[peirce-l] Re: Peircean elements
Ben, I have a question. What is the relation between cognition and recognition? It seems that3a and 3b respond to two different questions, namely, what isa correct logical description of the structure of cognition and how is thatstructure *validated* for any given peice of information. No wonder that 3a and 3bappear incompatible. To represent an answer graphically would appear to require extended sides,more vertices, new objects and interpretants sincewhat determines a sign to an interpretant does not explain how or why it does so. I do not know if I am even getting warm here but I guess that the interpretant might become a sign which has new objects and interpretants that do the explaining. How the extended apparatus can show its reference to the original structure of cognition without ad hoc marks eludes me. Jim W-Original Message-From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Wed, 8 Mar 2006 15:20:42 -0500Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Peircean elements Claudio, list, It's fine with me if you or others modify my graphics for the purposes of discussion, and you seem good at the graphics. The discussion has advanced considerably beyond the point which you seem to have reached. You seem to have isolated a few of my remarks and addressed them without reading the rest. Thus you end up saying things like you find "nothing" in my text about _why_ there should be a fourth element. It really is not plausible to address my explanations by claiming that I did not offer any, claiming it so casually as to raise the question of whether you read more than a few sentences of that post. I in fact did so and have done so in many other posts. You also fail to distinguish between the categories themselves, the semiotic elements, and, apparently, Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes. About a year after I joined peirce-l, Joe justifiably dinged me for not offering arguments for my claims -- I was mainly offering patterns of ideas and asking people to ponder them and grasp resonances, grasp them as that which might be called a philosophical-conceptual version of curve-fitting. So, since then, I have worked to develop arguments, and sought to capture articulate various inferential moves which I was making but had regarded as somehow "too technical" to be worth stating. And so I can understand how the interpretant seems to have the valuable cognitive content and how an inference to a judgment,an inference to a recognition, can seem somehow "extra" and its thematization can seem "not reallyneeded" because what such inference adds is mainly soundness, it adds the status of that which can reasonably be called knowledge,rather than still-further understanding.The interpretant appraises; the recognition merely legitimates. But in fact it is by such inference and its articulate counterpart, the argument that concludes in an acknowledgement, that a discipline like philosophy gets anywhere. I mean, it's nice and I really do like it when people respond to my posts, but I ask them to follow the argument closely enough to respond to it. Also, my arguments relate in important ways to Peirce's discussions of collateral experience, many of which are at http://peircematters.blogspot.com/2005/02/collateral-observation-quotes.html Now I think I can show, that collaterally based recognition's being a semiotic element follows from the Peircean conception of semiotic (a.k.a. logical) determination. I will try to make it as deductive as I can, so it is important for the reader to consider whether s/he grants the premisses and regards the conclusions as following deductively or at least cogently. Points 1 - 3 have, I think, the most deductive structure, I can't deduce all possible counterarguments, however, so from 4 (with its A-K) onward we're in especially inductive territory. I will send Points 1-4 today. Some peope may have additions to make for Point 4, so I'll hold off on going beyond Point 4for a week or two. Thebasic ideais that everything logicallydeterminate or determinative is logically determinate or determinative _as_ a semiotic element, (e.g.,_as_ semiotic object or _as_ sign or _as_ interpretant). Thus, if the collaterally based recognition is logically determinate or determinative in its role _as_ collaterally based recognition,then it must be a semiotic element. 1. **Semiosis is logical process, the process OF logic,and everythinglogically determinative or determinate in the course of semiosis is so _in some logical role_.** 2. **The idea of the sufficiency of the triad, the idea of the diagrammability of relationships of logical determination interms of the three elements or elemental roles in thetriad,is this, the idea that everything that is logically determinative or determinate,is so,in the role of either object, sign, or interpretant.** If somebody diagrams semiotic, logically determinational relations, one would expect at any given juncture or 'vertex' to find a
[peirce-l] naming definite individuals
List, I am trying to sharpen my understanding of the concept of index with respect to a natural or an artificial language.I was struck by the number of entries, at least in the Commens Dictionary, that fail to isolate what is essential for distinguishing an index from a subindice with respect to linguistic entities. Peirce uses a lot of concepts, including connection, relation, real relation, reaction, actual connection, individualand existence to doa lot ofwork. In the case of proper names, if the name is governed by a law or legisign, it can count as an index. BUT this still does not give us all of the the necessary conditions fora proper name to count as an index. (In fact, the law could state that it has indefinite reference, and thus concede that proper names are subindices.) The further necessary condition appears to be "definite."I did not find this in the Commens. The law has to prescribe the application of the name to *one and only one individual.* I might add that the existence and individuality of the object namedare criticallyessential also. But those two conditions are not sufficient. Consequently, the proper name "Charles Peirce" is an index only if: 1. Charles Peirce existed 2. Charles Peirce is an individual 3. "Charles Peirce" names a definite object Maybe I missed something in the Commens or should look elsewhere or maybe "individual" and "existence" do all the work "definite" is supposed to. But it seems thatthey do not.Even if Charles Peirce can be differentiated from every other existent individual and made definite, I cannot find any entry in the Commens Dictionary that captures how the law of the proper name could suggest this application.Thus,I cannot find in the text how a proper name can clearly count as an index rather than a subindice. It is not enough to suggest that a law is involved without being more specific about that law. Does anyone know of another passage? Any related comments are welcome too. Jim W Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
You say,
"Subindex" is not a Peircean term, is it?What is it and why should Peirce be concerned to distinguish an index from it?
Joe,
The Commens Dictionary (online) has a singleentry for "Subindex" in the left side roll down window. It links to the followingpassage from CP2.274.But Peirce uses "subindices" in thispassage.I am not aware of him ever using "subindex." The passagehints atwhatsubindices are.(I never used"subindex" in my post.) You probably know all this. My concern is with distinguishing what kind of sign a proper name is, especially in light of both of the following passages. Peirce was apparently interested in the difference betweenan index and a subindice. He uses proper names as examples of both. What distinguishes them with respect to proper names? Peirce seems to be interested, if only indirectly,since he puts "a legisign" next to proper name in the second quote. Did I understand you correctly? Obviously, if there is no such sign, Peirce is hardly expectedto be interested in it. But there does seem to be a distinction.I tried to strengthen this distinction by adding "definite" to individual.
Jim W.
Peirce says,
"Subindices or hyposemes are signs which are rendered such principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus a proper name, [a] personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing to a real connection with its object but none of these is an Index, since it is not an individual." ('A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2:274, 1903)
The following is an entry for "index."
"I define an Index as a sign determined by its dynamic object by virtue of being in a real relation to it. Such is a Proper Name (a legisign); such is the occurrence of a symptom of a disease (the symptom itself is a legisign, a general type of a definite character. The occurrence in a particular case is a sinsign)." (A Letter to Lady Welby, SS 33, 1904)-Original Message-From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Sat, 18 Mar 2006 14:14:41 -0600Subject: [peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
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Subject: [peirce-l] naming definite individuals
List,
I am trying to sharpen my understanding of the concept of index with respect to a natural or an artificial language.I was struck by the number of entries, at least in the Commens Dictionary, that fail to isolate what is essential for distinguishing an index from a subindice with respect to linguistic entities. Peirce uses a lot of concepts, including connection, relation, real relation, reaction, actual connection, individualand existence to doa lot ofwork. In the case of proper names, if the name is governed by a law or legisign, it can count as an index. BUT this still does not give us all of the the necessary conditions fora proper name to count as an index. (In fact, the law could state that it has indefinite reference, and thus concede that proper names are subindices.) The further necessary condition appears to be "definite."I did not find this in the Commens. The law has to prescribe the application of the name to *one and oly one individual.*
I might add that the existence and individuality of the object namedare criticallyessential also. But those two conditions are not sufficient. Consequently, the proper name "Charles Peirce" is an index only if:
1. Charles Peirce existed
2. Charles Peirce is an individual
3. "Charles Peirce" names a definite object
Maybe I missed something in the Commens or should look elsewhere or maybe "individual" and "existence" do all the work "definite" is supposed to. But it seems thatthey do not.Even if Charles Peirce can be differentiated from every other existent individual and made definite, I cannot find any entry in the Commens Dictionary that captures how the law of the proper name could suggest this application.Thus,I cannot find in the text how a proper name can clearly count as an index rather than a subindice. It is not enough to suggest that a law is involved without being more specific about that law. Does anyone know of another passage? Any related comments are welcome too.
