Chris writes: b although Cheerskep firmly claims otherwise, yes, there is an ontic difference between reading a book and discussing it afterwards -- just as there is a difference between being in Kuai and then being back in Chicago.b
Look carefully, and you'll notice that nothing I said denies this. This whole subject is immensely complicated, with all kinds of subtle differences between notions. But two distinct notions does not entail there must be two distinct non-notional entities, especially if one of them is alleged to be a b category/class/setb . Remember, this was Michael's question: b Does the development of themes and motifs as the series progresses constitute a critical commentary by the artist?b To which I charged: b Your question there should not be considered a query about an ontic category: b Is the development a member of the class of all critical commentaries?b Okay, so would I b call itb c.c., do I b think of itb as c.c.? Sometimes.b What you wrote (above) was in response to my saying: b Chris drives himself deep into the woods by confused ontological questions about making b distinctionsb .b And what THAT was responding to was your earlier queries: b Can we distinguish the experience of a drama (as we are watching it) from the subsequent reflections upon it? b Can we distinguish "what does it mean?" from "what does it mean regarding the question of XXX?" b Can we distinguish "what does it mean?" from "what does it mean regarding the question of XXX?" b And can we distinguish between what the author intends while producing the work, from what he says he intended in a conversation after the work was completed? b I make all three of those distinctions.b Anyone would have b distinctionsb arising in his mind as he ponders your li nes. But ask: b distinctionsb between what? Notions? Yes. Material entities? Sometimes. Non-material, non-notional entities? For example? Even the word 'distinction' is potentially confusing. Sometimes the notion behind it is b a differenceb . But b a differenceb conveys something static. At other times, b a distinctionb conveys a non-static action, b discerning the differenceb . A further complication arises between dualists - those who believe that consciousness is a non-material entity - and materialists - those who believe that what we think of as consciousness -- notion, b feelingb , images, ideas - is identical with the material neurons in our brains. Yet another complication comes up when the speaker cites a b distinctionb between non-existent non-notional entities. Suppose I asked, b Can we distinguish between an angel and an archangel?b Well, we might accept that we can distinguish between our NOTIONS of those two. But suppose the speaker gets indignant, b No, no - I mean can you grasp the difference between those non-notional entities, an angel and an archangel?b Can you feel a fog moving in? When you ask, b Can we distinguish "what does it mean?" from "what does it mean regarding the question of XXX?" I claim that confusion like an enwrapping python is squeezing the usefulness out of the question. Are you talking about the notions there? Or do you feel there is some non-notional entity that is b its meaningb and another non-notional entity that is b Its meaning regarding the question of XXXb ? Frege et al apparently have believed that b meaningsb - i.e. a word's b senseb and its b referentb - are non-notional entities independent of minds. And indeed so is each b wordb . Frege evidently would say there are two kinds of utterances and scriptions: those that have a sense, and those that don't. The ones that do are words (not merely b to be CALLEDb - they ARE words.) Frege did not address such annoying queries as, b All the utterances that were once familiar in a now dead language that no one can translate - are those utterance-sounds still words?b There are utterances and scriptions that, when heard or read, will occasion in the minds of many contemplators similar notions. This is not because the utterance b hasb an entity, and the entity b isb a meaning. It's merely because masses of people are exposed to similar associating experience - i.e. a notion is regularly juxtaposed with a given sound or sight (including, often, gestures etc.). If you utter a sound -- say, b pencilb - to someone exposed to associations like yours, a serviceably appropriate retrieval event will take place in his mind, resulting in arising of the serviceably appropriate notion in his mind. Utter the same sound to a shepherd in the Andes, and no such notion will arise. Utterances b haveb association, not b meaningsb . Corollary: Disputes about whether a given utterance has b ontic statusb as a b wordb are vacuous. There is no such Platonic status. It's certainly the case that one can stipulate a decision procedure for whether or not to call an utterance a 'word' (e.g. it has to be in certain dictionaries), but a stipulated definition creates nothing. So, with the scription 'what does it mean', were you asking about distinguishing one scription from another? Or between two notions? Or two b sensesb ? (Or even two b referentsb .) I myself believe in consciousness as well as neural events, and I believe in material entities. Thus I can discern a difference - i.e. distinguish - between the scriptions 'Eiffel Tower' and 'Washington Monument', and between two notions that might come to mind when I read those two different scriptions, and between two different neural arrangements, and I believe there is also a difference between two particular different physical objects in the external world. But as soon as I say that, I realize still further complications arise when I consider that all notion is indeterminate, indefinite, multiplex and transitory. It's silly of me to claim I have b ab notion of the Eiffel Tower, or Abraham Lincoln, or tragedy or cancer or, indeed, of anything. And add: so are all material objects IIMT. E.g. my notion of that Tower varies, and so does the rusting physical object in Paris. Thus, while I might be ready to say the rusting physical Tower in Paris has ontic status as a material entity, and my fleeting notion of it has ontic status as a notional entity, I'd never say that what we often call b wordsb have any non-material, non-notional ontic status at all. Just as b artb does not. There is, I think you can sense (heh-heh!) much more that could be said about the potential confusion involved in b making the distinctionsb that you mention. I apologize if my use of double-quotes again comes through like this: b You, Cheerskep, are concerned about: the artist's commentary on his own work in progress.b As I recall, Databank's format-system used to be able handle double-quotes easily.
