm not sure why it's a rule. Maybe it's because of
the pronunciation. The n' in an is felt to be part of the other. For
instance,
Jim,
I don't think that in fact you _would_ say "an...other serving" in
order to mean "another kind of serving." I think that you're drawing right now
on the sense of "other" in a sentence like "He was different, other" -- which is
an unusual use of "other" but isclear enough to sustain its
Jim, list,
I'm not sure at this point what more limited conclusion it is that we're
talking about!
Generally speaking, I don't have a view on any logical valence numbers's
being sufficient or necessary for all higher-valence relations. But I'm a bit
doubtful that Peirce's trichotomism
Claudio, Patrick, list,
That object for which truth stands doesn't sound fully like Peirce. But
Peirce did say that truth is of a predicate, proposition, assertion, etc. ; a
true predicate corresponds to its object. Inquiry seeks to arrive at true signs
about the real.
66~~~ ('A Sketch of
Interesting remarks, including but not limited to those by Peirce.
Maybe I should add that I find it difficult to believe that anyone has
actually been able to read all of the way through Calvino's practical joke of
a book!
It's also difficult to believe that anyone eats all the way through a
Robert, list,
Robert's "The Syntax of a Class of Signs" (scroll down to see) is
interesting. Robert might helpfully clarify a few things.
1. Robert's conclusion is "We can define the syntax of a classe of signs
as the part of the lattice of the ten classes of signs situated below this
Jean-Marc, list
It is unfortunate that Peirce used the terms 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' in
the place of ordinals when he used the same vocabulary for the categories.
In the texts that you chose the terms do not refer to categories, they simply
refer to 3 things presented in a given
Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker!
66~~
*A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine
triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of
detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic
relation to its Object in
Jean-Marc, list,
I don't even agree in the end with Peirce's classification but it's pretty
obvious that whether one partially or totally orders the 10 classes depends on
the criteria. And it's pretty obvious that the trichotomies are ordered (or
orderable) in a Peircean categorial way,
in the
series monistic, dualistic).
Best, Ben Udell
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 11:36 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc, list,
I
Joe, list,
I would add a heuristic value to the mnemonic value which Joe discusses. The
diagrams can bring patterns to light which we might otherwise miss. I think
that Gary will want to address this, but I'll resist the opportunity to steal
his thunder.
More generally, I think that Joe
Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 1:48 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Benjamin Udell wrote:
Jean-Marc, list,
I don't even agree in the end with Peirce's classification but it's pretty
obvious that whether one partially or totally
peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 2:19 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Benjamin Udell wrote:
Jean-Marc,
I spoke of the three trichotomies, not the five or six or ten. If you don't
address what's said, why do you bother sending posts
.
Far from overlooking it, I responded to it, and am still awaiting Robert's
reply. I append it directly below.
Best, Ben Udell
- Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion
Forum Sent: Friday, June 16, 2006 12:28 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: redundancies
of trichotomies
Jerry, Gary, list,
A number of recent posts have addressed the topics of:
On Jun 19, 2006, at 1:05 AM, Peirce Discussion Forum digest wrote:
Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign
I am seeking help in understanding the importance of these terms to
individual scholars.
The definitions are
hought Hartshorne and
Weiss were making some sort of mistake in their account of what Peirce is
saying. I have not yet attempted to find out why I thought this is so, but
I will try to do that now to see if there is anything in that..Joe
Ransdell- Original Message - From: "Benjami
es on sign relations in Peirce.
Gary
Benjamin Udell wrote:
Joe, list,
It will be interesting to find out what you thought was wrong about what
the editors were saying. Again, thank you for your efforts in
this!
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
Joe, Vinicius, Robert, list,
My initial reaction was that Peirce had added the numbers but then I came
generally to the same conclusions as Joe.
It sure would be nice to have a color copy. I tend to think that at least
the line-boxes themselves were drawn by Peirce (the chart _is_ on graph
You're welcome, Joe.
Before you go, do you have a clearer view of the words written in the third
set of boxes?
Here's what it looked to me like it was saying:
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Joseph Ransdell
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 10:25
to stop for breakfast first!
Joe
- Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce
Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 9:38 AMSubject:
[peirce-l] Re: representing the ten classes of signs (corrected)
You're welcome, Joe.
Before you go, do you have a clearer view
Image came through beautifully!
Look carefully at the MS799.2 triangle of boxes and you can that the numbers
are change from an earlier set of numbers. I originally thought that the little
earlier numeral 8 was an extra numeral 3
CURRENT:
1 ~ 5 ~ 8 ~ 10
~ 2 ~ 6 ~ 9
~~ 3 ~ 7
~~~ 4
EARLIER:
work, Joe! Thanks for these images of Peirce's own writing.
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 2:01 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Image
Wilfred wrote,
"List,
"I did not know the Digital Peirce online site before. "
I should just send this to every new peirce-lister. Additions
corrections welcome. I've checked these links, they're all live, though some of
the URLs seem to be the result of recent changes. - Ben Udell
-
the word “red” more as being a qualisign, which then would also fit the
last sentence below. To me the word “red” can not be a sinsign since it is not
an actual existing thing or event. And to me a quality (like red) can also not
be a legisign. But I might be wrong. Of course.
