[peirce-l] Re: Peirce on personality, individualism and science
Bill, you say:BB: Were Arjuna of right mind, he would be dead to self and all earthly cares,his mind clearly fixed on the Absolute. REPLY: But according to my understanding of the Gita the idea is that to be of the right mind is to clearly fixed on your earthly task, on what you are doing right now, like any craftsman at work in his craft. That is a very different matter than being "fixed on the Absolute", which does not seem to me to be recommended anywhere in the Gita. What could that mean in Hinduism? Of course, the objection is obvious, given my interpretation, namely, who says what your task is? Well, Arjuna was a general; and the dramatic context provides the task there: be a general and do what that dictates now. But then in real life that is frequently the way it is. Wriggle around any way you like, at times; there is no getting around what your task appears to you to be, unless you are in the business of rejecting all obligations in principle. Now, Arjuna might well be faulted for never having asked himself before that moment, when all the troops are lined up, whether he really thinks he ought to be try to be a general, instead of raising that question at the last minute. But then he might have said, well, but is there no legitimate occasion ever to be a general, the task of whom is precisely to slaughter the enemy at certain times, no matter who the enemy is? And then we would have a wholly different kind of moral reflection going on. But do you think the point the Gita makes is simply wrong, regardless of context, or isn't it right in saying, in effect, "Hey, the world contains many unspeakably vile things, never to be justified by any reasoning based on practical worldly consequences. There is no solution at the level of this-worldly understanding, and no conclusion to be drawn about this world except that it is constructed in an unspeakably vile and unjust way, if you try to assess it in calculative terms of good and bad produced. But in fact these armies are drawn up and are going to be slaughtering one another regardless of what you decide now. But don't confuse yourself with the being that decided that the world would be like this, if it makes sense to say that there is any such being." There is something that simply passes the possibility of a mere stance of moral self-righteousness about such situations. And sometimes there is nothing to do but what is wrong, any way you want to look at it. (He is not, after all, being urged to slaughter needlessly -- any more than, say, he is being urged to torture people by proxy, as generals and commanders-in-chief frequently are, Western and Eastern alike. Would that the products of Western civilization and the Christian religion could be expected to rise routinely to the level of a sincere and intelligent devotee of the Gita and just do their job instead of exploiting its power! ) So the only way out, when you are in such a situation of moral impossibility is just to do your job, assuming you know what your job really is." In my opinion, the next stage of development after Hinduism is Socratic Platonism -- Plato is acually a Reform Hindu in my opinion -- where you take as your job the task of, say, trying to get clear on what it means to be a general. Not that that gets you off the hook of these morally imponderable situtations, but at least you've got a better job! And if you ever find yourself in position to be the executive ruler of a great country you might be able to avoid disgracing your office and your political and religious tradition when such questions as, What is the job of a President? and What is the job of a torturer? arises! I am reminded just now, by the way, of that passage in the l898 lectures on "vitally important topics" where Peirce says that the vivisectionist becomes immoral precisely at the moment when he tries to justify his actions in slicing up the dog on the grounds that it will have beneficial results. Joe --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce on personality, individualism and science
Joe, There's never time to say it all, and I often say it sloppy. Bill, you say:BB: Were Arjuna of right mind, he would be dead to self and all earthly cares,his mind clearly fixed on the Absolute.REPLY:JR:But according to my understanding of the Gita the idea is that to be of the right mind is to clearly fixed on your earthly task, on what you are doing right now, like any craftsman at work in his craft. That is a very different matter than being "fixed on the Absolute", which does not seem to me to be recommended anywhere in the Gita. What could that mean in Hinduism? Of course, the objection is obvious, given my interpretation, namely, who says what your task is? Well, Arjuna was a general; and the dramatic context provides the task there: be a general and do what that dictates now. BB More appropriately, I should have said "dead to ego and all its earthly desires."The task before Arjuna is not an earthly task, although it occurs on earth. As Krishna makes plain, thisbattle has nothing to do with Arjuna as a personality,but with Arjuna in his incarnated role as a general. Krishnahas already ordained thebattle deaths andoutcome; that will not change. Only Arjuna's social face is at stake in his actions;he may act according to his dharma and