Jim W
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[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Hi Ben, We need to start over. Would you agree that "subindex" never occurs in Peirce's writing, or at least the relevant passages we are dealing with?You say, "That which can occur more than once, "x number of times,"is the subindex. That which occurs once only once is the index." (end quote) The distinction does not break down that way in the two passages I have focused on. It breaks down along individual or not. It is clear from the 1904 Welby passage that the symptom can occur many times. Each occurence is a sinsign or token of the symptom. "Individual" does not equal singular occurence. I think you were more on the right track when you spoke of qualitative character. Individuality may be a function of qualitative character, but that same symptom can occur many times. Individuality rests on identity; maybe qualitative identity. You say, "An instance of 'the' on a material page is one occurrence and is an index, at least in the sense that it occurs once only once." (End quote) No, the instance of "the" is a sinsign. There is a lot more to determining whether it functions as an index. Multiple instances of "the" on this page do not characterize subindices. Each occurence is a sinsign regardless of both its relation to an object or its individuality. You say, "If a name like "Abraham" _actually_ picks out plural individuals for a reader or listener, then the context has failed to supply precision and the index or subindex is too vague to serve its function -- we have a confusionand ambiguity among real relations. " (end quote) I would say "Abraham" actually picks out plural individuals. The question is whether the naming relation is a real relation. You say, "A name like "The Beatles" picks out plural individuals, but is supposed to do that, picking them out collectively or distributively. Again, it's important to treat Peirce's introduction of the subindex as a development in his thought -- rather than, say, as a fluctuation over which we can average." (end quote) I agree that the name "the Beatles" is entrenched that way. Actually, "the Beatles" is not a proper name. "Beatles" might be. I can identify the aggregate as the product of john, paul, george, and ringo.Did you know that they were once called the "Silver Beatles."Not only were the personel slightly different, but had they been the same, and had the name remained the same, would the naming relation count as a real relation?I doubt it. Thus, to my understanding, the name, whatever it may be,could never count as an index. But I do not understand how you are using "subindices."Look at the 1903 Syllabus definition of "subindices." It has nothing to do with singular or plural reference. It has to do with the individuality of the name.The names "John," "Paul," "George," and "Ringo" are not subindices of the name "Beatles" In fact, the person named by "John Lennon" might have had a different name. Thus, the naming relation is not a real relation and the name "John Lennon" is not an index. Jim W -Original Message-From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Sun, 19 Mar 2006 13:32:02 -0500Subject: [peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals Hi, Jim, One of your paragraphs was cut off, which I've indicated in bold red. Also two of mine were, and I've restored mine in gray between pairs of insert "^^" symbols. [Jim] Thanks for the response. What's in a name? I don't think that the sign's relation to itself is critical. The fact that the sign "Ben" has three letters or that it appears black colored on my screen x number of times does not make for a decision regarding its status as an index or a subindice. Actually it does make a difference _when one distinguishes subindex from index_. That which can occur more than once, "x number of times,"is the subindex. That which occurs once only once is the index. An instance of 'the' on a material page is one occurrence and is an index, at least in the sense that it occurs once only once. That which canoccur once or moreon the page is the subindex (as qualisign andas legisign). That decides whether we're discussing an index or a subindex. That which can occur in a limited variety of appearances, such thatacross that variety there is sufficient unity thatone can reasonably treat them as variations of the samequalitiative appearance,is the qualisign. That decides whether we're talking about a subindexical qualisign or some other kind of index/subindex. That which can occur in an unlimited variety of appearances is the legisign. That decides whether we're talking about a subindexical legisign or some other kind of index/subindex. The difference between a subindexical qualisign and a subindexical legisign seems just as large as the difference between either of them and the indexical sinsign. The subindex the index are definitively constradistinguished from each other in terms of exactly the "sign's relation to itself",i.e. (in
[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Ben,
You say,
"But, in any case,why wouldn't you think that the index or the subindex involve a "real relation"? Why, in the case of a (sub)indexical qualisign,wouldn't there be reality ina habit of using a certain set of sound to direct the attention of one or more among a set of minds to certain individual? Why, in the case of a (sub)indexical legisign, wouldn't there be reality in habits of using whatever set of sounds(or other appearances)to direct the attentionwhatever set of minds to a certain individual?" (end quote)
I tried to explore the relation in terms of the use of a name.My focus all alonghas been with linguistic entities like proper names. I can use a name to indicate an object. I was experimenting to see if there is the right sort of factual relation between a proper name andits object. In one sense, there is symbolic convention in the choice of a name. ButI suppose the use of a name on a single occasion would be a real relation to an object although my act of legislating the connection plays an important interpretive role and does not quite have thesame existential causal reaction, say, that a symptom has with anunderlying desease.
Jim W
-Original Message-From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Sun, 19 Mar 2006 21:22:28 -0500Subject: [peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Jim, list,
You sound like you've gotten it partly right.
Sometimes Peirce characterizes the index as something that can be general or singular (individual). But sometimes instead he says that an index has to be singular (individual).Once, hedefines as thesubindex that which is a sign through some real connection with the object. I've taken this to be in contradistinction to the indexas being necessarily singular. And you're right, I _inferred_ that a subindex is always non-singular. It hadn't occurred to me that Peirce might have meant that the index is a mode of subindex. It hadn't occurred to me that Peirce's subindex might simply be a "pointer" in whatever scope, singular or general or whatever.
However, looking overPeirce's definition yet again--
1903 ('A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2:274) he says of subindices / hyposemes (click on "subindex" in the sidebar at the Commens Dictionary) http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html: 66~~~_Subindices_ or _hyposemes_ are signs which are rendered such principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus a proper name, [a] personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing to a real connection with its object but none of these is an Index, since it is not an individual. ~~~99
-- it does now strike me as logically possible that he meant that the subindex can be either singular or general and that, whena subindex issingular, said subindex is an index.
Well, I just tried the Century Dictionary, and in the Supplement there is:
http://www.leoyan.com/century-dictionary.com/12/index12.djvu?djvuoptspage=537
66~~~
subindex (sub'in-deks''), n. A specifying figure or letter following and slightly below a figure, letter, or symbol: as the 0 in x0.
~~~99
The word "subindex" already existed. SoPeirce wasthinking first of all of labels in a math diagram. That thought of a letter attached to a diagram was my basic picture of the subindex and that's why I thought of it as nonsingular. But clearly Peirce didn't come out and say so, so who really knows. Well, since evidently Peirce seldom actually used the word, the main thing is the variation in his definition of that other word, "index." Sometimes he holds that an index must be individual, in which case we find ourselves looking for a term for indexlike general signs, and there's that word "subindex" looking really handy. Sometimesinstead Peirce holds thatan indexcan be individual or general and suddenly we don't need a word like "subindex" any more.
As far as I can tell, Peirce wavered between the two views. I doubt that it was strictly a verbal, terminological question with him, but I'm not sure what he saw at stake in it.
But, in any case,why wouldn't you think that the index or the subindex involve a "real relation"? Why, in the case of a (sub)indexical qualisign,wouldn't there be reality ina habit of using a certain set of sound to direct the attention of one or more among a set of minds to certain individual? Why, in the case of a (sub)indexical legisign, wouldn't there be reality in habits of using whatever set of sounds(or other appearances)to direct the attentionwhatever set of minds to a certain individual?
