William asks: "Please define non-epistemic. Do you mean non-material, as in non-physical? WC"
The term is Luc's. Brady also asked Luc to explain it. A few minutes ago, Luc posted this response: "Sensorial process is non-epistemic in the sense that it does not bring any knowledge per se, just "raw material", "bare signs of the Real"; it is a non-conscious event." In my long posting below, sent two days ago, I suggested that the source of misunderstanding was a merely verbal disagreement. I argued that Luc seemed to consider "sensing" to be all the nerve activity prior to "the popping into consciousness of the raw sense data", while people like me thought of 'sensing' as including the raw sense data. We do this because we think of ourselves as b eing "aware", conscious of, redness, smell, a sound etc. Luc's latest suggests I got him wrong -- he wants to include the arrival of raw sense data as part of "sensing", and he wants to call those sense data "non-conscious". He would evidently reserve 'awareness', 'consciousness', for what comes to mind after the raw data are processed to some extent -- e.g. we are not aware of redness or raw smell; 'awareness' arrives when we "realize" it's an apple, that's a skunk smell. I myself continue to prefer to distinguish between the pre-data nerve activity -- nerve-endings in the nose being impinged upon, nerve impulses running up the arm to the olfactory bulb in the brain -- which I grant occur without "sensation" -- and the "datum" that, I have phrased it, "pops up": redness, smell. I'd say a mind can be what I'd call "conscious of" a sensation -- as I was of the taste of the fluid in the champagne glass below -- before being able to "identify" it. I infer Luc disagrees. He would say we are not "conscious" of a sensation until when we have processed it into "knowledge" -- i.e. "identified" to some extent. I still claim that this is basically a verbal disagreement -- about whether or not raw sense data should be called "conscious". On October 13 I wrote: Luc writes: "It as been said that aesthetic involves the senses (sensorial receptors); fine. But if you believe, as I do, that sensing is not a conscious mental state. . ." Here's my notion of "sensing". My eyes, ears, nose etc are receptors where the first events occur that will result in what I've called raw sense data. Visually, these "data" comprise colors and shapes; aurally what is "coming through" will result in various "sounds"; aromas and stenches that I will become aware of depend on earlier events in my nose. Initially, what happens is that non-mental objects impinge on nerve endings in the receptors, and nerves deliver certain impulses to various parts of the brain. It is not until the "olfactory bulb" -- a physical part of the brain -- does its work that we "become aware of" the smell. It's comparable to switching on a light. The "impinging" is the flicking of the switch. Electricity courses through the wire until it hits the bulb. Then -- light! So "sensing" is for me a multi-part event -- including the moment of our first being "aware" of the colors, sounds, smells. For me it's not simply that initial impinging and racing nerve impulses. But I think that the initial activity may be all that Luc has in mind with "sensing". That would account for his asserting "sensing is not a conscious mental state," because indeed I'm not "aware of" that initial "pre-bulb", pre-brain nerve activity. I'm ready to assume that what he has in mind with 'conscious' is very close to what I have in mind with 'aware'. We'd both agree, I think, there is no "notion" until after the brain starts working. Luc further writes: "If you believe, as I do, that sensing is non-epistemic, that sensing is not a conscious mental state, that there is no qualitative resemblance, just structural isomorphism, then you have to ask yourself the question I put forward." Maybe I've got Luc wrong in believing he thinks of "sensing" as all the pre-awareness activity because I'm not sure how the pre-brain activity can have "structural isomorphism" if there's not yet any "notion". Certainly nerve impulses have their own "shape", but there isn't yet anything for them to be "iso" -- similar -- to. When notion arises, with colors, shapes and sounds, then we can talk of their being isomorphic with, say, the shape of the object "out there". But maybe Luc does see the "shape" of the coursing electricity before the bulb lights up as having a shape that is in some way isomorphic with, say, the color or intensity of the ensuing light. (Meantime, I can't grasp how a smell could have "structural isomorphism" at all.) Again, though, I don't see any of this as an important disagreement between my ideas and Luc's. All pass over Luc's "there is no qualitative resemblance" not because I think he's wrong, but because I don't know what he has in mind. Perhaps he means that the nerve-ending agitation and immediately subsequent impulses on their way to the brain have no "redness", "skunk-smell", etc. So, putting aside possible inconsistencies, at the outset Luc and I may "misunderstand" each other because we have different notions in mind with the same word -- 'sensing'. In infer the difference in usage continues with Luc's word 'perceiving'. But I say this isn't an important difference either. Luc uses 'perceiving' to apply to events in the mind BEGINNING WITH the arising into consciousness of the colors, smells, sounds. I have said this is part of what I've called "sensing". What we call them is inconsequential. Presumably we both believe in the same sequence: impinging, nerve impulses, work in the brain, pictures! I've used the term "receiving and processing apparatus". I think of "receiving" as including everything through the popping into of consciousness of the raw sense data, and I think of "processing" as what begins the instant after the image pops. We "recognize" the face in the picture "as" George's face. Then we take on board what George is doing. We "notice" he's wearing the same shirt as yesterday, etc. We "remember" he spilled ketchup on it yesterday, and, yes, there's the stain. Associating is underway. Compare it to reading: We "see" the page of words, then we "read" the words, which we couldn't do until after the picture arrived. I certainly agree that an aesthetic experience takes place SUBSEQUENT TO the arrival into consciousness of the raw sense data. When we are reading a poem, we see the words first, and the a.e. can only come subsequent to reading. We can't identify the smell as "skunk-smell" until after we're aware of the smell. ************** New MapQuest Local shows what's happening at your destination. Dining, Movies, Events, News & more. Try it out (http://local.mapquest.com/?ncid=emlcntnew00000002)
