Yes, I can see why Cheerskep rebuts. It's because he prefers static over organic situations. But I prefer to regard signs as very organic, being a sign at one moment and the signified at another; being an agent or ocassion of signification at one moment and a named object at another (and, further, retaining echoes of its former roles). So I can't come up with fixed notions because for me they don't "exist" except fleetingly and in recollection. Yes, a sign for butter can also be a sign for lard when lard is the accepted substitute for butter (as I recall from a WWII childhood).
One reason I fail to communicate to Cheerskep is because he has the secret notion I'm supposed to match (that's correspondence theory). It's like the old 1940s radio show "20 Questions" in which a contestant would ask questions about some secret answer known only to the MC and try to tease it out bit by bit. There are numerous variations of this game even today. My view is that if I describe a "notion" my conversant should try to wiggle around enough IQ in his head to comprehend it in my terms. That's not weird. When I read a book, I am submitting to the author's notions and I try to fashion them in my brain by whatever imaging power I have, verbal, visual, hunchable, or whatever. Often, I need to read a long way into a book before I can do that and I often need to let loose of my much beloved notions and modify them. Cheerskep doesn't want to do that. He wants all communication to be truly expository, like giving directions or a recipe. I think all communication is really extremely abstract, ambiguous, organic, slippery, inconclusive, many-sided, nearly infinitely variable, and so on. And metaphorical. If everything looks like something else then everything is what it is and is also a stand-in for something else, probably nearly an infinite number of other things (both notional and non-notional). Is that clear? What else can I say to obfuscate the vain hope that any means or ocassion of communication can be specific? If I have an obligation to verbally sculpt a solid notion to awkwardly fit (correspond to) Cheerskep's empty box for that notion, then why doesn't he have an obligation to refashion that empty box to accomodate my offering? Shouldn't he do some of notion work too? WC --- On Wed, 10/8/08, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: "Signs" > To: [email protected] > Date: Wednesday, October 8, 2008, 3:55 PM > William writes: > "Cheerskep can say that a word is the occasion for > notions but what is an > occasion if not a sign and what is a sign if not a stand-in > and what is a > stand-in if not an imitation (however metaphorical) and > what is an imitation > if not a > correspondence of some sort with something else? Otherwise > I completely agree > with him about something, I'm sure." > > William here fails to communicate to me what he has in mind > -- for the same > reason Frances so often does: He uses many terms that > don't convey to me the > notion he has in mind. When I read the following words, the > notions that come > to > my mind are so various and multiplicitous, so > indeterminate, and so > indefinite, I don't know what "interpreting" > notion he wants me to conjure: > > Sign, stand-in, imitation, correspondence. > > I have tried many times to get Frances to describe what she > has in mind with > the word 'sign', but I haven't succeeded. > Frances replies by substituting > other equally uncommunicative general abstractions, roughly > like, "A sign is > an > icon, symbol, indexicalb&" > > William equates "occasion" with "sign". > But to my mind that would make every > material object in the world a sign, since all the material > objects we > encounter are occasions for sense data. Indeed, all notions > thus become signs > because, by association, they occasion other notion. > > I have never known what William has in mind with > "stand-in". In show-biz, a > stand-in is what we call the person who replaces the > (expensive) actor while > lights etc are being set up. So a stand-in is a > replacement, a substitute. > During WWII lard was often a substitute for butter. Our > cook often uses > various > oils to substitute for butter. So I have to read William as > saying lard is a > correspondence for butter. It's also a sign for butter. > It's also the occasion > for butter. I do not mean to lampoon here; I'm honestly > trying to describe > what > runs through my mind when I read such an explanation. > > I could never persuade Frances that the best way to convey > what is on her > mind with 'sign' is, first describe the notion as > best she can; then give > specific "concrete" examples -- not just of > signs, but of things that are NOT > signs. > Conveying what a tricky term is NOT meant to convey is > often very useful in > clarifying what one has in mind with a term. > > I admit I use the word 'sign' often in > non-philosophical situations. For > example, "Your fever is probably a sign of an > infection." But I certainly > wouldn't > go on to say a fever is a stand-in, a substitute, for > infection. > > I do take a stick figure with a skirt on a lavatory door as > a sign the > lavatory is for women only. It's a drawing intended to > occasion an idea in my > head, > and it does that. So would the phrase "Women > only" do that, but I wouldn't > take that phrase to be an imitation of anything, nor does > it substitute for > anything. And, of course, I deny that it > "corresponds" to anything > non-notional. > > Sometimes William and Frances seem to use the word > 'sign' to convey "anything > that calls to your mind something else". "Smoke > is a sign of fire," seems to > me a serviceable usage, but not because the smoke is a > substitute for fire, or > an imitation of it. It is simply associated with fire in > our minds because > fire has so often been the occasion for smoke. I'd go > along with saying the > drawing is an imitation of the appearance of a woman -- in > our society. In a > society where both men and women wear skirts it might work. > The imitation is > not > intrinsic; it simply calls upon inculcated associations. > > If a child draws a stick figure and says, > "Daddy," would William and Frances > say that "makes" the drawing a sign? Would they > say there are any drawings > that are NOT signs? Why? > > Williams and Frances seem to me to hold that, given certain > conditions, it > isn't just that we CALL certain objects signs, they ARE > signs. I ask them > tell > us why. > > Note: If they say a person can be WRONG in calling > something a sign, that > seems to imply there is some sort of decision-procedure for > determining "the > fact > of the matter" -- i.e. it is not just a question of a > thing's being CALLED a > sign but of its BEING a sign. (Unless it's merely a > question of accepted > word-usage. Frances might claim it is wrong to say a > pragmatist would call a > given object a sign.) > > "Sign" often seems to have a connotation of > intention, but not always. Same > with "imitation". Is mere resemblance > "imitation"? Certainly any "intention" > would be in the mind of the sign-maker, not the insensate, > inanimate, inert > sign. > > I could go on like this, but that's more than enough to > convey why I have > grave doubts about the soundness of the notions behind > 'sign'. > > > > ************** > New MapQuest Local shows what's happening at your