Best, Ben
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Subject: [peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Thanks Ben,
The individual equals the singular. OK.I wanted an individual to be, as you say, "atomic." But it is not. I thought if it was, then there was
[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Ben A general term has a "range" or "domain." A quantifier has a "scope." Peirce following DeMorgan called the domain a "universe of discourse." The variables x,y are general terms; as is the predicate letter J. (My post right before this raises a lot of questions about that predicate letter.) The schema ExAy(Jy--x=y)translates "there is something x such that for every y, y is J if and only ifx is identical to y.I don't know what you mean by "purport." But I think that if either both domains are empty, or if the domain ofx is non-empty and the universal quantifier has existential import,the statement is formally true. Jim W -Original Message-From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Mon, 20 Mar 2006 22:46:51 -0500Subject: [peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals Jim W., Frances, Jim P., Joe, I'm having trouble keeping up with this thread, but I want to get to everything sooner or later. Jim wrote, Ben You say, "I'm not able to find anything saying that the embodiment of a qualisign could be called a "replica" of the qualisign. I don't see why not, but I don't find anything saying that it would be okay." (end) You and I considered a sign that is not individual. If a sign is not individual, does it follow that its general? Consider a "free" logic where the variables are not bound. If a sign is not individual, then it is possible that it is neither individual nor general.I have changed modes. The replica of the qualisign must be possible. Jim W [Image removed] I wish I knew. The Peircean scope system is particularly obscure to me in regard to quality. Quality is vague. I haven't found a scope system in any philosophy that had more than a few "rubber bands safety pins" for a terminology. It's my biggest pet peeve in philosophy. But anyway In contemporary deductive logic, a "general term" is, as far as I can tell, simply a term which does not purport as to scope. If it were general by purport or assumption, then a schema like "ExAy(Jy--x=y)" would be formally false. If (using "E!" as the unique-existence functor) E!x Hx, then "H" is singular, though not necessarily by purport. So then I guess it's no longer called "general," but I don't really know. If we say that a sign truly corresponding to at least two things is general, and that a sign truly corresponding to only one thing is singular, then how does a free-variable logic let us escape the idea that any sign will be either singular or general? I'm not familiar with free-variable logic. Maybe you should take it from there, because what follows are my further boggings-down. I would take qualities and qualisignsto be either general or such that they could be general. I.e., maybe there's only one thing that has a certain exact shade of blue, but there's no intrinisic reason for that, there could have been a second such-blue thing. Not every possible quality will be embodied even once, but then neither will every possible singular or every possible law. So quality doesn't seem vaguer to me than the other categories in that regard. A quality, certainly a sensory-style quality, belongs to some spectrum or gamut or multi-dimensional version of a spectrum in terms of which a mode of sensing or feeling _divides up the world_. So a given quality is (to my way of thinking) is neither singular nor fully universal, but in between -- a non-universal general, or, one could just as wellsay,a non-singular special. The inductive structure of alternatives among qualities, events (universes), etc.,is the subject matter of fields like statistics. The deductive structure of such alternatives is the subject matter of fields like probability theory. Meanwhile "two," "seven" etc. are universal in the sense that any things can be among the two or the seven, their modifications qualities are irrelevant. All that count are things' identities distinctnesses, orderings, mappings, arrangements, etc. The deductive and often equivalentially deductive structure of such things is the subect matter of the pure maths. The abductive structure of such things (where you do have to take qualities reactions, not to mention probabilities the like,into account) is the subect matter of the special sciences. That's all to my fourish way of thinking, not Peirce's trichotomical way. The existential particular doesn't nail down vagueness in the way that the hypothetical universal nails down generality. "ExHx" is vague as to which x is H, but in order to verify it I don't need to find the x which the assertor presumably found, instead I just need to find at least one x which is H, it certainly doesn't have to be the same one which the assertor presumably found. However, if one wants to understand the genesis of the semiosis,one may indeed want to find out which x the assertor found to be H. This is natural from a philosophical, inductive perspective and should not be regarded as merely a quaint wrinkle of Peirce's
[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Ben, Fis a variable.But it does not matter. Vagueness (indefiniteness) is a feature of existential quantification regardles of whether it is the object or predicate.This appears to match what Lane and the trikonic say. You say, "In that predicate logic which you're useing, does the existence of an aggregate of qualities formally imply the existence of something x which has that aggregate of qualities?" (end) (EF)Fx--- qx.qx is a definite aggregate and implied by a rule of assumption.But the existence of x is not implied.The statement is true if the aggregate exists.The object letter x can be interpretedbut existence is solely on the side of qualities. In extensional logic, do we ask whether qualities exist? Jim W-Original Message-From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 18:04:27 -0500Subject: [peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals Jim, Quick question: is "F"a variable in "(EF) Fx" or is it a constant? What I really want to ask but don't know how to phrase schematically (till I know themethod for expressing distinctly the variable predicate and the constant predicate) is, In that predicate logic which you're useing, does the existence of an aggregate of qualities formally imply the existence of something x which has that aggregate of qualities? I'll probably be out the door by the time that you reply, but I thought I'd give it a shot. - Original Message - Jim wrote,Leave the object variable unbound; bind the property. "(EF) Fx" translates "there is some aggregate of qualities such that x has it."---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Thanks Ben, It is a little difficult to assess matters since I have been focusing on the NLC and you are looking more broadly at the corpus. You say you do it differently. Nevertheless,I will try to locate a problem area. You say, "The disparity of Peirce's approaches to (1) attribution and accident and (2) identity/distinction and substances (substantial things), is a serious flaw, and his approach to attribution and accident is better than his other approach." (end) In what way is there a flaw? In the NLC, a "pure species of abstraction" plays anecessary role in cognition. Peirce's theory (in many ways a continuation of Aristotelian and Medieval psychology) commits to this abstraction, without which assertions are inexplicable. Peirce says it is discriminated and treated independently. In other words, the question is not whether blackness is in the stove essentially or accidentally but only what is required for assertion or the "applicability of the predicate to the subject." Are you using the term "accident"in the classical metaphysical sense or are you reflecting on the passage where Peirce says that "intermediate conceptions may be termed accidents" or neither? Jim W -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Wed, 6 Sep 2006 2:43 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List Jim, list, [Jim Wilgoose] You say, [Ben] "We don't just assert reality, we acknowledge it. Inquiry's coming to reasonable rest is marked not by assertions but by acknowledgements." (end) [Jim] But, every acknowledgement has an assertion to endorse. Thus, at the foundation of inquiry are cognitive assertions. The theory of cognition (JSP series) suggests a potentially infinite number of cognitions leading to a conclusion. But the NLC paper does not care whether the "reference to interpretant" is final or not. The paper is not concerned with listing epistemic interpretants. In fact, I will suggest that acknowledgement has a different subject and predicate than the cognition under consideration. The proposition ' "this stove is black" is true' has the predicate "--is true" and a proposition for a subject. But it still has the basic structure of the categories. I'm not concerned simply with criticism of the NLC paper and I'm not even concerned primarily with criticizing Peirce. I'm concerned with philosophical issues of the categories, and of determination, conveyance, meaning, and establishment. That the NLC paper does not care whether the "reference to interpretant" is final or not, is relevant to a fair criticism of Peirce at the time of the NLC paper, but that is not a criticism which I'm trying to do fairly or unfairly. In the present context it is, for instance, potentially relevant in outlining where and why Peirce developed the conception of the final interpretant -- which was in order to account for truth, reality, and inquiry, as themselves and as deeply and radically related to one another such that, for instance, inquiry is not just a whistling in the dark. [Jim] Thus, at the foundation of inquiry are cognitive assertions. The use of the word "foundation" can be quite ambiguous. Physics is "foundational" to the special sciences in the order of the entities and laws to which we appeal in explaining things. It is not "foundational" to the special sciences in the order of the principles to which minds appeal in establishing or verifying things. A special-scientific study of such establishmental and verificational principles and their use would belong in the human/social studies; this study would be especially concerned with surmise and abductive inference. (The cenoscopic (i.e., general but still positive-phenomenal) study of establishmental and verificational principles and their use is not in inverse optimization or in statistics, but in philosophy, and ampliatively inductive inference is the kind which most lends itself to being studied in the general but still positive-phenomenal context. The forward-implicationally deductive study is not in deductive mathematical theories of optimization or probability but in deductive logic. The equivalential-inferential and mathematically inductive study is not in maths of equations, manifolds, graphs, extremization, or integration, measure, etc., but in the maths of order structures.) A note: In my last post I tried to equate propositions with assumptions, and I'm having second thoughts there; the propositions studied in logic are not merely "toy assumptions," even if in some intellectual-historical sense the conception of propositions might have evolved in that way. It's probably better to think of propositions as a form abstractible indifferently from acknowledgements, renditions, assertions, and assumptions (or, really, expressions of assumptions; I'm not aware of a distinct word for such expressions). Anyway, by your reasoning, we could take
