[peirce-l] Re: Peirce and knowledge
On Sep 26, 2006, at 3:23 PM, Burke Johnson wrote:
Did Peirce ever give his own working definition of the word
knowledge?
I know that Peirce thought that our knowledge is fallible,
truth is
something we only approach in the long run, that scientific knowledge
has a social nature, etc., but, again, would anyone on the list
tell me
more about how you think he would define that concept?
Thanks in advance.
Burke Johnson
Check out the entry on Fallibilism in the Peirce Dictionary:
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/fallibilism.html
There isn't an entry for knowledge but many of the quotes end up
getting at the point.
I'd add that I think knowledge for the individual in Peirce ends up
being that belief which we can't doubt which is thus a habit.
Knowledge in the sense of the community of inquirers is obviously a
bit more.
I'd add that this quote from CP 2.773 might be helpful as well.
Reasoning is a process in which the reasoner is conscious that a
judgment, the conclusion, is determined by other judgment or
judgments, the premisses, according to a general habit of thought,
which he may not be able precisely to formulate, but which he
approves as conducive to true knowledge. By true knowledge he means,
though he is not usually able to analyse his meaning, the ultimate
knowledge in which he hopes that belief may ultimately rest,
undisturbed by doubt, in regard to the particular subject to which
his conclusion relates. Without this logical approval, the process,
although it may be closely analogous to reasoning in other respects,
lacks the essence of reasoning. Every reasoner, therefore, since he
approves certain habits, and consequently methods, of reasoning,
accepts a logical doctrine, called his logica utens. Reasoning does
not begin until a judgment has been formed; for the antecedent
cognitive operations are not subject to logical approval or
disapproval, being subconscious, or not sufficiently near the surface
of consciousness, and therefore uncontrollable. Reasoning, therefore,
begins with premisses which are adopted as representing percepts, or
generalizations of such percepts. ('Dictionary of Philosophy and
Psychology' vol. 2, CP 2.773, 1902)
I'd add this one as well.
But since symbols rest exclusively on habits already definitely
formed but not furnishing any observation even of themselves, and
since knowledge is habit, they do not enable us to add to our
knowledge even so much as a necessary consequent, unless by means of
a definite preformed habit. ('Prolegomena to an Apology for
Pragmaticism', CP 4.531, 1906)
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[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Gary, Joe, et al.
With circularity, I think you'll have to consider, what Peirce wrote of taking up the same premisses again and again in cyclical systems, e.g. cyclical algebra. That is not circulum vitiosum. The same premisses take on new meanings, with a new context, that's how I've interpreted the idea.
To Peice, meaning IS contextual.
Kirsti Määttänen
[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
25.9.2006 kello 20:55, gnusystems kirjoitti:
Joe, thanks for that pointer to Jeff Kasser's paper; it clears up many
of the questions i've had lately about what Peirce meant by
psychologism (and psychology).
However i'm inclined to question Jeff's emphasis (in the middle of the
paper) on the circularity of psychologistic approaches to logic as a
crucial component of Peirce's antipsychologism. I think there's an
important sense in which the logic of science -- the logic that Peirce
was mainly interested in -- *has* to be circular, or rather cyclical. I
won't go into that here, but i will point out a circularity in Peirce
which i think would be rather damning if all circles were vicious.
Jeff quotes W2 270-1, CP 5.354, EP1 81 [1869]:
[[[ [L]ogic rigidly requires, before all else, that no determinate fact,
nothing which can happen to a man's self, should be of more consequence
to him than everything else. He who would not sacrifice his own soul to
save the whole world, is illogical in all his inferences, collectively.
So the social principle is intrinsically rooted in logic. ]]]
Now, compare this with a clearly recycled version from 1878 (EP1, 149;
CP 2.654):
[[[ It seems to me that we are driven to this, that logicality
inexorably requires that our interests shall not be limited. They must
not stop at our own fate, but must embrace the whole community. This
community, again, must not be limited, but must extend to all races of
beings with whom we can come into immediate or mediate intellectual
relation. It must reach, however vaguely, beyond this geological epoch,
beyond all bounds. He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the
whole world, is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his inferences,
collectively. Logic is rooted in the social principle. ]]]
The social principle is rooted in logic, and logic is rooted in the
social principle. If that ain't circular, what is?