win glory, or hemay not, and spend a few lifetimes as an Untouchable for his penance and edification. The utimateenlightenment in Hinduism is the full identificationof theeternal self with the Absolute--Aman is Brahman. In that identification, there is no roomfor ego, the perishing self, nor its willfulassertion in "conscience." There's no contradiction between a mind fixed on the absolute andone's dharma. Here's I'm using "dharma" duty arising from the structures of social role into which Arjuna has been incarnated. As the Caste system indicates, those roles and duties arean intrinsic part of the divine order. JR: But then in real life that is frequently the way it is. Wriggle around any way you like, at times; there is no getting around what your task appears to you to be, unless you are in the business of rejecting all obligations in principle. Now, Arjuna might well be faulted for never having asked himself before that moment, when all the troops are lined up, whether he really thinks he ought to be try to be a general, instead of raising that question at the last minute. But then he might have said, well, but is there no legitimate occasion ever to be a general, the task of whom is precisely to slaughter the enemy at certain times, no matter who the enemy is? And then we would have a wholly different kind of moral reflection going on. But do you think the point the Gita makes is simply wrong, regardless of context, or isn't it right in saying, in effect, "Hey, the world contains many unspeakably vile things, never to be justified by any reasoning based on practical worldly consequences. There is no solution at the level of this-worldly understanding, and no conclusion to be drawn about this world except that it is constructed in an unspeakably vile and unjust way, if you try to assess it in calculative terms of good and bad produced. But in fact these armies are drawn up and are going to be slaughtering one another regardless of what you decide now. But don't confuse yourself with the being that decided that the world would be like this, if it makes sense to say that there is any such being." There is something that simply passes the possibility of a mere stance of moral self-righteousness about such situations. And sometimes there is nothing to do but what is wrong, any way you want to look at it. (He is not, after all, being urged to slaughter needlessly -- any more than, say, he is being urged to torture people by proxy, as generals and commanders-in-chief frequently are, Western and Eastern alike. Would that the products of Western civilization and the Christian religion could be expected to rise routinely to the level of a sincere and intelligent devotee of the Gita and just do their job instead of exploiting its power! ) So the only way out, when you are in such a situation of moral impossibility is just to do your job, assuming you know what your job really is." BB: Well, assumedly, the general can order his troops out of battle--declare retreat or whatever, and let another commander come in--and have the virtue of following his conscience's dictates, even if disgraced and drummd out of the military. The eastern case is different because there is not supposed to be any individual conscience to salve. He is not to do"what is wrong, anyway you look at it." He is to do the only right thing, and without regard for hisor any mortal moral premise. It is his holy duty. It is not even with "God on his side." He has no side. He is merely a untensil.
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce on personality, individualism and science
Bill, i sent this offline but got bounced by one of your filters. Well,
it's short.
[[ I don't doubt your sincerity, only your California style dharma. ]]
:-) I've never been to California, so can't comment on that attribution.
But i've noticed that the New Age epithet is often useful as an excuse
for not investigating whatever it's applied to. I've used it that way
myself, though i've since given up that habit. More generally, people's
reasons for not investigating any line of inquiry are of little or no
use to other people.
If you read Peirce on the scientific enterprise, you'll find that
for him, the true scientist, as a pure seeker after truth, is a very
rare individual indeed -- precisely because his interests are neither
individual nor tied to the aims of some limited community. And if you
investigate Mahayana Buddhist texts seriously, you'll find that the
same is true of the bodhisattva, who is not a transcendent figure to be
worshipped (and thereby kept at a safe distance) but an embodiment of a
path to be lived, an infinite challenge to be met at every moment.
gary F.
}Once the whole is divided, the parts need names. There are already
enough names. One must know when to stop. [Tao Te Ching 32
(Feng/English)]{
gnoxic studies }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/gnoxic.htm
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[peirce-l] Re: Peirce on personality, individualism and science
And if you investigate Mahayana Buddhist texts seriously gary F. :=) Bill Bailey --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce on personality, individualism and science
Gary, thanks for this quote, which i'm pretty sure i haven't seen
before -- i wouldn't have thought Peirce would talk about a
Buddhisto-christian religion!
