" If certain objects have
certain shapes we prefer, it's not because those shapes are special, or
aesthetic, but
because we are cognitively evolved to see, use, and enhance the benefits of
selecting
some shapes over others."

My question is: " Why we cognitively evolved to see, use, and enhance the
benefits of selecting some shapes over others." Is not that because they are
significant to us for some objective reason 'demanded' by nature of our
existence?
Boris Shoshensky
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Reading Kivy: Chaper 6 - The Quest for Musical Profundity
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2009 10:41:13 -0700 (PDT)

Now Miller is confusing thesis with title. Peyton Place is a title of a book.
The thesis is something else...I don't know what it is in Peyton Place because
I've never read the book and can't recall what has been said about it. I think
it was a dumb and shallow best seller of the fifties.

I did allow that things (subjects) can effect some content better than others
because we are wired to prefer some shapes, sounds, tastes, etc., over others.
All of this was mentioned in my last post.  Miller should read it before
looking for hooks to hang his biased views on.

Miller's repeated comment that "he can't imagine..." is to be taken at its
face value.  He can't imagine.

Miller's disreputable habit of insulting others (and I admit my own habit to
call him out on that and respond in kind) without any reasoned argument is
tiresome, to say the least.  Now I am like a gangbanger and a fanatic, perhaps
like those totalitarians and their patsy artists he's admired (Hitler and
Mao). At any rate, those are bad monikers.

I am indeed fairly confident about some of my remarks because they fit an
accepted outlook.  That outlook has ---as I've said-- favored aesthetic
quality to be constructed in the mind/brain and not intrinsic to independent
objects.  If certain objects have certain shapes we prefer, it's not because
those shapes are special, or aesthetic, but because we are cognitively evolved
to see, use, and enhance the benefits of selecting some shapes over others.
Why is that so difficult to understand?  That does not mean that A must
symbolize B or any other referent, but that some symbolization is preferred,
and biologically and socially reinforced.  But it does not mean, either, that
A symbolizes B only.  I do think an extraordinarily large array of symbolic
inferences can be made from A, including B.  This is, essentially the delight
of metaphor, the creative impulse.  Not long ago I mentioned Arthur Koestler
and his notion c. 1963, of "bisociation" by which he
 meant to signal the underlying trait of creativity -- the mixing of illogical
patterns or streams of cognition to evoke the "ah-ha" or eureka discovery.  He
investigated humor as the most basic evidence of bisociation but it certainly
applies to other scientific and creative endeavors.  Much has been learned
since Koestler's time, particularly in the technology related to brain imaging
and in neuroscience, including neuro-biology.  This new knowledge reinforces
Koestler's basic thesis.

There is another position that affirms the idea that aesthetic quality is in
the object.  This is, I suppose, the "significant form" idea.  I do not
subscribe to this view.  I have given my reasons many times.  They are mostly
adopted reasons, gleaned from years of close reading and association with
distinguished scholars, scientists, artists. My notions of make believe,
belief, meaninglessness, open allusiveness, metaphor, and certainly subject
and content, are not made up but are my admittedly non-professional and
largely eclectic views.  Just the other day, suggested that  listers take a
look at F. Schiller's letters on aesthetics.  Here is an example of the
artist, a poet, examining difficult issues in the new field of aesthetics, as
an artist and only secondarily as a non-professional philosopher. Yet his
ideas have survived to influence much current thinking on aesthetics,
especially regarding the intermixing of allusions, metaphor, and the like,
 essentially the absence of the strict ratiocination required in formal
philosophy.

If I'm a "gangbanger fanatic" because I am bisociative and metaphorically
diverse, open to paradox and the non-linear nature of creativity, then I am up
"against the wall'  with some exceptional company. Also, having met me Miller
knows quite well that I am not the gangbanger sort at all but rather an
elitist upper crusty sort of fellow whose delicate "clenched fists" protrude
from Italian cotton shirts with gold cufflinks. But mean, a city boy.
wc

----- Original Message ----
From: Chris Miller <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Sent: Friday, October 23, 2009 11:26:29 AM
Subject: Re: Reading Kivy: Chaper 6 - The Quest for Musical Profundity

"None of what you say affects the simple clarity and truth of my comment that
subject is to be distinguished from content."  (WC - 10/23)
"subject matter is the name of the thing and the content is what it can
symbolize. (WC - 10/22")

                                                  -------------


William is quite sure that this statement is very important,  and is "a
concise restatement of what many others have
noted for centuries."

But I can't imagine anyone would ever  suggest that "subject matter is the
name of the thing" -- because
the names of things have been chosen for such a wide variety of reasons, and
only occasionally do they suggest
anything like what might be called subject matter.

What does the name "Peyton Place" tell us about the subject matter of that
novel?

Nor, do I recall anyone has ever suggested that "content is what it can
symbolize", unless accompanied by the implication that there are some things
that content cannot symbolize,  and William continues to assert that content
is  a "subjective personal and cultural perception"

If you think A symbolizes B,  according to William, you cannot be wrong for
any reason.

So why even use a word like "content" when discussing art works instead of
vodka bottles?

And, no, William's distinction between name and possible symbolization is not
the same as that between words and feelings, as articulated by Hamlet's uncle
as he guiltily recognized that his prayers (whose symbolization he knew quite
well) were not  felt in his heart (which he also knew quite well).

The wackiness of William's assertions are only matched by the ferocious
confidence with which he asserts them -- like a gangbanger, with  clenched
fists,  backed up against a wall, defending his turf.

There is something noble about that tough, never-say-die attitude.

Even if it is shared by fanatics of every stripe.



____________________________________________________________
Love Spell
Click here to light up your life with a love spell!
http://thirdpartyoffers.netzero.net/TGL2231/c?cp=m_JZdHcedVyK1yZKMYe_VgAAJz6c
l_zTaptgNR5c8Mer1v9kAAYAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAADNAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAARwAAAAA=

Reply via email to