From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Subject: "Signs"
Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2008 16:55:12 EDT
William writes:
"Cheerskep can say that a word is the occasion for notions but what is an
occasion if not a sign and what is a sign if not a stand-in and what is a
stand-in if not an imitation (however metaphorical) and what is an
imitation
if not a
correspondence of some sort with something else? Otherwise I completely
agree
with him about something, I'm sure."
William here fails to communicate to me what he has in mind -- for the same
reason Frances so often does: He uses many terms that don't convey to me
the
notion he has in mind. When I read the following words, the notions that
come
to
my mind are so various and multiplicitous, so indeterminate, and so
indefinite, I don't know what "interpreting" notion he wants me to conjure:
Sign, stand-in, imitation, correspondence.
I have tried many times to get Frances to describe what she has in mind
with
the word 'sign', but I haven't succeeded. Frances replies by substituting
other equally uncommunicative general abstractions, roughly like, "A sign
is
an
icon, symbol, indexicalb&"
William equates "occasion" with "sign". But to my mind that would make
every
material object in the world a sign, since all the material objects we
encounter are occasions for sense data. Indeed, all notions thus become
signs
because, by association, they occasion other notion.
I have never known what William has in mind with "stand-in". In show-biz, a
stand-in is what we call the person who replaces the (expensive) actor
while
lights etc are being set up. So a stand-in is a replacement, a substitute.
During WWII lard was often a substitute for butter. Our cook often uses
various
oils to substitute for butter. So I have to read William as saying lard is
a
correspondence for butter. It's also a sign for butter. It's also the
occasion
for butter. I do not mean to lampoon here; I'm honestly trying to describe
what
runs through my mind when I read such an explanation.
I could never persuade Frances that the best way to convey what is on her
mind with 'sign' is, first describe the notion as best she can; then give
specific "concrete" examples -- not just of signs, but of things that are
NOT
signs.
Conveying what a tricky term is NOT meant to convey is often very useful in
clarifying what one has in mind with a term.
I admit I use the word 'sign' often in non-philosophical situations. For
example, "Your fever is probably a sign of an infection." But I certainly
wouldn't
go on to say a fever is a stand-in, a substitute, for infection.
I do take a stick figure with a skirt on a lavatory door as a sign the
lavatory is for women only. It's a drawing intended to occasion an idea in
my
head,
and it does that. So would the phrase "Women only" do that, but I wouldn't
take that phrase to be an imitation of anything, nor does it substitute for
anything. And, of course, I deny that it "corresponds" to anything
non-notional.
Sometimes William and Frances seem to use the word 'sign' to convey
"anything
that calls to your mind something else". "Smoke is a sign of fire," seems
to
me a serviceable usage, but not because the smoke is a substitute for fire,
or
an imitation of it. It is simply associated with fire in our minds because
fire has so often been the occasion for smoke. I'd go along with saying the
drawing is an imitation of the appearance of a woman -- in our society. In
a
society where both men and women wear skirts it might work. The imitation
is
not
intrinsic; it simply calls upon inculcated associations.
If a child draws a stick figure and says, "Daddy," would William and
Frances
say that "makes" the drawing a sign? Would they say there are any drawings
that are NOT signs? Why?
Williams and Frances seem to me to hold that, given certain conditions, it
isn't just that we CALL certain objects signs, they ARE signs. I ask them
tell
us why.
Note: If they say a person can be WRONG in calling something a sign, that
seems to imply there is some sort of decision-procedure for determining
"the
fact
of the matter" -- i.e. it is not just a question of a thing's being CALLED
a
sign but of its BEING a sign. (Unless it's merely a question of accepted
word-usage. Frances might claim it is wrong to say a pragmatist would call
a
given object a sign.)
"Sign" often seems to have a connotation of intention, but not always. Same
with "imitation". Is mere resemblance "imitation"? Certainly any
"intention"
would be in the mind of the sign-maker, not the insensate, inanimate, inert
sign.
I could go on like this, but that's more than enough to convey why I have
grave doubts about the soundness of the notions behind 'sign'.
**************
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