Marci said:
I would disagree, because any woman who wants to be a priest is
clearly at odds with heavily document ecclesiology in the Church that
forbids them becoming a priest. Their views, therefore, cut them out
of the picture before you even get to gender.
As a side note, the Episcopal
Though this isn't a theology list, a clarification is in order; the Catholic
Church does not recognize the validity of Episcopalian ordinations. They were
rejected by the Church as early as 1554, and definitively in 1896.
Episcopalian ministers who convert
to Catholicism must be ordained as
Actually, there is a considerable difference between, for want of a better
term, the squabbling and accommodation between Catholics and Anglicans and the
permissible gender of priests. The differences are rooted both in Scripture
and in the Magisterium of the Catholic Church. (This
I hope I don't unduly belabor the matter, and those who think I do can hit
the delete button and rest assured I won't prolong it in future messages
(absent some unexpected expression of demand). As Michael Newsom well
explains, the rule of celibacy for Catholic priests is a rule of discipline
Not exactly, I think. The law allows sex to be BFOQ. Of course the BFOQ comes from the religious beliefs which in turn are what is protected by the First Amendment. Other BFOQs based on sex include things like restroom attendants and roles in operas and plays and movies -- though Elizabethan
\
I would disagree, because any woman who wants to be a priest is clearly at
odds with heavily document ecclesiology in the Church that forbids them becoming
a priest. Their views, therefore, cut them out of the picture before you
even get to gender.
Marci
Actually, as to the Catholic
The caselaw and legislative history are fairly clear -- and uniform, as far
as I know-- in holding to the contrary. The general right of
churches to insist that their employees share the church's religious beliefs
cannot be used to circumvent the other prohibitions of title VII. For
Title: Re: Harm to Others as a Factor in Accommodation Doctrine
Although Marcis point is well-taken, I think another way to understand Marcs (BTW, how cute is that, Marci and Marc?) point is to change Marcis counter-example from churchs protecting pedophiles under the free exercise clause to
I see a larger role than Marci does for constitutionally mandated and
judicially enforced free exercise exemptions, but there is a problem with
Brad's argument. A law that prohibited a certain kind of speech *as speech*
would not be neutral and generally applicable; it would target speech the
same
With respect to religious speech, there is no difference. When it
comes to conduct, though, it is fairly obvious that conduct must be capable of
greater regulation than speech, because of its greater potential for harm.
This is a principle that has a distinguished pedigree, Locke,
This is rather far afield, actually. These are questions of what
evidence can be adduced in court. Penitent-minister communications are
generally not fair game and have been excluded, unless the penitent waives the
privilege. Patient-doctor privileges essentially get the same
treatment.
if
Mark-- Elvig does not gainsay my point that if an abusive or discriminatory
practice is not motivated by a sincere religious belief, the claim can go
forward in the courts. So the ministerial exception is not some blanket
protection for anything that happens between clergy and religious
What Elvig appears to hold is that if the remedy does not interfere with the
church's selection of its own clergy, the ministerial exception is not
implicated. It certainly does not hold that a pastor can be reinstated if she
was discharged because of her sex, or her complaints about sexual
As I read this, I found myself wondering what the point is of having
constitutionally protected free exercise if the exercise is only free when the
legislature decides it is. The scenario you describe seems to be one where
the legislature is free to demand or prohibit any conduct they like,
On Mar 13, 2005, at 10:55 AM, Brad Pardee wrote:
...would you say that the Catholic Church is required, by
anti-discrimination laws, to hire women as priests unless the
anti-discrimination law was to specifically exempt the Church?
It seems to me that the Catholic Church in America doesn't hire
The term hire refers to any position in which one is employed,
regardless of how one got there or the motivation for doing so.
There is, of course, an exemption for religious positions in religious
organizations in Title VII and it would be required in any event under
the Free Exercise clause.
I agree that the Free Exercise clause requirea an exemption, regardless of
whether or not Title VII provided for one. However, Marci's position, as I
understood her to explain it, is that there would be no exemption under the
Free Exercise clause for a neutral, generally applicable law unless
Marci,my comment was responding to Marty's and Tom Berg's earlier post,
about harm to third parties being part of the criteria courts employ in
determing whether an accommodation the legislature has granted should be
struck down on Establishment Clause grounds. Several federal and state
court
As usual, it appears that we will not be able to change one another's minds
w/r/t the question whether piecemeal legislative accommodations are superior to,
or more constitutionally acceptablethan, judicial accommodations pursuant
to a general statutory mandate. (And we're certainly not
In connection with the discussion between the interplay between First
Amendment rights and harm to others, any thoughts on the recent action
by the New York City Board of Health to enjoin a mohel from performing
circumcisions, as he generally performs them? The facts are these:
As part of the
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