[peirce-l] Re: Dennett
List, The question is being too easily dismissed. For Peirce, its not that introspectiondoesn't exist, but that its results are unreliable for the purposes at hand, namely, a theory of cognition and the deduction of categories. The overall anti-Cartesian emphasis of Peirce's early work is reasonably clear. There is no epistemological privilage granted 1st person reports of the sort "auto-phenomenology" grants. (for instance, Husserl)It is not scientific enough. Dennett's program would agree. Peirce also has the famous example of the writing pen.At least one of the points of that example is to suggest that the mind is not simply localized in the brain. If so, it isless of a "serious problem" how to explain or otherwise translate back and forth between a localized brain and the content of consciousness.Dennett could agree. Nothing above denies or affirms the reality of the content of consciousness. It just displaces consciousness fromthe brain anddrains the Cartesian metaphor of a theater, the content of which is mine.Finally, there are numerous examples of phenomenological method in later Peirce writings that downplay acts of attention and focus instead on content. Some might say this avoids the problem. We seem to need consciousness to relate to content through acts of attention. Hence, we speak of the "content of consciousness." Thus, we need to account for consciousness in terms of the subjective relate of an act of attention. ( "I" attends-to "it.")Of course,there is norelate of an act of attention if consciousness is identical to its content.There are passages in the phenomenology where Peirce does seem to do this. ie. "immediate consciousness")It is non-relational.But immediate consciousness is an abstraction that takes no account of time. If we take account of time, the ego is always appearing as "it." One can ask again about that other pole of an act of attention especially when attention is directed towards a tactile pain in their own body.Rather than an ink stand, the "mind is in the body" so to speak and my body is in pain. No doubt we understand the concept and have all experienced the feeling. But are the results of introspection unreliable?Is there not a gradation of epistemological privelage? I tend to think Dennett and Peirce would agree that there is no way to formulatesome issues as a scientific problem. Jim W -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Fri, 8 Sep 2006 12:06 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Dennett Oh well hell, Steve! You have burst my bubble! (Sorry... I'll get serious now...) It struck me as Peirceian because, if I'm not mistaken, Peirce denied that there was such a thing as "introspection". He also seemed to affirm the idea that individuals are "less real" than generality... or rather that all individuals are instances of general categories and therefore less real as individuals. I also get the impression that what we call mind or subjective experience is more objective or public than we realize... and this seems to coincide with Dennett's heterophenomenology...the idea that an objective observer might be able to read someone's subjective experience better than the subject him/herself. On 9/7/06, Steven Ericsson-Zenith [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: My firm response is that I do not see how it could be. With respect, Steven On Sep 7, 2006, at 5:04 PM, R Jeffrey Grace wrote: Folks, Pardon me if this has been brought up before, but does anyone know if Daniel Dennett's Heterophenomenology, which maintains that all subjective states are ultimately objective states, is influence by Peirce or if this is even something similar to Peirce's view? Thanks for any comments... -- --- R. Jeffrey Grace [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.rjgrace.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- --- R. Jeffrey Grace [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.rjgrace.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Ben, You say, "The question is WHETHER the stove is black -- yes, no, novelly, probably, optimally, if only if..., etc. What is required for assertion or proposition or judging or even conceiving the situation is that the mind can apprehend whether the stove is, isn't, may be, might be, is 57%-probably, is if--only-if-it's-Thursday, would feasibly be, would most simply be, is, oddly enough, etc., etc., etc., black. " (end) I would say as I previously did that most of these can be handled by treating the subject as a proposition. Otherwise, youpredicate "possible blackness" of this stove rather than the proposition "this stove is black." This might not be so bad if only identification didn't break down. "this stove" is definite but "this is a possible black thing" suffers. I might even go so far as to say that "this stove is possibly black" fails to assert anything and thus fails the test of cognition. It also runs up potentially against contradiction since "this"refers to a definite, individualobject and the two propositions "this stove is possibly black" and "this stove is possibly not black" are inconsistent. But 'It is possible that "this stove is black"' seems to work better. What is the deal about supposing the identity of the predicate and then assessing the modality of the proposition? Peirce gives the example of "it rains" in the gamma graphs. He doesn't consider possible rain but whether the proposition "it rains" is possibly true (false) Jim W -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Thu, 7 Sep 2006 8:42 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List Jim, list, [Jim Wilgoose] It is a little difficult to assess matters since I have been focusing on the NLC and you are looking more broadly at the corpus. You say you do it differently. Nevertheless,I will try to locate a problem area. [Jim] You say, [Ben] The disparity of Peirce's approaches to (1) attribution and accident and (2) identity/distinction and substances (substantial things), is a serious flaw, and his approach to attribution and accident is better than his other approach. [Jim] In what way is there a flaw? In the NLC, a "pure species of abstraction" plays anecessary role in cognition. Peirce's theory (in many ways a continuation of Aristotelian and Medieval psychology) commits to this abstraction, without which assertions are inexplicable. Peirce says it is discriminated and treated independently. In other words, the question is not whether blackness is in the stove essentially or accidentally but only what is required for assertion or the "applicability of the predicate to the subject." Are you using the term "accident"in the classical metaphysical sense or are you reflecting on the passage where Peirce says that "intermediate conceptions may be termed accidents" or neither? I'm using "accident" in pretty much the sense in which I find it in Peirce. Peirce seldom mentions the conception of accident; basically, Peirce says the three categories 1stness, 2ndness, and 3rdness, can be termed "accidents" and thereafter we don't hear much about "substance-accident" issues.I'm not strong enough on Aristotlean or Scholastic philosophy to be able to say whether Peirce was departing from any tradition in flatly calling qualities "accidents." Of course, his definition of "quality" is not quite Aristotle's. Anyway, the question is not about the essentialness or accidentalness of the blackness's being in the stove. Thequestion is about _whether_ the blackness is or isn't in the stove. It's not even about the ground per se or about that word "in." The question is WHETHER the stove is black -- yes, no, novelly, probably, optimally, if only if..., etc. What is required for assertion or proposition or judging or even conceiving the situation is that the mind can apprehend whether the stove is, isn't, may be, might be, is 57%-probably, is if--only-if-it's-Thursday, would feasibly be, would most simply be, is, oddly enough, etc., etc., etc., black. A mind which cannot conceive, or can only weakly conceive,of alternatives to the actuality with which it is presented, is no longer a mind, oris a weak or weakened mind. In people, it bespeaks brain damage. _Meaning and implicationare in terms of such alternatives._ For instance, consider "'(p--q)'=='((~p)vq)'=='~(p~q)'" and, indeed, consider it both in its propositional-logic aspect and in its 2nd-order aspect. In Scholastic terms, I'm using "whetherhood" and "attribution-relation" in a sense similar to that ascribed to Avicenna's conception of _anitas_ which is a Latin translation of an Arabic term.The Latin word_anitas_ was coined by the translator from the common Latin _an_ which means "whether" and is used in the formation of indirect questions like "You know whether she is here." (It's quite English-like; neither "whether" nor_an_ is an
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Thanks Ben,
The proposition "She is possibly pregnant" is easily understood by all. I overstated my case. (nor is their a potential contradiction) But I think it masks a problem for the theory of cognition, and furthermore,not all ordinary expressions are as clear as they might be. So, we might try to rephrase some expressions if they do not fit the theory. It appears here that "possibility" reflects a state of ignorance with respect to the predicate.How far can the theory be extended and still work? The abstracted quality "pregnancy" can be identified. Butcan "possible pregnancy" be identified? I think your response would be "so much the worse for the theory." As you said previously, it is not rich enough. As for the matter of my particular interpretation of "possibility" being nowhere near shouting distance of ordinary Engish, that may be a virtue. Consider that adefinite, actual stove cannot have contrary predicates. So, there is only oneindividual under consideration regardless of our ignorance of the predicate.The statements cannot both be true and in that sense they are inconsistent with each other. In any case, do you think some of your examples can be handled by Peirce's theory of cognition?
