Cheerskep's notion of processing assumes an "empty container" state of consciousness and cognition receiving the sense data. But the sense data is preselected and then modified by the container. We construct the sense data according the already preset "patterns" in cellular structures. Sensing is a two sourced -- the inner and the outer mixed, like pouring two liquids together. We are aware on the mixed results that we can't separate again. WC
--- On Mon, 10/13/08, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: Unnoticed asthetic response > To: [email protected] > Date: Monday, October 13, 2008, 10:27 AM > I think Luc and I have basic philosophical differences, but > not nearly as > many as first reading suggested to me. My guess is that we > have some > fundamentally similar views, but our ways of articulating > are so different that the > similarities are not immediately easy to discern. > > It seems a lesson in how the mere difference in verbal > labeling of notions > can produce what seems a serious disagreement about > fundamental things when in > fact there's no basic dispute at all. > > For example, Luc writes: > > "It as been said that aesthetic involves the senses > (sensorial receptors); > fine. But if you believe, as I do, that sensing is not a > conscious mental state. > . ." > > Here's my notion of "sensing". My eyes, ears, > nose etc are receptors where > the first events occur that will result in what I've > called raw sense data. > Visually, these "data" comprise colors and > shapes; aurally what is "coming > through" will result in various "sounds"; > aromas and stenches that I will become > aware of depend on earlier events in my nose. Initially, > what happens is that > non-mental objects impinge on nerve endings in the > receptors, and nerves deliver > certain impulses to various parts of the brain. It is not > until the "olfactory > bulb" -- a physical part of the brain -- does its work > that we "become aware > of" the smell. > > It's comparable to switching on a light. The > "impinging" is the flicking of > the switch. Electricity courses through the wire until it > hits the bulb. Then > -- light! > > So "sensing" is for me a multi-part event -- > including the moment of our > first being "aware" of the colors, sounds, > smells. For me it's not simply that > initial impinging and racing nerve impulses. But I think > that the initial > activity may be all that Luc has in mind with > "sensing". That would account for his > asserting "sensing is not a conscious mental > state," because indeed I'm not > "aware of" that initial "pre-bulb", > pre-brain nerve activity. I'm ready to > assume that what he has in mind with 'conscious' is > very close to what I have in > mind with 'aware'. We'd both agree, I think, > there is no "notion" until after > the brain starts working. > > Luc further writes: > > "If you believe, as I do, that sensing is > non-epistemic, that > sensing is not a conscious mental state, that there is no > qualitative > resemblance, just structural isomorphism, then you have to > ask yourself the question > I put forward." > > Maybe I've got Luc wrong in believing he thinks of > "sensing" as all the > pre-awareness activity because I'm not sure how the > pre-brain activity can have > "structural isomorphism" if there's not yet > any "notion". Certainly nerve > impulses have their own "shape", but there > isn't yet anything for them to be "iso" > -- similar -- to. When notion arises, with colors, shapes > and sounds, then we > can talk of their being isomorphic with, say, the shape of > the object "out > there". But maybe Luc does see the "shape" > of the coursing electricity before the > bulb lights up as having a shape that is in some way > isomorphic with, say, > the color or intensity of the ensuing light. (Meantime, I > can't grasp how a > smell could have "structural isomorphism" at > all.) > > Again, though, I don't see any of this as an important > disagreement between > my ideas and Luc's. > > All pass over Luc's "there is no qualitative > resemblance" not because I think > he's wrong, but because I don't know what he has in > mind. Perhaps he means > that the nerve-ending agitation and immediately subsequent > impulses on their way > to the brain have no "redness", > "skunk-smell", etc. > > So, putting aside possible inconsistencies, at the outset > Luc and I may > "misunderstand" each other because we have > different notions in mind with the same > word -- 'sensing'. > > In infer the difference in usage continues with Luc's > word 'perceiving'. But > I say this isn't an important difference either. Luc > uses 'perceiving' to > apply to events in the mind BEGINNING WITH the arising into > consciousness of the > colors, smells, sounds. I have said this is part of what > I've called "sensing". > What we call them is inconsequential. Presumably we both > believe in the same > sequence: impinging, nerve impulses, work in the brain, > pictures! > > I've used the term "receiving and processing > apparatus". I think of > "receiving" as including everything through the > popping into of consciousness of the > raw sense data, and I think of "processing" as > what begins the instant after the > image pops. We "recognize" the face in the > picture "as" George's face. Then > we take on board what George is doing. We > "notice" he's wearing the same > shirt as yesterday, etc. We "remember" he spilled > ketchup on it yesterday, and, > yes, there's the stain. Associating is underway. > > Compare it to reading: We "see" the page of > words, then we "read" the words, > which we couldn't do until after the picture arrived. > > I certainly agree that an aesthetic experience takes place > SUBSEQUENT TO the > arrival into consciousness of the raw sense data. When we > are reading a poem, > we see the words first, and the a.e. can only come > subsequent to reading. We > can't identify the smell as "skunk-smell" > until after we're aware of the smell. > I remember once finding a dark orange-brown fluid in a > champagne glass. I > tasted it, and the taste was extremely familiar, but its > unfamiliar setting > stalled me from "recognizing" the taste. I was > intrigued by this experience of a > very familiar taste while being unable to put a name on it. > My > processing-associating apparatus scurried madly. And then > it came to me: This is apple juice! > So: first the raw taste, then the processing. (The feeling > of liking the taste
