William -- Your position below entails difficulties for any forum whatever, I think.
I quoted you accurately when you described one of Winnicutt's arguments: " D.W. Winnicott argued that the baby presumes that all sensation is the self, that all is created by the self," I read it and responded: "This strikes me as absurd on two scores. First, if the baby watches a fiendish adult come to her and pinch her, I don't believe the baby thinks she herself has created that sensation. Second, Winnicott seems to be imputing to the baby a quasi-metaphysical ratiocination that is ridiculous. "Presumption" indeed." Now you suggest I should not have considered your report worthy of response. If your criticism of my responding to your description of Winnicott's argument is valid, doesn't that imply that no description of any scholar's thesis should be responded to unless we first go on to read the entire opus the scholar wrote in support of his argument? In today's posting you write: " Winnicott argues that the baby, the infant, acquires consciousness from an initial sense that everything is an extension of the self -- omnipotence -- and must gradually recognize that the real world is independent." I presume you would have me not comment on what you write there. But when you write: " For me Winnicott developed the idea that we, in consciousness, have a dynamic relationship with objects in the world. Objects define us as we define them. This does not mean that objects have intrinsic meaning but it does suggest that objects evoke, through their sensed --constructed -- shapes and traits, particular responses." -- I presume I may comment without criticism of the simple fact of commenting at all. I may do so because that's your own thoughts you're expressing. That IS the required opus. But I presume it isn't, really. My guess is you've put a lot of thinking into what you say there, and what's there is largely confined to your conclusions, so in truth I'm not qualified to respond since I haven't had access to your opus, and I haven't exploited that access. Okay, I won't comment on what you say. But then, because of the frustration in reading postings that I'm not allowed to comment on, it seems best I just not read your postings. I imagine my taking that position wouldn't distress you much. On the other hand, perhaps I should not take your proscriptive fiat seriously. There are many writers close to what you apparently are in this way: They will say they welcome comment, indeed, criticism, but only if it conforms to certain unilateral rules that they lay down. Hell, I'm that way myself. I sniff at listers who never respond to counter-arguments. "You shouldn't ignore counter-arguments!" I yammer. I yammer, but I accept that they won't conform to my unilateral rule. I won't change them. So I can only hope you'll accept that sometimes you won't change me. I'm a bit flabbergasted by Cheerskep's response to my post re Winnicott. One would expect an educated person to at least examine the person's thesis that I referred to before pronouncing it ridiculous. Winnicott's contributions are widely known and highly influential and are certainly not as simplistic as Cheerskep assumes they are. Cheerskep's response is too much like the freshman's blurting out denials upon being informed that some popular myth is wrong. Winnicott devoted a honored career to dealing with the various ways children had been psychologically damaged in infancy. Physical abuse of a baby is obviously very damaging, perhaps even the evil pinching Cheerskep refers to. Winnicott argues that the baby, the infant, acquires consciousness from an initial sense that everything is an extension of the self -- omnipotence -- and must gradually recognize that the real world is independent. Winnicott calls this object relations. Whatever greatly disturbs this natural process from infant omnipotence to an integrated relationship with objects in the world can lead to mental distress and illness later on. See Playing and Reality, 1971, for a start. For me Winnicott developed the idea that we, in consciousness, have a dynamic relationship with objects in the world. Objects define us as we define them. This does not mean that objects have intrinsic meaning but it does suggest that objects evoke, through their sensed --constructed -- shapes and traits, particular responses. Not all objects can evoke all responses although I don't know why not. They surely evoke far more than we suspect consciously and far more than we might be willing to list, depending on our metaphorical inventiveness, but our brains are simply not equipped to produce all patterns for all objects, to say nothing of those aspects of nature that fall beyond our sensing capacities. Until Cheerskep can accept that our subjectivity is not fully independent of a chaotic mass of energy-matter he cannot explain why we do tend to respond to certain shapes, and other sensory stimuli in more or less grouped ways. Here's a famous question taken from Winnicott: Did you make it or did you find it?" For a healthy mind the answer is "Both". Meanwhile, Cheerskep, now back in a Boston preppy school, is to write the following one hundred times: "I shall not say an idea is ridiculous before I understand it well enough" WC ************** You're invited to Hollywood's biggest party: Get Oscars updates, red carpet pics and more at Moviefone. (http://movies.aol.com/oscars-academy-awards?ncid=emlcntusmovi00000001)