gary
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[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Coming out of hibernation this is one hell of an interesting thread, but I've not had time to put in my contribution because my time is consumed with various projects. So I'll put in my 0.02 cents worth now. What more compelling factor in fixation of belief is there than the mind-body unity of all the mind-bodies (of our body-cells) that come together in the one mind-body that is self? What about all the little animals (neurons) that are having to contend with their own habits? Surely the group-habits of the cells of which we are composed will establish an attractor (chaos theory) that will lock us into fixed ideas until we can get the whole team (of cells) to agree to a new set of habits? People can incorporate new ideas swiftly, so long as these new ideas are not in fact new, but expressions of an EXISTING logic-set. It's easy to change political opinions, for example, if we know what the different political parties are about - but this understanding of political parties emerges over a long period of time. But step outside of what we know, and the fixation of belief, courtesy of the habits of the critters of which we are comprised, will have a lot of momentum that is not changed easily. A truly new idea will take some considerable time to emerge, especially within a new logical framework that is establishing itself. In other words, we are dealing more with the momentum of tornadoes and hurricanes rather than logic-switching of circuits. That's my 0.02 cents worth. Back to my projects... __ Newton's Laws of Emotion: http://members.iinet.net.au/~tramont/biosem.html There can be no complexity without simplicity. Stephen Springette __ --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Title: [peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Pei Kristi, Yes indeed, I'm thinking of growth logically. This is why I don't think (at least am not convinced by any argument I've seen) that there is much to be gained by looking at the order of different methods of fixation chiefly in psychic or psychological terms. We can certainly conceive the logical possibility of a monadic mind, however we need to remember that for Peirce mind (human or not) is Third since the Law of Mind is the law of habit-taking. A monadic mind would therefore be a mind in an entirely different sense, it would be a mind that cannot grow, that cannot form habits; it would be the mere possibility of a mind, one where the law of mind would be a mere incohate possibility. cheers, Martin Lefebvre Martin, Joe, et al., 25.9.2006 kello 19:40, martin lefebvre kirjoitti: I consider the Fixation essay to be organized around a sort of development/growth principle that leads to the scientific method as the method of choice of reason. I believe that growth here can be thought of categorially. Yes, I agree, absolutely. But still, the principle of growth can be viewed as predominantly a logical order, or predominantly as a metaphysical order, or as a psychic order ( the term 'psychic' to be understood here in contradistinction to 'psychological' - which is a distinction Peirce at least once made - a distinction I've interpreted as: the former referring to philosophy of mind, and the latter referring to the empirical science called 'psychology'.) From the following, it seems to me you are considering the logical order: The method of tenacity works as long as the individual is considered monadically (the social impulse must be held in check) and as long as there is no attempt to examine a belief against experience. A monadic mind (what could that be???)... A monadic mind is something we can think of, so it's a logical possibility, it is conceivable, irrespective of whether any such (human) mind would exist. Kirsti Määttänen [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Joe, Kirsti, list,
[[ Well, Gary, it looks like some fancy footwork with the term is
rooted in might have to be resorted to if we are to save Peirce on this
one! You've caught him with a flat contradiction there! ]]
Personally i think the contradiction is more apparent than flat. As i
said (and i think Kirsti said the same), this is not circulum vitiosum
but a pattern which underlies inquiry and therefore can only be itself
investigated via a cyclical process.
The social principle is implicit in explicit (formal) logic, *and*
logic/semeiotic is implicit in the social principle. (Though Peirce
would not have put it that way in 1869 or 1878.) The social
principle is intrinsically rooted in logic (1869) because recognition
of others as experiencing beings is a special case of seeing a
difference between phenomenon and reality, or between sign and object --
or between soul and world, to use the terms Peirce uses in both of
these passages. Logic begins with the revelation of a real world out
there beyond phenomenal consciousness. Logic is rooted in the social
principle (1878) in that it explicates the relationship between
experience and reality, which it cannot do prior to the developmental
stage at which the difference between the two is recognized -- a stage
accessible only to *social* animals who can handle symbolic signs. (The
method of tenacity is, in a sense, a reversion to an earlier stage of
development even though it is also a social stance.)
So i don't think Peirce needs to be saved; or if he does, it's only
because (like a bodhisattva) he has sacrificed his own soul to save the
whole world.
gary F.
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[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Gary, Joe, Kirsti, list,
Personally i think the contradiction is more apparent than flat. As i
said (and i think Kirsti said the same), this is not circulum vitiosum
but a pattern which underlies inquiry and therefore can only be itself
investigated via a cyclical process.
I have to agree. The more I read of Peirce, the more I see loops of reasoning -
loops, networks, call it what you will. In fact it only seems to jive with his
thinking, especially showing itself when he gets knee-deep in relative logic.
The circle has less to do with circular reasoning than with being able to
define even the simplest conceptions via the logic of relations (5.207).
A bit like the hermeneutic circle of Heidegger - the structure of meaning, and
of Dasein itself, looping back on itself and forming a system (H. 153 of Being
and Time). So far as I know, Heidegger never read Peirce, but they seem to be
touching on the same thing.
Circles in reasoning must be demonstrated to be truly vicious; I'm not
convinced that this one is.
best,
jacob
Original-Nachricht
Datum: Wed, 27 Sep 2006 09:35:29 -0400
Von: gnusystems [EMAIL PROTECTED]
An: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Betreff: [peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce
referring to?
Joe, Kirsti, list,
[[ Well, Gary, it looks like some fancy footwork with the term is
rooted in might have to be resorted to if we are to save Peirce on this
one! You've caught him with a flat contradiction there! ]]
Personally i think the contradiction is more apparent than flat. As i
said (and i think Kirsti said the same), this is not circulum vitiosum
but a pattern which underlies inquiry and therefore can only be itself
investigated via a cyclical process.