Jim W
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Fri, 8 Sep 2006 6:00 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] You say,
"The question is WHETHER the stove is black -- yes, no, novelly, probably, optimally, if only if..., etc. What is required for assertion or proposition or judging or even conceiving the situation is that the mind can apprehend whether the stove
is,
isn't,
may be,
might be,
is 57%-probably,
is if--only-if-it's-Thursday,
would feasibly be,
would most simply be,
is, oddly enough,
etc., etc., etc.,
black. " (end)
[Jim] I would say as I previously did that most of these can be handled by treating the subject as a proposition. Otherwise, youpredicate "possible blackness" of this stove rather than the proposition "this stove is black." This might not be so bad if only identification didn't break down. "this stove" is definite but "this is a possible black thing" suffers.
I don't see what's wrong with it. In real life we do in fact talk about possibilities involving actual things. You can break it into two interlocked propositions if you wish, oneaffirming the actual existence of the stove and the other affirming a possibility about it. Just make sure that their subjects are somehow equated. And I don't see what's wrong with making the possibility sentence into a one-place predicate "Ex(x={this stove} x[possibly(Eyy{y is black} y=x)])" which can be rephrased to "This stove is possibly black." Of course, one is more likely to say something like, "This stove is possibly malfunctioning a bit."
"This stove is possibly black" and "this stove is possibly not-black" are not inconsistent in any logic whose treatment of the word "possibly" is within shouting distance of ordinary English usage. In fact their conjunction makes for at least one sense of the word "contingent," as in _it is a *contingent* question whether the stove is black or non-black._ Usually "possibly..." and "possibly not..." are taken in a sense parallel to that of "consistent" and "non-valid." Any truth-functional sentence is either (a) valid or (b) inconsistent or (c) both consistent and non-valid.
[Jim] I might even go so far as to say that "this stove is possibly black" fails to assert anything and thus fails the test of cognition.
Tell that to the man who's just been told, in regard to his wife, "She is possibly pregnant," and, in regard to his finances, "You are possibly bankrupt," and so on -- all definitely existent things around which possibilities range.
[Jim] It also runs up potentially against contradiction since "this"refers to a definite, individualobject and the two propositions "this stove is possibly black" and "this stove is possibly not black" are inconsistent.
It potentially runs up against contradictions? I think you'll need to spell them out.They may be the fault of an inadequate logical formalism since obviously we deal with such things every day. And, again, "possibly black" and "possibly not black" are consistent, not inconsistent, unless one's formalism constrains one to signify something quite deviative from normal English usage of words like "possibly."
[Jim] But 'It is possible that "this stove is black"' seems to work better. What is the deal about supposing the identity of the predicate and then assessing the modality of the proposition? Peirce gives the example of "it rains" in the gamma graphs. He doesn't consider possible rain but whether the proposition "it rains" is possibly true (false)
If your possibilitative propositions are incapable of transformation into one-or-more-place predicates, then they seem strangely limited.
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Thanks Ben,
There is a difference between treating possibility epistemically or treating it ontologically. "Possibly black' and "possibly non-black" are (sub) contraries, indeterminate with respect to a state of information. But since we are considering "this stove," and not allowing multiple reference for "this," we know that both statements cannot be true for a definite individual. Particular propositions, for Peirce,obey both the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle. ( 1st order Form: (poss. Bs poss -Bs )Notice thatI do not use the quantifier "E" since "this stove" denotesa definite individual. ("s" is an individual variable and "B" is a predicate letter.) These two propositions are not "compossible, although they are severally possible." (Peirce's language) However, 2nd order Formcreates a problem. EF(Fs -Fs) Which property? Here "F" is an indefinite predicate variable.Should not all substitutions for "F" be identical regardless of whether we can identify the property?Maybe not. Peirce said in the gamma graphs that for ordinary purposes, "qualities may be treated as individuals." Ifthere is no definite property, then the proposition is vague rather than false. Identity is critical even for possible states of information.
Jim W
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Mon, 11 Sep 2006 10:18 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] The proposition "She is possibly pregnant" is easily understood by all. I overstated my case. (nor is their a potential contradiction) But I think it masks a problem for the theory of cognition, and furthermore,not all ordinary expressions are as clear as they might be. So, we might try to rephrase some expressions if they do not fit the theory. It appears here that "possibility" reflects a state of ignorance with respect to the predicate.How far can the theory be extended and still work? The abstracted quality "pregnancy" can be identified. But can "possible pregnancy" be identified? I think your response would be "so much the worse for the theory." As you said previously, it is not rich enough. As for the matter of my particular interpretation of "possibility" being nowhere near shouting distance of ordinary Engish, that may be a virtue. Consider that adefinite, actual stove cannot have contrary predicates. So, there is only one individual under consideration regardless of our ignorance of the predicate. The statements cannot both be true and in that sense they are inconsistent with each other. In any case, do you think some of your examples can be handled by Peirce's theory of cognition?
A possible pregnancy could be idenitified as being in respect of signs positive but inconclusive about pregnancy. In the given case, there would need to be an understood threshhold, even if only a vague one, for what the mind counts as representing a significant degree of possibility, as in practical affairs wherein one signifies that one is momentarily departing from just such a practical understood norm by saying something like, "well, it's _theoretically_ possible but...," etc. I don't know to what extent modal logics have dealt with these issues or instead leave them to the user along with the standard advice to be consistent across the given case.
Note that any problem with the idea of a possible pregnancy is also part of a problem with a flat-out modal proposition such as "Possibly there is a pregnant woman" or any propostion of the form "Possibly[Ex(GxHx)]. In any non-empty universe, certain Ex, there is something. So it's a question of the possibility of HxGx. If one goes even simpler, "Possibly[ExHx], then in any non-empty universe the same question about a "possibly H" will be raised.
Theories of probability and statistics are among the ways of dealing with possibility more variegatedly. There's alsofuzzy logic, or at least a fuzzified modal logic (I presume),in order to deal with ways to formalize the informality and vagueness involved with talking about things like "maybe pregnant," "oh just possibly pregnant," etc.
I don't see why you consider "possibly black" and "possibly non-black" contrary. They seem forall the world to be _subcontrary_ -- it seems that of a given subject they can both be true butthey can't both be false."Necessarily black" and "necessarily non-black" -- those seem contrary, since it seems that of a given subject they can both be false but can't both be true.
Boldface: *3 any-pair-wise contraries*, collectively exhausting the options (usually one would say "exhausting the possibilities" but the word "possible" itself appears in the table, so, in order to avoid confusion)
Italics: _3 any-pair-wise subcontaries_, whose negatives collectively exhaust the options.
~ ~ ~ _necessary or impossible_ ~ ~ ~
*necessary* ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ *impossible*
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ | ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Ben,
Peirce says,
"Very many writers assert that everything is logically possible which involves no contradiction Let us call that sort of logical possibility, essential, or formal, logical possibility. It is not the only logical possibility; for in this sense, two propositions contradictory of one another may both be severally possible, although their combination is not possible." (CP3:527)
Two propositions, "Bs" and "-Bs" may both be possible. (severally) But, the proposition "pos Bs poss.-Bs" is not possible. The first two propositions arenot contradictory of one another. The proposition resulting from their combination appears to be. They are not Aristotelian (sub) contraries dealing with "some" objects. The so called "failure of contradiction" deals usually with general object indefiniteness in the case of the existential quantifier. That is not what is going on here. Vagueness is just as much the result of considering the two propositions severally.