CP 1.673. . .. the supreme commandment of the Buddhisto-christian
religion is, to generalize, to complete the whole system even until
continuity results and the distinct individuals weld together. Thus it
is, that while reasoning and the science of reasoning strenuously
proclaim the subordination of reasoning to sentiment, the very supreme
commandment of sentiment is that man should generalize, or what the
logic of relatives shows to be the same thing, should become welded
into the universal continuum, which is what true reasoning consists
in. But this does not reinstate reasoning, for this generalization
should come about, not merely in man's cognitions, which are but the
superficial film of his being, but objectively in the deepest
emotional springs of his life. In fulfilling this command, man
prepares himself for transmutation into a new form of life, the joyful
Nirvana in which the discontinuities of his will shall have all but
disappeared.
It does accord pretty closely with what i was thinking; and so does
everything in your later post (below), including the other Peirce
passages you found:
- Original Message -
...
I would suggest that the ideal of the scientific method requires a
authentic scientific personality as Peirce conceived it, the kind of
person who, like Peirce, was willing to offer his life to the pursuit of
truth in those areas in which he was most likely to significantly
contribute. But this tendency ought to be alive not only in scientists
but in all of us to some extent--this desire to help make the world a
more reasonable place where it is 'up to us' to do so.
CP 1.615 The one thing whose admirableness is not due to an ulterior
reason is Reason itself comprehended in all its fullness, so far as we
can comprehend it. Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be
to execute our little function in the operation of the creation by
giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as
the slang is, it is up to us to do so. In logic, it will be observed
that knowledge is reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be
to follow such methods as must develope knowledge the most speedily. .
. .
But Peirce suggests that in the true scientist that this represents a
kind of religious commitment involving a strong sense of duty,
sacrifice, faith in the reality of God (as this is presented in the N.A.
and elsewhere), and so forth. While you are no doubt correct that Peirce
emphasized the communal nature of science, there is yet an individual
contribution to be made beyond this veritable sacrifice of all other
concerns to this compelling scientific pursuit. Commenting on the extent
to which Peirce emphasized the communal you wrote:
GF: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Peirce did not, to my knowledge,
put as much emphasis on that last point as he did on the collective,
public, social, communal nature of true science (as opposed to the more
mundane enterprise which *he* sometimes called art or practice --
obviously my sense of practice is different.) His emphasis was
appropriate for the cultural milieu in which he wrote. For my own part,
i'd say that the key principle here is the creative tension between
individual and community: the individual who merely conforms to
communal
habits does not contribute to its development.
I would suggest that the creative tension between individual and
community was always there in Peirce, and even in the scientific method
as he conceived it. After all, abduction tends to be--if it is not
exclusively--a personal matter (even when several scientists abduce the
same hypothesis at more or less the same time).
---
Yes, exactly -- thank you!
gary F.
}No wise fish would go anywhere without a porpoise. [the Mock Turtle]{
gnoxic studies }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/gnoxic.htm
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[peirce-l] Re: Peirce on personality, individualism and science
Bill,
I'm on this list because i read Peirce and take him seriously as a
writer whose concepts have some bearing on the conduct of a life -- any
life -- and my working assumption is that others are here for similar
reasons. Likewise, my interest in the bodhisattva concept arises from my
reading of texts which represent it in a context relevant to the actual
conduct of a life (or a sentient being, to use the Buddhist term). These
texts include the Lotus Sutra and a broad range of Buddhist writers and
translators ancient and modern (especially Dogen) who also take the
concept seriously. I don't profess to be a Buddhist, just as i don't
profess to be a scientist or any kind of specialist, because i don't see
such professions as being relevant: i'm here as a reader, and if i'm
going to discuss any concept drawn from my reading, the discussion will
have to be based on the texts in question. In those terms, i don't see
our exchange here as very relevant either, so pardon me if my responses
are abrupt.
Bill [re the Gita]: It is not a politico telling Arjuna what his social
duty is; it is a god telling a human what his duty is to God. I suppose
gods tend to be a bit totalitarian, but that's just the way they are.
gary: Gods do tend to come across that way in the monotheistic Abrahamic
traditions; whether that transcendent alpha-male quality should be read
into the immanent gods of the Vedic tradition is another question.
(Hmmm, now i seem to be the one making an East/West distinction; isn't
that odd? But maybe you also consider the Abrahamic religions as
Eastern; that would be reasonable, since their region of origin is
what we now call the Middle East, but it's not what i thought you had
in mind.)
