William writes: "Cheerskep can say that a word is the occasion for notions but what is an occasion if not a sign and what is a sign if not a stand-in and what is a stand-in if not an imitation (however metaphorical) and what is an imitation if not a correspondence of some sort with something else? Otherwise I completely agree with him about something, I'm sure."
William here fails to communicate to me what he has in mind -- for the same reason Frances so often does: He uses many terms that don't convey to me the notion he has in mind. When I read the following words, the notions that come to my mind are so various and multiplicitous, so indeterminate, and so indefinite, I don't know what "interpreting" notion he wants me to conjure: Sign, stand-in, imitation, correspondence. I have tried many times to get Frances to describe what she has in mind with the word 'sign', but I haven't succeeded. Frances replies by substituting other equally uncommunicative general abstractions, roughly like, "A sign is an icon, symbol, indexicalb&" William equates "occasion" with "sign". But to my mind that would make every material object in the world a sign, since all the material objects we encounter are occasions for sense data. Indeed, all notions thus become signs because, by association, they occasion other notion. I have never known what William has in mind with "stand-in". In show-biz, a stand-in is what we call the person who replaces the (expensive) actor while lights etc are being set up. So a stand-in is a replacement, a substitute. During WWII lard was often a substitute for butter. Our cook often uses various oils to substitute for butter. So I have to read William as saying lard is a correspondence for butter. It's also a sign for butter. It's also the occasion for butter. I do not mean to lampoon here; I'm honestly trying to describe what runs through my mind when I read such an explanation. I could never persuade Frances that the best way to convey what is on her mind with 'sign' is, first describe the notion as best she can; then give specific "concrete" examples -- not just of signs, but of things that are NOT signs. Conveying what a tricky term is NOT meant to convey is often very useful in clarifying what one has in mind with a term. I admit I use the word 'sign' often in non-philosophical situations. For example, "Your fever is probably a sign of an infection." But I certainly wouldn't go on to say a fever is a stand-in, a substitute, for infection. I do take a stick figure with a skirt on a lavatory door as a sign the lavatory is for women only. It's a drawing intended to occasion an idea in my head, and it does that. So would the phrase "Women only" do that, but I wouldn't take that phrase to be an imitation of anything, nor does it substitute for anything. And, of course, I deny that it "corresponds" to anything non-notional. Sometimes William and Frances seem to use the word 'sign' to convey "anything that calls to your mind something else". "Smoke is a sign of fire," seems to me a serviceable usage, but not because the smoke is a substitute for fire, or an imitation of it. It is simply associated with fire in our minds because fire has so often been the occasion for smoke. I'd go along with saying the drawing is an imitation of the appearance of a woman -- in our society. In a society where both men and women wear skirts it might work. The imitation is not intrinsic; it simply calls upon inculcated associations. If a child draws a stick figure and says, "Daddy," would William and Frances say that "makes" the drawing a sign? Would they say there are any drawings that are NOT signs? Why? Williams and Frances seem to me to hold that, given certain conditions, it isn't just that we CALL certain objects signs, they ARE signs. I ask them tell us why. Note: If they say a person can be WRONG in calling something a sign, that seems to imply there is some sort of decision-procedure for determining "the fact of the matter" -- i.e. it is not just a question of a thing's being CALLED a sign but of its BEING a sign. (Unless it's merely a question of accepted word-usage. Frances might claim it is wrong to say a pragmatist would call a given object a sign.) "Sign" often seems to have a connotation of intention, but not always. Same with "imitation". Is mere resemblance "imitation"? Certainly any "intention" would be in the mind of the sign-maker, not the insensate, inanimate, inert sign. I could go on like this, but that's more than enough to convey why I have grave doubts about the soundness of the notions behind 'sign'. ************** New MapQuest Local shows what's happening at your destination. Dining, Movies, Events, News & more. Try it out! (http://local.mapquest.com/?ncid=emlcntnew00000001)
