I have been taken to task for driving myself "deep into the woods by confused ontological questions about making distinctions". "Even the word 'distinction' is potentially confusing."
But why would such confusion be absent when Cheerskep later tells us that "unexplained rewriting of a work is different from issuing non-fiction statements of the intent/'meaning' of a work" Is it somehow less confusing to say "x is different from Y" instead of "x can be distinguished from y" ? Or is it just that Cheerskep allows that only his own speech should be considered "serviceable", and therefore free from the ontological confusion of which everyone else is culpable. The problem with Cheerskep's obsession with "meaning" is that it obliterates whatever topic is under discussion. Even if "There is, in the end, no THE "meaning" of any work of art" -- still, important non-fictional issues can be involved, the discussion of them can be useful, and the consideration of such issues need not diminish the joy of the experience. In what circumstances, exactly, is author commentary harmful? Cheerskep's obsession prohibits him from addressing this question. And what kind of questions can he address, anyway ? For him, all non-fictional literature in the humanities is so hopelessly compromised by issues of meaning, that none of it is worth reading.(even that Peter Kivy's book that once seemed so promising) Cheerskep's only contribution to any discussion, other than personal reminiscence, is his grim reminder that "a fog is moving in" So, we should probably be grateful that he usually chooses not to participate. ................ the following are B-free versions of recent posts .................... When a work is creative, made-up, rinsing out the ambiguities and multiple possible interpretations is often the wrong thing to do. Its effect is to dilute and to falsify. For me, the value of a play -- or movie, opera, symphony, dance -- is in the multi-rung ladder itself, the story and its effects at each rung, including the view from the top. In other words, it's not only unwise for the writer to try to xplain his works; it entails a falsehood by assuming that what the creator had in mind is somehow "THE meaning" There is, in the end, no THE "meaning" of any work of art. ................ There is your author's commentary in the form of an entire reinventing the work. -But such unexplained rewriting of a work is different from issuing non-fiction statements of the intent/'meaning' of a work. ................. --Chris drives himself deep into the woods by confused ontological questions about making distinctions. Your question there should not be considered a query about an ontic category: Is the development a member of the class of all critical commentaries? Okay, so would I call it c.c., do I think of it as c.c. Sometimes. There are changes prompted by a writer's conviction that he just made a mistake of one kind or another. That can be thought of as c.c. Other changes offer themselves because the writer's interests have evolved, or history has made a passage irrelevant or obscure. Revivals of fifty year old plays often change allusions to current events back then. I myself wouldn't call that critical commentary. --Aw, shoot, Michael, I thought I took a useful shot at giving a number of reasons why I think there will be greater joy in this world if authors issued less commentary on their own works. I said: When a work is creative, made-up, rinsing out the ambiguities and multiple possible interpretations is often the wrong thing to do. Its effect is to dilute and to falsify. Consider the young student who reads Othello and is told that Shakespeare stated, its meaning is that jealousy is bad ---I repeat that I wouldn't burn a newly found Shakespeare explication of HAMLET (which, I've conveyed, I'm fairly sure he'd never write), and I know I'd find it interesting, but in the end I fear it would restrict my joy in that play. .......................... Look carefully, and you'll notice that nothing I said denies this. This whole subject is immensely complicated, with all kinds of subtle differences between notions. But two distinct notions does not entail there must be two distinct non-notional entities, especially if one of them is alleged to be a category/class/set . Remember, this was Michael's question: b Does the development of themes and motifs as the series progresses constitute a critical commentary by the artist?b To which I charged:Your question there should not be considered a query about an ontic category: Is the development a member of the class of all critical commentaries? Okay, so would I call it c.c., do I think of it as c.c.? Sometimes. What you wrote (above) was in response to my saying: Chris drives himself deep into the woods by confused ontological questions about making distinctions And what THAT was responding to was your earlier queries: Can we distinguish the experience of a drama (as we are watching it) from the subsequent reflections upon it? Can we distinguish "what does it mean?" from "what does it mean regarding the question of XXX?" And can we distinguish between what the author intends while producing the work, from what he says he intended in a conversation after the work was completed? I make all three of those distinctions. Anyone would have distinctions arising in his mind as he ponders your lines. But ask: distinctions between what? Notions? Yes. Material entities? Sometimes. Non-material, non-notional entities? For example? Even the word 'distinction' is potentially confusing. Sometimes the notion behind it is difference. But a difference conveys something static. At other times, a distinction conveys a non-static action, discerning the difference. A further complication arises between dualists - those who believe that consciousness is a non-material entity - and materialists - those who believe that what we think of as consciousness -- notion, feeling, images, ideas is identical with the material neurons in our brains. Yet another complication comes up when the speaker cites a distinction between non-existent non-notional entities. Suppose I asked, Can we distinguish between an angel and an archangel?b Well, we might accept that we can distinguish between our NOTIONS of those two. But suppose the speaker gets indignant, No, no - I mean can you grasp the difference between those non-notional entities, an angel and an archangel? Can you feel a fog moving in? When you ask, Can we distinguish "what does it mean?" from "what does it mean regarding the question of XXX?" I claim that confusion like an enwrapping python is squeezing the usefulness out of the question. Are you talking about the notions there? Or do you feel there is some non-notional entity that is its meaning and another non-notional entity that is Its meaning regarding the question of XXX? Frege et al apparently have believed that meanings i.e. a word's sense and its referent - are non-notional entities independent of minds. And indeed so is each word. Frege evidently would say there are two kinds of utterances and scriptions: those that have a sense, and those that don't. The ones that do are words (not merely to be CALLED - they ARE words.) Frege did not address such annoying queries as, All the utterances that were once familiar in a now dead language that no one can translate - are those utterance-sounds still words? There are utterances and scriptions that, when heard or read, will occasion in the minds of many contemplators similar notions. This is not because the utterance has an entity, and the entity is a meaning. It's merely because masses of people are exposed to similar associating experience - i.e. a notion is regularly juxtaposed with a given sound or sight (including, often, gestures etc.).