Bill: ... you gut the doctrine of all its stringencies, as if they were
yours to explain away, and leave only a pale image of Buddhism.
gary: From here, it looks like you're the one who doesn't take the
bodhisattva vow seriously or recognize the stringencies involved in
living by it.
What i am referring to under that name is simply a person who
has taken the bodhisattva vow and is actually living as if he means
it.
Bill: Why don't you try bouncing this conception off a traditional
Buddhist and see if he or she recognizes it.
gary: My conception is drawn directly (with some rewording) from the
likes of Dogen, Thich Nhat Hanh, etc. I'm sure there are many who call
themselves Buddhists and see the concept differently, but if that's what
you mean by a traditional Buddhist, i don't see their testimony as
relevant. (Likewise i'd rather read Peirce than consult a traditional
Peircean.) The point here is not at all to describe what the Buddhist
masses believe.
Bill: What if, for example, Buddhist logic is not rooted in the social
principle? Would that affect your claim? Or is it, as I feel, just the
general similarity that you are interested in.
gary: If Buddhist logic were so different from Peircean logic as to be
not rooted in the social principle, then nobody could understand or
use it at all -- including you and me. And yes, it is the general
similarity that i'm interested in; but as Peirce says, you must
consider that, according to the principle which we are tracing out, a
connection between ideas is itself a general idea, and that a general
idea is a living feeling (EP1, 330). Starting with a general
similarity, you can always make distinctions, but doing so doesn't
always advance the inquiry.
gary F.
}Once the whole is divided, the parts need names. There are already
enough names. One must know when to stop. [Tao Te Ching 32
(Feng/English)]{
gnoxic studies }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/gnoxic.htm
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[peirce-l] Re: Peirce on personality, individualism and science
Gary F.
I don't doubt your sincerity, only your California style dharma. You might
find Dan Leighton's Compassionate Faces more useful than Dogen; I don't know
how you got from Dogen to here. In any case, Leighton precedes you in the
New Age applied bodhisattva conception by noting several recent
inductees/nominees, among them Mother Theresa, Bobby Dylan, Gloria Steinem,
Muhammad Ali, and Thich Nhat Hanh.
Best,
Bill Bailey
Bill Bailey
Bill,
I'm on this list because i read Peirce and take him seriously as a
writer whose concepts have some bearing on the conduct of a life -- any
life -- and my working assumption is that others are here for similar
reasons. Likewise, my interest in the bodhisattva concept arises from my
reading of texts which represent it in a context relevant to the actual
conduct of a life (or a sentient being, to use the Buddhist term). These
texts include the Lotus Sutra and a broad range of Buddhist writers and
translators ancient and modern (especially Dogen) who also take the
concept seriously. I don't profess to be a Buddhist, just as i don't
profess to be a scientist or any kind of specialist, because i don't see
such professions as being relevant: i'm here as a reader, and if i'm
going to discuss any concept drawn from my reading, the discussion will
have to be based on the texts in question. In those terms, i don't see
our exchange here as very relevant either, so pardon me if my responses
are abrupt.
Bill [re the Gita]: It is not a politico telling Arjuna what his social
duty is; it is a god telling a human what his duty is to God. I suppose
gods tend to be a bit totalitarian, but that's just the way they are.
gary: Gods do tend to come across that way in the monotheistic Abrahamic
traditions; whether that transcendent alpha-male quality should be read
into the immanent gods of the Vedic tradition is another question.
(Hmmm, now i seem to be the one making an East/West distinction; isn't
that odd? But maybe you also consider the Abrahamic religions as
Eastern; that would be reasonable, since their region of origin is
what we now call the Middle East, but it's not what i thought you had
in mind.)
Bill: ... you gut the doctrine of all its stringencies, as if they were
yours to explain away, and leave only a pale image of Buddhism.
gary: From here, it looks like you're the one who doesn't take the
bodhisattva vow seriously or recognize the stringencies involved in
living by it.
What i am referring to under that name is simply a person who
has taken the bodhisattva vow and is actually living as if he means
it.
Bill: Why don't you try bouncing this conception off a traditional
Buddhist and see if he or she recognizes it.
gary: My conception is drawn directly (with some rewording) from the
likes of Dogen, Thich Nhat Hanh, etc. I'm sure there are many who call
themselves Buddhists and see the concept differently, but if that's what
you mean by a traditional Buddhist, i don't see their testimony as
relevant. (Likewise i'd rather read Peirce than consult a traditional
Peircean.) The point here is not at all to describe what the Buddhist
masses believe.