We started this discussion with a number of examples of "whetherhood" designed to expand and qualify the predicate assertion. I chose possibility becasue of its generality and largely epistemic flavor. I read Peirce as developing the meaning of possibility with "states of information," knowledge and probability in mind. I also favored in the beginning attaching the modal operator to propositions and treating the proposition as a subject. I did this in order to preserve the copula "is" in the subject assertion without qualification. The various ordinary ways of expressing the proposition can be rephrased. I also pointed out the way that identity becomes problematic.
You say,
"Maybe there's a necessary difference at a simple logical level between epistemic and ontological treatments of possibility, but such difference isn't evident to me."
Consider the difference between saying each proposition "Bs' and "-Bs" is indeterminate with respect to truth and saying that it is impossible that both propositions are jointly true. Ontologically,I do not think that the same stove or same women can have contrary qualities. Is this a principle of Being or just an idealization of excluded middle?Further, would you be prepared to say that the truth value of the compound proposition is indeterminate in the sense of "not known to be false?"
Jim W
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Mon, 11 Sep 2006 6:50 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] There is a difference between treating possibility epistemically or treating it ontologically. "Possibly black' and "possibly non-black" are (sub) contraries, indeterminate with respect to a state of information. But since we are considering "this stove," and not allowing multiple reference for "this," we know that both statements cannot be true for a definite individual. Particular propositions, for Peirce,obey both the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle. ( 1st order Form: (poss. Bs poss -Bs )Notice thatI do not use the quantifier "E" since "this stove" denotesa definite individual. ("s" is an individual variable and "B" is a predicate letter.) These two propositions are not "compossible, although they are severally possible." (Peirce's language) However, 2nd order Formcreates a problem. EF(Fs -Fs) Which property? Here "F" is an indefinite predicate variable.Should not all substitutions for "F" be identical regardless of whether we can identify the property?Maybe not. Peirce said in the gamma graphs that for ordinary purposes, "qualities may be treated as individuals." Ifthere is no definite property, then the proposition is vague rather than false. Identity is critical even for possible states of information.
Maybe there's a necessary difference at a simple logical level between epistemic and ontological treatments of possibility, but such difference isn't evident to me.
You don't provide a reference or a quote, but presumably Peirce is referring to the components of "(Bs ~Bs)" as non-compossible and as severally (separately) possible, but is _not_ referring to a form like "(poss. Bs poss. -Bs)"at all. It would be strange, I think, if he did. Yet Peirce's technical conception of propositions and predicates and their treatment differs enough from the contemporary, that, well, who knows? So I ask for a quote from him. Somehow you seem to be thinking that "poss.Bs" is the negative of "poss.~Bs".
The same issues are involved withthe "(Fs ~Fs)"in "EF(Fs ~Fs)."
I don't know what your assumptions are about the 1st-order syntactical status of "poss.", but it's as if you're treating "poss." in "poss. Bs" as a predicate, whereas one needs to treat it asa functor (like the negative sign) and to treat the resultant "poss. Bs" as function of "Bs" rather than as "Bs" itself with some added predicated description "possible."This is the same as one
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Ben, (I responded to your later message first.) I agree with a lot here.The idea that there are objective possibilities that are true, regardless of our knowledge, has beenarguably the central issue in discussions of philosophical realism for 2500 years. The idea of objective indeterminacy is a part of that. Consider that a proposition which reflects an objectively indeterminate state of affairs is not bivalent. (I assume that a God would know that it is not bivalent. S/he would be omniscient.) Just some terminological notes. "1st order" logic usually means the universe of discourse and the domain of the variablesareindividuals. "2nd order" logic usually meansthe discourse is about collections, properties, or relations. I am not sure what you mean by "standard." A lot hinges on that. You say, "The idea that a true proposition (zero-place predicate) about concrete things is true of all concrete things everywhere and everywhen seems -- somehow -- at odds with the idea that the relevant information is not everywhere and everywhen, if indeed chance is real (for my part, I think it's real)" (end) I am not sure I understand this. We can replace a variable with an individual. If an individual satisfies a predicate, it is called "zero-place." Some logics allow "substitution of identity." Any individualcan be substituted for another that satifies the predicate with certain restrictions.I think of formal logic as a set of rules that, in part, allow us to represent things. If we don't like the representation, we can change the rules. A large part of logic is not monolithic. The "flat in or out" universe is a problem of identity. We seem to need this to manage many affairs no matter how rough the identity is. I am not sure why the big bang universe is a problem for 1st order logic. Jim W -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Mon, 11 Sep 2006 12:53 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List Jim, I should add, upon re-reading your comments, that the idea of possibility that I've been discussing has pretty much been in terms of ignorance, but it seems to me that the terms don't need to be essentially in terms of ignorance. If one is talking about a future event, then the reason for one's ignorance of the outcome may be the uncertainty and vagueness of current things themselves as determinants of the future -- the uncertainty is not just "in one's head," nor even just "necessarily in one's head, by the nature of intelligence." I think that Peirce agrees that not all uncertainty is merely epistemic, since he holds that chance is real. For my own part, I consider standard 1st-order logic as a low-resolution, "low-pixelage"picture of the real for this reason among others. The idea that a true proposition (zero-place predicate) about concrete things is true of all concrete things everywhere and everywhen seems -- somehow -- at odds with the idea that the relevant information is not everywhere and everywhen, if indeed chance is real (for my part, I think it's real). That is to say that our concrete Big-Bang universe differs in some logically deep way from a 1st-order logical universe of discourse -- well, who could be shocked! shocked! by that, but what I mean is, that the idea of a flat-out in-or-out membership in a universe of discourse seemsa crudebeginning for understanding what sort of universe of "discourse" and information it is that we actually live in. It's not that I've forgotten that, in a 1st-order logical universe, there can be true contingent propositions which don't imply each other -- I get that, but chance and uncertainty seem (to me) deeper and more complicated in the concrete world, for some reason. Best, Ben Udell http://tetrast.blogspot.com - Original Message - Jim, [Jim Willgoose] The proposition "She is possibly pregnant" is easily understood by all. I overstated my case. (nor is their a potential contradiction) But I think it masks a problem for the theory of cognition, and furthermore,not all ordinary expressions are as clear as they might be. So, we might try to rephrase some expressions if they do not fit the theory. It appears here that "possibility" reflects a state of ignorance with respect to the predicate.How far can the theory be extended and still work? The abstracted quality "pregnancy" can be identified. But can "possible pregnancy" be identified? I think your response would be "so much the worse for the theory." As you said previously, it is not rich enough. As for the matter of my particular interpretation of "possibility" being nowhere near shouting distance of ordinary Engish, that may be a virtue. Consider that adefinite, actual stove cannot have contrary predicates. So, there is only one individual under consideration regardless of our ignorance of the predicate. The statements cannot both be true and in that sense they are
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Thanks Ben,
Well,I guess the passage doesn't discuss modal propositions if you disallow rephrasing "this stove is possibly black" with 'It is possible that "this stove is black."'There is certainly a logic of possibility at work.Why aren' t these modal propositions?It is just that the possibility operator is outside of the proposition. I took it that Peirce is saying that "this stove is black" and this "stove is not black" are formally possible. What would a "logical _expression_ of modality" be? The operator is a unary connective much like negation. ('it is not the case that "this stove is black."')
You say,
"~ poss.(Bs ~Bs)" == "'Bs' and '~Bs' are incompossible." == "[Logically,] it can't be both that this stove is black and that this stove is not black." (END)
Ilike this alot and have read it this way too.(at times) My mistake with respect to mixing contrary and contradiction up. It is easy to get in the habit. What is the other sort of possibility Peirce refers to? I have always looked for the supposed vague possibility.Maybe this is not the right passage from Peirce.Yet, If weacceptthe proposition"poss. Bs poss.-Bs", then the point of the passage might be that besides formal possibility, there is vague possibility.In the othermode of possibility, contradiction is inapplicable. Thus, the proposition "poss. Bs poss.-Bs" is not a contradiction.But I reject this for the example "this stove is possibly black and this stove is possibly not black."