Wilfred
Van: Benjamin U
Joe, Bernard, Wilfred, list,
_Magno cum grano salis_ it is, then. The content of the 10-chotomy on which I
got my paws is very suggestive, beginning with the sign's own phenomenological
category and ending with a trichotomy of _assurances_ of instinct, experience,
and form, i.e., as at an
Thank you,
Bernard!-Ben
Qualisign
Sinsign
Legisign
Icon
Index
Symbol
Rheme
Dicisign
Argument
qualisigns
iconic
rhematic
/ sinsigns
\
iconic
rhematic
Cassiano wrote,
It's been a long while I don't write, but the subject interests
me.I run the risk of repeating everything that was said here about
entelechy, but a look up at the form of the word seems appropriate:
entelechy in ancient greek is a form of saying (as literally as I can
see)
as inferable from a phenomenon of which
it is said to be the signification.
4. Importance; consequence; significant import. Halliwell. [Obsolete or prov.
Eng.]
5. In French-Canadian law, the act of giving notice; notification.
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce
Gary, Jim, list,
[Gary] I've been wanting to address some of the issues of this post of Ben's
but, feeling under the weather, I can't yet tackle it with any certainty that
I'll contribute to clarifying any of these. I did come across an interesting
passage today which, however, might shed
-
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Monday, May 29, 2006 3:41 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Graphics in posts
List,
I've been considering Richard Hake's complaints about html, graphics, etc., in
messages. Believe it or not, I have some
Jim, list,
Oops, erratum: I wrote: "Darned if I know what it'd mean for a particle to
go at lightspeed -- tau zero -- in a circle and thus coincide with itself
indefinitely many times all at once.)."
I was thinking of the particle's "own" viewpoint. (Technically, it
doesn't even have one
Jerry,
Jerry,
I missed this question in my response to your post to Gary R. and me:
[Jerry] Can you explain your understanding / usage of the concept of
grammar?
Gary is using "grammar" in Peirce's sense, in order to refer to the
discipline and field of study of the various kinds of signs,
Jerry,
Gary Richmond's view doesn't technically contradict Gary F.'s statements, since
Gary F.'s statements were qualified by the possibility of somebody's producing
evidence, though Gary F. obviously seemed doubtful about the idea of the
chemical connection. I felt kind of doubtful too,
Dear Jim, list,
One thing is that I wouldn't underrate the importance of the conception of
resistance/reaction -- I wouldn't replace it with location. Location has a lot
to do with resistance and reaction! Space, shortest distances, straight lines,
least action, fields, -- there's quite a set
Jim, list,
Ben wrote: (Beginning with a quote from my earlier remarks)
[Jim] One can indicate the location of an object (or at least to its center
of gravity). An object which perfoms this function is called an index. One
can not readily point to the quality or form an object because form
Gary F, list,
[Gary] I've been following this thread with great interest -- following in
the sense that it's always a step or two ahead of me! But i'd like to insert
something with reference to Ben's question about words like not, probably,
if, etc.
[Gary] I don't think it is helpful to
Gary F., list
An addendum
[Gary] Another relevant distinction from linguistics is between semantics and
syntax. If we want to study what (or how) how closed-class words mean, then
we have to focus mainly on syntax, or the structure of utterances as
determined not by objects denoted or
Joe, list,
I had a thought about an topic from February 2006.
- Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell To: Peirce Discussion
Forum
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2006 9:32 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS:
So what is it all about?
[Ben] Yet attributions, ascriptions,
rsue choosing verbs
for these various aspects of signifying.
Anyway, while I'm at it, I've made a few syntatically stylistically
desperately needed corrections, between astrisks in blue, to my own previous
post, after Gary's quotes from Peirce.
Best, Ben Udell
- Original Message -
From: &
Joe, list,
The popular discussions of category theory on the Internet haven't helped me
very much. Apparently the basic explanational problem is that it's based on
higher math, so it's just hard to explain.
I once asked a singularity theorist, okay, it's about categories, so what are
the
List,
Just wanted to note that I'm having second thoughts about the idea that decay
is not an end!
But I'll keep it at least somewhat short because Jerry LR Chandler's post looks
interesting. (I read some things at http://www.hyle.org/ (philosophy of
chemistry) a few years ago, including
Gary,
Actually, you weren't taking too much for granted, at least not with most of
the listers, only with ignorant me. I think most listers have either read
Prigogine or read discussions about him. I have a book of his somewhere but
haven't read it.
[Gary] However i still don't find anything
Bill,
Thank you. Talking about cause effect does seem a bit of an art and when I
think about it too much, I tend to feel like I'm on thin ice. With other
factors held the same, when one wiggles something x, and something y behaves in
some corresponding manner and otherwise does not, then we
France, list
[Frances] My position is to generally agree with Peirce and pragmatism, to
include the trichotomic structure of the phenomenal categories.
