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SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STATEMENT TO THE PRESS on East Timor
8 September 1999
Good morning. I've just briefed the Council with my colleague Kieran
Prendergast, and we've shared with them our conversations
overnight. Kieran was in touch with Ian Martin, who, together with his
section chiefs, made a recommendation that we withdraw the
UN staff in East Timor. I did authorize the withdrawal, subject to certain
conditions--that they will be able to get out safely, and that
we'll be able to arrange the evacuation.
We are not only concerned about our staff. But we are also concerned about
the East Timorese, particularly the 2,000 internally
displaced persons in our compound. That is why I am taking measures to try
and see if we can thin out rather than withdraw
completely, so that we can maintain our premises, on the understanding that
the military around the building will continue to provide protection.
I have had a long series of conversations with President Habibie and Prime
Minister Howard of Australia. The Council is now
discussing the situation. The Security Council mission is now in Jakarta.
It has had several meetings. President Habibie told me he'll be meeting
them this afternoon. And I am sure they will press some of the points which
are of concern to us.
I maintain my position and I've also discussed with the Indonesian
President that if they are unable to maintain law and order then they
will have to invite and accept international assistance to bring order into
East Timor. I'm sure that this is also something that the Council
members will press.
Q: The military said that your 48-hour deadline was a joke, and
one of the military leaders said, referring to your 48-hour deadline,"This
is not like flushing the toilet." What do you think about this kind of
response to...
SG: I am not discussing or negotiating with the military on this.
I'm negotiating with the President of Indonesia.
Q: Do you consider that we need the consent from Jakarta to allow
an international force to act immediately?
SG: I think the governments that I have been in touch with who
are prepared to make troops available would all want to see Indonesian
consent. If that is the case then we have to bring our collective pressure
to bear on the Government to allow us to go in.
Q: Sir, reports out of Jakarta indicate that the reason UNAMET
had to pull out of Dili is because it's being cut off--water and food
supplies are being cut off--not just by the militia, but also by the
Indonesian military. Can you confirm that?
SG: It is correct that they are concerned about water, they are
concerned about supplies. The place is in chaos. The economy has collapsed.
The communication is very bad, and they need to be able to get out. In my
discussions with the President he assured me that the military will restore
these facilities. We will wait to see if this is done. But of course you
cannot have that many people in the compound who cannot get out, who have
been hearing shootings outside, and not do something about it.
Q On May 5th, in retrospect, do you feel that trusting the
Indonesian command structure to fulfill the promise that they made was a
gamble? That gamble has been a failure?
SG: I think you have to look at the facts. That Indonesia has
been controlling that territory for about 25 years. Indonesia has been
responsible for law and order. Indonesia has shown the international
community that it has the capacity to maintain law and order in East Timor.
And the international community expected it and demands that it maintains
law and order. Obviously, it is not working, and this is why the question
of allowing an international group to go in and assist them is absolutely
crucial. The question is, when you say was it a gamble, I wouldn't put it
as a gamble. I would put it as an expectation which was genuine. The
Indonesians gave their word that they would do it. Even at that point
international troops were not going to be allowed to go in until phase 3.
Of course, the other issue that we have suggested to Indonesia that they
could do, is to advance the decision on accepting the results of the ballot
which will accelerate phase 3.
Q: Your advisors have been sending notes to the Security Council
saying that the Indonesian military and the police have been participating
in the violence. Is it your opinion that they Indonesian military and the
Indonesian police have been actively organizing, participating in, or
orchestrating the violence?
SG: There have been allegations to that extent, and what I will
say is that they have failed. They have failed totally to maintain law and
order, both the military and the police. The President assures me that,
with this new group of soldiers going in, coming in from outside, and with
the withdrawal of those who are in East Timor, things are going to be
different.
Will it happen? I don't know. Only time will tell. But this is why we need
to go ahead with our own contingency planning of what the international
community can do to assist them. And I would urge the Indonesians that, if
this fails, they invite the international community to help restore order.
I think there is too much killing, and we cannot stand by and allow the
people of East Timor to be killed. The Council and the UN is determined,
and I think the international community is with us, in implementing fully
the results of the ballot of 30 August, and to implement the agreement of
May 5.
Thank you very much.
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