Bill: What if, for example, Buddhist logic is not rooted in the social
principle? Would that affect your claim? Or is it, as I feel, just the
general similarity that you are interested in.
gary: If Buddhist logic were so different from Peircean logic as to be
not rooted in the social principle, then nobody could understand or
use it at all -- including you and me. And yes, it is the general
similarity that i'm interested in; but as Peirce says, you must
consider that, according to the principle which we are tracing out, a
connection between ideas is itself a general idea, and that a general
idea is a living feeling (EP1, 330). Starting with a general
similarity, you can always make distinctions, but doing so doesn't
always advance the inquiry.
gary F.
}Once the whole is divided, the parts need names. There are already
enough names. One must know when to stop. [Tao Te Ching 32
(Feng/English)]{
gnoxic studies }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/gnoxic.htm
---
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[peirce-l] Re: Peirce on personality, individualism and science
Gary, I would tend to agree with your analysis below, while I was especially responsive to your interpreting the Gita in terms of what is real (as opposed to actual), that it refers to types (not tokens)You wrote: GF:. . . . . . . . . . . . . In Peircean terms, the scripture must refer to what's real rather than what is (or was) actual. Or to put it another way, it refers to *types* (rather than tokens) of practice. In practice we are guided by ideals, and the (psychological) fact is that the guidance is not effective unless we believe in their reality. Perhaps one could say that our ideals (firstness) must be seen as real (thirdness) if they are ever to be actualized in us and in the world (secondness). Your analysis of the Gita is most valuable from several vantage points, for example, your comments regarding Ghandi's position a propos of it (within his own historical context); and I am beginning to see quite clearly what you're pointing to in Peirce that parallels the bodhisattvic ideal. You wrote: GR: What i am referring to under that name is simply a person who has taken the bodhisattva vow and is actually living as if he means it. Logically, this entails working toward the enlightenment of all sentient beings rather than for some personal attainment or reward. It is the reality, and not the actuality (now or at any future time) of this ideal which functions to guide actual practice. The Peircean ideal of scientific method functions in exactly the same way, in my view. I would suggest that the ideal of the scientific method requires a authentic scientific personality as Peirce conceived it, the kind of person who, like Peirce, was willing to offer his life to the pursuit of truth in those areas in which he was most likely to significantly contribute. But this tendency ought to be alive not only in scientists but in all of us to some extent--this desire to help make the world a more reasonable place where it is 'up to us' to do so. CP 1.615 The one thing whose admirableness is not due to an ulterior reason is Reason itself comprehended in all its fullness, so far as we can comprehend it. Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is up to us to do so. In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be to follow such methods as must develope knowledge the most speedily. . . . But Peirce suggests that in the true scientist that this represents a kind of religious commitment involving a strong sense of duty, sacrifice, faith in the reality of God (as this is presented in the N.A. and elsewhere), and so forth. While you are no doubt correct that Peirce emphasized the communal nature of science, there is yet an individual contribution to be made beyond this veritable sacrifice of all other concerns to this compelling scientific pursuit. Commenting on the extent to which Peirce emphasized the communal you wrote: GF: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Peirce did not, to my knowledge, put as much emphasis on that last point as he did on the collective, public, social, communal nature of true science (as opposed to the more mundane enterprise which *he* sometimes called art or practice -- obviously my sense of practice is different.) His emphasis was appropriate for the cultural milieu in which he wrote. For my own part, i'd say that the key principle here is the creative tension between individual and community: the individual who merely conforms to communal habits does not contribute to its development. I would suggest that the creative tension between individual and community was always there in Peirce, and even in the scientific method as he conceived it. After all, abduction tends to be--if it is not exclusively--a personal matter (even when several scientists abduce the same hypothesis at more or less the same time). Thanks for your most thought-provoking analysis, Gary. I'll be reflecting on it for days. Gary R. PS I've only had a chance to glance at the quotations you linked to, but will read through them this week. It looks to be a very rich and suggestive collection indeed! gnusystems wrote: Bill, [[ To deny what I said of the Bhagavad Gita, you have to deny what is written there. ]] Well, if you choose (or are predisposed) to read it as an apology for a totalitarian ethic, then i'm sure there is no difficulty in doing so. I think this is evident in the principles shared by semiotics and hermeneutics. It is also evident that at least some of its deepest readers -- Gandhi, for one -- do not read it that way. [[ I've seen Ghandi's commentary, and whether he liked the Gita or not is irrelevant. He, in fact, treated the Mahabharata War as allegorical. ]] Naturally, he treated it as metaphorical (i