One metaphysical thorn for me however is whether all the things in the world
as posited by Peirce are indeed phenomenal, or rather if there
Frances, list,
It's a bit hard to respond to this because, though it's okay for you to
disagree with Peirce, you do so in ways that are vague to me; I don't really see
clearly the viewpoint which you hold, so it's hard for me to address it. For
instance, you say things like "...which signs
: [peirce-l] Re: evolving universe
On 3/23/06, Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Il-Young Son, list,
Il-Young Son wrote,
I am not sure how many, if many, when pressed, would object to the notion
that there are fundamental limits to models and that the mapping (or the
mediator) between
it's an index or subindex in singling me
out, or singling some other Ben out. It's not a legisign in virtue of such
ambiguity.
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Sent: Sunday, March 19, 2006 1:32 PM
Subject: [Norton AntiSpam] [peirce-l] Re: naming def
Jim, list,
You sound like you've gotten it partly right.
Sometimes Peirce characterizes the index as something that can be general
or singular (individual). But sometimes instead he says that an index has to be
singular (individual).Once, hedefines as thesubindex that
which is a sign
Joe, Jim,
Joe wrote,
Jim:
Subindex is not a Peircean term, is it? What is it and why should Peirce
be concerned to distinguish an index from it?
Joe Ransdell
I recently posted about the index and the subindex. Friday, February 10, 2006
2:51 PM, Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So
Thomas, list,
Peirce's version of the proof for Cantor's theorem can be mapped in a quite
straightforward way to the structure of the New List of 1867. At the same
time the proof of Cantor's theorem can be extended by continued
diagonalization (which latter, by the way, Peirce discovered
Frances, Gary, Steven, Joe, Theresa, list,
I've taken a while to respond to this, partly because I've been busy, and
partly because I wished, despite my difficulty in understanding it, to be
responsive to it. I admit I've simplified my task by only briefly skimming all
the posts that have
Jim,
I don't know what could be wrong. It works fine on my MS Internet Explorer
Mozilla. Ah, the heck with it! Here they are. - Best, Ben
Collateral observation
(quotes) Update: Thomas
L. Short points to “a long and important
section of MS318, first published by Helmut Pape in Nous 1990
Jim, list,
Jim wrote:
Ben,I have a question. What is the relation between cognition and
recognition? It seems that 3a and 3b respond to two different questions, namely,
what is a correct logical description of the structure of cognition and how is
that structure *validated* for any given
Claudio, list,
It's fine with me if you or others modify my graphics for the purposes of
discussion, and you seem good at the graphics.
The discussion has advanced considerably beyond the point which you seem to
have reached. You seem to have isolated a few of my remarks and addressed them
Frances,
In Peirce's discussions of collateral experience, notice how he repeatedly says
that the sign, the interpretant, the sign system, do not convey experience of
the object. Instead, they convey meaning about the object.
Second correction! I must be tired. Sorry. I've gone over it extra carefully
this time. - Ben.
Sorry, one-word correction, but it's needed. It's indicated in the text. - Ben
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Hi, Thomas,
Some of what you say is quite suggestive. I hope somebody here at peirce-l
understands it better than I do.
I'm hardly acquainted with the EGs. I had a notion that they're basically a
visual form of 1st-order logic. I had no idea that Peirce's exploding-point
cuts and his maths of
Gary, Jim, Joe, Thomas, list,
Erratum. In fact I should probably have cut the kinematic quantities out
since there's room to explain what the heck I'm thinking about with them, but,
since I mentioned them, I should at least get them right. Change of observer's
time should appear where I put
Joe, list,
[Joe] Ben, you say:
[Ben] I don't pose a tetradic reduction thesis applicable to all relations.
I just say that there's a fourth semiotic term that isn't any of the classic
three.
A sign stands for an object to an interpretant on the basis of a recognition. I
think that an
; harder still to confirm solidify it by entelechy = by staying good =
continual renovation and occasional rearchitecting (entelechy is not
necessarily a freeze) amid changing evolvable conditions.
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce
Joe, list,
Thank you for your recollections of Morgenbesser.
He sounds so New York Jewish!
To B.F. Skinner, Let me see if I understand your thesis. You think we
shouldn't anthropomorphize people?
Yes, I've come to think that the NYT claim sounds ridiculous (I didn't know
what to think back
Darrel, Tori, Gary,
I knew it!
I shoulda, woulda, coulda posted my surmise that it was from nothing.com.
By the way, did you check out something.com? There's been something there,
though the server seems to be down right now.
Best, Ben Udell
Tori,
Being an optimist by nature, I typed
Joe, Gary,
Thanks, Gary, for letting me know that I'm not out to lunch on this one. I
think that you're right, that the same distinction appears, just with different
words, and when Peirce gets down to the business of defining, he's persistently
clear which words mean what.
Joe, you'll
Joe, list,
I think you've got it right -- the cognitive content rather than either the act
of interpretation or the activity of interpretation. This distinction may get
slippery, though, insofar as obect - sign - interpretant are agent - patient -
act! Well, let's burn that bridge when we come
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