That's a self serving definition of subtlety from Cheerskep, quite novel, too. There's nothing amiss in his claiming that meaning is the notion and not the words, gestures, etc., used to convey it. That's akin to Lakoff and Johnson's use of the term "container" to signify the clustering of images, words, etc., in metaphorical cognition. If that's really true of Cheerskep's sense of meaning then he's even more at risk of seeing his argument dissolve --like waterfront sand around his feet-- since "notions" are mediated between subject and object by means of metaphor suggested by sensory and remembered experience, together with mult-loop-tracked free associations. That holds, it seems, hether it's me looking at a rock or writing to this list. So how does the rock manipulate my notions? Would I have similar notions without the rock? There's something missing in Cheerskep's seemingly sensible argument -- the object.
WC --- On Fri, 8/29/08, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: "Meaning" is always in a mind, never in an object." > To: [email protected] > Date: Friday, August 29, 2008, 9:41 AM > William writes: > > "Cheerskep fails to engage the subtlety of the > argument that we involuntarily > assign meaning to external objects, etc. That is not to > say those objects > have meaning but in fact it's almost the same thing > because we can't sense the > world without a-priori experiencing it as > "meaningful"." > > Arguments tend to be thought "subtle" when they > employ numerous unexplained > terms, and the notions behind those key are fundamentally > confused. > > William has never described what he has in mind with > 'meaning' or > "meaningful', or 'assign meaning to' -- an > alleged action like the one I infer Kate has > in mind when she says "place meaning IN". > > I've engaged the argument at length, particularly in my > last several > postings. I've described what I have in mind when I say > "meaning" -- i.e. it's always > notion; the notion in the mind of a speaker when he uses a > word (or any other > "sign", including gestures etc.), or the notion > in the mind of someone who > contemplates the word. > > I've worked hard to convey I'm not saying > that's what meaning "IS", it's only > what I have in mind with the word. And I've tried to > convince listers we make > a fundamental mistake whenever we hunt for "THE > meaning of" a word as though > a "meaning" is some non-notional entity. > > I've tried to explain why it's therefore a mistake > to believe there is a > "meaning" "IN" any external objects > (including words) -- a mistake regardless of > whether the lister feels that meaning is "placed > in" or "assigned to" the > object by "us". > > I've maintained that listers -- and not just listers; > generations of > philosophers -- have made this mistake because they are > beguiled by the fact that when > a given word is uttered, throughout the listening audience > a roughly similar > notion arises. "How could that be if a word > doesn't have a meaning in it?" > > This similarity, I have argued, is because we in a given > community have each > of us separately been repeatedly exposed to similar > juxtapositions of words > and objects. Our brain is a storehouse of memories -- and > it is an ASSOCIATING > apparatus. Seeing one thing "calls to mind" > another. > > As an example I used the word 'kayak' (I was > prompted by an event in the > recent Olympics). Suppose I say 'kayak' to you. A > tumble of associated images and > remembered usages come to your mind. They're far from > identical with those > that come to my mind, but they're similar enough so > that a serviceably similar > image arises in your mind. Most of us got our images from > tv, magazines, books, > dictionaries -- all "cultural" input. > > If 'kayak' HAS a meaning IN it, why don't > people in communities where it's > not a word in their language have that "meaning" > pop to mind when they read the > word? Because minds in those communities have no > accumulated associations with > the word. Don't say it's merely because those > people haven't "been taught the > meaning". Being "taught the meaning of" > 'kayak' is usually this: You're shown > a picture of a kayak, and told, "This is a kayak. > Here's another picture > showing a woman doing white-water kayaking." An > ASSOCIATION is being inculcated in > your mind. > > If your teacher is misinformed and shows you a picture of a > rowboat and says, > "This is a kayak," thereafter when you hear > "kayak" an image of a rowboat > comes to your associating mind. Eventually someone will say > to you, "No -- that's > WRONG. That's not a kayak, that's a rowboat. (Modal > logicians ponder arcane > problems that arise when two different communities apply > the same word, like > 'water' to two different sorts of objects. Where > their ponderings can go wrong > is when they start asking themselves, "But which > REALLY IS water?") > > 'IS' just doesn't come into it. It's merely > a matter of CALLING. No object IS > what it's regularly called in a given community. The > man who tells you your > use of 'kayak' is "wrong" is motivated by > solely this: What comes to your mind > with the word 'kayak' is very different from what > comes to the mind of the > huge majority of people in our community. He is justified > in saying that much, > but if he insists on what a kayak IS and what a rowboat IS, > he will never be a > very good philosopher. > > "But 'kayak' is its name." The > 'its' there is an error. It suggests the > name-word in some way "belongs to" to the object. > The prominent philosopher Saul > Kripke has written famously about names and naming. > Sometimes he seems to be > arguing why a given name-word IS the name of an object, and > at other times he > appears to be arguing why we OUGHT to accept the word as > the object's name. But > in both cases he is evidently proceeding from a muddled > notion of "is". He is > stipulating a "rule", but stipulation is never > creation. > > William's second sentence above -- "That is not to > say those objects have > meaning but in fact it's almost the same thing because > we can't sense the world > without a-priori experiencing it as > "meaningful"." -- deserves a separate > posting. > > > > > ************** > It's only a deal if it's where you want to go. Find > your travel > deal here. > > (http://information.travel.aol.com/deals?ncid=aoltrv00050000000047)
