Thanks for the detailed reply, Robert.  A significant part of it seems to be 
suggesting that high-end array hardware from multiple vendors may be 
*introducing* error sources that studies like CERN's (and Google's, and CMU's) 
never encountered (based, as they were, on low-end hardware).

If so, then at least a major part of your improved experience is not due to 
using ZFS per se but to getting rid of the high-end equipment and using more 
reliable commodity parts:  a remarkable thought - I wonder if anyone has ever 
done that kind of a study.

A quick Google of ext3 fsck did not yield obvious examples of why people needed 
to run fsck on ext3, though it did remind me that by default ext3 runs fsck 
just for the hell of it every N (20?) mounts - could that have been part of 
what you were seeing?

There are two problems with over-hyping a product:  it gives competitors 
something legitimate to refute, and it leaves the impression that the product 
has to be over-sold because it doesn't have enough *real* merits to stand on.  
Well, for people like me there's a third problem:  we just don't like spin.  
When a product has legitimate strengths that set it out out from the pack, it 
seems a shame to over-sell it the same way that a mediocre product is sold and 
waste the opportunity to take the high ground that it actually does own.

I corrected your misunderstanding about WAFL's separate checksums in my October 
26th response to you in 
http://storagemojo.com/2007/10/25/sun-fires-back-at-netapp/ - though in that 
response I made a reference to something that I seem to have said somewhere (I 
have no idea where) other than in that thread.  In any event, one NetApp paper 
detailing their use is 3356.pdf (first hit if you Google "Introduction to Data 
ONTAP 7G") - search for 'checksum' and read about block and zone checksums in 
locations separate from the data that they protect.

As just acknowledged above, I occasionally recall something incorrectly.  I now 
believe that the mechanisms described there were put in place more to allow use 
of disks with standard 512-byte sector sizes than specifically to separate the 
checksums from the data, and that while thus separating the checksums may 
achieve a result similar to ZFS's in-parent checksums the quote that you 
provided may indicate the primary mechanism that WAFL uses to validate its 
data:  whether the 'checksums' reside with the data or elsewhere, I now 
remember reading (I found the note that I made years ago, but it didn't provide 
a specific reference and I just spent an hour searching NetApp's Web site for 
it without success) that the in-block (or near-to-block) 'checksums' include 
not only file identity and offset information but a block generation number (I 
think this is what the author meant by the 'identity' of the block) that 
increments each time the block is updated, and that this generation nu
 mber is kept in the metadata block that points to the file block, thus 
allowing the metadata block to verify with a high degree of certainty that the 
target block is indeed not only the right file block, containing the right 
data, but the right *version* of that block.

As I said, thanks (again) for the detailed response,

- bill
 
 
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