Why do you think that your summative pronouncements constitute anything beyond unreasoned opinion? What is the evidence, what are the arguments, where are the examples to support your statements? wc
________________________________ From: Boris Shoshensky <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Cc: [email protected]; [email protected] Sent: Friday, October 9, 2009 10:33:21 AM Subject: Re: Reading Kivy: Chapter Two - Wittgenstein and Weitz Judgment quality/ability is born and learned. Boris Shoshensky ---------- Original Message ---------- From: armando baeza <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Cc: armando baeza <[email protected]> Subject: Re: Reading Kivy: Chapter Two - Wittgenstein and Weitz Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2009 08:05:43 -0700 Humans are unique by nature, judgement is learned. mando On Oct 9, 2009, at 6:40 AM, Boris Shoshensky wrote: > How we know uniqueness without Aesthetic judgment? > Boris Shoshensky > > ---------- Original Message ---------- > From: armando baeza <[email protected]> > To: [email protected] > Cc: armando baeza <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: Reading Kivy: Chapter Two - Wittgenstein and Weitz > Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2009 22:10:50 -0700 > > Aesthetic judgement aside, art is always one of a kind (unique). > mando > > On Oct 8, 2009, at 7:23 AM, William Conger wrote: > >> Miller is much better here. He is more interesting and smarter >> because he raises questions from the content instead of attaching >> his (usually pejorative) judgments up front. >> >> I've always liked Weitz because he seemed to explain Wittgenstein >> (in terms of art) better than others. But I need to agree that >> just because "a family resemblance" cannot be pinned down to an >> explicit common feature or concept does not mean that the concept >> has already been fully examined or defined. We can't sidestep the >> issue by saying there are open and closed concepts. We can't be >> sure that a concept is closed but we are always right when we say a >> concept is open. I agree that nothing (in art) has been fully >> explicated. I turn again to a master of such thinking among >> artists, E. Delacroix: "That which has been done has not yet been >> done enough". >> >> So why not just admit that the art concept is always open? Why not >> admit that the "family resemblance" is always an evolving one -- >> like nature, remoter genes are reduced to near zero, if not zero, >> and newer ones seem all new -- or as with metamorphosis, a real >> change occurs. One can imagine a cluster of "closed concepts" >> within an ever expanding "open concept". >> >> Follow nature. Here's another quote from Renoir: "Take your >> theories (of art) to Nature and she knocks them all flat". >> wc >> >> >> >> >> ________________________________ >> From: Chris Miller <[email protected]> >> To: [email protected] >> Sent: Thursday, October 8, 2009 8:55:40 AM >> Subject: Reading Kivy: Chapter Two - Wittgenstein and Weitz >> >> "A concept is open if its conditions of application are emendable and >> corrigable; i.e. if a situation or case can be imagined or secured >> which would >> call for some sort of decision on our part to extend the use of the >> concept to >> cover this, or to close the concept and invent a new one to deal >> with the new >> case and its new property. If necessary and sufficient conditions >> for the >> application of a concept can be stated, the concept is a closed one" >> >> (Morris Weitz - following Wittgenstein's "Philosophical >> Investigations") >> >> ""Art" is an open concept . New conditions (cases) have constantly >> arisen and >> will undoubtedly arise; new art forms, new movements will emerge, >> which will >> demand decisions on the part of those interested, usually >> professional critics, as to whether the concept should be extended >> or not" >> (Morris Weitz) >> >> "The primary task of aesthetics is not to seek a theory but to >> elucidate the >> concept of art. Specifically, it is to describe the conditions >> under which we >> employ the concept correctly. Definitions, reconstruction, >> patterns of >> analysis >> are out of place here since they distort and add nothing to our >> understanding >> of art" (Morris Weitz) >> >> .......... >> . >> ....... >> ........ >> >> Kivy first notes that Weitz has not clarified whether his claim is >> epistemic >> (what we know) or ontological (what really is) I.e, "it might well >> be that we >> tell whether something is a work of art by noting family >> resemblances (the >> epistemic claim) even though, in fact, what makes it a work of art >> is some >> (unknown) property common to all artworks (the ontological claim)" >> >> Kivy suggest that Weitz has acknowledged this oversight, but In >> either case, >> the Wittgensteinian student of aesthetics will be "looking for the >> elusive >> common property" - "noting family resemblances to paradigm cases" to >> continually modify the cluster concept being assembled. >> >> And then Kivy, with no further explanation, suggests "my advice to >> the >> Wittgensteinian, then, would be the same as to the traditional >> theorists: give >> resemblance a rest. My theme is differences" >> >> Perhaps realizing that this advice is a bit irrelevant, Kivy then >> launches >> into a sharper attack -- noting that "The Wittgensteinian move in the >> philosophy of art was never a popular one, and at the present it is >> not a >> going concern" >> >> Unfortunately, as with his dismissal of Schopenhauer, Kivy seems to >> once again >> accept that the popular reception of a philosophy as the final >> word on its >> value. >> >> But to apply the coup de grace, he finally adds "There is a >> simpler, less >> philosophically expansive reason why I reject the Wittgensteinian >> model for >> art. It is simply that the only argument for its being a proper >> model is a >> bad argument" >> >> And that "bad argument" is that any traditional definition >> "forecloses on the >> very conditions of creativity in the arts" >> >> Why is this a bad argument? >> >> Because "even if (say) representation were a necessary condition >> for an art, >> it could hardly foreclose on "originality" or "creativity", since >> both (and I >> assume that they are not synonymous) can be exhibited with the >> constraints >> of >> representation and, as far as I can tell, can continue to be