I thinkI know my problem. In thecontext where "this stove" is a definite, actual individual and I assert this stove is black, every state of affairs is restricted to this stove and blackness. Thus, necessarily this stove is black and what does not occur is impossible or vice versa. This is an extreme form of actualism.But, I can make some sense of the claim that -poss.( poss.Bs poss-Bs) The confusion and irony, however, doesn't lie with the possibility operator or where possibility appears in an ordinary proposition. It is all modal logic.
Jim W
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Tue, 12 Sep 2006 1:28 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] Peirce says,
"Very many writers assert that everything is logically possible which involves no contradiction. Let us call that sort of logical possibility, essential, or formal, logical possibility. It is not the only logical possibility; for in this sense, two propositions contradictory of one another may both be severally possible, although their combination is not possible." (CP3:527)
Just as I thought, Peirce does not discuss modal propositions in the passage which you had in mind.
[Jim] Two propositions, "Bs" and "-Bs" may both be possible. (severally) But, the proposition "pos Bs poss.-Bs" is not possible. The first two propositions arenot contradictory of one another.
In the context of oppositions, the contradictory of a proposition is the _negation_ /of that proposition. "Bs" ("This stove is black") and "-Bs" ("This stove is notblack") are contradictory of one another. They can't both be true and they can't both be false. Thus they fit the form defined in the logic of oppositions for contradictories.
"Bs" and "-Bs" are both internally consistent but are inconsistent with each other. That is all that Peirce is implying, nothing more.
You are confusing formal logical properties with logical _expression_ of modality in just such a way that, ironically,you call impossible the same modal statement which can be used in order to express the idea that two propositions are severally possible.
Now, there is nothing that constrains modal expressions to be used in order solely tocharacterize formal logical relationships such as contrarity, subcontrarity, implication, etc.However, they _can_ be used in a context which confines them to that purpose.Taking 'poss.' as the 1st-order _expression_ corresponding to 2nd-orderimputation ofpossibility or logical internal consistency to a predicate or proposition,
"poss. Bs poss.-Bs" == "'Bs' and '~Bs' are severally possible." == "[Logically,] this stove can be black and this stove can be non-black."
"~ poss.(Bs ~Bs)" == "'Bs' and '~Bs' are incompossible." == "[Logically,] it can't be both that this stove is black and that this stove is not black."
(Note: "this stove", a.k.a. "s", is not, as you called it in an earlier post, an individual variable, but is instead an individual constant. In traditional logic, the subject of propositions in the form "Hs" (e.g. "Socrates is human") is taken as constant across propositions. If "this stove" is not constant across propositions in a given example, then it is really a variable and we're no longer talking about an already singled-out stove as in Peirce's example).
[Jim] The proposition resulting from their combination appears to be
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Ben,
You say,
"Saying that the NLC 'theory' of cognition (which seems to me no more a cognition theory than Peircean truth theory is an inquiry theory even though it references inquiry) is sufficient except when we talk about possibility, feasibility, etc., is -- especially if that list includes negation (you don't say) --to deny that there is an issue of cognizing in terms of alternatives to the actual and apparent, etc., even though then logical conceptions of meaning and implication become unattainable. " (END)
It is not asufficient theory. I see it as asking"what are the most general elements ina process by which the mind forms propositions." The example is a simple case ofperceptual data. But, it is not a complete theory of knowledge. In fact, it is more of a chapter in the history of cognitive psychology. It is a logical description of a psychological process;some parts of which may be empirically established. (For instance, Peirce thinks it is questionable what the then current results of empirical psychology have established with respect to acts of comparison and contrast.) If the paper is coupled with some theses from the JSP series, itseems clear to me that a theory of cognition emerges that could be of interest to psycholinguists and cognitive scientists working in language formation and even speech-act theory. Does it handle all epistemic interests, propositional attitudes, modalities? No.
But it is not a special science since the results uncovered are precisely the most general elements used in any inquiry.It is more nearly what the 1901 Baldwin entry suggests, namely, erkenntnislehre, a doctrine of elements. Peirce struggled with where to assign this study. Is it a part of logic or pre-logical? There doesn't seem to bemuch of the normative concern that later demarcates logic proper. But there is a law-like element that is presupposed in so far as "one can only discover unity by introducing it." That transcendental point could easily mark a historical divide between naturalists such as Quine and "static" modelists such as Chomsky. In some sense, grammar is the issue, although generalized to the utmost. Both could take the spirit of the paper and do things, Chomsky in the specialized application to syntactic structures and transformational grammar, and Quine, in so far as the theory is empirically testable, as shedding some light on knowledge.(He is also obviously engaged in the "paraphrase" business.)
Modern epistemology cannot even get off the ground with this NLC paper unless the enterprise is so naturalized that the theory (historical curiosity or not) is used to guide research in the relevant special sciences. The specific perceptual cognition and cognitive assertion under discussion meet none of the criteria for knowledge in the "classical" picture. The assertion "this stove is black" need neither be justified, true, or even believed. The paper, at least in part, is merely explanatory, if only insufficiently, of what is required to even begin the classical assessment.
You say,
"But the point in philosophy is not rephrasability, but instead to understand the result and end of such procedures, in which the description of signs is a _means_ to _transformations_ of extension and intension, transformations which themselves are a means to represent real relationships. The research interest of smoothing and smoothly "encoding" cognitions into common convenient keys ormodes guides deductive maths of propositions, predicates, etc.; but does not guide philosophy, which is more interested in the corresponding "decoding." Philosophy applies deductive formalisms but is no more merely applied deductive theory of logic than statistical theory were merely applied probability theory." (END)
Well, I agree. It is not for nothing that normative science is structured the way it is in Peirce's architecture. The purpose of logical analysis, linguistic analysis, "theory criticism," can't be lost sight of.
Jim W
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Wed, 13 Sep 2006 10:39 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose:] I am playing at trying to reject it. ("poss.Bs poss.~Bs") I have accepted it more often than not.
Now you tell me.
[Jim] I also understand the difference between discussing formal properties that hold between propositions (modal or non-modal) and forming a "1st order" proposition out of the discussion of contingent propositionsand the formal properties. This could be made clearer by noting the following:
[Jim] "P" is a contingent proposition
[Jim] "P" "-P"are feasible.
[Jim] "" and "feasible" are part of the metalanguage used to discuss contingent propositions.
[Jim] "feas. P" "feas.-P" are ill-formed.
