It's dismaying that Frances can write at such length about "sign" and yet be unable to describe her notion of it.
In a message dated 7/3/09 7:32:01 PM, [email protected] writes: > Frances to Michael and Cheerskep... > 1. > The sign theory of Eco is a dyadic lingual system derived from > and aligned with francoeuropean semiology, even though his theory > is called semiotics, which is confusingly wrong in my opinion. > His theory and system furthermore is mainly about the ratio of > sign production in the mind, whereby signs are either easy to > make or hard to make. The approach to signs called semiology is > however useful in addressing the human signs of linguistic > languages within social settings. If something is to be held as a > sign, for semiology it must first be reduced to and translated > into language. It is basically akin to nominalism and its limits. > > 2. > There are numerous sign typologies that have been posited by > theorists in the last few centuries. Their structure is usually > either dyadic or triadic, but most are triadic and are clearly > derived from that of Peirce in the pragmatist camp. The one thing > about the triadic sign system of Peirce is that it is > categorically consistent throughout, despite its jargon and > complexity. Peirce spent many years trying to work out a realist > philosophy and a theory of signs, which stands to this day as the > best success of a bad lot. His brand of idealist realism roughly > called pragmatism is now better than any other philosophy > currently available, and is recognized as such throughout > scholarly academia. His realism neatly corrects the flaws of > theories like idealism and materialism and subjectivism. Many of > his ideas are still being applied by technicians and scientists > today who even seek out patents for inventions made possible by > his pragmatism. > 3. > The psychical mentalist states that nothing exists objectively as > a sign. If something is felt or known as a sign, it is > arbitrarily deemed so and then only by a normal human being, > because the sign resides subjectively in the mind as a vision or > notion or lingual nomination. This is also the case for any > meaning a sign may be deliberately assigned or conferred with. > What the mentalist fails to realize is that in the mind there is > a sign structure, even if signs are wrongly deemed to be wholly > mental. For a sign to work in the normal mind of a human being > there must be a lawful theoretical structure embedded in the mind > that allows a sign to be made. In regard to the signs of language > for example that theory is a science called linguistics. The > grammatical structure of linguistics is holistic and > transformational and regulatory as well as determinate and > definite and linear and established. Furthermore, the originating > stuff of signs and visions or notions or nominations that are in > the mind comes from phenomena previously sensed objectively and > stored in the mind ready to be used, therefore that original > stuff of mental signs and acts does not come from the internal > mind itself epiphenomenally, because the brain and the mind > cannot generate the stuff on its own solely alone without getting > it externally from sensed phenomena. The subjective stuff of > signs in the mind like images and ideas and thoughts and > discourses is after all the objective stuff of senses in the > world. > > Cheerskep wrote... > Michael writes: > "Eco says that a sign is always an element on the expression > plane that is > conventionally correlated to one (or more) elements on the > content plane. > More exactly, he says, we should refer to a sign-function in > which two > functives (content and expression) are mutually correlated. He > then elaborates > about codes and how the sign-function operates. > "Peirce wrote extensively about signs, and his system was indeed > complex. > He refers to representamen, ground, and object, and describes > three kinds of > triadic configurations of them.... > "You want to take it from here?" > Crikey, no, don't take it from there -- because that sounds very > much like > you're saying, Okay, that much is clear, but what comes next? > Eco, the life-long semiotician, is not a hell of a lot clearer > than > Frances. And, of course, Peirce's style is a kind of Maginot > line, studded with > neologisms and other concrete verbal obstacles denying students > any access to > alleged enlightenment -- or access to evidence of fundamental > errors. > The most frequent of those other obstacles to comprehension is > the taking > of an old, familiar, relatively simple word, and disfiguring it > out of > recognition with a new stipulative (and usually very complicated) > definition. So > each time a reader encountered the old familiar word there ensued > a > screeching of brakes, a backing up, and a slow turn to the left > to proceed carefully > down a narrow alley to a newly built labyrinth of "meaning". It > was all very > exasperating. > Peirce, in his final years, looked back on his writings and > cursed his own > style as counter-productive, perhaps the chief reason his > teachings did not > dominate philosophy the way he'd expected. He was only half right > in this. > His philosophy failed to triumph because, after brilliant > beginnings, his > thinking had gone wrong. He was a self-destructively reifier, > jamming an > attic so full of chimerical entities, categories, sub-categories, > qualities, > etc, its floor finally gave way, and the lot crushed everything > below right > down into the basement. > > > ************** It's raining cats and dogs -- Come to PawNation, a place where pets rule! (http://www.pawnation.com/?ncid=emlcntnew00000008)
