On May 3, 2008, at 7:59 PM, Matt Kettler wrote:
Have you tried running one of the forged messages, and an actual legitimate message through SA manually with the -D flag to see what the trusted and untrusted hosts are, as SA sees it?

Yes.  Many times.  That's not the point of this thread.
I still think it is.

Matt, how can I possibly get you to move past this unfounded assumption that my trust path is broken and focus on the real problem? The trust path is not broken, it's just fine.

If your AWL is applying the same history data to forged email as unforged email, either there's a *major* bug in the AWL code, or your trust path is broken. Period.

The AWL is designed to be able to distinguish forged mail from nonforged mail. If that's not working, that's a major problem.

I've read the code and I see nothing designed to determine forgeries. There is code to save data with an IP range, but that's not relevant to this issue.

The point of this thread is the obvious ease of forging e-mail from recipient to (same) recipient. It's one situation where the AWL wouldn't work very well.


Actually, it's very difficult to forge in a way that will confuse the AWL, if your trust path and the AWL code is working properly. After all, it looks at the combination of email address and first untrusted IP. Forged email will not be from the same IP as legitimate email, unless your trust path is broken and SA always sees all mail as entering your network from the same IP.

Or that you receive e-mail from the very same public wireless and/or phone providers as everyone else does. My trust path doesn't have to be broken if the networks used to send the e-mail are public networks.

(if you can laugh == "welcome to the 21st century and the Crackberry/ Treo/iPhone") Not trying to be snide.

It would be fairly easy to forge, and worthwhile enough for botnets to just do this (which they are, in force, for the last month)

I personally see no value in applying AWL to messages from self to self.
I agree, but I see no value in applying the exception. I'd rather try to fix the more general problem of your AWL not distinguishing message sources properly.

I see no evidence of this. My trust path is just fine (ie "nonexistent" == all mail not from localhost isn't trusted)

I may be wrong, and I'm open to arguements against this, but I am suggesting that the AWL module should skip over self->self messages. It seems too easy to forge, and no gain in doing so.

You're overlooking how the AWL works. It's actually really hard to forge.

However, I will agree with you there's limited value in self-to-self AWL records.. but there's also no harm in them if the AWL is working properly.

Instead of making statements like this, please explain how the AWL deals the forgery. Because I have the code right in front of me and I see absolutely nothing in the AWL code that tries to identify forgeries. Instead of making unfounded statements, can you be specific about the issues?

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