How we know uniqueness without Aesthetic judgment? Boris Shoshensky ---------- Original Message ---------- From: armando baeza <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Cc: armando baeza <[email protected]> Subject: Re: Reading Kivy: Chapter Two - Wittgenstein and Weitz Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2009 22:10:50 -0700
Aesthetic judgement aside, art is always one of a kind (unique). mando On Oct 8, 2009, at 7:23 AM, William Conger wrote: > Miller is much better here. He is more interesting and smarter > because he raises questions from the content instead of attaching > his (usually pejorative) judgments up front. > > I've always liked Weitz because he seemed to explain Wittgenstein > (in terms of art) better than others. But I need to agree that > just because "a family resemblance" cannot be pinned down to an > explicit common feature or concept does not mean that the concept > has already been fully examined or defined. We can't sidestep the > issue by saying there are open and closed concepts. We can't be > sure that a concept is closed but we are always right when we say a > concept is open. I agree that nothing (in art) has been fully > explicated. I turn again to a master of such thinking among > artists, E. Delacroix: "That which has been done has not yet been > done enough". > > So why not just admit that the art concept is always open? Why not > admit that the "family resemblance" is always an evolving one -- > like nature, remoter genes are reduced to near zero, if not zero, > and newer ones seem all new -- or as with metamorphosis, a real > change occurs. One can imagine a cluster of "closed concepts" > within an ever expanding "open concept". > > Follow nature. Here's another quote from Renoir: "Take your > theories (of art) to Nature and she knocks them all flat". > wc > > > > > ________________________________ > From: Chris Miller <[email protected]> > To: [email protected] > Sent: Thursday, October 8, 2009 8:55:40 AM > Subject: Reading Kivy: Chapter Two - Wittgenstein and Weitz > > "A concept is open if its conditions of application are emendable and > corrigable; i.e. if a situation or case can be imagined or secured > which would > call for some sort of decision on our part to extend the use of the > concept to > cover this, or to close the concept and invent a new one to deal > with the new > case and its new property. If necessary and sufficient conditions > for the > application of a concept can be stated, the concept is a closed one" > > (Morris Weitz - following Wittgenstein's "Philosophical > Investigations") > > ""Art" is an open concept . New conditions (cases) have constantly > arisen and > will undoubtedly arise; new art forms, new movements will emerge, > which will > demand decisions on the part of those interested, usually > professional critics, as to whether the concept should be extended > or not" > (Morris Weitz) > > "The primary task of aesthetics is not to seek a theory but to > elucidate the > concept of art. Specifically, it is to describe the conditions > under which we > employ the concept correctly. Definitions, reconstruction, patterns of > analysis > are out of place here since they distort and add nothing to our > understanding > of art" (Morris Weitz) > > ........... > ....... > ........ > > Kivy first notes that Weitz has not clarified whether his claim is > epistemic > (what we know) or ontological (what really is) I.e, "it might well > be that we > tell whether something is a work of art by noting family > resemblances (the > epistemic claim) even though, in fact, what makes it a work of art > is some > (unknown) property common to all artworks (the ontological claim)" > > Kivy suggest that Weitz has acknowledged this oversight, but In > either case, > the Wittgensteinian student of aesthetics will be "looking for the > elusive > common property" - "noting family resemblances to paradigm cases" to > continually modify the cluster concept being assembled. > > And then Kivy, with no further explanation, suggests "my advice to the > Wittgensteinian, then, would be the same as to the traditional > theorists: give > resemblance a rest. My theme is differences" > > Perhaps realizing that this advice is a bit irrelevant, Kivy then > launches > into a sharper attack -- noting that "The Wittgensteinian move in the > philosophy of art was never a popular one, and at the present it is > not a > going concern" > > Unfortunately, as with his dismissal of Schopenhauer, Kivy seems to > once again > accept that the popular reception of a philosophy as the final > word on its > value. > > But to apply the coup de grace, he finally adds "There is a > simpler, less > philosophically expansive reason why I reject the Wittgensteinian > model for > art. It is simply that the only argument for its being a proper > model is a > bad argument" > > And that "bad argument" is that any traditional definition > "forecloses on the > very conditions of creativity in the arts" > > Why is this a bad argument? > > Because "even if (say) representation were a necessary condition > for an art, > it could hardly foreclose on "originality" or "creativity", since > both (and I > assume that they are not synonymous) can be exhibited with the > constraints > of > representation and, as far as I can tell, can continue to be > exhibited ad > infinitum: there are infinite changes to be rung on the theme of > "representation"" > > (BTW - those who claim that representation has already > accomplished all that > it ever could would not agree with this assertion -- but I do - and > I would > take it even further, and say that originality and creativity can > be exhibited > ad infinitum within every specific style: Impressionism, Chinese > landscape, > Russian icons, etc) > > Kivy then notes that Weitz , possibly realizing that he goofed, has > somewhat > retreated from his "bad argument" by dropping the word > "creativity" from his > subsequent statement in 1977: > > "My argument against theories of art was (and is) that any attempt > to state > definite criteria for a concept whose use has depended on and > continues to > depend, not on its having such a set, but rather on its being able, > for its > correct use, to accomomodate new criteria that are derived, or > derivable, from > new art forms whose features demand amendation, rejection, or > expansion of
