I will admit to being highly critical of much public signage. For example the ubiquitous crosswalk signs show a hand for stop and a genderless striding humanoid for walk. But this striding humanoid has no feet or hands. If a hand signifies stop, why not a foot for walk? Re the stick figure within a tiangular "skirt" for women's lavatory, it is plenty sexist since it seems that the majority of women entering those lavatorys are not wearing skirts. Are they violators? Further, in big cities, at least, one does see men wearing skirts now and then, not in drag but as a fashion choice. What lavatory should they enter? Public signage everywhere needs a renaissance. And don't get me started on the "arrow" which of course signifies "go there", and is so common in America it must be the metaphor of idealism, that going to someplace other than where you are is a better place. There are far,far many more arrows nowadays than ever before in public signage. Is that a symbol of cultural anxiety, of wanting to be elsewhere? (Mr. Tufte notwithstanding). WC
--- On Wed, 10/8/08, GEOFF CREALOCK <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: GEOFF CREALOCK <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: RE: "Signs" > To: [email protected] > Date: Wednesday, October 8, 2008, 6:35 PM > Being scrupulous: Re your viewing a "sign" on a > washroom door: I don't think > you see a skirt, I think you see a shape which your mind > goes to work on and > construes as an indicator of "skirt" and you > (hopefully) avoid going into > that washroom. > Geoff C > > > >From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >Reply-To: [email protected] > >To: [email protected] > >Subject: "Signs" > >Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2008 16:55:12 EDT > > > >William writes: > >"Cheerskep can say that a word is the occasion for > notions but what is an > >occasion if not a sign and what is a sign if not a > stand-in and what is a > >stand-in if not an imitation (however metaphorical) and > what is an > >imitation > >if not a > >correspondence of some sort with something else? > Otherwise I completely > >agree > >with him about something, I'm sure." > > > >William here fails to communicate to me what he has in > mind -- for the same > >reason Frances so often does: He uses many terms that > don't convey to me > >the > >notion he has in mind. When I read the following words, > the notions that > >come > >to > >my mind are so various and multiplicitous, so > indeterminate, and so > >indefinite, I don't know what > "interpreting" notion he wants me to conjure: > > > >Sign, stand-in, imitation, correspondence. > > > >I have tried many times to get Frances to describe what > she has in mind > >with > >the word 'sign', but I haven't succeeded. > Frances replies by substituting > >other equally uncommunicative general abstractions, > roughly like, "A sign > >is > >an > >icon, symbol, indexicalb&" > > > >William equates "occasion" with > "sign". But to my mind that would make > >every > >material object in the world a sign, since all the > material objects we > >encounter are occasions for sense data. Indeed, all > notions thus become > >signs > >because, by association, they occasion other notion. > > > >I have never known what William has in mind with > "stand-in". In show-biz, a > >stand-in is what we call the person who replaces the > (expensive) actor > >while > >lights etc are being set up. So a stand-in is a > replacement, a substitute. > >During WWII lard was often a substitute for butter. Our > cook often uses > >various > >oils to substitute for butter. So I have to read > William as saying lard is > >a > >correspondence for butter. It's also a sign for > butter. It's also the > >occasion > >for butter. I do not mean to lampoon here; I'm > honestly trying to describe > >what > >runs through my mind when I read such an explanation. > > > >I could never persuade Frances that the best way to > convey what is on her > >mind with 'sign' is, first describe the notion > as best she can; then give > >specific "concrete" examples -- not just of > signs, but of things that are > >NOT > >signs. > >Conveying what a tricky term is NOT meant to convey is > often very useful in > >clarifying what one has in mind with a term. > > > >I admit I use the word 'sign' often in > non-philosophical situations. For > >example, "Your fever is probably a sign of an > infection." But I certainly > >wouldn't > >go on to say a fever is a stand-in, a substitute, for > infection. > > > >I do take a stick figure with a skirt on a lavatory > door as a sign the > >lavatory is for women only. It's a drawing intended > to occasion an idea in > >my > >head, > >and it does that. So would the phrase "Women > only" do that, but I wouldn't > >take that phrase to be an imitation of anything, nor > does it substitute for > >anything. And, of course, I deny that it > "corresponds" to anything > >non-notional. > > > >Sometimes William and Frances seem to use the word > 'sign' to convey > >"anything > >that calls to your mind something else". > "Smoke is a sign of fire," seems > >to > >me a serviceable usage, but not because the smoke is a > substitute for fire, > >or > >an imitation of it. It is simply associated with fire > in our minds because > >fire has so often been the occasion for smoke. I'd > go along with saying the > >drawing is an imitation of the appearance of a woman -- > in our society. In > >a > >society where both men and women wear skirts it might > work. The imitation > >is > >not > >intrinsic; it simply calls upon inculcated > associations. > > > >If a child draws a stick figure and says, > "Daddy," would William and > >Frances > >say that "makes" the drawing a sign? Would > they say there are any drawings > >that are NOT signs? Why? > > > >Williams and Frances seem to me to hold that, given > certain conditions, it > >isn't just that we CALL certain objects signs, they > ARE signs. I ask them > >tell > >us why. > > > >Note: If they say a person can be WRONG in calling > something a sign, that > >seems to imply there is some sort of decision-procedure > for determining > >"the
