On Oct 17, 2008, at 7:01 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What does "different" summon up in your mind in this context? Does
any degree of differentiation constitute a difference (or as the
saying goes, can there be a mere "distinction without a
difference")? Does a generic difference between, say, "talent" and
"brick" denote a greater range or span than a difference within a
category, such as between "talent" and "aptitude"? If so, would you
say that one's linguistic faculty uses a sequential range of
generalities, within which related word-notions are grouped, some
of which signify nested relationships and other of which indicate
equivalent terms?
I'd say my notions of "talent" and "aptitude" are more associated in
my mind than my notions of "talent" and "brick" -- e.g they both
involve potential action -- but the "degree" of difference feels
bootless to try to quantify. I don't see any "sequential" aspect.
Associations certainly seem to "cluster" in the mind. The "nests"
are mind-created; they are in effect "categories" -- which, my
mantra goes, are entirely notional, there are no non-mental
entities, "cagtegories". Etcetera.
My point was: How does one know when two notions, two "meanings," are
different? How is the difference known? And how does one determine for
himself that the distinctions between two words or two meanings are
sufficient to produce a noticeable difference? I suppose translators
face this decision many times a day.
In fact, how do we know that we know (not, *what* we know, but how do
we know that we know something)? (I am reminded of Donald Rumsfield's
"unknown unknowns": there are thinbgs we know that we know and even
things that we don't know, and there are things we do NOT know that we
don't know.) How do we confirm to ourself that something is
"true" (i.e., the knowledge is reliable, that the traffic light is, in
fact, green and we may proceed with a high probability of safety)? Or
for that matter, that something is "wrong" (not reliable)?
Is this a probablistic question? Do we operate on the probability that
the objective world exists outside ourselves? And, further, that it is
consistent and predictable, so that we can be confident in things
operating in the same fashion tomorrow?
So, back to Cheerskep's issue: how do we (a) recognize similarity and
(b) simultaneously recognize small degrees of differences, either
directly in the objective thing perceived or in the terms used to
refer to them?
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Michael Brady
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