The social principle is implicit in explicit (formal) logic, *and*
logic/semeiotic is implicit in the social principle. (Though Peirce
would not have put it that way in 1869 or 1878.) The social
principle is intrinsically rooted in logic (1869) because recognition
of others as experiencing beings is a special case of seeing a
difference between phenomenon and reality, or between sign and object --
or between soul and world, to use the terms Peirce uses in both of
these passages. Logic begins with the revelation of a real world out
there beyond phenomenal consciousness. Logic is rooted in the social
principle (1878) in that it explicates the relationship between
experience and reality, which it cannot do prior to the developmental
stage at which the difference between the two is recognized -- a stage
accessible only to *social* animals who can handle symbolic signs. (The
method of tenacity is, in a sense, a reversion to an earlier stage of
development even though it is also a social stance.)
So i don't think Peirce needs to be saved; or if he does, it's only
because (like a bodhisattva) he has sacrificed his own soul to save the
whole world.
gary F.
}To seek Buddhahood apart from living beings is like seeking echoes by
silencing sounds. [Layman Hsiang]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
}{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/gnoxic.htm }{
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[peirce-l] Re: What fundamental psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Kirsti Mtt��nen kirstima at saunalahti.fi writes: Dear Eugene, Thanks for an inspiring mail. The idea of a progressively broadening social conception I find a very fruitful one, enriching the idea of a logical ordering. This, together with your exhilarating thought-experiment with an evolutionary-historical progression, definitely made some thoughts I was not quite in the clear with, more clear. But I cannot see that the social should be excluded from the method of tenacity in the way you state: ��A tenaciously held belief is still social, as any habit is. Yet the social is excluded from the method of tenacity. What you believe by tenacity may also be social and learned, or perhaps social and instinctive, but believed in because you simply continue to believe in it, regardless of others' beliefs. Take for example the way things are nowadays in scientific communities, which is no way really furthering finding out truth. It's arranged according to the belief that maximal competition (between individuals) ensures that the 'best ones' win. Well, 'the best ones' in that view may win, but the truth certainly is not a winner. - Anyway, the method of tenacity is bound in this context to become one individuals with some success are pressed to resort to. Because if anything fundamental to the work of that individual is convincingly questioned, and so threatened, the whole career may be at stake. It does not make any difference, whether the person in question has primarily the truth as a personal motivating aim, or the just the aim of a fine career, winning others presents itself either as the means, or as the aim. In Economy of Reseach (or thus titled in CP) Peirce sees the only way of really furthering the finding out of the truth in the practice of just funding generously a lot of people. With a rational HOPE, but nothing more sure, that some of them, but some ones which cannot be identified in advance, will produce something worth funding the whole lot. Well, it's a long time since I read that piece. But I've had the opportunity for a good many years to be a part of a (quite small) research institute with absolutely no problems with funds. Within a short time it became internationally acknowledged as the leading institute in the field, as well as highly appreciated outside the special field. Then various things happened, and with them the 'normal' scarcity of funding started. Within a VERY short time followed a deep decay in level of research. I also had the opportunity to discuss with one of the persons in charge of the so called 'golden coller' department in the Finnish company Nokia, which some you may know, before the stupendous success the company later achieved. The principles were the same, except somewhat less rational. They acted on a principle based on spending money on individuals, based on decisions made in upper departments in the hierachy. So they were just sloshing around money, irrationally. At the institute I was a member, all decisions were discussed. But there was no pressure to make them look like reasonable to the outside. One of my favorite quotes from that particular piece used to be the metaphor by Peirce: Burning diamonds instead of coal to produce heat. Thanks again, Kirsti Kirsti Mtt��nen kirstima at saunalahti.fi Dear Kirsti, If I understand your criticism that the social should not be excluded from the method of tenacity, you are saying that much research today goes on under Darwin-like survival of the fittest rules: research by tenacity in a competitive social milieu, individuals forced by the game to stick to their prior thought which gave them their success. It seems to me somewhat similar to the description of Isolato tenacity I gave. Are you saying that through the competitive social milieu, in pushing individuals into tenacity, the social is thereby ingredient in the method of tenacity? Or that methodically tenacious individuals, in aiming for competitive social success, thereby reveal the social within the method of tenacity? I'm not sure. It seems to me such individuals can be characterized as aiming for power through whatever means, and would fit the method of authority. I characterized it in my previus post as: 2 You believe what you are forced by social power to believe or can force on others to believe. By force here I would include social legitimation, the power politics of cliques, peer reviews, etc., and not only police. Or maybe I should soften what I said in previous post to viewing the social as only indirectly involved in the method of tenacity? Tenacity seems to me to be about imposing one's way on experience. I am also familiar with the funding approach you describe, through some encounters with the MacArthur Foundation way back. I spent one evening with Jonas Salk and Rod MacArthur (shortly before he
