Ben,
I have a question. What is the relation between cognition and recognition? It seems that3a and 3b respond to two different questions, namely, what isa correct logical description of the structure of cognition and how is thatstructure *validated* for any given peice of information. No wonder
List,
I am trying to sharpen my understanding of the concept of index with respect to a natural or an artificial language.I was struck by the number of entries, at least in the Commens Dictionary, that fail to isolate what is essential for distinguishing an index from a subindice with respect to
You say,
"Subindex" is not a Peircean term, is it?What is it and why should Peirce be concerned to distinguish an index from it?
Joe,
The Commens Dictionary (online) has a singleentry for "Subindex" in the left side roll down window. It links to the followingpassage from CP2.274.But Peirce uses
Hi Ben,
We need to start over. Would you agree that "subindex" never occurs in Peirce's writing, or at least the relevant passages we are dealing with?You say,
"That which can occur more than once, "x number of times,"is the subindex. That which occurs once only once is the index." (end quote)
Ben,
You say,
"But, in any case,why wouldn't you think that the index or the subindex involve a "real relation"? Why, in the case of a (sub)indexical qualisign,wouldn't there be reality ina habit of using a certain set of sound to direct the attention of one or more among a set of minds to
Ben
A general term has a "range" or "domain." A quantifier has a "scope." Peirce following DeMorgan called the domain a "universe of discourse." The variables x,y are general terms; as is the predicate letter J. (My post right before this raises a lot of questions about that predicate letter.)
Ben,
Fis a variable.But it does not matter. Vagueness (indefiniteness) is a feature of existential quantification regardles of whether it is the object or predicate.This appears to match what Lane and the trikonic say. You say,
"In that predicate logic which you're useing, does the existence of
Thanks Ben,
It is a little difficult to assess matters since I have been focusing on the NLC and you are looking more broadly at the corpus. You say you do it differently. Nevertheless,I will try to locate a problem area.
You say,
"The disparity of Peirce's approaches to (1) attribution
List,
The question is being too easily dismissed. For Peirce, its not that introspectiondoesn't exist, but that its results are unreliable for the purposes at hand, namely, a theory of cognition and the deduction of categories. The overall anti-Cartesian emphasis of Peirce's early work is
Ben,
You say,
"The question is WHETHER the stove is black -- yes, no, novelly, probably, optimally, if only if..., etc. What is required for assertion or proposition or judging or even conceiving the situation is that the mind can apprehend whether the stove
is,
isn't,
may be,
might
Thanks Ben,
The proposition "She is possibly pregnant" is easily understood by all. I overstated my case. (nor is their a potential contradiction) But I think it masks a problem for the theory of cognition, and furthermore,not all ordinary expressions are as clear as they might be. So, we might
Thanks Ben,
There is a difference between treating possibility epistemically or treating it ontologically. "Possibly black' and "possibly non-black" are (sub) contraries, indeterminate with respect to a state of information. But since we are considering "this stove," and not allowing multiple
Ben,
Peirce says,
"Very many writers assert that everything is logically possible which involves no contradiction Let us call that sort of logical possibility, essential, or formal, logical possibility. It is not the only logical possibility; for in this sense, two propositions contradictory
Ben,
(I responded to your later message first.) I agree with a lot here.The idea that there are objective possibilities that are true, regardless of our knowledge, has beenarguably the central issue in discussions of philosophical realism for 2500 years. The idea of objective indeterminacy is a
Thanks Ben,
Well,I guess the passage doesn't discuss modal propositions if you disallow rephrasing "this stove is possibly black" with 'It is possible that "this stove is black."'There is certainly a logic of possibility at work.Why aren' t these modal propositions?It is just that the
Ben,
You say,
"Saying that the NLC 'theory' of cognition (which seems to me no more a cognition theory than Peircean truth theory is an inquiry theory even though it references inquiry) is sufficient except when we talk about possibility, feasibility, etc., is -- especially if that list
Joe and list,
It is difficult to tell exactly what those two psychological laws are from the text. (preceding the quote below) It is also difficult to frame them universally. Either we talk of all men at all times or some men at all times or all men at some time or another. I think we could
Clark and list,
Thanks for the reference to Timothy Williamson.I do not see any direct connection to Peirce but one could be made in terms of factoringbeliefs or maybe dispositionsinto prime/composite and contents into narrow/broad.I don't know how all of this would work. The unpublished
Response to J Kasser (resend)
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Mon, 2 Oct 2006 11:49 AM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?
J Kasser says,
"It's not easy to see how Peirce could
Jim P,
Interesting. But if all the scientist did was "average" three defective modes of inquiry, wouldn't we be stuck with the "least total error," yet an error nevertheless? We would have all agreed that the earth is flat, Euclidean geometry is the true physical geometry, a part can never
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