[Jim] Explanation: "Feasibility" is a 2nd order predicate used to discuss
It does appear that you
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Joe and list, It is difficult to tell exactly what those two psychological laws are from the text. (preceding the quote below) It is also difficult to frame them universally. Either we talk of all men at all times or some men at all times or all men at some time or another. I think we could talk of all men at some time or another"systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change in his opinions." That is what needs explaining. The explanation is teleological. What causes people to avoid changing their opinions? Why do people avoid changing their opinions? Peirce says, 1. an instinctive dislike of an undecided state of mind makes men cling spasmodically to the views they already take. 2. a steady and immovable faith yields great peace of mind. (sec. 5 FOB) Pyrryo, of course,claimed that 'suspension' yields peace of mind. But this was only after the method of science or experiencewas brought to bear.Furthermore, an undecided state of mind motivates inquiry as much as it closes it down. Effectively, this reflects the problem of framing a law universally. How about "The truth is too painful." If the man following the "method of ostriches" knew this about himself, however,it is difficult to see how it could yield peace of mind. Can s/he coherently say "I am impervious to the truth and I am happy." What can be said here? In any case, I am not sure what the two psychological laws are. #1 looks like a candidate. Jim W -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Fri, 22 Sep 2006 6:21 PM Subject: [peirce-l] What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to? In "The Fixation of Belief" Peirce says that "a man may go through life,systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change n his opinions, and if he only succeeds -- basing his method, as he does, on two fundamental psychologicl laws -- I do not see what can be said against his doing so". This is in Part V, where he is explaining the method of tenacity, where he then goes on to say that "the social impulse" will nevertheless somehow cause him, at times, to face up to some contradiction which impels recourse to adopting the second method, which is the method of authority. His explanation of this is very unsatisfactory, far too sketchy to be very informative, and I wonder if anyone has run across any place where he says anything that might flesh that out or, regardless of that, whether anyone has any plausible explanation themselves of exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to the second method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not have the order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be authority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried to justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't recall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory on this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much interest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of something right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I believe, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible? Joe Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce and knowledge
Clark and list, Thanks for the reference to Timothy Williamson.I do not see any direct connection to Peirce but one could be made in terms of factoringbeliefs or maybe dispositionsinto prime/composite and contents into narrow/broad.I don't know how all of this would work. The unpublished paper ( Can cognition be factorized into internal and external components?) I looked at was attempting to adjust the internal states of the knower to the environment in such a way that one could act on their beliefs. Part of the trick was to get the contents just "broad" enough that action goes through and the theory is workable. Supposing you want to buy a black stove, just how satisfieddo you have to be that this stove is black before you buy it? In any case, where is the principle of justification in the Baldwin quote? Condition #1 is true. Condition #2 is believed. Condition #3 is a character of a "satisfaction." Peirce says, "it would be logically impossible that this character should ever belong to satisfaction in a proposition not true." In other words, in a less than perfect cognition, one is never justified in believing a false proposition. This seems incredibly strong and parallels the ideal theory of truth. In effect, justification can only ever be approached. Jim W -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Wed, 27 Sep 2006 5:18 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Peirce and knowledge On Sep 27, 2006, at 12:19 PM, Joseph Ransdell wrote: This word is used in logic in two senses: (1) as a synonym for Cognition, and (2), and more usefully, to signify a perfect cognition, that is, a cognition fulfilling three conditions: first, that it holds for true a proposition that really is true; second, that it is perfectly self-satisfied and free from the uneasiness of doubt; third, that some character of this satisfaction is such that it would be logically impossible that this character should ever belong to satisfaction in a proposition not true. Thanks for that quote Joe. I'd not seen that one before. It's interesting to compare his (2) with the traditional sense of justified true belief. All three elements are there but the emphasis on perfectCognition makes me wonder whether he's really adopting the traditional sense at all or something more akin to a mental state ala Williamson's recent influential book. (Well, influential in a peculiar sense since no one I've met actually buys Williamson's arguments) Clark Goble --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Response to J Kasser (resend) -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Mon, 2 Oct 2006 11:49 AM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to? J Kasser says, "It's not easy to see how Peirce could have considered "the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry" a psychical or a psychological law. It seems charitable here to see Peirce as writing a bit casually once again and to construe him as meaning that the statement in question is a normative truth more or less forced on us by psychological (i.e. psychical) facts. But, as the following quote from another of your messages indicates, Peirce was pretty quick to close the is/ought gap with respect to this issue: The following axiom requires no comment, beyond the remark that it seems often to be forgotten. Where there is no real doubt or disagreement there is no question and can be no real investigation. So perhaps he really meant that a statement about the aim of iqnuiry could be a (coenscopic) psychological law." (end) The question is whether"the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry" is a normative truth or a psychological law. The fact that doubt is a necessary condition for inquiry does not settle this question. It merely suggests what is required for any inquiry to begin. Peirce does not say "the settlement of inquiry ought to be the sole object of inquiry." Thus, the statement is a generalization about what all (some?) men desire when they inquire. It is the major premise in a practical syllogism. The conclusion isthenormative claim that we ought to pursue the scientific method. Maybe there is an implicit premise that we ought to pursue the best method for settling opinion. This might satisfy those concerned with the "naturalistic fallacy." Peirce overstates his case about his own psychologism. His statement about the "origin of truth" is unfortunate. He should have spoken of either a "desire for truth" originating inthe impulse to self-consistency or of "belief."In the latter case,it makes perfectly good sense to talk about psychological concepts such as self-control, satisfaction, conviction, habit etc. The interesting question is whether we can make sense of practical reason andtalk of ends and actions without the introduction of psychological concepts. The problem here has less to do with replacing psychologizing tendencies with phenomenological observations than with using the "intentional idom" to assess practical reason. I have always thought of FOB as an "ethics of inquiry." And unless one wants to try and eliminate the concepts involved in moral psychology,they are always there as a conceptual resource for articulating the normative basis of methodology in the sciences. It appears then, that logical methodology is based on ethics. Jim W -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Sun, 1 Oct 2006 3:04 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to? Joe and other listers, Thanks, Joe, for your kind words about my paper. I fear that you make the paper sound a bit more interesting than it is, and you certainly do a better job of establishing its importance than I did. It's something of a cut-and paste job from my dissertation, and I'm afraid the prose is sometimes rather "dissertationy," which is almost never a good thing. First, as to the question in the heading of your initial message, it seems to me that Peirce can only be referring to the antecedents of the two conditional statements that motivate the method of tenacity in the first place. These are stated in the first sentence of Section V of "Fixation." "If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and if belief is of the nature of a habit, why should we not attain the desired end, by taking any answer to a question which we may fancy, and constantly reiterating it to ourselves, dwelling on all which may conduce to that belief, and learning to turn with contempt and hatred from anything which might disturb it." In the context of the paper, this would seem to make fairly straightforward sense of the idea that tenacity rests on "two fundamental psychological laws." Peirce sure seems to think that it should be apparent to the reader on which "laws" tenacity rests, and so I don't think we're to wander too far afield from the paper itself in determining which the laws are. This interpretation does have two disadvantages, however. If my paper is at all close to right, then Peirce considered these laws "psychical" rather than "psychological," in the 1870's as well as in the 1860's and in the latter half of his career (I don't mean that he had the term "psychical" available in 1877, however). But this is one of those places where the fact that Peirce was writing for *Popular Science Monthly* can perhaps be invoked to account for some
[peirce-l] Re: What
Jim P, Interesting. But if all the scientist did was "average" three defective modes of inquiry, wouldn't we be stuck with the "least total error," yet an error nevertheless? We would have all agreed that the earth is flat, Euclidean geometry is the true physical geometry, a part can never be greater than the whole and so forth. The other methods are experimentally defective. Even if the average was taken just from within the scientific community, are there not numerous examples of "leaps" in knowledge occurring by virtue of the beliefs held out along the fringes of the distribution? Jim W -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Wed, 4 Oct 2006 3:10 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What Dear Folks-- I'm trying to think of some sort of non psychologistic sounding way of describing or accounting for the drive to settle doubt. I'm thinking that doubt represents uncertainty (a measure of information) and uncertainty poses risk.In general, dynamic sytems tend toward equilibriums around their mean values. Perhapsthebehavior we call inquiry is a form of this "moderation in all things".The mean is the point in every distribution which yields the leasttotal errorif taken as the value for every member of the distribution.The mean is also the point of dynamic random equilibrium.Maybe doubt is a form of dynamic disequilibriumand inquiry a form of "regression to the mean". In a pluaralistic universe -- truth is the mean or that which mediates between extremes. Not the extremes that we imagineseparate our truth from the falsehood of others, but the extremes that actually exist each from another and of which our point of view of truth is but one. Truth is what drives consensus and is common to all POVs -- the lowly average. Thetenaciousthinkfeeling is truth, the authoritarian will, the rationalist reason and the scientist the 'average' of em all. MostlyI'm trying to get a better handle on some non psychologistic sounding ways of thinking about doubt, inquiry and belief. Maybe I've just substituted one set of mis-used words for another -- without any real progress in understanding. Curious what others might think of these borrowed (and probably misapplied) ideas. Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
