Preferred taste( aesthetics) is not complicated. Children learn it as
babies,
they even have tantrums over their preferences. After time of
accumulating
them, we start comparing ours to others and find variation that
tickle our
fancy................. A.E.'s !!!!
just having fun
mando
On Oct 13, 2008, at 12:39 PM, Luc Delannoy wrote:
Cheerskep: you might be right about the wording we use.
I propose:
1.- A
sensorial experience is not a consciousnes experience BUT it
requires a state
of pre-awareness. There is no self-observation on our sensorial
experience.
2.- I suggest perception starts in the sensorium with the bottum-
up path, I
locate interpretation of perception on the top-down pathway. We
sense the
world, lets say we get natural signs of it; perception and
interpretation help
us derive knowledge from the sensing of the world.
3.- Structural
isomorphism. "When we see on the television screen films that have
been taken
through an infra-red camera, we see the warm and hot portions of
the view as
shades of green; the green is structurally isomorphic to the heat
but does not
ressemble it - does your TV screen get hot? We manage reasonably
well to act
in the world with our internally colored, structurally isomorphic
evidence."
4.- Qualitative (and numerical identity) ressemblance. Am using
resemblance as
identity. There is no external smell to match neural smell. We have
no sound,
no smell, no color, no pictures in the brain.Our eyes pick up light
rays which
are uncolored.
5.- Sensing. Agnosics sense but do not perceive.
6.- Since
I consider sensing as being non epistemic I cannot accept the
traditional view
on the term "aesthetic experience" unless we "extend" the concept of
"aesthetic" to perceiving. I know Sense-Datum theorists have a
problem with
that (see Roy Wood Sellars, for exemple).
7.- Then there is this thing about
consciousness. I'm not sure with the "...arising into
consciousness". In that
particular case I rather say that consciousness is the "arising" (a
process).
My views on sensing and perceiving help me substantiate my views on
the
non-conceptual and the indirect realism theory.
I know I'm taking many short
cuts here, and I apologize for that but I am short on time.
Luc
PS. By the
way I also have a problem with the term "experience" when used in
"sensorial
experience". But, that's another story!
www.lucdelannoy.com
-----
Original Message ----
From: "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
[email protected]
Sent: Monday, October 13, 2008 10:27:41 AM
Subject: Re: Unnoticed asthetic response
I think Luc and I have basic
philosophical differences, but not nearly as
many as first reading suggested
to me. My guess is that we have some
fundamentally similar views, but our
ways of articulating are so different that the
similarities are not
immediately easy to discern.
It seems a lesson in how the mere difference
in verbal labeling of notions
can produce what seems a serious disagreement
about fundamental things when in
fact there's no basic dispute at all.
For
example, Luc writes:
"It as been said that aesthetic involves the senses
(sensorial receptors);
fine. But if you believe, as I do, that sensing is not
a conscious mental state.
. ."
Here's my notion of "sensing". My eyes, ears,
nose etc are receptors where
the first events occur that will result in what
I've called raw sense data.
Visually, these "data" comprise colors and
shapes; aurally what is "coming
through" will result in various "sounds";
aromas and stenches that I will become
aware of depend on earlier events in
my nose. Initially, what happens is that
non-mental objects impinge on nerve
endings in the receptors, and nerves deliver
certain impulses to various
parts of the brain. It is not until the "olfactory
bulb" -- a physical part
of the brain -- does its work that we "become aware
of" the smell.
It's
comparable to switching on a light. The "impinging" is the flicking of
the
switch. Electricity courses through the wire until it hits the
bulb. Then
--
light!
So "sensing" is for me a multi-part event -- including the moment
of our
first being "aware" of the colors, sounds, smells. For me it's not
simply that
initial impinging and racing nerve impulses. But I think that the
initial
activity may be all that Luc has in mind with "sensing". That would
account for his
asserting "sensing is not a conscious mental state," because
indeed I'm not
"aware of" that initial "pre-bulb", pre-brain nerve activity.
I'm ready to
assume that what he has in mind with 'conscious' is very close
to what I have in
mind with 'aware'. We'd both agree, I think, there is no
"notion" until after
the brain starts working.
Luc further writes:
"If you
believe, as I do, that sensing is non-epistemic, that
sensing is not a
conscious mental state, that there is no qualitative
resemblance, just
structural isomorphism, then you have to ask yourself the question
I put
forward."
Maybe I've got Luc wrong in believing he thinks of "sensing" as all
the
pre-awareness activity because I'm not sure how the pre-brain activity
can have
"structural isomorphism" if there's not yet any "notion". Certainly
nerve