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce on personality, individualism and science
Gary F. I'm not going the respond at any length here because I don't think my side belongs here. Yours, as a Peircean concern might. Bill, [[ To deny what I said of the Bhagavad Gita, you have to deny what is written there. ]] Well, if you choose (or are predisposed) to read it as an apology for a totalitarian ethic, then i'm sure there is no difficulty in doing so. I think this is evident in the principles shared by semiotics and hermeneutics. It is also evident that at least some of its deepest readers -- Gandhi, for one -- do not read it that way. I could as easily say you are predisposed to reading it as an argument for a communitarian ethic. In fact, it has nothing to do with either. It is not a politico telling Arjuna what his social duty is; it is a god telling a human what his duty is to God. I suppose gods tend to be a bit totalitarian, but that's just the way they are. [[ I've seen Ghandi's commentary, and whether he liked the Gita or not is irrelevant. He, in fact, treated the Mahabharata War as allegorical. ]] Naturally, he treated it as metaphorical (i would not say allegorical). It was, among other things, a metaphor for his own war against British imperialism. What's relevant is not whether Gandhi liked the Gita but his testimony that he based his *practice* on it. It's not possible, in my view, to base one's practice on an ancient scripture without reading it metaphorically -- not if you value *truth* as both Peirce and Gandhi did (i believe Gandhi is reported as saying there is no god higher than truth). In Peircean terms, the scripture must refer to what's real rather than what is (or was) actual. Or to put it another way, it refers to *types* (rather than tokens) of practice. In practice we are guided by ideals, and the (psychological) fact is that the guidance is not effective unless we believe in their reality. Well, here again--and this is my chief complaint with what I've read of your contentions--you gut the doctrine of all its stringencies, as if they were yours to explain away, and leave only a pale image of Buddhism. But more of this just below. Your description of the bodhisattva presented him as a quasi-mythic figure. What i am referring to under that name is simply a person who has taken the bodhisattva vow and is actually living as if he means it. Why don't you try bouncing this conception off a traditional Buddhist and see if he or she recognizes it. Many Christians take similar vows to work for the salvations of others and work at it as if they mean it. Is that appearance enough? The enlightenment the Buddhists speak of precedes the work, is in fact the pre-condition for the work. You cannot held others to achieve enlightenment until you have achieved it. I submit to you that state of mind is only achieved after much struggle and self discipline. Perhaps we can send our scientists away to a monastery for re-training? I'm sorry to be flip, but you seem to me to be taking a thin similarity and reducing Buddhism to fit it, leaving only a pale New-Age image in its place. Logically, this entails working toward the enlightenment of all sentient beings rather than for some personal attainment or reward. It is the reality, and not the actuality (now or at any future time) of this ideal which functions to guide actual practice. That may well be. But given your position, would not Buddhist monks do it better? This is what bothers me. You take one Buddhism's highest values, and try to stir it up as a potion in western water, as if it were immediately soluable. The Peircean ideal of scientific method functions in exactly the same way, in my view. You think the Peircean ideal of scientific method functions exactly the same as the Buddhist state of mind that is enlightenment? Exactly the same way as what? It's probably not necessary to append Peircean passages about this, which are many and well known; but i'll try to do that if requested. The upshot of it all is that the true scientist, like the bodhisattva, devotes his personal life to a *collective* enterprise (the quest for truth) in which he can only play a minute role. He must lose himself in that role, precisely because that's the only way to actualize his unique contribution to the quest. Peirce did not, to my knowledge, put as much emphasis on that last point as he did on the collective, public, social, communal nature of true science (as opposed to the more mundane enterprise which *he* sometimes called art or practice -- obviously my sense of practice is different.) His emphasis was appropriate for the cultural milieu in which he wrote. For my own part, i'd say that the key principle here is the creative tension between individual and community: the individual who merely conforms to communal habits does not contribute to its development. Peirce also emphasized that science and logic both demand and depend on identification of one's interests with those of an unlimited community. (For
